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ABSTRACT
THE EMPORER’S NEW CLOTHES:
HOW THE NEW ATHEISTS ARE REMINDING THE HUMANITIES
OF THEIR PLACE AND PURPOSE IN SOCIETY
David Ira Buckner
November 9, 2018
This dissertation will examine the social and intellectual impact of the so-called “New
Atheism” as evidenced by the writings and public careers of its four principal protagonists:
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, philosopher Daniel Dennett, journalist Christopher
Hitchens, and neuroscientist Sam Harris. I will argue that the New Atheists together provide
an account of reality philosophically superior to that of theism, including those superficially
sophisticated variations espoused in the writings of scholars William Lane Craig, John
Lennox, Allister McGrath, Alvin Plantinga, etc. Yet, even if this were not so, I would still
contend that the accessible, informative, and provocative style of the New Atheists’ prose
nevertheless epitomizes precisely what academic writing could and should be. Their
commitment to the Enlightenment principles of philosophical objectivity, reason, and the
successes of the scientific method stands in stark contrast not only to the more malleable
methodology of their religious opponents, but also to the prevailing (and ideologicallyconflicting) traditions of deconstructive postmodernism and post-structuralism (as
exemplified in the works of Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jacques
Lacan, and others) which have greatly influenced humanities’ scholarship in recent decades.

v

Therefore, while I very much intend to defend the substance of the New Atheists’
arguments against the various objections of their philosophical, religious, and scientific
critics, I simultaneously mean to defend their stylistic choices as well (not only against their
critics but also as compared to the obscurant, equivocal, and highly subjective style so often
employed by postmodernists). It is my fervent hope that even those who should ultimately
disagree with either the New Atheists’ assertions or my defense of them will still be able to
see the value of their (and hopefully my) clear, concise brand of communication. For theirs is
a style no longer widely employed within the confines of the academy. That said, I believe
that the humanities disciplines of history, literary theory, cultural studies, and philosophy
would greatly benefit, were they to adopt (or perhaps re-embrace) the communicative model
and underlying realist epistemology of the New Atheists.
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INTRODUCTION: A SWAN SONG AND A SIREN CALL

In order to better situate and communicate my work to as wide an audience as
possible, I have chosen to employ a frame tale of sorts upon which the various folds of
my argument might be better supported and thus more fully unfurled. Not simply an
eponymous reference, my reason(s) for repurposing this children’s narrative into a
literary device will, I trust, be made clear in the pages that follow.
So off went the Emperor in procession under his splendid canopy.
Everyone in the streets and the windows said, “Oh, how fine are the
Emperor’s new clothes! Don’t they fit him to perfection? And see his long
train!” Nobody would confess that he couldn’t see anything, for that
would prove him either unfit for his position, or a fool. No costume the
Emperor had worn before was ever such a complete success.
“But he hasn’t got anything on,” a little child said.
“Did you ever hear such innocent prattle?” said its father. And one
person whispered to another what the child had said, “He hasn’t anything
on. A child says he hasn’t anything on.”
“But he hasn’t got anything on!” the whole town cried out at last.
The Emperor shivered, for he suspected they were right. But he thought,
“This procession has got to go on.” So he walked more proudly than ever,
as his noblemen held high the train that wasn’t there at all.1
Undoubtedly one of the most widely recognized stories in all of Western
literature, Hans Christian Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes” has been translated

1

Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” trans. Jean Hersholt, The Hans
Christian Andersen Centre, 11 August 2015, accessed 25 May 2016, http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/
vaerk/hersholt/TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html.
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into more than one hundred languages,2 set to stage or screen on no fewer than twelve
occasions, and served as the inspirational springboard to numerous other artistic
enterprises and literary endeavors.3 Its basic plot and premise are so well-known to
Western audiences that even a brief summarization would likely prove superfluous in
explaining my decision to co-opt its title (and moral) to my own present purposes. In fact,
its very mention has become synonymous with a critique of pluralistic ignorance and the
perils such thinking engenders.4 Such is my intention. However, what is less widely
known is that Andersen’s now iconic last paragraph was not part of the original text.
Jackie Wullschlager explains, “Andersen’s simple, classical tale only acquired its
punch line at the last moment. The manuscript ends with everyone simply admiring the
clothes; when it was already at the printer’s, Andersen hit on the now famous ending of
the small child announcing, ‘But he doesn’t have anything on!’ He sent a new last
paragraph to the printer, asking for its insertion, ‘as it will give everything a more
satirical appearance.’”5 This late addition is of great significance, both for Andersen’s
intended audience as well as for my own. For had he chosen to omit this revision, and
simply allowed the charade to continue unchecked and unchallenged, satire is not all that

2

Hans Christian Andersen, Fairy Tales, ed. Jackie Wullschlager, trans. Tiina Nunnally (New
York: Viking, 2005), 4.
3
Heidi Ann Heiner, “Modern Interpretations of the Emperor’s New Clothes,”
SurLaLunefairytales.com, January 2005, accessed 25 May 2016,
http://www.surlalunefairytales.com/emperorclothes/themes.html.
4
According to Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller, “Pluralistic ignorance is a psychological state
characterized by the belief that one's private attitudes and judgments are different from those of others,
even though one's public behavior is identical…. If participants understood this state of affairs, the situation
would be self-correcting. However, they typically make the mistake of assuming that even though others
are acting similarly, they [themselves] are feeling differently. Their own behavior may be driven by social
pressure, but they assume that other people's identical behavior is an accurate reflection of their true
feelings.” “Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the
Social Norm,” The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 64, No. 2 (1993): 244.
5
Wullschlager, in Andersen’s Fairy Tales, 427.
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might have perished from his tale; hopefulness and a sense of individual agency may
have been lost to it as well.6
At the time of Andersen’s composition (1837), Romanticism was at its creative
and intellectual peak, and the Romantics had long considered children to be founts of
wisdom and purity in an otherwise capricious and corruptible world. This would hardly
have been lost on an author of fairy tales. What’s more, his affinity for (and subsequent
acquaintance with) Charles Dickens and the socially conscious work he was then
producing (The Adventures of Oliver Twist, The Life and Adventures of Nicholas
Nickleby) could well have nurtured Andersen’s underlying sensibilities concerning the
plight and promise of youth in the wake of inhumane industrialization. So when
considered from both a cultural and personal perspective, Andersen’s last-minute
decision seems both bitingly satirical and sincerely hopeful. After all, had the child
remained silent or been omitted from the story altogether, then widespread feelings of
futility and resignation toward the artifices and inequities of life would have been a much
more reasonable response; such is, indeed, the way of the world. But because of the
courage and conviction of one small voice unburdened by the grownup concerns of social
acceptance or economic security, many others soon rediscovered what they had
inadvertently lost somewhere along the way. Passive acceptance of the status quo no
longer seemed one’s only option. People instead began to realize that one person, no
matter how small or seemingly insignificant, can change the course of history. And that is
certainly cause for optimism.

6

This notion is supported by the fact that Andersen knew this story through a German translation
“So ist der Lauf der Welt” (“Such Is the Way of the World”), in Eduard von Bülow’s Das Novellenbuch,
Vol. 4, No. 3 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1836), 40-44.

3

My hopes for this project are at once as small as those of that innocent, young
child and as vast as those of the incisive author who chose to include her in his tale. I
simply want to say what is, and in so doing, I hope to change the world (or, at the very
least, my own small corner of it). For my principal subject, I have chosen the
(anti)religious writings and professional careers of four individuals whom I believe
embody the same sense of childlike courage and conviction, coupled with a steadfast
willingness to speak truth to power and tradition, no matter what it costs them.
Alternatively dubbed “The Four Horsemen of the New Atheism,” and “The Four
Horsemen of the (Non)Apocalypse,” evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins,
philosopher Daniel Dennett, neuroscientist Sam Harris, and (the late) journalist
Christopher Hitchens have, for over a decade now, dedicated themselves to challenging
some of the pretenses and presumptions of organized religion (as well as the presumed
existence of the various deities upon which it, in all its innumerable forms, was originally
established). In doing so, they have disputed and disillusioned many members of the
faithful, but perhaps more surprisingly, they have also earned the ire and disparagement
of a great many of their professional colleagues, as well as those ostensibly impartial (i.e.
agnostic) readers, for both the candor of their remarks and the simplicity and
straightforwardness with which they offer them. While the former response is not
altogether unexpected, motivations for the latter are less obvious and thus in need of
further explanation.
I would contend that such opposition to the so-called New Atheism can be
comfortably housed within one of three possible camps. To continue with my previous
analogy, I would liken these groups to the knowingly fraudulent tailors, the cravenly
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complicit aristocracy, and the unsuspecting populace of Mr. Andersen’s tale. To the
tailors, I would equate those specific philosophers and scientists who have so distorted
their disciplines and twisted their logic so as to lend support for a position that they
(should) know to be, by definition, both philosophically and scientifically indefensible. I
believe it is these individuals who must shoulder the lion’s share of the burden for our
current state of affairs. After all, it is they who have literally and figuratively spun their
yarns in order to deliberately enwrap their unwary victims. (Incredibly, some even
practice their pseudointellectual sleight-of-hand so long and so well that they forget their
initially deceitful intentions and are themselves eventually ensnared by the tricks of their
own duplicitous trade.) To the accommodating aristocracy, I would liken those
subsequent so-called academics, ecclesiastics, and would-be representatives of the
populace who, while always remaining privately unconvinced of their forerunners’
theories and conclusions, nevertheless publicly declare their adherence and support for
them for fear of what outright obstinacy or objection might cost them. (This group is
particularly difficult to dissuade, as their station, power, and privilege are often largely
predicated, from both above and below, upon their acceptance and transmission of the
perceived status quo.) My third comparison is far more obvious; the unsuspecting
populace represents precisely that: those individuals only peripherally acquainted with
the subject in question. Although their unfamiliarity and relative inexperience leaves
them most vulnerable to misinformation and specious logic, this segment of the public is
also (and for those very same reasons) most open to thoughtful discussion and spirited
debate, and, as a consequence, freest to follow where evidence and argument leads them.
For unlike the previous two categories, the general population has, for the most part, only

5

passively and unwittingly conspired in the machinations of their so-called superiors; they
have simply never invested (or been asked to invest) the same level of personal attention
and self-serving calculation as their “expert” counterparts. And while they have been
traditionally led to believe that they have much to gain from maintaining this societal
status quo (divine love, communal acceptance, eternal life, etc.), in reality, the public can
be easily shown that should they ever acquire the knowledge and muster the collective
will to overcome it, they, like the proletariat in Marx’ manifesto, “have nothing to lose
but their chains. They have a world to win.”7
I believe it is for this reason that the ironically-named “Four Horsemen,” like the
child from Andersen’s fable, have chosen to address themselves primarily to the
population at large. In much the same way that successful revolutionary movements have
historically realized that social, political, and/or economic change can only be achieved
and sustained with the express, informed consent of the people, Dawkins, Dennett,
Harris, and Hitchens have time and again bypassed the dry, dusty colloquiums of
academia and instead taken their cases directly to a general audience. In addition to their
easily accessible prose and comprehensible logic, they have chosen to employ both
traditional and social media platforms to spread their scientifically conscious, socially
inclusive message to as wide an audience as possible. Not wishing to exclude the
academic community (of which they themselves are/were a part), but simply to force
them from their ivory towers and their often circuitous style, the New Atheists have also
engaged in a significant number of public debates and roundtable discussions with their
philosophical, religious, and scientific adversaries in lecture halls and university
7

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party, IV: Position of the
Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties,” Marxists Internet Archive, 2010,
accessed 19 October 2017, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf.
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auditoriums throughout Europe and North America.8 After all, such conversations stand
to accomplish very little for very few if they are only ever held behind closed doors.
For their democratizing efforts, the New Atheists and their arguments have been
frequently maligned as unsophisticated, unconvincing, and ultimately undeserving of
serious academic scrutiny or public consideration. Of course, these facile attacks most
often originate from those among the aforementioned tailor and aristocratic camps, whose
own interests are hardly served by the continued presence and biting critiques of these
societal gadflies. Consequently, their critics are forced to inhabit a sort of oppositional
limbo, in which they can neither accept nor directly challenge the validity of the New
Atheists’ claims, for to do either might be construed as having lent support to the ways
and means by which the New Atheists seek to advance them. That, in and of itself, would
almost certainly spell inevitable defeat. (For when clothed in invisible garments, what can
one hope to gain with talk of possible alterations?) Rather, the opposition must seek to
deride and dismiss them as either artless or tactless (or both), and in so doing, discourage
those they mean to prevent from opening their eyes to the undeniable truth: the emperor
is naked… what’s more, he always has been. Though my charge of duplicitousness may
appear unduly conspiratorial in nature, one must remember that such behavior is not
without historical precedent. As Edward Gibbon once put it, when describing the
religiosity of the old Roman state:

8

The majority of these events have been either televised or streamed live on the Internet. Excerpts
from five such debates have been transcribed and included in the appendix. Special attention will be paid to
those involving academics William Lane Craig, John Lennox, Allister McGrath, and Alvin Plantinga. Upon
examination, one will discover that, despite their collective attempts to promote more scientifically
supportable explanations or plausible philosophical defenses of their faith, opponents of the New Atheists
are invariably forced to concede (either explicitly or de facto) that such arguments are themselves are faithbased. The circularity (and, I would argue, self-defeating nature) of such a presuppositional strategy should
become increasingly apparent as one moves through the debates.

7

The policy of the emperors and the senate, as far as it concerned religion, was
happily seconded by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the
superstitious, part of their subjects. The various modes of worship which
prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true;
by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful. And
thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious concord.9
This unfortunate situation can, in many ways, be considered a microcosm of what
is happening today in the humanities as a whole. Since the advent of postmodernism in
the mid to late twentieth century, the humanities have been metaphorically clothing
themselves in increasingly sumptuous and sophisticated, albeit immaterial, garb. This is
arguably because postmodernism is itself a reaction against the presumed certainty of
scientific (or other ostensibly objective) efforts to explain reality that is foundational to
the so-called modernist period that preceded it. In this highly subjective, pluralistic, and
yet exceedingly individualistic environment, their writings and conversations, one to
another, have begun to resemble those between the first two groups I outlined in
Andersen’s cautionary tale.10 There are some, though I would hazard the percentage to be
quite small, who genuinely believe in the product they’re peddling. There are many more
who consider their individual status and professional wellbeing to be entirely dependent
upon the perceived stability of its general market value, and thus “go along to get along”
in an arrangement they consider to be immutable, regardless of its relation to reality. And
there are more still, who either as a result of obliviousness or indifference, have never
9

Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol 1 (New York:
Fred de Fau and Company, 1906), 35-36.
10
This is made not only possible but inevitable by postmodernism’s (particularly deconstructive
postmodernism’s) core rejection of the existence of an objective, universally-applicable reality. This,
coupled with deconstructionism’s insistence upon the equivocality of meaning in the use of language, has
resulted in unavoidably-ambiguous prose that necessitates a multiplicity of perspectives on almost every
subject. If, for example, my perception of reality contains within its purview an invisible royal garment,
there can be no objective means to disprove its existence. Consequently, any outside or counterintuitive
perspective must be regarded with at least as much conviction and respect as one’s own, and so previously
absurd conversations concerning the necessary materials, requisite costs, sartorial elegance, etc., of such a
garment are not only allowed but required to continue unimpeded.
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bothered to question the validity of the present economic system, not to mention the
creeds and credentials of the artificers, merchants, and moneymen who established and
ensconced it in the first place. It is to this last group that the present work is primarily
addressed. Just as the New Atheists are redefining the norms of scholarly disputation and
public discourse within the sphere of religion, I hope to inspire a similar paradigm shift
within the humanities at large… a return to the socially conscious and/or activist roots of
our own once great discipline.
After all, we in the humanities are not curing cancer, inventing new technologies,
or plumbing the depths of the observable universe. This is not to say that we have nothing
to contribute with regard to these developments, but only that our work is unlikely to be
driving the advances themselves. Rather, it is our task to inquire, understand, and relate
these enterprises to our fellow human beings… to help us to ask the right questions, to
weigh and appreciate the consequences of our actions, to anticipate future needs and
dilemmas in light of our current efforts, and so on. In other words, our subject is
humanity itself, and yet somehow our discourse with our fellow human beings has been
allowed to regress from a once mutually beneficial conversation among members of a
shared social, intellectual, and linguistic community to a dolefully tone-deaf inner
monologue to which only we are now privileged (or subjected, as the case may be). As a
result, this siren call of sorts is, in fact, a plea to my fellow academics to broaden their
collective horizons and the scope of their scholarship… to once again enter into the
forum of public discourse in order to make both ours and our colleagues’ works
accessible (and thus relevant) again. This, too, is not without certain perils – to ourselves,

9

our positions, and our society – but I believe that the potential benefits far outweigh the
dangers.
In the first half of each of the first four chapters of this work, I will present the
central arguments of the New Atheists, as set forth in their respective books on the
subject. Although each is making a similar case for the abandonment of traditional
religious belief and the embrace of a more secular, humanistic worldview, there are
subtle differences in their styles and perspectives. To begin, I will simply attempt to
present my protagonists’ primary arguments, in succession, without extensive
commentary or critique. Although one may question the usefulness of such extensive
summarization, my motivation to do so comes from one of the New Atheists’ own critics,
Gregory Peterson, who cautions that “for most religion-and-science scholars, the likely
action will be to read the reviews, perhaps listen to an interview or two on public radio,
and then go on with one’s life and research, secure in the knowledge that much of what
these books contain is not sophisticated enough to bother with… But… these books have
something to say.”11 Wishing to avoid this sort of superficial familiarity and shallow
erudition, and because I expressly want the reader to grasp both the style and substance
of the New Atheists’ arguments, I believe it is necessary to allow the authors to speak for
themselves when and wherever possible, relying upon direct quotation at least as often as
upon my own ability to sufficiently synthesize their collective ideas and perspectives. I
will employ a similar methodology in the opening half of Chapter Five, when discussing
the various foundational and supplemental authors and texts of postmodernism.12 My

11

Gregory R. Peterson, “Why the New Atheism Shouldn’t Be (Completely) Dismissed,” Zygon
Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2007): 803.
12
In short, my methodology will be to paraphrase when possible, to summarize when necessary,
and to quote when essential.
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hope is that this will create a sort of natural juxtaposition in which the conflicting styles
and varying degrees of substance between the two groups is made all the more manifest
and unmistakable.
My first chapter, “God, the Devil, and Dawkins: The God Delusion and its
Critics,” will examine the basic premise of Richard Dawkins’ text, which primarily
employs Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection as a means of countering
religion’s more traditional creationist and/or intelligent design explanations for how both
the world and humanity came to be. I believe the scaffolding of Dawkins’ book will serve
both to contextualize and to buttress many of the arguments in Daniel Dennett’s Breaking
the Spell [both written in 2006], which likewise employs Darwinian science, but this time
principally as a means of exploring the evolution of religious belief itself. In his opening
chapter, Dennett explains precisely how and why he considers religion to be a distinctly
natural (i.e. not supernatural) enterprise. “[It] is a human phenomenon composed of
events, organisms, structures, patterns, and the like that all obey the laws of physics or
biology… it could be true that God exists, that God is indeed the intelligent, conscious,
loving creator of us all, and yet still religion itself, as a complex set of phenomena, is a
perfectly natural phenomenon.”13 This observation and ensuing argument will be the
primary focus of Chapter Two, “Breaking the Spell: Dennett and his Discontents.”
In Chapter Three, “A Real Life Devil’s Advocate: The Conscientious
Contrarianism of Christopher Hitchens,” I will turn my attention to Hitchens’ 2007 god is
not Great which (like Sam Harris’ 2004 The End of Faith) is much more attuned to the
historical and sociological realities of organized religion, primarily with an eye (or ear)

13

Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin,

2006), 25.
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toward establishing both a dialogue and a dichotomy between faith and reason. (My
analysis of Harris’ book is the subject of Chapter Four: “Superseding the Supernatural:
Sam Harris and The End of Faith.”) In this respect, the primary difference between Harris
and Hitchens lies not in their tenor but in their temporality. While there is considerable
overlap between them, Hitchens’ book more frequently looks backward as a means of
understanding the present, whereas Harris’ book focuses far more on the present as a
means of glimpsing (and hopefully affecting) the future. Thus while complementing the
largely scientific and chronologically expansive treatises of Dawkins and Dennett,
Hitchens’ and Harris’ books likewise serve to ground them in the everyday lives and
geopolitical realities of our increasingly interconnected world. Once complete, it is my
hope that the reader will have recognized that though few of the New Atheists’ arguments
may be wholly original or absolute, their forthright treatment of religion and their
jarringly candid tone toward the faithful are, in many ways, novel and refreshing…
perhaps purposely more provocative, but most assuredly more accessible (and thus
relevant) to the average reader as well.
Once the New Atheists’ arguments have been sufficiently outlined, I will turn my
attention to the numerous rebuffs and rebuttals that have been leveled against them.
Wishing to cast as wide a net as possible in my research (and to avoid the charge of
cherry-picking and/or scapegoating my examples), I scoured not only academic
publications but also public periodicals and mass media platforms. The resultant writers,
debaters, panelists, and interviewees included in this volume comprise a veritable crosssection of university academics, independent (though legitimately credentialed) scholars,
and other generally recognized experts in their respective fields, whose works singularly

12

and collectively embody the most tangible, hard-hitting critiques I have yet encountered.
(These will be subdivided by author and relegated to the second half of each of the
aforementioned chapters.)14
Although ample space will be allocated for dozens of specific religious,
philosophical, and scientific critiques, my hope is not only to challenge them
individually, but also to demonstrate the existence of a common theme that runs
throughout the various accounts… specifically the suggestion that the New Atheists’
arguments are largely unsophisticated and frequently waged against mere straw men
which they themselves have constructed.15 I intend to demonstrate that this is incorrect,
and that their approach reveals not an inadvertent weakness, but rather a deliberate
intention and strength. By and large, the New Atheists meet believers on their own
ground. They challenge the assumptions and widely-held beliefs of millions of the
faithful on the contents and contemporary implications of scripture, the unfortunate
realities of religious history, and the scientific advances that are every day rendering
more and more of their myths and appeals to tradition indefensible in the modern world.16

14

The reader will likely note the inordinate length and seemingly excessive number of quotations
contained within each of the above-mentioned sections. Although the critiques are presented at length and
en masse for the reasons previously listed (to ensure proper context and thus to avoid the charges of cherrypicking and/or of misrepresenting my examples), my efforts to be exhaustive in my research need not
necessarily result in the exhaustion of my audience. I remain convinced that whether examined
individually, collectively, or in more piecemeal fashion, the general thrust of my argument (that these
critiques strike glancing blows at best) remains intact and unanswered.
15
This, I will contend, is made obvious by their respective and collective failure(s) to pinpoint the
source of this supposed lack of sophistication or to demonstrate the speciousness of the “straw men” they
would so readily dismiss.
16
Since one of the aspects of New Atheists I admire most is their conscious and consistent attempt
to “meet believers on their own ground,” I will endeavor to extend that courtesy and practice to my
treatment of the New Atheists themselves as well as to their ideological critics (and compatriots).
Consequently, in my defense I intend to broach no arguments (nor employ any methodology or stratagem)
which are not themselves already present or specifically referenced in either the works of the New Atheists
or in the numerous rebuttals against them.
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Therefore, when members of the opposition begin to abandon such traditional
defenses (as indeed they almost invariably do) in favor of more semantic, scientific,
and/or philosophical critiques and counterproposals, I believe they are, in effect, proving
the New Atheists’ point and accomplishing their task for them.
To put it another way:
Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely
anything of their original sense. They give the name of “God” to some
vague abstraction which they have created for themselves; having done so
they can pose before all the world as deists, as believers of God, and they
can even boast that they have recognized a higher, purer concept of God,
notwithstanding that their God is now nothing more than an insubstantial
shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrines. Critics
persist in describing as ‘deeply religious’ anyone who admits to a sense of
man’s insignificance or impotence in the face of the universe, although
what constitutes the essence of the religious attitude is not this feeling but
only the next step after it, the reaction to it which seeks a remedy for it.
The man who goes no further, but humbly acquiesces in the small part
which human beings play in the great world – such a man is, on the
contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word.17
In other words, if in order to maintain legitimacy and logical cohesion in the face of
scientific and social progress, critics of the New Atheists must abandon and attempt to
replace many of the theological appeals to tradition and moral authority that once
constituted the heart of their arguments, then I would argue that it is they who are in fact
grasping at straws.
In my fifth and final chapter, “A Preliminary Postmortem on Postmodernism,” I
will attempt to demonstrate just how inaccessible, self-absorbed, and esoteric scholarship
in the humanities has become in recent decades. Although Alan Sokal and Jean
Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense will serve as my starting point, I do intend to allow the
ambiguities, peculiarities, and incoherencies of so-called foundational postmodern texts
17
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to speak for themselves as often as possible (sometimes with, but frequently without
comment). Within the context and/or critique of Sokal and Bricmont’s text, special
attention will be paid to the writings of the two Jacques (Lacan and Derrida), as well as
those of Luce Irigaray, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio, and Gilles Deleuze. However,
given my somewhat limited exposure to the aforementioned authors and wishing to avoid
the reciprocal charge of superficial familiarity with which Sokal and Bricmont frequently
accuse them in their own writings, I also intend to make use of some of the required
reading lists (and resultant responses) from a number of my own graduate seminars. This
should serve to establish that the “problems” Sokal and Bricmont expose in their
respective fields (mathematics and the natural sciences) exist within the humanities and
social sciences as well. These will include books, essays, and plays by postmodernist
authors such as Suzan-Lori Parks, Sylvia Winter, Rosi Braidotti, and Avtar Brah,
phenomenologists Daniel Zahavi, Shannon Vallor, and Alva Noë, as well as postcolonial
writer Frantz Fanon, with all of whom I am far better acquainted.18 My primary present
engagement with the works will be accomplished via an examination of my own previous
attempts to analyze, synthesize, and, on occasion, rebut them. That said, I will allow the
authors to speak for themselves when and wherever possible and in sufficient context
with which to consider my treatment of them. But aware of the limited usefulness of
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I am well aware of the tendency to confuse and/or conflate postmodernism and postcolonialism. However, my interest in them both (as well as with phenomenology, for that matter) is based
largely upon their collective inclination to deride, dismiss, or at the very least obscure the principles of the
Enlightenment and/or the Scientific Revolution, the former from within and the latter largely from without.
Therefore, I will attempt to confine my treatment of them to this predisposition alone (and not make the alltoo-common error of considering them as synonyms for the same phenomenon). This will, of course, be in
keeping with the spirit of the New Atheists’ various attacks on religion, which are themselves largely
underwritten by an affirmation in the existence of an objective, observable reality governed by natural laws,
a commitment to Enlightenment ideals (such as empiricism, rationality, equality, freedom, secularism, selfdetermination, tolerance, etc.), as well as to the principles established and advances wrought by utilization
of the scientific method.
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simply criticizing the status quo, I want to offer, as a means of closing the chapter, a few
examples of my own of the sort of accessible, interdisciplinary, and substantive writing
that I’d like to see more frequently and forcefully affirmed within our discipline. Though
dealing with seemingly disparate topics, these examples are, in fact, intended to serve as
a template of sorts for those in any number of sub-fields or specialized traditions within
the humanities who might agree with my identification of this wide-ranging problem as
well as with my proposed solution to combat it. My hope, like that referenced above
between the New Atheists and their critics, is that the contrast in both style and substance
between this sort of scholarship and that which it attempts to rebuke will become
increasingly more obvious as I progress, to the point where any concluding arguments or
commentary on my part would feel redundant. If I am successful, then maybe those of
similar dispositions (and in similarly tenuous situations) will feel emboldened to follow
suit, and perhaps the paradigm shift that the New Atheists have begun in the religious
realm can be harnessed and repurposed by humanities scholars in service of their own
honorable ends.
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CHAPTER ONE: GOD, THE DEVIL, AND DAWKINS: THE GOD DELUSION AND
ITS CRITICS
Introduction

As an ethologist and evolutionary biologist, almost the entirety of Richard
Dawkins’ professional career has been in some way indebted to the conceptual and
scientific work of Charles Darwin. In fact, Dawkins’ first publication, 1976’s The Selfish
Gene, is primarily a defense (and perchance an extension) of Darwin’s famous theory of
evolution by means of natural selection. In it, Dawkins endeavors to provide a genecentered account of evolution that satisfactorily reconciles Darwin’s work with that of
geneticist Gregor Mendel, and in so doing replaces (or at the very least expands upon) the
more organism and/or group-centered interpretations of the theory that had largely come
before it.
Dawkins’ seven subsequent books – from 1982’s The Extended Phenotype to
2004’s The Ancestor’s Tale – all dealt with exploring the intricacies and implications of
Darwin’s theory in as accessible, palatable, and profitable a manner as his talents
permitted. It is for this reason that many critics consider his 2008 The God Delusion to be
a deliberate departure from the scientifically-centered focus of his previous work and thus
argue that, like Dante, Dawkins has inadvertently wandered into a dark wood through
which he is ill-prepared to traverse. To paraphrase the oft-repeated reproach: a scientist
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should stick to science and leave metaphysics and belief to the philosophers and the
faithful.
In this chapter, I aim to both contextualize this critique and to contest its illconsidered implications. After all, it was the work of Charles Darwin that first advanced a
successful challenge to the so-called teleological (or design) argument that had been
variously conceived, advanced, and defended by as motley a crew of intellectuals as the
ancient pagan philosopher Aristotle, the Golden Age Islamic theologian Al-Ghazali, the
medieval scholastic Thomas Aquinas, and (just seven years prior to Darwin’s birth) the
Anglican clergyman William Paley. That Dawkins would decide to consider the
ramifications of Darwin’s theory on this, the last bastion of socially-acceptable creationist
thought, thus seems less a deviation from his professional journey and more like its most
logical and long-intended destination. The fact that he was so skillfully able to navigate
this admittedly treacherous terrain, all the while leaving intellectual breadcrumbs
substantial enough for the rest of us to follow, is both a tribute to his wit and a nod to the
position he held from 1995 until his retirement in 2008: the University of Oxford's
Professor for the Public Understanding of Science. Consequently, I consider what follows
to be the culmination of a career (not its ruination), and, in many ways, Professor
Dawkins’ most significant cultural contribution to date.

The same high mental faculties which first led man to believe in unseen spiritual
agencies, then in fetishism, polytheism, and ultimately in monotheism, would infallibly
lead him, as long as his reasoning powers remained poorly developed, to various strange
superstitions and customs. Many of these are terrible to think of – such as the sacrifice of
human beings to a bloodloving god; the trial of innocent persons by the ordeal of poison
or fire; witchcraft, etc. – yet it is well occasionally to reflect on these superstitions, for
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they shew us what an infinite debt of gratitude we owe to the improvement of our reason,
to science, and to our accumulated knowledge.19
Part I: The God Delusion

In the preface to The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins outlines his basic purpose
in writing the book. “It is intended to raise consciousness – raise consciousness to the fact
that to be an atheist is a realistic aspiration, and a brave and splendid one. You can be an
atheist who is happy, balanced, moral, and intellectually fulfilled. That is the first of my
consciousness-raising messages.”20 He goes on to list three additional consciousnessraisers that he believes will collectively serve to demonstrate to the reader “why there
almost certainly is no God.”21
The first of these (second overall) has long been the primary focus of Dawkins’
professional life: explaining and defending the intricacies of Darwin’s theory of evolution
by natural selection. His impetus this time is as a means of countering the creationist and
intelligent design dogmas that have so vehemently taken hold in both the popular
imaginations and educational curriculums of many Western nations, the United States in
particular. As he explains:
Far from pointing to a designer, the illusion of design in the living world is
explained with far greater economy and with devastating elegance by
Darwinian natural selection. And, while natural selection itself is limited
to explaining the living world, it raises our consciousness to the likelihood
of comparable explanatory ‘cranes’ that may aid our understanding of the
cosmos itself.22
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Dawkins’ next consciousness-raiser revolves around (what he considers to be) the
deplorable practice of childhood religious indoctrination, in which most if not all of the
world’s major faiths engage. He strongly dissents: “I shall not apologize for mentioning it
here in the Preface as well as in Chapter 9. You can’t say it too often. I’ll say it again.
That is not a Muslim child, but a child of Muslim parents. That child is too young to
know whether it is a Muslim or not. There is no such thing as a Muslim child. There is no
such thing as a Christian child.”23 His suggestion for countering the effects of such
indoctrination is to demonstrate “how a proper understanding of the magnificence of the
real world, while never becoming a religion, can fill the inspiration role that religion has
historically – and inadequately – usurped.”24
His fourth, and final, conscious-raiser Dawkins describes as atheist pride. This he
relates to the American gay pride movement of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. He
argues that, like the number of gay individuals, the percentage of atheists and agnostics in
American society has always been considerably higher than is generally acknowledged or
has been historically recorded. The problem in confirming this reality is that “the very
word ‘atheist’ has been assiduously built up as a terrible and frightening label.”25 (Here,
one is reminded of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s incredulous 2007
comment, “In Iran, we don’t have homosexuals like in your country.”)26 To counter this
prevailing and assailing notion, Dawkins believes that a general atheistic “coming-out-ofthe-closet” must occur. Of course, this push towards a national social and political
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movement is not without its obstacles, but Dawkins maintains that it is a requisite first
step.
Organizing atheists has been compared to herding cats, because they tend
to think independently and will not conform to authority. But a good first
step would be to build up a critical mass of those willing to ‘come out,’
thereby encouraging others to do so. Even if they can’t be herded, cats in
sufficient numbers can make a lot of noise and they cannot be ignored.
To encourage those already inclined to do so, Dawkins closes by admitting that he hopes
to add to their ranks. “If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be
atheists when they put it down.”27 We shall see.
In Chapter One, “A Deeply Religious Non-Believer,” Dawkins attempts to
distinguish between those scientists (such as Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking) who
sometimes metaphorically reference “God” in their respective works, from those
individuals who adamantly insist that such allusions ostensibly imply deeply-held
religious conviction. As Dawkins asserts, “a quasi-mystical response to nature and the
universe is common among scientists and rationalists. It has no connection with
supernatural belief.”28 Noting that the religious have long attempted to co-opt and claim
such eminent scientists and thinkers as among their own, Dawkins offers a way to avoid
such predicaments in future. First, he attempts to explain, by means of a clarifying
definition, how an atheist (such as Hawking revealed himself to be in 2014)29 might still
be defended in utilizing such awe-inspired language without its progressing past the point
of no rational return. “An atheist… is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the
natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the
27
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observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles – except in the sense
of natural phenomena that we don’t yet understand.”30 For this sort of mysticism and
sense of wonder toward the unknown, Dawkins has both a respect and an affinity. That
said, it is a linguistic practice that he would like to see go the way of the horse and buggy.
I wish that physicists would refrain from using the word God in their
special metaphorical sense. The metaphorical or pantheistic God of the
physicists is light years away from the interventionist, miracle-wreaking,
thought-reading, sin-punishing, prayer-answering God of the Bible, of
priests, mullahs, and rabbis, and of ordinary language. Deliberately to
confuse the two is, in my opinion, an act of intellectual high treason.31
What he has far less patience and understanding for is the “widespread
assumption, which nearly everybody in our society accepts – the non-religious included –
… that religious faith is especially vulnerable to offence and should be protected by an
abnormally thick wall of respect, in a different class from the respect that any human
being should pay to any other.”32 Dawkins demonstrates this assumption by way of two
examples: both partly historical and partly hypothetical. The first is as follows:
By far the easiest grounds for gaining conscientious objector status in
wartime are religious. You can be a brilliant moral philosopher with a
prize-winning doctoral thesis expounding the evils of war, and still be
given a hard time by a draft board evaluating your claim to be a
conscientious objector. Yet if you can say that one or both of your parents
is a Quaker you sail through like a breeze, no matter how inarticulate and
illiterate you may be on the theory of pacifism or, indeed, Quakerism
itself.33
The second is intended as a commentary on the real-life reactions to the issuing of fatwas
against the author Salman Rushdie for his 1989 novel The Satanic Verses and against
numerous cartoonists at the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten for their depictions (in
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2005) of the prophet Muhammad. Not so much shocked at the religious tendency to take
offence, Dawkins is far more appalled by so many so-called liberals who, in the
immediate aftermath of each event, seemed eager to condemn not the religious incitement
to violence, but the simple expressions of free speech that preceded them.
If the advocates of apartheid had their wits about them they would claim –
for all I know truthfully – that allowing mixed races is against their
religion. A good part of the opposition would respectfully tip-toe away.
And it is no use claiming that this is an unfair parallel because apartheid
has no rational justification. The whole point of religious faith, its strength
and its chief glory, is that it does not depend on rational justification. The
rest of us are expected to defend our prejudices. But ask a religious person
to justify their faith and you infringe ‘religious liberty’.34
Dawkins concludes, “It is in the light of the unparalleled presumption of respect
for religion that I make my own disclaimer for this book. I shall not go out of my way to
offend, but nor shall I don kid gloves to handle religion any more gently than I would
handle anything else.”35
In Chapter Two, Dawkins argues that the existence of god (whether deistic or
theistic, simple creator or anthropomorphic interventionist) is, at its core, a scientific
hypothesis that can be tested… in principle, if not in practice. And though he dedicates
the opening few pages of the chapter to distinguishing between the various forms of
polytheism, monotheism, and the more ethical Eastern systems such as Buddhism and
Confucianism, he ultimately concedes that such distinctions are, for his purposes,
ultimately irrelevant. Anticipating the charge that his critique hones in on an antiquated
notion of God, Dawkins responds “I know you don’t believe in an old bearded man
sitting on a cloud, so let’s not waste any more time on that. I am not attacking any
particular version of God or gods. I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything
34
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supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented.”36 For example,
after going to reasonably great lengths to established the deistic leanings of most of
America’s founding fathers, Dawkins ultimately argues that though their creator god “is
certainly an improvement over the monster of the Bible… it is scarcely more likely that
he exists or ever did.”37
Dawkins then attempts to dismantle two popularly-held conventions that have
cropped up as a means of either defending the notion that God remains outside the
purview of science or of side-stepping the issue altogether: unconsidered, egalitarian
agnosticism and the late Stephen Jay Gould’s concept of “non-overlapping magisteria,”
hereafter referred to as NOMA. His critique of the former rests on the idea that any
proposition currently deemed unverifiable does not automatically enjoy an equal
probability of eventual confirmation or falsifiability. Though seemingly a sticking point
when it comes to religious conviction, Dawkins demonstrates the short-sightedness of
such objections. Referencing popular children’s beliefs as well as the work of Bertrand
Russell, Dawkins posits:
The fact that orbiting teapots and tooth fairies are undisprovable is not felt,
by any reasonable person, to be the kind of fact that settles any interesting
argument. None of us feels an obligation to disprove any of the far-fetched
things that a fertile or facetious imagination might dream up. I have found
it an amusing strategy, when asked whether I am an atheist, to point out
that the questioner is also an atheist when considering Zeus, Apollo,
Amon Ra, Mithras, Baal, Thor, Wotan, the Golden Calf and the Flying
Spaghetti Monster. I just go one god further.38
Where NOMA is concerned, Dawkins attempts to pinpoint the reason(s) why so
many of the religious and non-religious alike have so readily appealed to its tenet of
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mutual inapplicability. This, he argues, is less the consequence of the impossibility of
scientifically studying religious phenomena and more a result of the current paucity of
such efforts.
The presence or absence of a creative super-intelligence is unequivocally a
scientific question, even if it is not in practice – or not yet – a decided one.
So also is the truth or falsehood of every one of the miracle stories that
religions rely upon to impress multitudes of the faithful. Did Jesus have a
human father, or was his mother a virgin at the time of his birth? Whether
or not there is enough surviving evidence to decide it, this is still a strictly
scientific question with a definite answer in principle: yes or no. Did Jesus
raise Lazarus from the dead? Did he himself come alive again, three days
after being crucified? There is an answer to every such question, whether
or not we can discover it in practice, and it is a strictly scientific answer.
The methods we should use to settle the matter, in the unlikely event that
relevant evidence ever became available, would be purely and entirely
scientific methods. To dramatize the point, imagine, by some remarkable
set of circumstances, that forensic archaeologists unearthed DNA evidence
to show that Jesus really did lack a biological father. Can you imagine
religious apologists shrugging their shoulders and saying anything
remotely like the following? ‘Who cares? Scientific evidence is
completely irrelevant to theological questions. Wrong magisterium! We’re
concerned only with ultimate questions and with moral values. Neither
DNA nor any other scientific evidence could ever have any bearing on the
matter, one way or the other.’ The very idea is a joke. You can bet your
boots that the scientific evidence, if any were to turn up, would be seized
upon and trumpeted to the skies. NOMA is popular only because there is
no evidence to favour the God Hypothesis. The moment there was the
smallest suggestion of any evidence in favour of religious belief, religious
apologists would lose no time in throwing NOMA out of the window.39
In other words, Dawkins maintains that the validity of agnosticism and the adherence to
NOMA are current realities, not eternal ones. Just as science has advanced our
knowledge of other natural phenomena (disease, natural disasters, astronomical events,
etc.) to the point where supernatural explanations are neither required nor desired,
Dawkins remains confident that such scholarship shall someday illuminate the dark
depths of these and other religious mysteries as well. In the meantime, he bemusedly,
39
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though somewhat leadingly, asks “Why are scientists so cravenly respectful towards the
ambitions of theologians, over questions that theologians are certainly no more qualified
to answer than scientists themselves?”40 Dawkins is, in effect, reminding us that though
science may not yet be able to provide a completely plausible account, it does not
necessarily stand to reason that theology is either as close (or as far) from a likewise
satisfactory explanation. Simply put, uncertainty cannot be presumed to automatically
result in a dichotomous fifty-fifty proposition.
In Chapter Three, Dawkins attempts to refute some of the most common
arguments for God’s existence, from the metaphysical (St. Anselm’s Ontological
Argument, Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs, and Pascal’s Wager) to the material (the
arguments from beauty, scripture, and personal experience). With biting wit and succinct
precision (not all of it his), Dawkins rebukes Anselm’s argument by showing that “it
reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the
real world,” and then by subsequently noting the way(s) in which the Australian
philosopher Douglas Gasking once turned the entire argument on its head.41 I present his
contributions below:
1. The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement
imaginable.
2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic
quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
3. The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more
impressive the achievement.
4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be nonexistence.
5. Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an
existent creator we can conceive a greater being – namely, one
who created everything while not existing.
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6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which
a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable
and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
Ergo:
7. God does not exist.42
As Dawkins wryly remarks “Gasking didn’t really prove that God does not exist. By the
same token, Anselm didn’t prove that he does. The only difference is, Gasking was being
funny on purpose.”43 But lest one think that the intentional facetiousness of Gasking’s
parody is less than Anselm’s argument deserves, allow me to present an excerpt from
David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which two of the fictional
participants, first Cleanthes and then Philo, attempt to respond to Anselm’s claims (and
their companion Demea’s defense of them) with admittedly more substance, but all the
while with similar derision.
I shall not leave it to Philo, said Cleanthes, though I know that the starting
objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this
metaphysical reasoning….
I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in
pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments
a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a
contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a
contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as
non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is
demonstrable….
It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this
necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if
we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as
impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is
evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as
at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the nonexistence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever
lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in
the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice
42
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two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no
meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.
But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent
being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not
affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can
determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would
make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is
five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world
is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the
contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. “Any particle of
matter,” it is said, “may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may
be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is
not impossible.” But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the
same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any
conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be nonexistent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown,
inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear
impossible, or his attributes unalterable: and no reason can be assigned,
why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether
unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with
it….
Though the reasonings which you have urged, Cleanthes, may well excuse
me, said Philo, from starting any further difficulties… I shall venture to
add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been found very
convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have
accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from
mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through
obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same
habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other
people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always
some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to
explain distinctly where it lies; a certain truth that men ever did, and ever
will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of
reasoning.44
To return to Dawkins’ critique, the first three of Aquinas’ proofs Dawkins simply
criticizes as leading to an illogical and infinite regress. These arguments, respectively
known as the Unmoved Mover, the Uncaused Cause, and the Cosmological Argument,
Dawkins argues “rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They
44
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make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress.”45
The fourth proof, the Argument from Degree, Dawkins’ destroys with mere word
substitution. Traditionally, the argument states that since goodness exists to varying
degrees in various creatures, its maximum quantity (i.e. complete goodness) must reside
outside of said creatures. That perfectly good being we call God. Dawkins merely
suggests substituting the word smelliness for goodness, and immediately the logic begins
to break down. (The fifth proof, the Argument from Design, is the subject of Chapter
Four, so I will omit its implications for now.) Pascal’s Wager Dawkins is inherently
dismissive of because, as he notes, “there is something distinctly odd about the
argument… believing is not something you can decide to do as a matter of policy.”46
The more tangible arguments (from beauty, scripture, and personal experience), I
will present solely in the guise of Dawkins’ retorts. I believe this truncation will suffice
as a serviceable conclusion for the section while still allowing the reader ample
opportunity to grasp both the essence of each argument as well as the weight of the
author’s challenges.
From Beauty:
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Obviously Beethoven’s late quartets are sublime. So are
Shakespeare’s sonnets. They are sublime if God is there and they
are sublime if he isn’t. They do not prove the existence of God;
they prove the existence of Beethoven and of Shakespeare.47
From Scripture:
Robert Gillooly shows how all the essential features of the Jesus
legend, including the star in the east, the virgin birth, the
veneration of the baby by kings, the miracles, the execution, the
resurrection and the ascension are borrowed – every last one of
them – from other religions already in existence in the
Mediterranean and Near East region. [Tom] Flynn suggests that
Matthew’s desire to fulfil messianic prophecies (descent from
David, birth in Bethlehem) for the benefit of Jewish readers came
into headlong collision with Luke’s desire to adapt Christianity for
the Gentiles, and hence to press the familiar hot buttons of pagan
Hellenistic religions (virgin birth, worship by kings, etc.). The
resulting contradictions are glaring, but consistently overlooked by
the faithful…. Although Jesus probably existed, reputable biblical
scholars do not in general regard the New Testament (and
obviously not the Old Testament) as a reliable record of what
actually happened in history, and I shall not consider the Bible
further as evidence for any kind of deity.48
From Personal Experience:
Constructing models is something the human brain is very good at.
When we are asleep it is called dreaming; when we are awake we
call it imagination or, when it is exceptionally vivid, hallucination.
As Chapter 10 will show, children who have ‘imaginary friends’
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Ibid., 110. While the tendency to relativize sublimity (like beauty) to the point of existing solely
in the eye of the beholder is understandable, such ostensibly fair-minded sensibilities are quite problematic.
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sometimes see them clearly, exactly as if they were real.49 If we are
gullible, we don’t recognize hallucination or lucid dreaming for
what it is and we claim to have seen or heard a ghost; or an angel;
or God; or – especially if we happen to be young, female and
Catholic – the Virgin Mary.50 Such visions and manifestations are
certainly not good grounds for believing that ghosts or angels, gods
or virgins, are actually there.… That is really all that needs to be
said about personal ‘experiences’ of gods or other religious
phenomena. If you’ve had such an experience, you may well find
yourself believing firmly that it was real. But don’t expect the rest
of us to take your word for it, especially if we have the slightest
familiarity with the brain and its powerful workings.51
In Chapter Four, “Why There Almost Certainly is No God,” Dawkins states that
“the theory of natural selection is genuinely simple. So is the origin from which it starts.
That which it explains, on the other hand, is complex almost beyond telling: more
complex than anything we can imagine, save a God capable of designing it.”52 First, he
seeks to identify the most common objections; these he lists as the argument from
improbability, the argument from irreducible complexity, the God-of-the-Gaps
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hypothesis, and the anthropic principle. He then goes on to explain how Darwin’s theory
either effectively refutes or explains the rationale, and thus the appeal, behind each of
them.
As Dawkins admits at the onset of the chapter, “The argument from improbability
is the big one.”53 This, he believes, is because evolution is in some ways counterintuitive
to basic human understanding. He credits Daniel Dennett with pinpointing this
misconception. “‘The idea that it takes a big fancy smart thing to make a lesser thing. I
call that the trickle-down theory of creation. You’ll never see a spear making a spear
maker. You’ll never see a horse shoe making a blacksmith. You’ll never see a pot making
a potter.’ Darwin’s discovery of a workable process that does that very counterintuitive
thing is what makes his contribution to human thought so
revolutionary, and so loaded with the power to raise consciousness.”54 But just how
might this process occur? Dawkins begins by providing the basic framework of the
traditional argument against its feasibility. “The argument from improbability states that
complex things could not have come about by chance. But many people define ‘come
about by chance’ as a synonym for ‘come about in the absence of deliberate design.’ Not
surprisingly, therefore, they think improbability is evidence of design.”55 What one must
do as a result is explain the role (if any) that chance plays in the process.
Genetic mutations occur quite frequently and at all levels of life; these are random
in the truest sense of the word. However, whether or not those alterations are passed
down through each successive generation is not. Only those characteristics which provide
some timely and tangible advantage (no matter how rudimentary or incremental) allow
53

Ibid., 137.
Ibid., 142.
55
Ibid., 139.
54

32

the individual specimens who possess them to outlast or outflank their reproductive
competition in the ongoing struggle for life. Survival of the fittest. 56 But this point is
perhaps better made in Dawkins’ subsequent discussions on the argument from
irreducible complexity.
As Dawkins explains:
What is it that makes natural selection succeed as a solution to
the problem of improbability, where chance and design both fail at
the starting gate? The answer is that natural selection is a
cumulative process, which breaks the problem of improbability up
into small pieces. Each of the small pieces is slightly improbable,
but not prohibitively so. When large numbers of these slightly
improbable events are stacked up in series, the end product of the
accumulation is very very improbable indeed, improbable enough
to be far beyond the reach of chance.57
Historically, such an argument has been countered by the presentation of an adaptation or
organ believed to be so complex that “the removal of one of its parts causes the whole to
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In a study on the correlation between artistic creativity and mental illness, author Daniel Nettle
writes “the cystic fibrosis gene is clearly very damaging when it leads to the disease. However, natural
selection has not, as yet, removed it from the human gene pool. This is probably because having one copy
of the disease variant does the bearer no harm and might even do some good” (Strong Imagination:
Madness, Creativity and Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 60.) Incidentally, the
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cease functioning.”58 The most common examples given have been the wing and the eye,
adaptations that have long manifested themselves in nature in myriad ways and in very
disparate species. Dawkins once again explains the misconception:
As soon as we give these assumptions a moment’s thought, we
immediately see the fallacy. A cataract patient with the lens of her eye
surgically removed can’t see clear images without glasses, but can see
enough not to bump into a tree or fall over a cliff. Half a wing is indeed
not as good as a whole wing, but it is certainly better than no wing at all.
Half a wing could save your life by easing your fall from a tree of a certain
height. And 51 per cent of a wing could save you if you fall from a
slightly taller tree. Whatever fraction of a wing you have, there is a fall
from which it will save your life where a slightly smaller winglet would
not. The thought experiment of trees of different height, from which one
might fall, is just one way to see, in theory, that there must be a smooth
gradient of advantage all the way from 1 per cent of a wing to 100 per
cent. The forests are replete with gliding or parachuting animals
illustrating, in practice, every step of the way up that particular slope of
Mount Improbable.59
The God-of-the-Gaps hypothesis Dawkins treats with even more disdain. He
laments: “it is precisely the fact that ID [Intelligent Design] has no evidence of its own,
but thrives like a weed in gaps left by scientific knowledge, that sits uneasily with
science’s need to identify and proclaim the very same gaps as a prelude to researching
them.”60
Here is the message that an imaginary ‘intelligent design theorist’ might
broadcast to scientists: ‘If you don’t understand how something works,
never mind: just give up and say God did it. You don’t know how the
nerve impulse works? Good! You don’t understand how memories are laid
down in the brain? Excellent! Is photosynthesis a bafflingly complex
process? Wonderful! Please don’t go to work on the problem, just give up,
and appeal to God. Dear scientist, don’t work on your mysteries. Bring us
your mysteries, for we can use them. Don’t squander precious ignorance
by researching it away. We need those glorious gaps as a last refuge for
God.’61
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The anthropic principle is sometimes referred to as the argument from fine-tuning.
It is basically an appeal to an intentionally designed Goldilocksian universe, in which
every substance, every law, and every process is precisely tuned to allow for both life and
the universe that contains it to have developed exactly as they have. One slight variation
and the whole thing would either cease to be or never have existed in the first place. This
can be applied on both a planetary and a cosmological scale. Such questions/arguments
along this line of thinking include, “Why is there life on earth?” “Why is there something
instead of nothing?” “Mustn’t such precision indicate that some sort of (divine) mind is
responsible?” Once again, Dawkins’ response is stunningly simple, yet profoundly
provocative.
Natural selection works because it is a cumulative one-way street to
improvement. It needs some luck to get started, and the ‘billions of
planets’ anthropic principle grants it that luck.… We live on a planet that
is friendly to our kind of life, and we have seen two reasons why this is so.
One is that life has evolved to flourish in the conditions provided by the
planet. This is because of natural selection. The other reason is the
anthropic one. There are billions of planets in the universe, and, however
small the minority of evolution-friendly planets may be, our planet
necessarily has to be one of them.62
Thus, rather than proving the need for a designer, the anthropic principle actually
demonstrates that, statistically speaking, such a designer is indeed superfluous. Both the
“creation” of the cosmos and the evolution of life upon (at least) one planet within it can
remain highly improbable events, and yet still be reasonably expected to occur with at
least the frequency and in precisely the manner in which they have. Never one to let
sleeping dogs lie, Dawkins also offers some telling examples which demonstrate, at best
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an inherent lack of design, and at worst an inattentiveness or malevolence of some sort on
the part of the would-be designer.
Darwinism raises our consciousness in other ways. Evolved organs,
elegant and efficient as they often are, also demonstrate revealing flaws –
exactly as you’d expect if they have an evolutionary history, and exactly
as you would not expect if they were designed. I have discussed examples
in other books: the recurrent laryngeal nerve, for one, which betrays its
evolutionary history in a massive and wasteful detour on its way to its
destination. Many of our human ailments, from lower back pain to hernias,
prolapsed uteruses and our susceptibility to sinus infections, result directly
from the fact that we now walk upright with a body that was shaped over
hundreds of millions of years to walk on all fours. Our consciousness is
also raised by the cruelty and wastefulness of natural selection. Predators
seem beautifully ‘designed’ to catch prey animals, while the prey animals
seem equally beautifully ‘designed’ to escape them. Whose side is God
on?63
Because Dawkins’ fifth chapter, “The Roots of Religion,” is in many ways a
microcosm of Daniel Dennett’s entire book, my treatment of its contents here will be
comparatively brief. Like Dennett, Dawkins is primarily interested not in the sociological
or historical origins but in the evolutionary roots and the Darwinian imperative(s) of
religion, and he offers a number of plausible reasons for its continued existence. Wanting
to distinguish these so-called “ultimate” explanations from more proximate ones,
Dawkins clarifies: “the question of whether religions are deliberately designed by cynical
priests or rulers is an interesting one, to which historians should attend. But it is not, in
itself, a Darwinian question. The Darwinian still wants to know why people are
vulnerable to the charms of religion and therefore open to exploitation by priests,
politicians and kings.”64 Among the more prominent theories that Dawkins’ wishes to
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discuss in service of this end, there are two of special significance: group selection theory
and the by-product hypothesis.65
While not a strong supporter of group selection theory himself, Dawkins
nevertheless acknowledges that “those of us who belittle group selection admit that in
principle it can happen. The question is whether it amounts to a significant force in
evolution. When it is pitted against selection at lower levels – as when group selection is
advanced as an explanation for individual self-sacrifice – lower-level selection is likely to
be stronger.”66 In Chapter Six, he offers two possible reasons for the theory’s prolonged
(and ultimately misplaced) popularity: kin selection and the notion of reciprocal altruism.
In the interest of full disclosure, Dawkins later admits that “the general theory of
religion as an accidental by-product – a misfiring of something useful – is the one I wish
to advocate.”67 To illustrate this tendency to misfire, Dawkins describes what we might
call the “self-immolation behavior” of moths.
Moths fly into the candle flame, and it doesn’t look like an accident.…
Artificial light is a recent arrival on the night scene. Until recently, the
only night lights on view were the moon and the stars. They are at optical
infinity, so rays coming from them are parallel. This fits them for use as
compasses. Insects are known to use celestial objects such as the sun and
the moon to steer accurately in a straight line, and they can use the same
compass, with reversed sign, for returning home after a foray.… But the
light compass relies critically on the celestial object being at optical
infinity. If it isn’t, the rays are not parallel but diverge like the spokes of a
wheel. A nervous system applying a 30-degree (or any acute angle) rule of
thumb to a nearby candle, as though it were the moon at optical infinity,
will steer the moth, via a spiral trajectory, into the flame.… Though fatal
in this particular circumstance, the moth’s rule of thumb is still, on
average, a good one because, for a moth, sightings of candles are rare
65
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compared with sightings of the moon. We don’t notice the hundreds of
moths that are silently and effectively steering by the moon or a bright
star, or even the glow from a distant city. We see only moths wheeling
into our candle, and we ask the wrong question: Why are all these moths
committing suicide? Instead, we should ask why they have nervous
systems that steer by maintaining a fixed angle to light rays, a tactic that
we notice only where it goes wrong. When the question is rephrased, the
mystery evaporates. It never was right to call it suicide. It is a misfiring
byproduct of a normally useful compass.68
Dawkins goes on to explain how this behavior might similarly manifest itself in
humans:
My specific hypothesis is about children. More than any other species, we
survive by the accumulated experience of previous generations, and that
experience needs to be passed on to children for their protection and wellbeing. Theoretically, children might learn from personal experience not to
go too near a cliff edge, not to eat untried red berries, not to swim in
crocodile-infested waters. But, to say the least, there will be a selective
advantage to child brains that possess the rule of thumb: believe, without
question, whatever your grown-ups tell you. Obey your parents; obey the
tribal elders, especially when they adopt a solemn, minatory tone. Trust
your elders without question. This is a generally valuable rule for a child.
But, as with the moths, it can go wrong.… the flip side of trusting
obedience is slavish gullibility. The inevitable by-product is vulnerability
to infection by mind viruses. For excellent reasons related to Darwinian
survival, child brains need to trust parents, and elders whom parents tell
them to trust. An automatic consequence is that the truster has no way of
distinguishing good advice from bad. The child cannot know that ‘Don’t
paddle in the crocodile-infested Limpopo’ is good advice but ‘You must
sacrifice a goat at the time of the full moon, otherwise the rains will fail’ is
at best a waste of time and goats. Both admonitions sound equally
trustworthy. Both come from a respected source and are delivered with a
solemn earnestness that commands respect and, demands obedience. The
same goes for propositions about the world, about the cosmos, about
morality and about human nature. And, very likely, when the child grows
up and has children of her own, she will naturally pass the whole lot on to
her own children – nonsense as well as sense – using the same infectious
gravitas of manner.69
In essence, Dawkins is arguing that what allows these individual instances of
nonsense to be passed down along with the valuable bits of useful information is that the
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basic Darwinian framework – that children should listen to their parents/elders – is, for
the most part, sound. This, in many ways, parallels the “behaviors” of certain genes
which pass down specifically because they are best suited to do so, regardless of what
their ultimate effect(s) may be on the organism as a whole. For this reason, Dawkins
decides to give this practice a name that implies such similarities of both structure and
purpose. Intended as an amalgam between the word gene and that of the ancient Greek
word, “mīmeîsthai,” meaning “to imitate or to copy,” Dawkins created the word
“meme.”70 And as he subsequently explains, “as with genes in a gene pool, the memes
that prevail will be the ones that are good at getting themselves copied.”71 Thus, religion
may have been able to endure, irrespective of its ultimate value to the human species.
Perhaps for some it remains a reliable compass, illuminating their way in an otherwise
dark world, while for others it leads them, sadly and mistakenly, headlong into the flame.
In Chapter Six, “The Roots of Morality: Why are We Good?”, Dawkins explores
the possibility that morality may likewise be the by-product of other biologically-useful
evolutionary processes. As he states “this chapter is about evil, and its opposite, good;
about morality, where it comes from, why we should embrace it, and whether we need
religion to do so.” 72 For a Darwinian explanation of this phenomenon, he returns to the
two concepts he mentioned in the previous chapter: kin selection and the notion of
reciprocal altruism. The first of these he demonstrates quite simply and succinctly. “A
gene that programs individual organisms to favour their genetic kin is statistically likely
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to benefit copies of itself.”73 In other words, the so-called “selfish gene” can manifest that
selfishness by encouraging or otherwise allowing its host organism to display protective
and nurturing concern towards those with whom it shares its hereditary makeup. (As it is
survival of the gene itself that is paramount, not the individual organism in which it
resides, this seems a most sensible arrangement.)
Reciprocal altruism, on the other hand, does not depend upon shared genes.
“Indeed it works just as well, probably even better, between members of widely different
species, when it is often called symbiosis. The principle is the basis of all trade and barter
in humans too. The hunter needs a spear and the smith wants meat. The asymmetry
brokers a deal.”74 Explaining the way(s) in which the correlative concept of delayed
gratification (an often necessary scaffold in the overall structure of the relationship)
manifests itself specifically in humans, Dawkins adds “Natural selection favours genes
that predispose individuals, in relationships of asymmetric need and opportunity, to give
when they can, and to solicit giving when they can’t. It also favours tendencies to
remember obligations, bear grudges, police exchange relationships and punish cheats
who take, but don’t give when their turn comes.”75 It is certainly possible to envision how
most (if not all) rudimentary notions of human morality could have developed under such
evolutionary conditions. Nevertheless, he notes that even these have a tendency to misfire
as well.
In ancestral times, we had the opportunity to be altruistic only towards
close kin and potential reciprocators. Nowadays that restriction is no
longer there, but the rule of thumb persists. Why would it not? It is just
like sexual desire. We can no more help ourselves feeling pity when we
see a weeping unfortunate (who is unrelated and unable to reciprocate)
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than we can help ourselves feeling lust for a member of the opposite sex
(who may be infertile or otherwise unable to reproduce). Both are
misfirings, Darwinian mistakes: blessed, precious mistakes.76
The ultimate aim of Dawkins’ argument is not to make a value judgment upon this
modern-day circumstance, but simply to demonstrate that morality need not (indeed
cannot) be considered absolute and eternal. Like the organisms in which they reside,
morals are constantly subjected to both the biological and cultural demands of incessant
evolution. To declare them as both timeless and specifically tethered to a particular faith
or tradition is to paradoxically and pugnaciously miss the point.
As proof of this, Chapter Seven, “The ‘Good’ Book and the Changing Moral
Zeitgeist,” offers numerous examples of so-called timeless and unconditional moral
imperatives found within scripture and then demonstrates the way(s) in which the great
majority of them are either, he says, distinctly immoral or, at the very least, no longer
considered binding in today’s society. After proceeding through a veritable laundry list of
Old Testament stories, the likes of which are so generally well known as to not require
further elaboration here – Noah and the Flood, Lot and the destruction of Sodom,
Abraham and the near murder of his son Isaac, Moses and the conquering of the
Promised Land – Dawkins explains precisely how and why such stories reveal not moral
absolutism but cultural relativism of a most obvious sort.
Of course, irritated theologians will protest that we don’t take the book of
Genesis literally any more. But that is my whole point! We pick and
choose which bits of scripture to believe, which bits to write off as
symbols or allegories. Such picking and choosing is a matter of personal
decision, just as much, or as little, as the atheist’s decision to follow this
moral precept or that was a personal decision without an absolute
foundation. If one of these is ‘morality flying by the seat of its pants’, so is
the other.77
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Turning his attentions to the New Testament, Dawkins actually offers none other
than Jesus of Nazareth in support of his previous claims.
Jesus’ ethical teachings were – at least by comparison with the ethical
disaster area that is the Old Testament – admirable; but… the moral
superiority of Jesus precisely bears out my point. Jesus was not content to
derive his ethics from the scriptures of his upbringing. He explicitly
departed from them, for example when he deflated the dire warnings about
breaking the sabbath. ‘The sabbath was made for man, not man for the
sabbath’ has been generalized into a wise proverb. Since a principal thesis
of this chapter is that we do not, and should not, derive our morals from
scripture, Jesus has to be honoured as a model for that very thesis.78
Dawkins nevertheless goes on to demonstrate the ways in which many of the New
Testament morals that we still hold to be worthy in today’s society were actually much
narrower in their original scope and intent. By showing that such long respected
pronouncements as “love thy neighbor” and “thou shalt not kill” were initially meant to
apply only to the Jewish community (oftentimes at the devastating expense of their most
proximate co-inhabitants) he hopes to make plain that
religion is undoubtedly a divisive force, and this is one of the main
accusations levelled against it. But it is frequently and rightly said that
wars, and feuds between religious groups or sects, are seldom actually
about theological disagreements. When an Ulster Protestant paramilitary
murders a Catholic, he is not muttering to himself, ‘Take that,
transubstantiationist, mariolatrous, incense-reeking bastard!’ He is much
more likely to be avenging the death of another Protestant killed by
another Catholic, perhaps in the course of a sustained transgenerational
vendetta. Religion is a label of in-group/out-group enmity and vendetta,
not necessarily worse than other labels such as skin colour, language or
preferred football team, but often available when other labels are not.79
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religious acts serves to trump or mask more material (i.e. earthly) concerns.
79

42

To understand how such biblically-limited moral constructs as love for one’s
neighbor and the imperative not to take the life of another communal relation could have
eventually been extended to encompass a fundamental respect and love for all human
beings, Dawkins turns to recent examples (both positive and negative) of the changing
moral zeitgeist in our own time and culture. Referencing society’s changing attitudes
towards racial equality, women’s suffrage, the conduct of war, and the rights of animals,
etc., Dawkins is able to demonstrate a sort of underlying, but undeniable moral progress
towards egalitarianism and empathy for all. This he contrasts with the viewpoints of our
Victorian counterparts, whose disparate views on race, gender, and common equality are
hardly thought to be enlightened by today’s standards, but were considered very much so
by the measures and milieus of their own. Morals change, and we must be willing to
reevaluate our perceptions of both past and present as a result.
In summation and support of this point, Dawkins references two twentiethcentury public figures to whom the judgment of history has not been kind: Adolph Hitler
and Joseph Stalin. Although generally acknowledged to be immoral (or at the very least
amoral) today, neither was initially considered so by either the Catholic Church or the socalled intelligentsia of the West. After all, Hitler’s Nazi regime depended heavily upon
the silent, obedient consent of the Church and the faithful service of its members, much
as Stalin’s Soviet empire demanded absolute allegiance from the whole of its citizenry to
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both his party and his person.80 This fact notwithstanding, both men are now often seen
as the standard-bearers of atheism and as cautionary tales of the evil(s) it supposedly
entails. Dawkins’ point is that, regardless of their private religious beliefs (or lack
thereof), their respective movements embraced both the structure and the rhetoric of
organized religion in order to realize their ambitions. As Dawkins concludes “individual
atheists may do evil things but they don’t do evil things in the name of atheism… why
would anyone go to war for the sake of an absence of belief?”81
In Chapter Eight, “What’s Wrong with Religion? Why Be So Hostile,” Dawkins
addresses the oft-repeated criticism that his customary defense of Darwinism (and of
scientific principles and practices, more generally) reeks of the same sort of absolutism
for which he decries the religiously-minded. That said, the majority of his arguments are
arranged not so much as an apology for his behavior but instead as an open warning to all
those who insist that benign neglect is a much more appropriate, benevolent and
constructive (non)response to fundamentalism of a more religious persuasion. The
speciousness of this logic he expresses by examining, largely via anecdote, the detriments
to science and the injuries to personal liberty that religion (in both its moderate and
fundamentalist forms) continues to inflict and invite.
The charge of fundamentalism he rebuts with scornful simplicity.
It is all too easy to confuse fundamentalism with passion. I may well
appear passionate when I defend evolution against a fundamentalist
creationist, but this is not because of a rival fundamentalism of my own. It
is because the evidence for evolution is overwhelmingly strong and I am
80
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passionately distressed that my opponent can’t see it - or, more usually,
refuses to look at it because it contradicts his holy book.… Books about
evolution are believed not because they are holy. They are believed
because they present overwhelming quantities of mutually buttressed
evidence. In principle, any reader can go and check that evidence. When a
science book is wrong, somebody eventually discovers the mistake and it
is corrected in subsequent books. That conspicuously doesn’t happen with
holy books.82
To illustrate the ways in which fundamentalism subverts science, Dawkins relates
the story of Kurt Wise, an Ivy-League-educated geologist, who, despite all available
evidence to the contrary found himself unable to depart from the creationist teachings of
his youth. Here, Dawkins allows Wise to speak for himself. “As I shared with my
professors years ago when I was in college, if all the evidence in the universe turns
against creationism, I would be the first to admit it, but I would still be a creationist
because that is what the Word of God seems to indicate.
Here I must stand.”83 Dawkins then laments, “I am hostile to religion because of what it
did to Kurt Wise. And if it did that to a Harvard-educated geologist, just think what it can
do to others less gifted and less well armed.”84
To show the harm of absolutism in its myriad religious forms, Dawkins discusses
the offenses of blasphemy and apostasy which still carry, throughout most of the Islamic
and some of the Christian world, an unduly harsh and irreversible penalty. “It is pure
thoughtcrime, to use George Orwell’s 1984 terminology, and the official punishment for
it under Islamic law is death.”85 He follows a similar vein of logic when discussing the
likewise victimless “crime” of homosexuality. To communicate this circumstance, he
relies on the admittedly-tragic biography of Alan Turing, father of the modern computer
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and instrumental contributor in the successful Allied effort to break the German Enigma
code machine during the Second World War, who committed suicide after having been
convicted of the crime of “indecency.” As Dawkins laments:
When Turing’s role was no longer top secret, he should have been
knighted and fêted as a saviour of his nation. Instead, this gentle,
stammering, eccentric genius was destroyed, for a ‘crime’, committed in
private, which harmed nobody. Once again, the unmistakable trademark of
the faith-based moralizer is to care passionately about what other people
do (or even think) in private.86
The next section of the chapter, Dawkins dedicates to the anti/abortion debate still
raging across the cultural landscape of America. This debate is generally tethered to
religious fervor of one stripe or another and almost always takes the form of an absolute
respect for the sanctity (and potential) of all human life. This Dawkins not so much
challenges as contextualizes, by demonstrating that the fundamentalist’s commitment to
both of these precepts is neither unqualified nor steadfast. By recounting a number of
recent murders committed by anti-abortionists in America, Dawkins is able to
demonstrate that one’s respect for the sanctity of human life does not necessarily extend
beyond the womb.87
Of course, it might be possible to argue that the potential (and thus ultimate
destiny) of the fetus was still unwritten, while the abortion doctor(s) had already made
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their own metaphorical beds and were simply being made to lie in them. This argument is
sometimes referred to as “The Great Beethoven Fallacy.” Dawkins outlines it by quoting
from its believed creator, Maurice Baring, who himself cast it in the guise of an imagined
dialogue between two doctors.
‘About the terminating of pregnancy, I want your opinion. The father was
syphilitic, the mother tuberculous. Of the four children born, the first was
blind, the second died, the third was deaf and dumb, the fourth was also
tuberculous. What would you have done?’
‘I would have terminated the pregnancy.’
‘Then you would have murdered Beethoven.’88
Biographical errors aside (and there are several), Dawkins’ ultimate point in passing on
this story is to demonstrate into just how ludicrous and limiting a corner such thinking
ultimately paints one. He explains, “the logical conclusion to the ‘human potential’
argument is that we potentially deprive a human soul of the gift of existence every time
we fail to seize any opportunity for sexual intercourse. Every refusal of any offer of
copulation by a fertile individual is, by this dopey ‘pro-life’ logic, tantamount to the
murder of a potential child!”89 Such an argument is obviously incompatible with the
imperatives to modesty and decorum that so often accompany sexual guidelines for
religious individuals, particularly women. One wonders which of these beliefs/behaviors
is to take precedence when they invariably come into conflict with one another? Who or
what can say? Certainly not religion.90
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In closing the chapter, Dawkins admits that while there are many among the
religious whose more moderate views should not be conflated or confused with those of
the fundamentalists whom he has just critiqued, even their comparatively temperate
views are not without risks of their own. As Dawkins explains “the teachings of
‘moderate’ religion, though not extremist in themselves, are an open invitation to
extremism. It might be said that there is nothing special about religious faith here.
Patriotic love of country or ethnic group can also make the world safe for its own version
of extremism, can’t it?”91 The problem, as Dawkins sees it, is that “Christianity, just as
much as Islam, teaches children that unquestioned faith is a virtue.”92 To demonstrate the
devastating though possibly unintentional consequences of such belief and in respect for
such belief, Dawkins posits a timely hypothesis:
Suicide bombers do what they do because they really believe what they
were taught in their religious schools: that duty to God exceeds all other
priorities, and that martyrdom in his service will be rewarded in the
gardens of Paradise. And they were taught that lesson not necessarily by
extremist fanatics but by decent, gentle, mainstream religious instructors,
who lined them up in their madrasas, sitting in rows, rhythmically nodding
their innocent little heads up and down while they learned every word of
the holy book like demented parrots. Faith can be very very dangerous,
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and deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child
is a grievous wrong.93
Chapter Nine, “Childhood, Abuse and the Escape from Religion,” begins with the
story of six-year-old Edgardo Mortara, who in 1858, was kidnapped by papal police from
his home in Bologna, Italy, forcibly relocated to a religious conversion house in Rome,
and “thereafter brought up as a Roman Catholic.”94 Although unquestionably the child of
Jewish parents, the papacy justified this action on the grounds that a secret baptism,
performed years earlier (by the child’s teenage babysitter no less), had forever rendered
young Edgardo a Catholic. Once this baptism had come to the Church’s attention, leaving
the child in the incompetent hands of his Christ-killing, Jewish parents was simply not an
option; to do so, from their perspective, would have been grievously immoral. Better,
they thought, to separate him from his entire world in order to save his young, yet
nevertheless immortal, soul. Though admittedly an extreme example (at least by today’s
standards), young Edgardo’s story serves to both ground and to buttress Dawkins’ central
point of the chapter. As he explains, “even without physical abduction, isn’t it always a
form of child abuse to label children as possessors of beliefs that they are too young to
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have thought about? Yet the practice persists to this day, almost entirely unquestioned.
To question it is my main purpose in this chapter.”95
In order to do so, Dawkins begins by distinguishing the more popularly
understood and rightly condemned varieties of physical abuse (such as those deplorable
actions taken by pedophile priests and sadistic schoolmarm nuns) from the less
considered forms of psychological abuse (the soul-crushing guilt for sins real or
imagined, the all-encompassing fear of an eternity in hell, etc.) to which religions are
rarely, if ever, held accountable. Dawkins offers two explanations for this. One: the latter
are not abusive if they are true, and two: even if they aren’t, surely the physical damage is
more crippling than the psychological. Dawkins is decidedly and derisively dismissive of
the first proposition, but his scorn for the second he defends thusly:
‘Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me.’
The adage is true as long as you don’t really believe the words. But if your
whole upbringing, and everything you have ever been told by parents,
teachers and priests, has led you to believe, really believe, utterly and
completely, that sinners burn in hell (or some other obnoxious article of
doctrine such as that a woman is the property of her husband), it is entirely
plausible that words could have a more long-lasting and damaging effect
than deeds. I am persuaded that the phrase ‘child abuse’ is no exaggeration
when used to describe what teachers and priests are doing to children
whom they encourage to believe in something like the punishment of
unshriven mortal sins in an eternal hell.96
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In support of this, he recounts interviews he held with American evangelical pastor Ted
Haggard (since infamously disgraced, though once again with a congregation)97 and
Keenan Roberts, whose “Hell House” exhibitions Dawkins vividly describes as places:
where children are brought, by their parents or their Christian schools, to
be scared witless over what might happen to them after they die. Actors
play out fearsome tableaux of particular ‘sins’ like abortion and
homosexuality, with a scarlet-clad devil in gloating attendance. These are
a prelude to the pièce de résistance, Hell Itself, complete with realistic
sulphurous smell of burning brimstone and the agonized screams of the
forever damned.”98
These extreme examples of systematized self-loathing and the paralyzing fear of
hell-fire aside, Dawkins then goes on to demonstrate that even more generally accepted
and presumably more benevolent examples of this child abuse nevertheless exist.
Undoubtedly two of the most commonplace in this country are an almost universallyingrained sense of respect for the religious freedom of the Amish to raise their children in
their own isolating and regressive culture, as well as the prevalent practice of genital
circumcision (one of the few tenets upon which all three Abrahamic religions agree).
Both of these Dawkins objects to not only because of their obvious physical and
psychological risks, but because in neither case is the child in question consulted. Here,
he references the work of Psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, who “makes the point that
no adult woman who has somehow missed out on circumcision as a child volunteers for
the operation later in life.”99 As for the Amish, he explains:
Even if the children had been asked and had expressed a preference for the
Amish religion, can we suppose that they would have done so if they had
been educated and informed about the available alternatives? For this to be
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plausible, shouldn’t there be examples of young people from the outside
world voting with their feet and volunteering to join the Amish?100
How and why do these beliefs and practices persist? Dawkins thinks he knows:
The same tendency to glory in the quaintness of ethnic religious habits,
and to justify cruelties in their name, crops up again and again. It is the
source of squirming internal conflict in the minds of nice liberal people
who, on the one hand, cannot bear suffering and cruelty, but on the other
hand have been trained by postmodernists and relativists to respect other
cultures no less than their own.101
What, then, is to be done? Dawkins’ admittedly unsurprising recommendation is
one which he shares with each of his fellow New Atheists.
A good case can indeed be made for the educational benefits of teaching
comparative religion.… Let children learn about different faiths, let them
notice their incompatibility, and let them draw their own conclusions
about the consequences of that incompatibility. As for whether any are
‘valid’, let them make up their own minds when they are old enough to do
so.102
Dawkins’ final chapter, “A Much Needed Gap?”, deals with the twin issues of
consolation and inspiration, two qualities often believed to be strongly tethered to
religious belief of one sort or another. For the former, Dawkins makes a comparison to
the common childhood experience of having an imaginary friend. He admits that such a
belief:
brings me as close as I shall probably come to understanding the consoling
and counselling role of imaginary gods in people’s lives. A being may
exist only in the imagination, yet still seem completely real to the child,
and still give real comfort and good advice. Perhaps even better:
imaginary friends – and imaginary gods – have the time and patience to
devote all their attention to the sufferer. And they are much cheaper than
psychiatrists or professional counsellors.103
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Of course, Dawkins immediately reminds us that “religion’s power to console
doesn’t make it true.”104 What’s more, he questions religion’s ability to actually provide
that consolation, specifically as it refers to a belief in life after death. He notes that “polls
suggest that approximately 95 per cent of the population of the United States believe they
will survive their own death. Aspiring martyrs aside, I can’t help wondering how many
people who claim such belief really, in their heart of hearts, hold it.”105 If this were truly
the case, Dawkins argues, then wouldn’t religious people welcome and embrace news of
the impending demise of a loved one, or more specifically of themselves? Yet to do so (at
least in our society), one risks being derided as callous or cruel, or perhaps even outright
ostracism from one’s so-called community. Undoubtedly, there are those who will argue
that it is not death but the painful process of dying that they fear. To this, Dawkins
responds “in that case, why does the most vocal opposition to euthanasia and assisted
suicide come from the religious?… The official reason may be that all killing is a sin. But
why deem it to be a sin if you sincerely believe you are accelerating a journey to
heaven?”106 In place of such religious (non)consolation, Dawkins offers the more worldly
example of Mark Twain, who once said: “‘I do not fear death. I had been dead for
billions and billions of years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest
inconvenience from it.’”107 In many ways, this seems equally comforting, if not more so.
Because in Twain’s view (and in Dawkins’), fears of temporary torment in purgatory or
perpetual agony in hell are neither logical nor likely.
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As for inspiration, Dawkins lambasts the claim that religious belief is a
prerequisite for a happy, fulfilled, and purposeful life. He says:
there is something infantile in the presumption that somebody else
(parents in the case of children, God in the case of adults) has a
responsibility to give your life meaning and point. It is all of a piece with
the infantilism of those who, the moment they twist their ankle, look
around for someone to sue. Somebody else must be responsible for my
well-being, and somebody else must be to blame if I am hurt. Is it a
similar infantilism that really lies behind the ‘need’ for a God?… The truly
adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as
wonderful as we choose to make it. And we can make it very wonderful
indeed.108
In other words, the responsibility ultimately rests with us. We must find happiness in our
own lives, fulfillment in our own actions, and hopefulness in the potential of our own
species. What’s more, such individuality cannot be guided by a one-size-fits-all approach
to mantra or doctrine. As Dawkins explains, “if the demise of God will leave a gap,
different people will fill it in different ways. My way includes a good dose of science, the
honest and systematic endeavour to find out the truth about the real world.”109
Unsurprisingly, Dawkins believes we have Darwin to thank for this opportunity.
Think about it. On one planet, and possibly only one planet in the entire
universe, molecules that would normally make nothing more complicated
than a chunk of rock, gather themselves together into chunks of rock-sized
matter of such staggering complexity that they are capable of running,
jumping, swimming, flying, seeing, hearing, capturing and eating other
such animated chunks of complexity; capable in some cases of thinking
and feeling, and falling in love with yet other chunks of complex matter.
We now understand essentially how the trick is done, but only since 1859.
Before 1859 it would have seemed very very odd indeed. Now, thanks to
Darwin, it is merely very odd. Darwin seized the window… and wrenched
it open, letting in a flood of understanding whose dazzling novelty, and
power to uplift the human spirit, perhaps had no precedent.110
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To where will this opportunity lead? Dawkins admits “I genuinely don’t know the
answer, but I am thrilled to be alive at a time when humanity is pushing against the limits
of understanding.” So shouldn’t we all.

Part II: Criticisms and Rebuttals111
In his article, “The Fear of Religion,” Thomas Nagel argues that
the fear of religion leads too many scientifically minded atheists to cling to
a defensive, world-flattening reductionism. Dawkins, like many of his
contemporaries, is hobbled by the assumption that the only alternative to
religion is to insist that the ultimate explanation of everything must lie in
particle physics, string theory, or whatever purely extensional laws govern
the elements of which the material world is composed. This reductionist
dream is nourished by the extraordinary success of the physical sciences in
our time, not least in their recent application to the understanding of life
through molecular biology. It is natural to try to take any successful
intellectual method as far as it will go. Yet the impulse to find an
explanation of everything in physics has over the last fifty years gotten out
of control. The concepts of physical science provide a very special, and
partial, description of the world that experience reveals to us. It is the
world with all subjective consciousness, sensory appearances, thought,
value, purpose, and will left out. What remains is the mathematically
describable order of things and events in space and time.112
Thus while admitting of the recent and “extraordinary success of the physical sciences”
to explain all sorts of previously unexplained natural phenomena (including even the
possible origins of life itself), Nagel nevertheless chastises Dawkins for clinging to a
“world-flattening reductionism” that, he believes, necessarily precludes the existence of
111
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“all subjective consciousness, sensory appearances, thought, value, purpose, and will.” Of
course, scientific materialism is not committed to such a proposition at all. As Sophie
Elmhirst explains:
The scientific method, for Dawkins, is not merely essential to
understanding the physical world; it can be deployed to help answer moral
questions as well. “Human society, human love, human hate, art, music,
poetry – these are all things which are the products of human brains, and
brains are the products of ultimately scientifically explicable phenomena.
But not in practice explicable, because it’s too difficult, it’s too
complicated.” There is still room in Dawkins’s worldview for mystery –
about the nature of human consciousness, for example – but that mystery
is neither supernatural nor ultimately inexplicable.113
Thus, Nagel appears to be conflating scientific materialism (i.e. naturalism) with
an all-encompassing philosophical eliminativism.114 Scientific materialism merely states
that such phenomena, while plausibly and qualitatively existing, must simultaneously
permit of entirely naturalistic explanations. To suggest otherwise is to immediately invite
explanatory appeals to supernaturalism, as Nagel seemingly, even consciously, proceeds
to do.
He continues:
God, whatever he may be, is not a complex physical inhabitant of the
natural world. The explanation of his existence as a chance concatenation
of atoms is not a possibility for which we must find an alternative, because
that is not what anybody means by God. If the God hypothesis makes
sense at all, it offers a different kind of explanation from those of physical
science: purpose or intention of a mind without a body, capable
nevertheless of creating and forming the entire physical world. The point
of the hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that
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there is a mental, purposive, or intentional explanation more fundamental
than the basic laws of physics, because it explains even them.115
In other words, to distinguish himself from what he perceives to be Dawkins’ “worldflattening reductionism,” Nagel must entertain the notion that potentially any and all
heretofore unexplained phenomena could simply be the result of a purposeful but
immaterial mind. This is problematic because such thinking is indicative, at least where
humans are concerned, of some type of underlying commitment to property (if not
substance) dualism.116 When applied specifically to the God hypothesis, this commitment
becomes even more worrisome because not only is Nagel arguing for the distinctiveness
of mind and body, but specifically for the eternal existence of the former and the utter
needlessness of the latter. This is similar to Thomas Martin’s critique that
Dawkins claims God is improbable because God, to be meaningful, would
be a complex intelligence. Existence must start simple and build
complexity via cosmic evolution. Fair enough, but he seems incapable of
comprehending, or has simply not done enough research to understand
that theology responds by saying that God is utterly simple, by virtue of
having no parts. Dawkins insists that intelligence requires parts, (154)
confusing the requirements for our intelligence with those for a divinity.
What he demonstrates is that brains require an evolved complexity of
parts. He does not demonstrate that brains are a requirement for any and
all intelligence.117
Or as William Lane Craig has argued:
Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer of the universe, the
designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, so that no
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explanatory advance is made. This objection raises all sorts of questions
about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations;
for example, how simplicity is to be weighted in comparison with other
criteria like explanatory power, explanatory scope, and so forth. But leave
those questions aside. Dawkins’ fundamental mistake lies in his
assumption that a divine designer is an entity comparable in complexity to
the universe. As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity.
As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient
properties, like self-consciousness, rationality, and volition, are essential
to it. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe with all its
inexplicable quantities and constants, a divine mind is startlingly simple.
Certainly such a mind may have complex ideas – it may be thinking, for
example, of the infinitesimal calculus –, but the mind itself is a remarkably
simple entity. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind’s ideas, which may,
indeed, be complex, with a mind itself, which is an incredibly simple
entity. Therefore, postulating a divine mind behind the universe most
definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, for whatever that is
worth.118
Of course, when forced to concede that such an arrangement (mind existing without
body) exists absolutely nowhere else in nature, Nagel, Martin, and Craig can simply
argue that God is the supernatural exception which proves the natural rule. This Nagel as
much admits when he suggests that even should the laws of physics eventually provide an
overarching explanation of the cosmos, God could still be evoked to explain the
fundamental nature and existence of the physical laws themselves. Thus, I would argue
that if anyone is a reductionist in this scenario it is Nagel. For at least Dawkins’
commitment to science and scientific materialism is itself a testable and falsifiable
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hypothesis that must be evidentially confirmed in order to be reasonably adopted. Nagel’s
commitment to deistic reductionism requires no such strenuous methodology.119
Nevertheless, Nagel attempts to bolster support for his deistic/dualistic/design
claims by arguing that
Dawkins is not a chemist or a physicist. Neither am I, but general
expositions of research on the origin of life indicate that no one has a
theory that would support anything remotely near such a high probability
as one in a billion billion. Naturally there is speculation about possible
non-biological chemical precursors of DNA or RNA. But at this point the
origin of life remains, in light of what is known about the huge size, the
extreme specificity, and the exquisite functional precision of the genetic
material, a mystery – an event that could not have occurred by chance and
to which no significant probability can be assigned on the basis of what
we know of the laws of physics and chemistry. Yet we know that it
happened. That is why the argument from design is still alive, and why
scientists who find the conclusion of that argument unacceptable feel there
must be a purely physical explanation of why the origin of life is not as
physically improbable as it seems.120
When Nagel states that “no one has a theory that would support anything remotely near
such a high probability as one in a billion billion,” he is apparently suggesting that
Dawkins’ reliance upon statistical luck as an explanation for the origins of life is
unsupported because the (comparatively) low number of planets in the universe simply
does not lend credence to such an unlikely hypothesis. Unfortunately, this passage calls
into question both Nagel’s reasoning and mathematical skills. As Dawkins himself said:
It has been estimated that there are between 1 billion and 30 billion planets
in our galaxy, and about 100 billion galaxies in the universe. Knocking a
few noughts off for reasons of ordinary prudence, a billion billion is a
conservative estimate of the number of available planets in the universe.
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Now, suppose the origin of life, the spontaneous arising of something
equivalent to DNA, really was a quite staggeringly improbable event.
Suppose it was so improbable as to occur on only one in a billion planets.
A grant-giving body would laugh at any chemist who admitted that the
chance of his proposed research succeeding was only one in a hundred.
But here we are talking about odds of one in a billion. And yet… even
with such absurdly long odds, life will still have arisen on a billion planets
– of which Earth, of course, is one.121
Thus, a billion billion (or quintillion) is, by all accounts, an incredibly conservative
estimate of the number of planets in the universe. In fact, current estimates place the
number of planets in our galaxy at 100 billion (at least), and the number of galaxies in our
universe at 100 – 200 billion.122 And as Eric Mack notes:
Should these calculations hold up – and the researchers behind them
encourage astronomers to check to see whether the planets they predict are
actually there to help bolster their case – it means that the chances of our
planet being the universe’s only potentially habitable rock that actually
hosts life would be not one in a million, one in a billion or even one in a
trillion – but one in a sextillion. (In case this is your first time seeing that
word, a sextillion is a one with 21 zeroes behind it.)
Actually, if the estimates of 40 billion Earth-sized planets in habitable
zones of sun-like or red dwarf stars in the Milky Way and the estimate of
the 100 billion to 200 billion galaxies in the universe are accurate – and if
the average galaxy has roughly the same number of Earth cousins as the
Milky Way, then the chances that we are the only planet with life are more
like one in 6 sextillion.123
Thus, it seems that Nagel’s arguments against chance and for design are, in fact, those
least supported by the numbers. As a result, one could reasonably argue that a
proliferation of unintended life seems both a more likely and more mathematically-sound
hypothesis.

121

Dawkins, The God Delusion, 137-8.
Fraser Cain, “How Many Galaxies in the Universe,” UniverseToday.com, 24 December 2014,
accessed 3 August 2016, http://www.universetoday.com/30305/how-many-galaxies-in-the-universe/.
123
Eric Mack, “There May be More Earth-like Planets than Grains of Sand on all our Beaches.”
CNet.com, 19 March 2015, accessed 3 August 2016, http://www.cnet.com/news/the-milky-way-is-flushwith-habitable-planets-study-says/.
122

60

Nagel, however, goes on to conclude that
a religious worldview is only one response to the conviction that the
physical description of the world is incomplete. Dawkins says with some
justice that the will of God provides a too easy explanation of anything we
cannot otherwise understand, and therefore brings inquiry to a stop.
Religion need not have this effect, but it can. It would be more reasonable,
in my estimation, to admit that we do not now have the understanding or
the knowledge on which to base a comprehensive theory of reality.
Dawkins seems to believe that if people could be persuaded to give up the
God Hypothesis on scientific grounds, the world would be a better place –
not just intellectually, but also morally and politically. He is horrified – as
who cannot be? – by the dreadful things that continue to be done in the
name of religion, and he argues that the sort of religious conviction that
includes a built-in resistance to reason is the true motive behind many of
them. But there is no connection between the fascinating philosophical
and scientific questions posed by the argument from design and the attacks
of September 11. Blind faith and the authority of dogma are dangerous;
the view that we can make ultimate sense of the world only by
understanding it as the expression of mind or purpose is not. It is
unreasonable to think that one must refute the second in order to resist the
first.124
Pay special attention to those last two sentences. “Blind faith and the authority of dogma
are dangerous.” With this, Dawkins would undoubtedly agree. Unfortunately, “the view
that we can make ultimate sense of the world only by understanding it as the expression
of mind or purpose is not,” is self-contradictory, as the statement itself represents a rather
rigid approach to reality. As for Nagel’s claims that “it is unreasonable to think that one
must refute the second in order to resist the first,” I would argue that it would be more
accurate to say that it is unreasonable to believe one can defend the second, all the while
attempting to distinguish it from the first. His earlier statement that “there is no
connection between the fascinating philosophical and scientific questions posed by the
argument from design and the attacks of September 11,” is even more puzzling and
problematic. This is because it is often the disregard, derision, and/or outright dismissal
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of the evidential and logical limitations of these teleological claims that allows the
fundamentalism and/or fanaticism of so many faiths to continue unchecked and
unchallenged in the first place, often with the tacit approval (if not the explicit support) of
educated and enlightened individuals such as Nagel. He and others like him must be
made to understand the real-world consequences of their intellectual equivocations.
Therefore, I submit that even without Dawkins’ countermanding viewpoint, Nagel’s
attempts to balance between open-minded agnosticism and irreducible deism are, by
definition, mutually exclusive, and thus his argument is destined to collapse under the
weight of its own self-imposed contradictions.

In response to Dawkins’ critique of his thought in The God Delusion, Richard
Swinburne retorts:
On p.65 Dawkins quotes my remark that ‘too much evidence [for the
existence of God] might not be good for us’, and then understandably
dismisses it as (in effect) absurd. Here the fault is mine – I should have
given a reference to some place where I point out the advantages of having
to rely on a balance of probability, and not total certainty, with respect to
the existence of God. (The reason why I did not do so is that the journal in
which my comments appeared, Science and Theology News, wanted their
articles to be self-standing, and not to include references to other writing. I
should have insisted on a reference to a place where I defend the view in
question.) For my defence of the advantages of a lack of total certainty,
see pp. 267-72 of the second edition (2004) of my book The Existence of
God. The basic point is that a good God (like a good parent) would surely
want humans (by their own free choice) to form a naturally good
character, and so – for example – to become naturally inclined to help the
poor and starving out of love for them because they are poor and starving.
But if God made it totally certain that he exists and will give a wonderful
everlasting life to those who have formed a naturally good character, then
inevitably humans will find themselves strongly inclined to try to form
such a character and so to help the poor and starving, not out of love for
the poor and starving but in order to please God and to gain everlasting
life. This latter is a good motive for any action, but not always the best
motive. It will be easier for humans to form a natural inclination to help
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the poor and starving out of love, if the existence of God and the prospect
of everlasting life are not (at least for a considerable period of our earthly
lives) totally certain.125
Swinburne presumably means that absolute certainty of God’s existence would
undermine one’s otherwise moral actions and intentions. While this is quite likely true, I
would argue that even relegating such beliefs from the absolute to the probable (or
merely to the possible) still renders such actions as inherently less moral than those based
upon the Socratic notion that “virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment.”
One is consequently left to wonder whether or not the converse of Swinburne’s argument
would hold true as well. In other words, would knowledge of God’s inexistence render
man’s moral obligations to his fellow beings as less binding, enforceable, and/or of
immediate/eternal consequence? For the religiously minded and/or motivated, it seems
difficult to imagine otherwise.126 Thus, I would submit that any character
developmentally dependent upon the possibility (either real or imagined) of obtaining
eternal life (or avoiding everlasting damnation) is, by definition, not the “naturally good
character” Swinburne seemingly intends to instill. It is, instead, the supernaturally
hopeful character that religion universally requires.

In his article, “Voltaire This Ain’t,” Jonathan Marks argues:
Science, it hardly needs to be pointed out, has been spectacularly
successful at its
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program of producing reliable knowledge about Nature. Of course there
have been skeptics since the very beginning. Christopher Marlowe’s Dr.
Faustus (ca. 1600) sought ultimate knowledge: His first questions of
Mephistopheles were about astronomy. But only slightly farther down the
list, it became clear that he really just wanted to smooch with Helen of
Troy and see if she was as hot as all that. However revolutionary these
ambitious new-fangled knowledge-seekers may seem, Marlowe seems to
warn us, they are still just a bunch of over-educated, horny old geezers.…
Richard Dawkins, of course, doesn’t believe in Mephistopheles or Wotan
or Baal. He does believe, however, that ‘‘God almost certainly does not
exist’’ (p. 189), which helps to articulate the first paradox: How do you
establish degrees of certainty in the domain of the Supernatural? Are you
more likely to have telepathy or future vision? Neither, obviously; there
are no applicable degrees of certainty here. It’s like taking a probabilistic
approach to history. Napoleon didn’t ‘‘almost certainly’’ lose the Battle of
Waterloo: According to the standards of knowledge production we can
apply to the subject, Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo. To qualify it as
if it were a scientific statement, subject to the laws of probability, is an
inappropriate invocation of statistical inference. If we know that the
methods of science work for Nature – and in large measure because
Nature was deliberately circumscribed in order to be subject to the
methods of science – then how can we apply its methods to Supernature
and expect reliable knowledge in return (Barzun 1964)?127
Notice the semantical game that Marks is attempting to play. But in equating belief in
God with belief in telepathy or “future vision,” and then suggesting that such an action is
akin to “taking a probabilistic approach to history,” I would argue that Marks is
inadvertently demonstrating the merits of Dawkins’ approach, all the while discrediting
his own. For example, by suggesting that “according to the standards of knowledge
production we can apply to the subject, Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo,” Marks is
suggesting that the probabilistic approach to history is, at best, superfluous to the issue at
hand. Factual, historical evidence can answer this question, without the need to introduce
degrees of probability into the mix. Fair enough. But Marks then goes on to argue that
“Supernature” falls outside the observable and quantifiable realm of nature and is thus
not evaluable by means of either science or history. This is already worrisome because of
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the implied evidential immunity such a notion entails but becomes especially problematic
when one recalls Marks’ earlier remark that, where the supernatural is concerned, “there
are no applicable degrees of certainty.” In other words, for Marks, probability is often
useless in the natural realm and absolutely impossible in the supernatural. And if
historical fact, scientific methodology, and mathematical probability have all been ruled
out as effective means of considering the supernatural, one wonders what possible
avenues of thought might be left open to those who wish to question Marks’ hypothesis.
At the very least, Dawkins’ arguments leave open the possibility of considered criticism
and refutation. One simply cannot say the same for Marks and his unassailable reliance
upon belief.128
Marks, however, goes on to offer a pseudo-intellectual defense of his position, by
attacking Dawkins’ admitted hostility and impatience with cultural relativism. He writes:
Dawkins… has little use for modern relativistic anthropology, which he
tends to see as an anti-science ally of the creationists in the Science Wars.
Some modes of thought are simply superior to others, and the yardstick of
superiority is accuracy. The realer, the better – and science provides the
realest story of all. That is why everyone should be a scientist. But what a
boring and tragic universe to inhabit!129
Marks attributes this hostility not to Dawkins’ personal affinity for the scientific method,
but instead to the process of equating truth and accuracy with methodological superiority.
One consequently supposes that, in Marks’ world, the blatantly false and/or the
evidentially/logically unsupported must be afforded the same reverence and respect as the
authentic and precise in order to avoid offending those less knowledgeable and informed
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among us. But hyperbole aside, this extreme position is apparently the one Marks most
wishes to defend. As he subsequently explains:
The point is that the same can be said of the general non-scientific mode
of human thinking that Dawkins decries. It was very valuable to the
process of becoming human, and is very valuable to the enterprise of
being human. We can take as an illustration the most simple, and the most
quintessentially symbolic act: pointing. Chimps never do it, but humans
are doing it within their first year. It is simply an imaginary extension of
the second manual phalanx, but that analysis conceals the important aspect
of pointing: there isn’t anything there, just a mental association between
the fingertip and the object. It exists only in the mind of the pointer and of
those with similarly built brains, and is the purest symbolic act: the
arbitrary and meaningful conjunction of two things that have no necessary
connection to one another. The association just doesn’t exist to a
chimpanzee, because there isn’t anything there. Symbolic thought is
fundamentally non-rational and unscientific; it is metaphoric. It is pointing
writ large; there is never anything there, just thoughts. Those thoughts are
what make the evocativeness of art, dance, story, and music as diagnostic
of a human condition as chromosome 2 is of a human cell. And yet the
former commonly stands in contrast to the latter, in contrast to science –
the rational, problem-solving, technological aspect of modern life – as
humanities. The very name bespeaks their evolutionary significance: they
confer humanity upon us. Without them, we would be Neanderthals (albeit
with chins and foreheads) at best, but not human. To Dawkins, though, it
seems that any such irrationalism is better left back in the Pleistocene, a
holdover of earlier, primitive anthropoid sensibilities.130
Of course, I cannot recall any instance of Dawkins (or any other scientist) decrying
humanity’s ability to point as an irrationalism “better left back in the Pleistocene, a
holdover of earlier, primitive anthropoid sensibilities” (nor do I see how, even if true,
such claims are in any way relevant to his current hypothesis), but perhaps this claim
sheds some light on Marks’ own worldview. For instance, in an article entitled,
“Understanding the Point of Chimpanzee Pointing,” David A. Leavens, William D.
Hopkins, and Kim A. Bard explain how and why Marks’ claim that “chimps never do it”
is simply false. They write:
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Developmental psychologists have long claimed that pointing, like speech,
is a human species-specific adaptation for reference. One line of argument
in support of this hypothesis has been the widespread but incorrect claim
that apes do not point (Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2003).
Experimental work in our laboratory (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens,
Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Leavens, Hopkins, & Thomas, 2004; reviewed by
Leavens, Russell, & Hopkins, 2005) demonstrates that chimpanzees in
captivity commonly point to unreachable food. Between 41% and 71% of
chimpanzees in our studies point to unreachable food, with sample sizes
ranging from 29 to 115 subjects. Sometimes they point with their index
fingers, though more usually chimpanzees in this population point with all
fingers extended (pointing with the whole hand). Some researchers refer to
this latter kind of pointing as ‘‘reaching,’’ but we know that these are
communicative signals because chimpanzees will not reach towards
obviously unreachable food if there is nobody around to see them do it.131
This digression is undoubtedly as irrelevant as Marks’ original argument, though I
suppose he could rationalize dismissing it on the grounds that its conclusions are entirely
scientific and thus not applicable to the inherently unscientific enterprise of pointing, but
what would ultimately be the point of that? In the end, perhaps Marks’ lack of
appreciation and comprehension of science does make for a universe “less boring” than
Dawkins’, but given his inability (or unwillingness) to discern simple fact from fiction,
one fears it is likely a far more dangerous and tragic place to inhabit.
But regardless, Marks concludes:
The fact is that science must answer to cultural standards, as any other
instrument of social power must. I don’t know how he could have
invented anatomy any other way, but Vesalius was plagued by accusations
of grave robbing for most of his life. Physical anthropologists still
commonly have difficulty with the proposition that ordinary citizens find
their interest in other people’s bones and blood somewhat distastefully
morbid.… But nobody is really anti-science. We all make decisions about
what science to accept, what science to reject, and what science to ignore,
and we have complex criteria for doing so. Indeed, only an utter
ignoramus would take all scientific pronouncements at face value. Some
are, at very least, much more interesting than others. Personally, I would
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rather read last week’s TV Guide than superstring theory, even if
superstring theory will indeed lead to a Theory of Everything. For unless
the Theory of Everything is going to include a Theory of Achieving
Universal Peace and Prosperity – which I somehow doubt – I can happily
slog through the rest of my life without it. I consider it science that I (and
any other reasonable person) don’t need to bother with.132
Here again, Marks fails to frame his argument. The fact that Vesalius had to deal with
accusations of grave-robbing or that anthropologists sometimes have to explain their
interest in human remains speaks volumes about their respective cultures, but is virtually
silent about the scientific endeavors with which they were then engaged. Marks’ inability
to distinguish this fact makes me wish that he had taken his own advice and stuck to last
week’s TV Guide. As for his efforts in “Voltaire This Ain’t,” all I can say is “reasonable,
they aren’t.”

Speaking of pointing, Peter S. Williams, in his article, “The Emperor’s Incoherent
New Clothes – Pointing the Finger at Dawkins’ Atheism,” writes:
When we ask how the new atheism conceives of our intellectual
obligations, we discover a theory of knowledge so narrow as to be selfcontradictory: Next time somebody tells you something that sounds
important, think to yourself:
‘Is this the kind of thing that people probably know because
of evidence? Or is it the kind of thing that people only
believe because of tradition, authority or revelation?’ And
next time somebody tells you that something is true, why
not say to them: ‘What kind of evidence is there for that?’
And if they can’t give you a good answer, I hope you’ll
think very carefully before you believe a word they say.
Dawkins limits what counts as evidence so tightly (conflating evidence
with empirical evidence) that his encouragement is self-defeating, because
it can’t be justified with anything that he’d count as evidence. The
assertion that all beliefs must be justified on the basis of other beliefs
before they count as rational entails an infinite regress of justifications that
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can never be accumulated. Dawkins’ own statement implores us not to
believe a word he says – a fine example of sawing through the branch
upon which one is seated.133
I would argue, however, that Dawkins is on a far firmer foundation than Williams’
critique implies. For while accusing Dawkins of “conflating evidence with empirical
evidence,” Williams simultaneously conflates evidence with belief. Thus, as far as
religion is concerned, Williams is undoubtedly right: “The assertion that all beliefs must
be justified on the basis of other beliefs before they count as rational entails an infinite
regress of justifications that can never be accumulated.” Science, however, does not rest
upon any belief that is itself separable from the ascertainable (i.e. empirical) evidence for
that belief. Thus, in practice, Williams’ accusation of an infinite regress is certainly not
infinite and in fact, barely a regress at all.
Williams eventually betrays his conflation of evidence with belief, when he
argues:
How can anyone (e.g. a religious believer) be responsible for not living up
to their intellectual obligations if they aren’t free to be responsible for
anything in the first place? If everything about a person is ‘governed by
the laws of physics’, blaming them for their intellectual failings would
make as much sense as Newton blaming gravity for giving him an applesized bump on the head. Indeed, if all beliefs are caused by nothing but the
laws of physics, how can we rationally privilege one effect of these laws
(e.g. belief in atheism) over another (e.g. belief in theism)?134
As for Williams’ attempt to blame the New Atheists for the emperor’s unfortunate
nakedness, he writes:
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The Emperor’s rhetorically fine new clothes are logically incoherent;
which is as much as to say that they have no substance in the land of truth.
Despite appearances, the Emperor is naked. Agnostic John Humphrys is
ready to take up the call of Hans Christian Andersen’s innocent child in
the crowd:
The atheists… must prove, rather than merely assert, that
mainstream religion is a malign force in the world [but how
can they do this whilst denying any objective reality to
moral malignancy?]. They cannot rely on a small minority
of religious extremists to do that for them or hark back to
the brutality of earlier centuries. And they must offer an
alternative to the millions who rely on their beliefs to make
sense of their lives [but how can they do this whilst
denying any objective reality to our intellectual
obligations?]. Unlike the militant atheists I do not think
people are stupid if they believe in God. For vast numbers
of ordinary, thoughtful people it is impossible not to. Of
course, this may be the result of indoctrination at a very
early age – but it may also be a considered reluctance to
accept that the material world is all there is.135
In attempting to drive the final nail into Dawkins’ arguments, Williams has swung his
hammer too wildly and unintentionally struck his own Achilles’ heel in the process. The
child in Hans Christian Andersen’s tale had nothing to prove. All he or she had to do was
utter the truth: the emperor is naked. The obviousness of that statement became
immediately apparent. The impetus to dispute it then fell to the emperor (who believed he
was clothed), to the tailors who had supposedly clothed him in the first place (and in so
doing, promoted that belief), or to the multitude (who had heretofore complied in this
charade). The desire to shift the burden of proof away from the faithful is, of course,
understandable, given that none of the available evidence accrued thus far rests in their
corner, but indoctrination and/or considered reluctance aside, this does not excuse
Williams, or the religious more generally, of having to mount any sort of defensible
rebuttal to the New Atheists’ arguments.
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In his article, “Taking the Dawkins Challenge, or the Dark Side of the Meme,”
Gregory Schrempp argues that
meme theory, [when] confronting the problem of evil, is drawn toward, if
not into, traditional religious paradigms for dealing with the problem of
evil. Judeo-Christian moralizing, for example, shows a tendency to align
the material and the biological with the imperfect or evil, as if matter is
inherently morally compromised. The antidote must be found in some
realm that transcends matter, its limitations, and its mechanics. Memes are
not material things, and yet they are defined through robust biological
analogy and materialistic mechanics. They are encumbered with an aura of
scientific materiality. Dawkins has been criticized repeatedly for
biological reductionism. But I find his most interesting characteristic to lie
in the opposite direction; namely, that despite the biologizing, he appears
to hold out for a realm of moral reflection that transcends not only genes
but memes – a realm that he does not attempt to elaborate in relation to
either. Dawkins concludes his announcement of the concept of the meme,
“We are built as gene machines and cultured as meme machines, but we
have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel
against the tyranny of the selfish replicators” (1989:201). This comment
and others suggest a phenomenology of moral reason that has no clear
relation to the scheme of influence and causation he sets up in his concept
of the meme nor to the processes of Darwinian evolution to which he is
committed.136
Although a refreshingly original and intriguing notion, the logic of Schrempp’s account
breaks down in two basic ways. First, it fails to grasp the inherent “behavioral”
similarities between genes and memes. Rather than resembling the religious dichotomy
between (immaterial) good and (material) evil, genes and memes actually represent two
distinct, complementary, and yet sometimes conflicting processes, which collectively
serve to shape both biological and cultural human evolution. By understanding both the
genetic and memetic underpinnings of our biological and cultural drives, Dawkins argues
that we can “turn against our creators,” (i.e. overcome our baser natures). Schrempp

136

Gregory Schrempp, “Taking the Dawkins Challenge, or, the Dark Side of the Meme,” Journal
of Folklore Research Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan. – Apr., 2009): 96.

71

seems to believe that Dawkins has no logical or moral basis upon which to make such an
assumption. This is Schrempp’s second misconception. Rather than requiring a
transcendent realm or extraneous explanation, all that is needed is insight into the inner
workings of one’s own being and environment. This might be considered somewhat akin
to examining one’s behavioral predilections (or lack thereof) via both physiological and
psychological methods. While the answers one seeks are most likely to be found to have
origins in both one’s body and one’s conscious experience, no additional explanatory
scaffolding is necessary in order to grasp the reality of one’s complex, yet still
completely natural, situation. In other words, natural selection, whether considered on a
biological or cultural level, remains a self-contained system.
Admirably, Schrempp himself eventually admits of this possibility. He writes:
So, what do we have when meme theory meets the problem of evil? One
possible answer is that we have a new mythology, one that, like all
mythologies, plays on the real as envisioned in a particular time and place
– whether that means invasive demons or genes and their power to shape
us – in order to conceptualize and dramatize the problem of evil. The other
possible answer is that what we have here is finally science: memes as the
demythologized, real entities behind our archaic religious illusions. My
own sympathies are with the former view, although if I am wrong on this,
but right that memes in the context of the problem of evil are drawn
towards pre-existing religious paradigms (or memeplexes, if you will) , the
situation is even more interesting: it would illustrate the power of religious
forms over even their detractors.137
And though his own sympathies may lie with the mythological or transcendent
explanation he offered earlier, Schrempp’s final point about “the power of religious
forms over even their detractors” is certainly something we should all be willing to
consider. But again, even if he is correct, Dawkins would surely maintain that simple
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insight into this condition is sufficient to remedy its potential pitfalls. No mythologizing
is necessary.

In his article, “Dawkins’ god-less delusion,” J. Angelo Corlett boldly claims that
In studying Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, one is left with the
impression that he is on an evangelistic mission to “go into all the world
and preach the gospel” of scientific atheism so that his readers might be
delivered from the delusional tenets of theism. However, it is unclear that
Dawkins’ self-described brand of atheism is genuinely atheistic in the first
place. But even if it is atheistic, it is implausible. At most, what Dawkins’
argument supports is an atheology relative to orthodox Christian theism.
But this is atheism only for those who are parochially Western in their
thinking about God, a problem (ironically) with which Dawkins saddles
orthodox Christian theism. So while it might be true that orthodox
Christian theism is delusional, for all Dawkins argues, he himself suffers
from the Godless delusion of wrongly reasoning that the defeat of
orthodox Christian theism justifies atheism, properly construed. Indeed, I
shall argue that agnosticism is a more intellectually responsible and
respectable position to adopt than Dawkins’ atheism. Thus I shall turn
Dawkins’ reasoning on its head, exposing his Godless delusion.138
In the preceding paragraph, Corlett makes two basic claims about Dawkins. First, Corlett
argues that disproving the tenets of any one specific form of theism (in this case,
orthodox Christian theism) does not logically result in one’s automatic adoption of
atheism, but should rather result in agnosticism. Second, Corlett claims that this is, in
fact, precisely what has occurred, and that (the actually agnostic) Dawkins has simply
misrepresented the results of his deconversion.
Corlett elaborates:
Evidence of Dawkins’ poor reasoning is found in his dealing with
agnosticism by conveniently distinguishing what he declares are two
forms of it: “… the legitimate fence-sitting where there really is a definite
answer, one way or another, but so far we lack the evidence to reach it”
from a more permanent kind of position of this sort of fence-sitting. One
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might concur with Dawkins that the former position is more acceptable
than the latter, as the latter leaves no room for the future discovery of the
fact of the matter about God’s existence one way or the other. But why
Dawkins’ reasoning does not lead him to adopt the former view instead of
the one he does adopt is mysterious in light of the evidence and his own
arguments. One wonders, then, whether the title of that section of his book
(“The Poverty of Agnosticism”) ought rather to read: “The Plausibility of
Agnosticism.” Moreover, he deliberately, or perhaps out of ignorance of
alternative theisms developed by certain philosophers and theologians in
recent decades, focuses his attention on one of the weakest or most easily
refutable of Christian theisms. While this tactic sells books among those
unaware of the fallacies underlying such rhetorical shenanigans, it does
nothing to advance serious discussion of the important issues at hand.139
Unfortunately, such a statement fails to recognize that Dawkins does precisely what
Corlett implores him to do. One will recall Dawkins’ notion of a spectrum of belief,
ranging from 1 (Strong Theist) to 7 (Strong Atheist), as well as Dawkins’ related remarks
that “I count
myself in category 6, but leaning towards 7 – I am agnostic only to the extent that I am
agnostic about fairies at the bottom of the garden.”140 Thus, it would seem that the
furthest Dawkins could have gone in renaming this particular section of the book is “The
Possibility of Agnosticism.” But that is not what Corlett suggests. He instead offers the
word “plausibility,” which incidentally means “having an appearance of truth or reason;
seemingly worthy of approval or acceptance; credible; believable.”141 This is hardly a
neutral position either, and Corlett is wrong to present it as such. As for Corlett’s
criticism that Dawkins doesn’t seem to consider (at least seriously) the “alternative
theisms developed by certain philosophers and theologians in recent decades,” I can only
agree. But I would argue that this is for reasons which Corlett himself suggests when
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attempting to describe Dawkins’ omission and subsequent focus on more mainstream,
traditional faiths. He writes that “the fallacies underlying such rhetorical shenanigans…
[do] nothing to advance serious discussion of the important issues at hand.” As I will
demonstrate presently, these criticisms could and should apply more so to these recent
theologies than to Dawkins’ decision to dismiss them.
Nevertheless, Corlett attempts to qualify his previous statement. He submits that
Dawkins:
is guilty of refuting a theology that is so outmoded and implausible that
few competent, non-fideistic scholars would endorse it. Indeed, even
Thomas Aquinas, hardly a radical Christian theologian, doubted some of
the hyperbolic (yet orthodox) divine attributes. Perhaps Dawkins is
unaware that entire schools of Christian (or quasi-Christian) theism have
been developed over the past half-century or so that attempt to address
precisely many of his concerns – and then some! Undoubtedly, his reason
for addressing orthodox Christian theism is because of its popularity in the
West, and as a public scholar he is diligently attempting to raise
consciousness about natural selection and its power to explain various
phenomena. This much is understandable. However, for Dawkins to draw
the conclusions he draws without at least delving somewhat into such
alternative theologies is misleading, if not irresponsible.…When carefully
combined, certain process and liberation theologies can go a long way
toward addressing many of Dawkins’ concerns with theism, making
theism a more live option than Dawkins ever considers it to be.142
And herein lies the problem with Corlett’s critique. Dawkins sees no need to reconcile
scientific reality with the Iron Age beliefs of a desert-dwelling, tribalistic society, with
the medieval scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, or with the more present-day QuasiChristian, process, and/or liberation theologies. This is simply because all of these
perspectives start from the supposition that (at least some version of) God exists and that
such a belief can be made to fit with naturally observable phenomena as well as (at least
some elements of) traditional Christian theology. Science need not hold any such
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preconceived notions, and thus has neither the time nor the inclination to examine or
“carefully combine” any methodologies that do. This, incidentally, serves to reinforce my
prior criticism, which is that Corlett’s agnosticism isn’t any more neutral than Dawkins’.
If the latter rates himself a six on the scale, I would argue that Corlett can be ranked no
higher than two. The only difference is, Dawkins can admit it.

In his article, “Affirmations After God: Friedrich Nietzsche and Richard Dawkins
on Atheism,” J. Thomas Howe argues that
Nietzsche’s celebration of the death of God is infused with notes of
tragedy. By this, I mean that the life we awaken to in the godless universe
contains real and profound possibilities for significant joys and beauties.
But they come only with great effort and unavoidable cost. Living well
after God requires an honest awareness and affirmation of reality’s costly
and destructive ways. There are workable strategies for minimizing the
risks of living in such a world. One can play it “safe” by means of
renunciation, certain forms of asceticism, and resignation. But these
devices, argues Nietzsche, are decadent and weaken one’s capacities for
joy, strength, abundance, and beauty. Nietzsche’s way of affirmation is a
life of willing and wanting, of full engagement, all the while knowing and
affirming that one does so with unavoidable exposure to the risks of
destruction and suffering. Throughout Dawkins’s writings one finds little
sense of these serious consequences of life without God. Here we see that
life without God is essentially unproblematic, with very little difficulties
in terms of how to go on with things. In fact, life without God is presented
as something airier, roomier, and altogether more wonderful. Dawkins
partakes in what Charles Taylor calls a “subtraction story” (Taylor 2007,
22). This is not to suggest that Dawkins is entirely oblivious to the
consequences of his views. Clearly, he attempts to make his atheism
intellectually honest. But in Dawkins’s presentation of the value of life
without God, there is a naïve optimism that purports that human beings,
educated in science and purged of religion, will find lives of peace and
astonishing wonder.143
Consequently, it seems that Howe’s main criticism of Dawkins’ particular brand of
atheism is that it is too “naively optimistic.” According to Howe, Nietzsche understood
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that, if one is to inhabit a truly godless universe, both the death throes of God and the
subsequent birth pangs of atheism must be accompanied by “unavoidable exposure to the
risks of destruction and suffering.” This, of course, implies that it is we who are now
suddenly responsible for providing the sense of comfort and meaning in our lives that our
former belief in God once afforded us. Dawkins simply disagrees. He writes:
There is something infantile in the presumption that somebody else
(parents in the case of children, God in the case of adults) has a
responsibility to give your life meaning and point. It is all of a piece with
the infantilism of those who, the moment they twist their ankle, look
around for someone to sue. Somebody else must be responsible for my
well-being, and somebody else must be to blame if I am hurt. Is it a
similar infantilism that really lies behind the ‘need’ for a God?… The
truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as
wonderful as we choose to make it. And we can make it very wonderful
indeed.144
In other words, there is nothing naively optimistic about Dawkins’ understanding of
atheism. By contrast, I would consider it a far more mature rendering of the atheist’s
personal responsibilities. But as in Nietzsche’s own account, nothing is ever certain.
Maybe those who subscribe to Dawkins’ views will indeed find “lives of peace and
astonishing wonder.” Perhaps they won’t (as Howe and Nietzsche believe). Dawkins’
point is simply that the choice (and the responsibility) has been solely theirs all along. 145

Understood in this light, James McBain’s arguments in his review of The God
Delusion can now be taken with the appropriate grain(s) of salt. He claims:
To raise the closet-atheists’ consciousness requires giving a morality we
can sink our teeth in to. We need to account for all the normative factors
of one’s moral life, not just the description of the origins. Morality, in part,
gives our lives meaning. It is this meaning that would motivate the closetatheist off the couch and to the window ready to scream. I must be clear. I
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am not maintaining this can’t be done; rather that Dawkins doesn’t do it!
There are a host of others who are tackling this issue (evolution and
morality) and attempting to provide a robust account of morality, not just
the descriptive claim about the origins of our sense of right and wrong.
This is the problem. Dawkins simply doesn’t come through and that makes
me mad as hell.146
However, as Dawkins has just explained, both our sense of meaning and our
understanding of morality are concepts we must all continually work out for ourselves.
To expect God or one’s society to unburden us of this most precious responsibility is to
miss out on the most prized joys and most pressing obligations of being human.147

Nicholas Lash, in his article, “Where Does the God Delusion Come From?” offers
a far more semantic criticism of Dawkins’ arguments. He writes:
Where the grammar of the word “God” is concerned, Dawkins, ignorant of
centuries of Jewish, Christian and Islamic reflection on the “naming” of
the holy and utterly transcendent mystery on which the world depends,
persists in taking for granted that “God” is the name of a non-existent
thing, a particular, specifiable, fictitious entity. His understanding of the
notion of “belief in God” (to which I now turn) is as crass and ill-informed
as his understanding of what the word “God” means. He takes it for
granted that “believing in God” is a matter of being of the opinion that
God exists. However, as Saint Augustine pointed out sixteen centuries
ago, even the devils know that God exists! One may know quite well that
God exists and yet be entirely lacking in the virtue of faith. Dawkins
defines faith as “belief without evidence”. Christianity does not. To
believe in God, to have faith in God, as Christianity understands these
things, is (to quote Augustine again) “in believing to love, in believing to
delight, in believing to walk towards him, and be incorporated amongst
the limbs and members of his body”. To be a Jew, or a Christian, or a
Muslim, is to be a member of a particular people: a people whose identity
is specified by particular habits of memory and ritual, of understanding
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and relationship and hope. Dawkins tells the story of a young Afghan who
was “sentenced to death for converting to Christianity”. The story is a
tragic commentary on the extent to which the relationships between two
traditions, two “peoples”, which should (and sometimes have) understood
each other to be “cousins”, have sometimes deteriorated into bitter
conflict. Dawkins, however, sees things differently. “All [the young
Afghan] did”, he remarks, “was change his mind. Internally and privately,
he changed his mind. He entertained certain thoughts.” Not so. He
publicly changed his allegiance from one people to another.148
Thus, according to Lash’s interpretation, Dawkins’ error is in attempting to define “God”
at all. If Dawkins would only accept that God is “an utterly transcendent mystery upon
which the world depends,” then, and only then, will he have earned the right to consider
the notion itself. Of course, in so doing, he would be required to admit that no further
inquiry into the matter would now be possible. Lash, however, goes one step further in
relegating God to the periphery of religion. When he writes that “to be a Jew, or a
Christian, or a Muslim, is to be a member of a particular people: a people whose identity
is specified by particular habits of memory and ritual, of understanding and relationship
and hope,” he is arguing for an almost exclusively sociological understanding of religion.
According to this interpretation, the young Afghan’s crime was not that of apostasy
(which might come as a shock to those who sought to execute him for it) but rather a
public renunciation of his citizenship! But I suppose if God is a mystery and religion
merely a membership, then such equally specious conclusions about the implications of
the former and the all-too-real consequences of the latter are also possible.
Take for example, the following passage, wherein Lash attempts to describe
Dawkins’ misunderstanding of the use(s) of scripture. He writes:
“Of course,” says Dawkins at one point, “irritated theologians will protest
that we don’t take the book of Genesis literally any more. But that is my
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whole point! We pick and choose which bits of scripture to believe, which
bits to write off as allegories”. Notice that “any more”. Dawkins takes it
for granted that Christians have traditionally been fundamentalists, but that
as the plausibility of fundamentalist readings of the text has been eroded
by the march of reason, “irritated theologians” protest that they no longer
take biblical texts literally. Paradoxically, he has the story almost
completely upside down. Patristic and medieval theology worked with a
rich, at times almost uncontrollable diversity of “senses of scripture”.
Passages of Scripture gave up their sense only by being read in many
different ways. Fundamentalism – in the sense of the privileging of the
meaning which a passage, taken out of any context, appears a priori, on
the surface, to possess – is, as the Old Testament scholar James Barr
demonstrated thirty years ago, a byproduct of modern rationalism: of the
privileging of timeless and direct description, of mathematics over
metaphor, prose over poetry. What I earlier described as Richard
Dawkins’ “fundamentalism in reverse” comes through clearly in his
curious insistence that the only way to take a biblical text seriously is to
“believe it” literally. To take it allegorically (for example) is to “write it
off”. Somewhere at the back of all this is the myth (the roots of which lie
back in ancient Greece) that truth can only be expressed through
prosaically direct description, and that all other literary forms are forms of
fiction, incapable of expressing truth.149
Did you catch that? “Patristic and medieval theology worked with a rich, at times almost
uncontrollable diversity of ‘senses of scripture’. Passages of Scripture gave up their sense
only by being read in many different ways.” In other words, how dare Dawkins attempt
to interpret any passage of scripture (and subsequently pass judgment upon it) without
realizing that it necessarily permits of various (and sometimes conflicting)
understandings. To Lash, I would simply reiterate the warning as he continues summarily
passing judgment upon Dawkins’ words without exercising the careful consideration he
insists upon for scripture. But the fundamentalism of which Dawkins speaks is not that
which Lash chastises. It is simply that, whether they consider it to be literal or
metaphorical (or both), all Christians believe and understand the Bible to be the greatest
(if not sole) source of Truth in the world. Were they ever to entertain the possibility that
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such a conviction might be wrong, then, and only then, would they transcend the label of
fundamentalist.
Unfortunately, Lash doesn’t believe Dawkins understands the word “science”
either. He explains:
When C. P. Snow gave the Rede Lecture in Cambridge in 1959, on “The
Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution”, he was expressing an
anxiety in British culture concerning what many perceived to be “a
profound mutual suspicion and incomprehension” between those he called
“the literary intellectuals” and the natural scientists. Although the roots of
this division can be traced back to the development, in the seventeenthcentury, of new standards of empirical investigation of the natural world,
it is worth bearing in mind that “the Enlightenment’s great intellectual
monument”, Diderot’s Encyclopedia, no more represents human
knowledge as structured around a division corresponding to what we
would now call “the sciences” and “the humanities” than had Francis
Bacon’s Advancement of Learning a century earlier (on which the design
of the Encyclopedia was based). The construction of this division was a
nineteenth-century achievement, and the “anglophone heresy” seems to
have made its first appearance in 1867, in the Dublin Review. “We shall”,
said W. G. Ward, “use the word ‘science’ in the sense which Englishmen
so commonly give to it; as expressing physical and experimental science,
to the exclusion of theological and metaphysical”. The point is this.
Whenever one comes across the concept of “science”, in the singular,
being used (as Dawkins does) to support sweeping assertions to the effect
that here, and here alone, is truth to be obtained, then one is in the
presence neither of science, nor of history, but ideology.150
Essentially, Lash is arguing that, by omitting the theological and metaphysical from his
scientific deliberations, Dawkins is committing the “anglophone heresy.” Consequently,
his affinity for evidential and experimental science is not actually science, but merely an
ideological preference.151 So, to sum up, Lash maintains that god is a mystery, religion a
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social club (whose membership cannot be revoked), and that Christianity has never
subscribed to a fundamentalist understanding of scripture. Consequently, I would argue
that it is Lash, not Dawkins, who “is in the presence neither of science, nor of history, but
ideology.” As Joan Bakewell explains:
Believers wrongly accuse Dawkins of being himself a fundamentalist, a
fundamentalist atheist. He argues the difference: that given proof he was
wrong he would at once change his opinions, whereas the true
fundamentalist clings to his faith whatever the challenge. What he doesn’t
satisfactorily answer is the sense that people of faith have of the divine, a
true experience for them that encompasses love and joy and celebration all the things Dawkins finds in the physical world. He doesn’t comprehend
that for many people reasoned argument is not the final arbiter of how
they choose to live their lives. They are swayed by feelings, moved by
loyalties, willing to set logic aside for the sake of psychic comfort. Tell
them that all this is the product of chemical and electrical activity in the
brain and they will at best assert that God made it thus. For decades now
we have been willing to let such diversity of unverifiable beliefs exist
among a democratic tolerance of ideas. But this, the assumption of the
secular outlook, can no longer be taken for granted. The clouds are
darkening around tolerance.152
But against Bakewell, I would suggest that Dawkins does in fact comprehend that “for
many people reasoned argument is not the final arbiter of how they choose to live their
lives.” He simply wants the religious to reconsider that position and has dedicated a
considerable amount of time and energy toward compiling and communicating a
veritable laundry list of reasons for doing so. In fact, I would say it was this purpose,
above all others, which prompted him to publish The God Delusion in the first place.

In his review, Stephen Bullivant argues that Dawkins’ central mistake was in not
taking his own advice from years earlier. He writes:
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Dawkins made his name as a brilliant popularizer of complex biological
science – a subject upon which he is amply qualified to comment. Here
too, when writing on the virtues and plausibility of a humanistic
worldview, and when demolishing creationism and the Paleian
teleological argument, Dawkins is at the top of his game. The same
cannot, however, be said for his more general forays into philosophy and
theology – subjects in which he has neither expertise nor interest. Indeed,
as the celebrated zoologist himself once put it in a footnote to The Selfish
Gene: ‘Publishers should correct the misapprehension that a scholar’s
distinction in one field implies authority in another. And as long as the
misapprehension exists, distinguished scholars should resist the temptation
to abuse it.’153
In other words, if Dawkins wants to talk about biology, fine. But he is simply not
qualified to venture off into the more nuanced philosophical and theological arguments
for God. These, he should have left to the experts. Bullivant elaborates:
Dawkins does not seem… to have checked whether theistic philosophers
have formulated any adequate response. Here, as throughout the book, a
lack of real engagement with (as opposed to the odd quotation from)
serious theology and religious philosophy is glaring. As conspicuous, but
more puzzling, is the absence of serious atheist philosophy also. Thus the
powerful and closely-reasoned critiques of religious belief by Michael
Martin, Nicholas Everitt and Kai Nielsen, incomparably stronger allies to
Dawkins’s cause than the popular and superficial works littering his
bibliography, all go unmentioned. A passing acquaintance with Martin’s
Atheism, Morality and Meaning (2002), in particular, would vastly have
strengthened Dawkins’s two chapters on the relationship of religion to
morality which, as they stand, already contain some of the volume’s
highlights.154
In addition to chastising Dawkins for not checking to see whether theistic philosophers
have managed to concoct any plausible rebuttals to his criticisms, Bullivant argues that
Dawkins is guilty of the same superficial tendencies where his own side is concerned as
well. Odd then that Bullivant would single out Michael Martin’s recent book, rebuke
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Dawkins’ for his apparent lack of familiarity with it, and then admit that The God
Delusion nevertheless seems to have captured “some of the volume’s highlights.”155
But as for the claim that Dawkins misrepresents those rebuttals against his
positions, Bullivant offers a particularly telling example. He states:
As it happens, Dawkins avoids contradiction by presenting even the
strongest arguments so superficially that, to the philosophically innocent
bystander, it appears they really are so ‘spectacularly weak’ (p. 2) as to be
impossible for any sincere, half-way intelligent person to accept. This
strategy, however, leads Dawkins into some interesting dead-ends, as with
the young Bertrand Russell’s fleeting assent to the ‘ontological proof’.
Unable to admit that this ‘infantile’ piece of ‘logomachist trickery’ (pp.
80, 81) might possess even a shred of plausibility, he wildly suggests that
Russell was ‘an exaggeratedly fair-minded atheist’, and gently berates him
for being, as a philosopher, ‘over-eager’ to base his beliefs on logic (p.
81)!156
This, of course, omits the fact that, in his essay, “Why I Am Not a Christian,” Bertrand
Russell writes:
To come to this question of the existence of God, it is a large and serious
question, and if I were to attempt to deal with it in any adequate manner I
should have to keep you here until Kingdom Come, so that you will have
to excuse me if I deal with it in a somewhat summary fashion.157
As confirmation of this tendency, I present Russell’s treatments of both the ontological
argument as well as the argument from design. (The first of these excerpts is taken not
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from “Why I Am Not a Christian,” but rather from Russell’s 1905 article, “On
Denoting.”)
The most perfect Being has all perfections; existence is a perfection;
therefore the most perfect Being exists” becomes:- “There is one and only
one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is
a perfection; therefore that one exists”. As a proof, this fails for want of a
proof of the premise “there is one and only one entity x which is most
perfect”.158
You all know the argument from design: everything in the world is made
just so that we can manage to live in the world, and if the world was ever
so little different we could not manage to live in it. That is the argument
from design. It sometimes takes a rather curious form; for instance, it is
argued that rabbits have white tails in order to be easy to shoot. I do not
know how rabbits would view that application. It is an easy argument to
parody. You all know Voltaire’s remark, that obviously the nose was
designed to be such as to fit spectacles. That sort of parody has turned out
to be not nearly so wide of the mark as it might have seemed in the
eighteenth century, because since the time of Darwin we understand much
better why living creatures are adapted to their environment. It is not that
their environment was made to be suitable to them, but that they grew to
be suitable to it, and that is the basis of adaptation. There is no evidence of
design about it.159
Thus, it seems that even Russell was eventually obliged to treat both the
ontological and teleological arguments (among others) with the same requisite terseness
as Dawkins. This is undoubtedly because, as Graham Oppy observes:
One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared
hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive, i.e., none of them provides
those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists – and who
are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. – with either a pro tanto
reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any
reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far
which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result
which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance
that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept,
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or has a benign conclusion which has no religious significance, or else
falls prey to more than one of the above failings.160
Hence, if the best example Bullivant can muster in his critique of Dawkins’ summary
treatment of supposedly superior instances of philosophical and/or theological argument
can so easily be contextualized and/or explained, it seems only logical to conclude that it
may well be the case that more unanswerable accounts simply do not exist (at least as far
as he is aware).

Conversely, Michael Ruse writes in his review of The God Delusion that
Dawkins’ problem is not that he pays too little attention to traditional arguments for the
existence of God, but rather that he affords them too much. Ruse writes:
Saint Augustine, one of the greatest thinkers of Western civilization,
devoted but one paragraph in the City of God to the proofs. Saint Thomas
was categorical that the proofs are second to faith. John Henry Newman,
the greatest theologian that Britain has ever produced, was unambiguous.
In 1870 (twenty-five years after he converted to Catholicism from the
Anglican Church of his youth), in correspondence about his seminal
philosophical work, A Grammar of Assent, Newman wrote: “I have not
insisted on the argument from design, because I am writing for the 19th
century, by which, as represented by its philosophers, design is not
admitted as proved. And to tell the truth, though I should not wish to
preach on the subject, for 40 years I have been unable to see the logical
force of the argument myself. I believe in design because I believe in God;
not in a God because I see design.” He continued: “Design teaches me
power, skill and goodness – not sanctity, not mercy, not a future judgment,
which three are of the essence of religion” (The Letters and Diaries of
John Henry Newman, Vol. 21, ed. C. S. Dessain and T. Gornall [Nelson,
1971], p. 97).… Dawkins misunderstands the place of the proofs, but this
is nothing to his treatment of the proofs themselves. This is a man truly
out of his depth. Does he honestly think that no philosopher or theologian
has ever thought of or worried about the infinite regress of the
160
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cosmological argument? If God caused the world, what caused God? The
standard reply is that God needs no cause because he is a necessary being,
eternal, outside time. Read Saint Augustine’s Confessions. Just as 2+2=4
is uncaused and always true, so is God’s existence. Now, you might want
to worry about the notion of necessary existence. But at least you should
know that it is something to worry about. 161
Thus, Dawkins problem is that he simultaneously dedicates too much and too little time
to the traditional proofs for God’s existence, and that he likewise affords them both too
little and too much respect. Consequently, one wonders whether further action on
Dawkins’ part would remedy or exacerbate the problem.162

Nevertheless, echoing Bullivant’s criticisms, Peter Milward writes:
I have to confess I have been reading the latest best-seller, Richard
Dawkins’ The God Delusion, with a mixture of fascination and frustration
– with fascination, as the author writes so refreshingly well for an
academic biologist, yet with frustration, as the most interesting parts of his
book are those on which, as a biologist, he has no qualification to write. It
all reminds me of the proverb that the cobbler should stick to his last. So if
Dawkins is a biologist, he should stick to his biology and not meddle with
theology, about which he is so patently ignorant.163
Milward goes on to provide an example of Dawkins’ supposed ignorance. He explains:
Take, for instance, what he ventures to say about the God of the Old
Testament, that he is ‘arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction,
jealous and proud of it, a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak, a
vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic-cleanser,’ and so on. (p. 31) (I hope I may
be forgiven for declining to set forth his full string of blasphemies!)
Certainly, he must shock the majority of his readers, and he evidently
intends to shock them. No doubt, too, he can produce chapter and verse
from the Bible for each of his blasphemous assertions. Yet what they all
161
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add up to isn’t truth but falsehood. What Dawkins, perhaps from his
meticulous scientific viewpoint, fails to realize is that the assertion of the
truth frequently contains an implication of falsehood, or that, as
Shakespeare might have reminded him, it is ‘the equivocation of the fiend’
to lie like truth. There must be thousands of Bible readers, who know
almost every book of the Bible by heart, yet who might well be
astonished, at the parade of Biblical epithets this professed atheist trots out
from his select anthology to prove the godlessness of God. The fact is that
most believers who read the Bible for spiritual sustenance find what
appeals to them in what St. Jerome calls the forest of the Scriptures. There
is something in it for everyone, and Dawkins has evidently found in it
what appeals to him, like a dog in search of savory smells.164
Notice how this is in no way a rebuttal of any of Dawkins’ criticisms. For if, as Milward
maintains, “he can produce chapter and verse from the Bible for each of his blasphemous
assertions,” how can they be blasphemous? His Shakespearean quotes notwithstanding,
the fact that Dawkins’ dog-like search for savory smells has so quickly led him to some
of the more unsavory biblical passages is a problem for Milward (and other believers) to
explain, not Dawkins.
But when Dawkins turns his attentions to actual religious history, Milward is even
more dismissive in his critique. He argues that
far more than in the pages of the Bible, whether the Old or the New
Testament, Dawkins finds a happy hunting ground – like his predecessors
in this field, the Protestant Centuriators of Magdeburg – in the centuries of
Christian history, including the pages of that other respected source of
divine revelation known as Tradition. Roaming over these pages of often
scandalous gossip, spreading as they do over so many places and times,
and viewing them with what I can only call his ‘evil eye’ of atheism,
Dawkins characterizes them in terms of such aberrations as the Catholic
treatment of Jews, heretics and witches, with special attention reserved for
the crusades and the inquisition, as if the majority of Christians in so many
places and times were gloatingly engaged in such behavior most of the
time. He seems to be oblivious to the generally attested truth that ‘No
news is good news’, and that what seems to us most scandalous and
sensational in an age isn’t necessarily the most typical or representative of
people living in that age. He fails to realize that in the background to what
he can only see as sensational in the pages of history Christian people
164
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were living their ordinary Christian lives, trying to put into daily practice
the ideal of charity proposed to them by Christ, an ideal that, so far from
being restricted to their fellow-Christians, goes out to human beings all
over the world, as all are called to be children of our heavenly Father.165
In other words, if only Dawkins would focus on the passages of the Bible that aren’t
horrific, or on the actions of the faithful that aren’t inhumane (to the exclusion of all
others, I might add), then he would certainly come away with a more charitable view of
Christianity. While this is undoubtedly true, such arguments say very little for a tradition
that is required to adopt them in the face of deserved criticism. But if you’re still not
convinced of Milward’s arguments, do not fret. He has one final gem to offer for your
consideration. He writes:
By a strange accident of Fate, which he might well attribute to Natural
Selection, Dawkins boasts of a name that is weirdly close to that of his
hero – I almost said ‘god’ – Darwin. It is close enough in all conscience,
but it falls short in two important respects. First, one has to take the r from
Darwin’s name, the r (as I take it) that stands for ‘reason’, and then one
has to replace it with Dawkins’ own k and s, which taken together may
stand for either ‘kiss’ or (in reverse order) ‘sick’. The ‘kiss’ may in turn
stand for a Judas kiss, such as Judas gave to Christ in the moment of
betraying his Master, while it may also be seen in terms of Dawkins’ own
betrayal of his Master, Darwin, in the way he falsifies the rational
pretensions of biological science with a ‘sick’ fanaticism of his own for
atheistic propaganda.)… In his proselytizing affirmation of atheism
Dawkins writes more interestingly than the majority of his colleagues –
though I can’t claim to have read them all in proof of my affirmation. I
might also have said ‘more sensationally’, or ‘more scandalously’, or even
‘more blasphemously’. He puts into his own words, if in a more extreme
manner, what most of his scientific colleagues may be thinking to
themselves, and at the same time he makes himself the spokesman for his
academic profession, with the result that, in so far as they fail to repudiate
him and his writings, he had made himself the best known – and the
bestselling – scientist of modern times, even to the extent of putting
Einstein himself into the shade. In this, too, he has the advantage, on
which I have already touched, of echoing the sacred name of Darwin in his
own name.166
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Here I cannot help but be reminded of an old episode of the 90s sitcom Friends, entitled,
“The One With All the Poker.” Milward’s arguments have all the profundity of the
following exchange between two of the show’s principle characters.
Phoebe: You guys, you know what I just realized? ‘Joker’ is ‘poker’ with
a ‘J.’ Coincidence?
Chandler: Hey, that’s… that’s ‘joincidence’ with a ‘C’!167
Echoing Milward’s “no news is good news” argument, Peter Heinegg writes:
On the whole, Dawkins makes all sorts of interesting points and scores
any number of eye-catching hits, but he does seem rather blind to the
social functions of religion. Falling back on his beloved notion of memes,
he runs down some of these cultural genes (belief in immortality, hatred of
heretics, exaltation of blind faith, etc.) making up the “memeplex” of
religion. Now, whatever else he can say about religion, Dawkins has to
admit that it has shown a spectacular ability to survive and reproduce itself
despite all the odds (including the efforts of critics like him). But his list of
memes is such a casual, scattershot affair, ignoring religion’s mighty
community-building, life-enhancing, paradigm-shaping, sense-infusing,
joy-inducing, brain-transforming features – and concentrating instead on
superficial, obvious targets like the Qur’an’s visions of houris.… The
religion that Dawkins demolishes, like the God he imagines as enthroned
in its midst, deserves (and staggers under) practically all the blows he
launches at it; but there’s a whole other world that he scarcely lays a glove
on. That world isn’t necessarily immune to reason’s assaults, but they’ll
have to be orchestrated more subtly and sensitively than they are here.168
Although it could be quite reasonably argued that Heinegg’s comments hardly constitute
a criticism, his suggestion that Dawkins focus more so on the subtly and nuanced
manifestations of religion is to essentially argue that he ignore (or at the very least
downplay) the more mainstream historical and current understandings of the
phenomenon. As for Heinegg’s suggestion that Dawkins’ list of memes is “a scattershot
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affair,” I would simply suggest that such is the best practice for hitting as broad a target
as possible. To claim otherwise is to imply that a more precise aim might yield more
ideologically-appeasing results (all the while avoiding potential pitfalls along the way),
but such is not Dawkins’ intention. As in most forms of analysis, the bad (i.e. weak)
arguments can, indeed must, be considered alongside the good and/or strong ones. To
accuse him of omitting many of the latter while simultaneously suggesting he eliminate
almost all of the former seems a most unproductive approach.169

In his review of The God Delusion, Thomas Martin argues that
the book’s most serious weakness is Dawkins’ inability to adopt a
suspension of belief and practice what Ninian Smart called ‘sympathetic
understanding.’… Dawkins seems to be completely incapable of garnering
even an inkling of how religion might work as an explanation of reality.…
The failure to acknowledge known weaknesses in the philosophical
underpinnings of his argument, and the inability to suspend belief and
enter sympathetically into foreign intellectual territory causes Dawkins’
argument to go wrong more often than not. I finished the book with this
dictum in mind: no theist who has never agonized over the inadequacies of
faith and held serious doubts about God’s existence should be allowed to
write a book attacking atheism. No atheist who has never seriously
wondered if there might be more to the show than materialism is capable
of imagining should be allowed to write a book attacking God.170
Martin’s admittedly reasonable last dictum aside, I fail to see how Dawkins’ adopting a
more “sympathetic understanding” of the religious mindset will make for a more
compelling or complete analysis. To this charge of insensitivity, I will allow Dawkins
himself to respond. In a 2012 interview with Al Jazeera, Richard Dawkins was asked
169
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why his book “didn’t include some of the good things that religion has done?” What
follows is his response and the subsequent exchange:
Dawkins: My passion is for scientific truth. I don’t much care about
what’s good and evil, actually. I care about what’s true. Do you actually
believe, in your Muslim faith, do you believe that Muhammad split the
moon in two? Do you believe that Muhammad flew to heaven on a winged
horse, for example? I pay you the compliment of assuming that you don’t.
Mehdi Hasan: No, I do. I believe in Miracles.
Dawkins: You believe that?
Hasan: Yes.
Dawkins: You believe that Muhammad went to heaven on a winged
horse?
Hasan: Yes. I believe in God. I believe in miracles. I believe in revelation.
I mean, the point here is that let’s assume I’m wrong, Richard. I’m wrong.
Dawkins: Yeah, let’s.
Hasan: Let’s assume I’m wrong. I’m wrong. I’m happy to concede that,
Richard. I’m happy to concede it. I’m wrong. All religions are wrong. God
does not exist. We’re all mad. The issue is: we exist. We’ve existed for a
while, and I think even Christopher Hitchens said, and you’ve said in your
writings, we’re not going anywhere. So my question to you is: “Why not
acknowledge, for example, the good things that religion has done? Do you
accept that religion has done good things, despite all of our mad beliefs
and our miracles?171
Given Dawkins’ comments on the prominence of truth in his intellectual and scientific
pursuits, one immediately sees why Hasan’s question, and indeed Martin’s concern about
emotional empathy, is completely irrelevant: science simply does not require it.
Sympathetic understanding may be a requisite of religious belief, just as its reciprocity
undoubtedly aids in interfaith conversation, but science (and Dawkins) cares only about
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what is true. It requires neither belief nor sympathy in order to function. In fact, science
works equally well in their absence. The same simply cannot be said of faith.
Consequently, were Martin’s dictum to ever actually be implemented, one imagines the
number of atheistic and scientific tomes would be largely unchanged, while space on the
shelves of more religious archives would likely no longer come at quite such a premium.

But concurring with Martin, Michael Fuller, in “Reticence, Reason and Rhetoric:
Some Responses to Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion,” writes that
a side-effect of Dawkins’ approach… is the likelihood that his intemperate
rubbishing of those whom he perceives to be his opponents is doing great
damage to the reputation of the sciences. At a time when public suspicion
of science and technology is running rampant, over issues such as nuclear
and biological weaponry, GM crops, drug company profits, and the everpresent threat of ecological catastrophe, anyone with the (grossly
mistaken) idea that scientists are intolerant, megalomaniacal bigots would
have that view strikingly confirmed by The God Delusion.172
In other words, if Dawkins isn’t careful, his intemperance toward religion will lend
credence to the public’s current misconceptions about the “intolerant, megalomaniacal
bigotry” of science. Of course, Fuller goes on to argue, via the writings of Christian
Smith, that Dawkins’ greatest failure is his inability to recognize that science is itself
little more than an alternative faith-based system, and therefore just as vulnerable to
intolerance, megalomania, and bigotry as any other so-called (meta)narrative. He writes:
Christian Smith has commented, ‘our convictions and disagreements… are
based precisely on larger systems of beliefs grounded in deeper
suppositional beliefs’ – something which applies to theists and atheists
alike. Smith draws attention to the narratives which people tell in order to
give shape and meaning to experience: the ‘Christian narrative’ is one
such, and another is the ‘scientific enlightenment narrative’. It is the latter,
of course, which Dawkins reiterates so clearly. Smith comments, ‘what is
172
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evidence is itself largely made significant, if not constituted for us, by our
narratives’. If this is so, it is doubtful whether debates around The God
Delusion are capable of resolution, since participants coming from
different perspectives will weigh and judge evidence differently depending
on the narrative which has generated it for them.173
In essence, Fuller is arguing that if Dawkins doesn’t adjust both his attitude and his
approach, he runs the very real risk of confirming the public’s “grossly mistaken”
misconceptions about science, which incidentally and paradoxically happen to be quite
plausible, if not ultimately true. Such an “argument” is so circular and self-defeating that
I am even loathe to consider it as such.174

Nonetheless, this notion of science as simply an alternative explanatory narrative
is apparently an approach that Klaus Klostermaier wishes to adopt as well. In his article,
“Reflections Prompted By Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion,” he writes:
Virtually all terms used by modern sciences have a poetical and/or
philosophical antecedent and are intentionally reduced versions of larger
concepts. Time, for instance, has been reduced by science to the
mechanically measurable clicks of a chronometer (whether the oldfashioned clock-work or the newest atomic oscillation type). For the
ancient Greeks, to mention just one instance, Chronos was a mighty power
ruling over all living beings: He ate his own children. Time deeply affects
us personally; as we grow up and age, our lifetime is much more than the
sum-total of clock ticks during a specific period, and the same clock-ticks
signify very different events to different people. The awareness of the
transience of everything through the passing of time became the trigger for
173
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Gautama Buddha’s search for enlightenment and eventually for the birth
of Buddhism, reaching out for a condition of timelessness. According to
the great physicist Erwin Schrödinger (Nobel Prize, 1933), “physical
theory in its present stage strongly suggests the indestructibility of Mind
by Time.”175
That said, one wonders how this expanded, metaphorical, and personified notion of time
could possibly lend itself to a greater understanding or applicability of the concept itself.
Klostermaier simply seems to be echoing Nagel’s criticism that Dawkins’ worldview
entails a “world-flattening reductionism.” Fortunately, science was able to correct (or at
the very least contextualize) that misleading intuition centuries ago without any help from
poetical or philosophical antecedents.176
Thankfully, where theological explanations are concerned, Klostermaier seems a
bit more reasonable. He writes:
I agree that many of the arguments that have been used by theologians and
pious scientists to prove the existence of a Creator God from natural
evidence can no longer be upheld and that the attributes given to the
Creator ought to be revised on the basis of more recent science. Here, too,
a great new “simple” idea may replace the complexities of past theologies.
The intimation of a reality beyond the world of the senses and the awe and
wonder beyond the available explanations of natural phenomena take
place in every age according to the level of education of the beholder.
There is a transcendent element even in the most naïve wonder of an
ordinary person, although the “facts” behind it may have a scientific
explanation.177
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Though possibly misunderstanding Klostermaier’s point, Douglas Groothuis
offers two such “simple” ideas in his article, “Who Designed the Designer?”. He writes:
First, God is understood in monotheism as self-existent. God does not
depend on anything outside of himself for divine existence. That is, God is
the ultimate explanation for the universe and its form, but to ask where
God came from or who designed God from this perspective is a nonsense
question, something like: ‘What is north of the North Pole?’ or ‘What
word do you use when no words will do?’ So, Dawkins… to the contrary,
this is a perfectly good concept. There is no infinite regress such that
nothing gets explained. There is, rather, a finite regress to an infinite
being; that is, a self-existence being. The technical term for self-existence
is aseity. The Apostle Paul spoke of this when he said to the philosophers
of Athens in Acts, chapter seventeen: ‘The God who made the world and
everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and does not live in
temples built by hands. And he is not served by human hands, as if he
needed anything. Rather, he himself gives everyone life and breath and
everything else.’… Second, there is a significant tradition in Christian
theology that claims that God’s existence is simple. That is, God has no
parts. So, while God is the ultimate being in existence, God is not
composed of discrete sections or aspects, so to speak. If that view is
correct, then God would not be complex at all, but perfectly simple. On
Dawkins’s reasoning, therefore, what is perfectly simple is supposed to be
the end of the line in terms of explanation. Thus, Dawkins couldn’t
complain that an absolutely simple being needs to be explained on the
basis of something simpler than itself. 178
One supposes that were Dawkins willing to accept Groothuis’ two hypotheses – that God
is an infinite, self-existent being who is all the while simple – Dawkins could have his
Darwinian cake and eat it too, for chance and complexity would be effectively removed
as the sole remaining obstacles to his account. Unfortunately, an assertion from the
apostle Paul cannot substitute for actual argument or ascertainable evidence. Much more
would be required in order to support such a non(sensical) theory, and pending its
discovery, one assumes that Dawkins would prefer to deal with the ramifications of those
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two remaining obstacles than to simply sweep them aside in order to tidy the ideological
corners of his own scientific house. Observe Groothuis’ concluding thoughts on the
subject not as evidence of self-existence (as he posits), but of the sort of circular
reasoning from which it is well-nigh impossible to escape. “You don’t have to buy into
simplicity necessarily, since self-existence is the main argument I want to present….
[Those] such as Saint Anselm (and me) take God’s existence to be logically necessary….
Thus, God’s existence would be self-explanatory, and not a brute fact that might have
been otherwise. But God, of course, still ends up explaining the existence and design of
the universe….”179 Linguistic sleight-of-hand might work as a theistic solution to the
problem of God’s existence, but science demands more than semantics.

Unfortunately, this does not stop Stephen Ames from suggesting the following in
his review:
The issue is whether there is any reason to think that God creates and uses
such blind processes in bringing life into existence. Thomas Aquinas
provides the basis for an answer. Aquinas argues that to give the glory due
to God we must think of God as creating things with their own real
powers, with “the dignity of also being causes” of good in other things. On
my view we should therefore think that the living God would maximize
this aspect of the creation, so that created things are co-creators in a lifeproducing universe. Interestingly, Aquinas’ view was later rejected by
Luther and Calvin as robbing God of His glory. Their views were resumed
by Boyle and Newton, teaching that matter was passive and only moved
by God, which ensured a place for God in the new scientific account of the
universe. Ironically it was then overturned by the eighteenth century
atheists, Diderot and d’Holbach, who taught that things had their own
powers. Dawkins is so sure that the universe appears not to be created and
designed by God. Is it that he lacks an adequate theology? 180
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Given everything that has been considered thus far, I believe a simple “no” should suffice
to answer Ames’ question. Ames no doubt disagrees, but in explaining his reasons for
doing so, the explanatory poverty of his claims becomes ever more transparent. He states:
In Deeper than Darwin (Westview, 2003), Haught says we are drawn by
our pure desire to know to go deeper in our inquiries into the matters
before us. According to Haught it is God who draws us by this desire and
calls us on, no matter our stumbling. Dawkins has been drawn to inquire
beneath the mere appearances of design in living things, to a deeper level
of understanding. While holding fast to what he has attained scientifically,
is he prepared to go deeper still, and recognise in the pure desire to know
and its cognitive imperatives, an experience of God incognito, the God
who is no delusion?181
Here, one cannot help but compare Ames’ plea for Dawkins to delve deeper and
recognize “the God who is no delusion,” to Alice’s fateful decision to plunge headlong
into the rabbit-hole without ever considering how she might climb back out again. But
where Alice proved unable to resist the temptation, Dawkins managed to keep both his
sense and his sensibilities about him.182

In his article, “Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching,” Terry Eagleton writes that
Dawkins holds that the existence or non-existence of God is a scientific
hypothesis which is open to rational demonstration. Christianity teaches
that to claim that there is a God must be reasonable, but that this is not at
all the same thing as faith. Believing in God, whatever Dawkins might
think, is not like concluding that aliens or the tooth fairy exist. God is not
a celestial super-object or divine UFO, about whose existence we must
remain agnostic until all the evidence is in. Theologians do not believe
that he is either inside or outside the universe, as Dawkins thinks they do.
181
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Ames’ plea could be read as little more than an appeal to the “God-of-the-Gaps” hypothesis,
though an admittedly dexterous one at that. Prior to the mid nineteenth century, the traditional teleological
argument still held considerable sway amongst even the most ardent of religious skeptics. But once
effectively derailed by Darwin, Ames suggests that rather than demonstrating the inessentiality of divine
design, evolutionary theory actually proves just how cleverly hidden that design truly is. By employing
such a duplicitous tactic, Ames must certainly realize that he can never truly lose his argument. The further
scientific advances continue to shed light on the inner workings of nature, the more said advances can be
said to demonstrate the inexhaustible brilliance of nature’s ultimately unfathomable creator.
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His transcendence and invisibility are part of what he is, which is not the
case with the Loch Ness monster. This is not to say that religious people
believe in a black hole, because they also consider that God has revealed
himself: not, as Dawkins thinks, in the guise of a cosmic manufacturer
even smarter than Dawkins himself (the New Testament has next to
nothing to say about God as Creator), but for Christians at least, in the
form of a reviled and murdered political criminal. The Jews of the socalled Old Testament had faith in God, but this does not mean that after
debating the matter at a number of international conferences they decided
to endorse the scientific hypothesis that there existed a supreme architect
of the universe – even though, as Genesis reveals, they were of this
opinion. They had faith in God in the sense that I have faith in you. They
may well have been mistaken in their view; but they were not mistaken
because their scientific hypothesis was unsound.183
Believing he has satisfactorily repudiated Dawkins’ understanding of God, Eagleton
proceeds to offer his own. He explains:
Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely
obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not
exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however
supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people
simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an
octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person
in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or
‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for
religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the
condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He
is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the
universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot
constitute a pair of objects. This, not some super-manufacturing, is what is
traditionally meant by the claim that God is Creator. He is what sustains
all things in being by his love; and this would still be the case even if the
universe had no beginning. To say that he brought it into being ex nihilo is
not a measure of how very clever he is, but to suggest that he did it out of
love rather than need. The world was not the consequence of an inexorable
chain of cause and effect. Like a Modernist work of art, there is no
necessity about it at all, and God might well have come to regret his
handiwork some aeons ago. The Creation is the original acte gratuit. God
is an artist who did it for the sheer love or hell of it, not a scientist at work
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on a magnificently rational design that will impress his research grant
body no end.184
Thus, according to Eagleton, God is neither person nor principle, but instead “the
condition of possibility.” Against both traditional and existentialist philosophy, Eagleton
argues that God’s essence is neither synonymous with his existence, nor subsequently
derived from it, but is rather entirely separable from and unrelated to it. But in spite of
God’s perpetual state of essential/existential limbo, Eagleton maintains that God is love,
all the while likening him to an apparently frustrated artist (whose Creation was
impulsive and unnecessary, and which he may have since come to regret). Not only is
such an explanation of God completely incoherent, it is not even truly an explanation of
anything at all. Eagleton himself seems to realize this, as he closes with the following
caveat:
Now it may well be that all this is no more plausible than the tooth fairy.
Most reasoning people these days will see excellent grounds to reject it.
But critics of the richest, most enduring form of popular culture in human
history have a moral obligation to confront that case at its most persuasive,
rather than grabbing themselves a victory on the cheap by savaging it as so
much garbage and gobbledygook. The mainstream theology I have just
outlined may well not be true; but anyone who holds it is in my view to be
respected, whereas Dawkins considers that no religious belief, anytime or
anywhere, is worthy of any respect whatsoever. This, one might note, is
the opinion of a man deeply averse to dogmatism. Even moderate religious
views, he insists, are to be ferociously contested, since they can always
lead to fanaticism.185
In his reply to Eagleton’s article, A.C. Grayling explains how the former’s arguments rest
on a single, faulty premise. He writes:
Terry Eagleton charges Richard Dawkins with failing to read theology in
formulating his objection to religious belief, and thereby misses the point
that when one rejects the premises of a set of views, it is a waste of one’s
time to address what is built on those premises.… For example, if one
184
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concludes on the basis of rational investigation that one’s character and
fate are not determined by the arrangement of the planets, stars and
galaxies that can be seen from Earth, then one does not waste time
comparing classic tropical astrology with sidereal astrology, or either with
the Sarjatak system, or any of the three with any other construction placed
on the ancient ignorances of our forefathers about the real nature of the
heavenly bodies. Religion is exactly the same thing: it is the pre-scientific,
rudimentary metaphysics of our forefathers, which (mainly through the
natural gullibility of proselytised children, and tragically for the world)
survives into the age in which I can send this letter by electronic means.
Eagleton’s touching foray into theology shows, if proof were needed, that
he is no philosopher: God does not have to exist, he informs us, to be the
‘condition of possibility’ for anything else to exist. There follow several
paragraphs in the same fanciful and increasingly emetic vein, which
indirectly explain why he once thought Derrida should have been awarded
an honorary degree at Cambridge.186
This fact notwithstanding, in his article, “Beyond Belief,” Jim Holt employs a
more conciliatory approach, no doubt intended to appeal to both Dawkins and Eagleton.
He writes:
It is doubtful that many people come to believe in God because of logical
arguments, as opposed to their upbringing or having “heard a call.” But
such arguments, even when they fail to be conclusive, can at least give
religious belief an aura of reasonableness, especially when combined with
certain scientific findings. We now know that our universe burst into being
some 13 billion years ago (the theory of the Big Bang, as it happens, was
worked out by a Belgian priest), and that its initial conditions seem to have
been “fine-tuned” so that life would eventually arise. If you are not
religiously inclined, you might take these as brute facts and be done with
the matter. But if you think that there must be some ultimate explanation
for the improbable leaping-into-existence of the harmonious, biofriendly
cosmos we find ourselves in, then the God hypothesis is at least rational to
adhere to, isn’t it?187
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Though a noble sentiment, Holt’s comments on traditional arguments for the existence of
God ultimately illustrate why neither Dawkins nor Grayling feels the need to engage with
them. In fact, it is arguably the source of their contempt that “even when they fail to be
conclusive,” such theological and philosophical constructs “can at least give [otherwise
unreasonable] religious belief an aura of reasonableness.” In his review of The God
Delusion, Richard Weiner captures the Dawkins’ perspective perfectly when he states:
Dawkins tosses down the gauntlet to scientists and challenges them not to
retreat from the fundamentalist onslaught against science.
Clearly, most scientists would have no difficulty stating flatly that Greek
mythology is completely improbable as an explanation of natural
phenomena. Yet many scientists are loath to challenge the prevailing
Judeo-Christian mythologies prevalent in western societies, and instead
treat superstitions dating back millennia as deserving of solemn respect.
Scientists are able to recognize the intentional silliness of the mock
religion Pastafarianism, which postulates a giant flying spaghetti monster
as the creator of the Universe. Scientists know, as well as any empirical
statement can be known, that mass murderers aren’t rewarded with 72
virgins after they die. Yet how many scientists in Judeo-Christian
countries are willing to speak out publicly and flatly state Judeo-Christian
creationism is irrational nonsense?188
Weiner’s point is well-worth considering.

In his article, “How Richard Dawkins Lost His Battle with God,” Deepak Chopra
offers the following criticism of Dawkins’ methodology:
Let’s say that thousands of people claim to have seen a ghost. Their
experience isn’t disproved by arguing that the universe is made of atoms
and molecules, rendering non-physical entities impossible. The actual
experience of seeing a ghost must be met on its own terms. The same
holds true for the millions of people across the centuries who claim to
have an experience of God, heaven, the soul, the afterlife, and so on.
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Telling them that life evolved from one-celled microorganisms doesn’t say
anything about their experience, which is why Dawkins, a canny
propagandist, resorts to disdain and ridicule to demolish religious belief,
adding a healthy dose of accusations against the evils produced by
organized religion (which are undeniable but again don’t address people’s
genuine spiritual experiences).189
One problem with Chopra’s assessment is the naturalist’s response to the report that
“thousands of people claim to have seen a ghost,” would not be to tell them “that life
evolved from one-celled microorganisms.” It would instead be to inform those people of
the psychological and/or sociological phenomenon known as mass hysteria and to discuss
with them the several dozen historical examples of its manifestation. As John Waller
explains:
Supernaturalism has fueled most flamboyant cases of mass hysteria. Nuns
living in austere convents between the 1500s and 1700s were especially
prone. Convinced that they had been possessed by demons, unhappy nuns
would enter a trance, and proceed to writhe, convulse, laugh, speak in
strange tongues, smash crucifixes, thrust out their hips, and make other
lewd gestures and propositions. The sociologist Robert E Bartholomew
tells of one episode in which several nuns, who presumably saw cats as
Satanic familiars, “meowed together every day at a certain time for several
hours together”. In 1749, a contagion of squirming, screaming and trance
spread through a German convent; locals inferred the work of a witch,
seized a nun as a likely candidate and beheaded her in the marketplace.…
It takes only the right kind of fear, suggestion and false belief to trigger
epidemic hysteria or mass delusions. So as our fears change, so do
expressions of mass hysteria.190
In other words, how and wherever such collective hysteria presents, it tends to manifest
itself only in ways that are psychologically plausible to the populations who suffer. Just
as nuns became convinced they had been possessed by demons, the people of Salem
village became convinced that many of their neighbors had succumbed to the temptation
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of witchcraft. Similarly, one can reasonably assert that, were a thousand people to claim
to have seen a ghost, they must reside in a culture that considers such events (at least)
possible, if not altogether likely. Thus, rather than requiring supernaturalism to explain
them, as Chopra suggest, such phenomena can be readily explained by the strictly
naturalistic means of science.

James Hannon, however, remains unconvinced. He writes:
For me, the most significant argument for the existence of God is personal
experience. Here, Dawkins’ treatment is grossly inaccurate. When he talks
about the visions afforded to pilgrims by Our Lady of Fatima in 1917,
when the sun was seen to dance, he says this didn’t happen because the
rest of the world didn’t shake too. Given that the dancing sun was a vision,
Dawkins’ counter is ridiculous. A vision shared by thousands of people
must have an external cause and cannot be a trick of the mind. The sun
doesn’t actually have to move in space for the vision to be divine. Of
course, it could be a trick of the atmosphere but I do not know if the
phenomenon has been observed elsewhere. As for common religious
experience, Dawkins doesn’t address this at all except to say that the brain
can be tricked. So it can, but I fail to see why we should believe that it is
being tricked in this case.191
That, Dawkins would argue, is precisely the point. Nevertheless, Hannon goes on to
offer:
one final example of how Dawkins always fails to see the other side of the
argument even when it is breathing down his neck. In his penultimate
chapter he equates bringing up children within a religious tradition as
child abuse. I’ll ignore the libel but for one point. We learn about a
psychologist who helps people who have been mentally scarred by the
terror of hell. Most of us Christians don’t share this fear because we are
confident in Christ’s saving work. But some, probably vulnerable to all
sorts of worries, are damaged by it. It is one of the reasons that many
churches no longer try to exaggerate what hell means. The trouble that
Dawkins refuses to recognise is that atheists are as guilty in this
department as the most fire-breathing preacher. I have a friend who was
brought up by atheist parents. When she asked him what happens when
191
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you die, her father admitted that you are worm food. Annihilation was all
that he could offer her. This caused her such distress that many years later
she admitted that she was afraid of having children in case they suffered as
she had. Even today, she suffers panic attacks over death. Worse, her
atheistic upbringing means that she has never been able to find her home
in the church despite desperately wanting to.
You could argue that hellfire is worse than annihilation. You’d be right
although I’m a believer in hell as annihilation anyway. But the atheist has
no alternative. There is no escape, nothing you can do. Like it or not, you
are doomed. That many atheists can treat this matter with equanimity is
fortunate for them. But others, like Dylan Thomas and my friend, rage
against the dying of the light and will not go quietly into the night. As for
my friend, Dawkins would have to admit that by his lights her parents’
atheism led to her mental abuse and that she would be much better off
brought up as a Christian. His “consciousness raising” over the religious
upbringing of children is really just willful blindness to reality on his
part.192
Hannon’s personal views aside (for which, incidentally, he has no evidence), this seems
to represent a false equivalency between the fears of ego annihilation and those of
eternal, merciless torment. What’s more, despite Hannon’s implications, Dawkins’
perspective does permit of a more consoling, though still intellectually honest, view of
death, one which he shares with, and via passages from, Mark Twain and Bertrand
Russell. I reproduce them both below.
Twain: ‘I do not fear death. I had been dead for billions and billions of
years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience
from it.’
Russell: ‘I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will
survive. I am not young and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver with
terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is nonetheless true
happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love lose
their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has borne
himself proudly on the scaffold; surely the same pride should teach us to
think truly about man’s place in the world. Even if the open windows of
science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional
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humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great
spaces have a splendour of their own.’193
Thus, Hannon’s mistake is presuming that hope and fear are one’s only options for
emotionally dealing with death. But Dawkins, Twain, and Russell offer a more logical
approach which, while not promising anything beyond its evidential purview, can
nevertheless add meaning to the here and now by redirecting one’s focus more fully
toward it.

In his article, “On a Mission to Convert,” H. Allen Orr writes:
The most disappointing feature of The God Delusion is Dawkins’s failure
to engage religious thought in any serious way. This is, obviously, an odd
thing to say about a book-length investigation into God. But the problem
reflects Dawkins’s cavalier attitude about the quality of religious thinking.
Dawkins tends to dismiss simple expressions of belief as base superstition.
Having no patience with the faith of fundamentalists, he also tends to
dismiss more sophisticated expressions of belief as sophistry (he cannot,
for instance, tolerate the meticulous reasoning of theologians). But if
simple religion is barbaric (and thus unworthy of serious thought) and
sophisticated religion is logic-chopping (and thus equally unworthy of
serious thought), the ineluctable conclusion is that all religion is unworthy
of serious thought.194
Though undoubtedly convinced that he has just debunked Dawkins’ approach to religion,
I would argue that he has inadvertently confirmed it. Neither simple (i.e. traditional)
religion nor its more recent, sophistic(ated) qualifications are worthy of serious, rational
study because both approaches to argumentation are themselves based on the equally
unwarranted a priori assumption that God necessarily exists and one’s individual and/or
communal understanding of his essence and divine will is intrinsically true and thus
inherently superior to all other such notions. After all, one never sees a confessing
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Christian reason his way to Brahma or Buddha. Such expansive arguments are only ever
proffered in service of an already held belief.

For an example of this phenomenon, observe what Phillip Bell writes in his
article, “Atheist with a Mission”:
To Dawkins, much of the Bible is ‘weird’ and strange so perhaps his
theological illiteracy is partly accounted for. Yet, for a man who has
clearly studied the Bible – after a fashion – his (mis)use of it in these
pages smacks more of calculated deceit. Almost gleefully, he describes
immoral actions (such as Lot’s incest with his daughters in Genesis 19 and
the Levite’s behaviour concerning his concubine in Judges 19) and
concludes that this shows the Bible is not our source for morality (ignoring
that not everything reported in the Bible is endorsed by the Bible). But he
also willfully twists the actions of the heroes of faith – so Abraham’s
willingness to sacrifice Isaac is ripped out of all context to make him a
child abuser! Moses and Joshua also receive a bashing by this selfappointed theological expert, but his animosity is always at its fiercest
when he is persecuting the God that these biblical figures worshipped and
served:
‘What makes my jaw drop is that people today should base their lives
on such an appalling role model as Yahweh…’ (p. 248).195
However, I would argue that Bell’s claim that “not everything reported in the Bible is
endorsed by the Bible” is the one that smacks of calculated deceit. I will illustrate via
Bell’s first example. Before God destroys the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, he ensures
that Lot and his daughters have safely absconded. The fact that God did not likewise
choose to smite Lot, nor subsequently his daughters (or their incestuous descendants), all
the while condemning entire cities to utter destruction for the “crime” of sodomy, does
seem to suggest (at least tacit) divine approval for their unnatural relations. In this light,
Dawkins’ point seems eminently clear that anyone who would act today as Lot with his
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daughters, or Abraham with his son, could certainly be described in a variety of ways;
excessively moral, however, would most assuredly not be among them.

In his “Response to The God Delusion,” Yesuto Shaw writes:
In “A Proof for the Existence of God,” Peter Blair offers a response to the
very point Dawkins raises. As Blair writes, Dawkins errs in assuming that
God is overly complex, when classical Christian philosophy actually
considers God to be truly simple. This may sound preposterous with all of
the attributes and characteristics of God that are often discussed, but, Blair
writes, “Aquinas also argues that though we can distinguish in thought
between God’s goodness, his truth, his power, his intellect, his will, his
existence, etc., in God himself there actually is no distinction between
these things. God’s goodness is his truth, which is his will, which is his
power, and so on. God is a simple unity.” It could also be argued that the
immaterial and the intellectual are inherently more simple than the
material and the physical. “For instance, the idea of something such as a
cathedral is much simpler than the thing itself, the physical cathedral. An
idea has no direction, size, shape, weight, or any spatiotemporal
characteristics. It has no parts and no constituent material. In all these
ways, it is simpler than that which it represents.”196
Although yet another example of the intellectual high wire upon which modern-day
theologians are required to balance, Shaw nevertheless goes on to chastise Dawkins for
not providing sufficient evidence to support his own claims. Shaw writes:
Overall, Richard Dawkins is clearly an intelligent, educated, and, yes,
witty man. But in The God Delusion, he shows that his strong atheist
stance is based on simplistic and misinformed assumptions. For some of
what would be his strongest points he uses faulty data without providing
sources to back them up, and he often makes stronger claims than his
evidence warrants. Therefore, the probability that God doesn’t exist is not
nearly as easily concluded as Dawkins claims it is, and it would seem that
the probability may even point in the other direction. Perhaps the delusion
here is not so much with those who believe in God as those who believe in
Dawkins.197
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Unfortunately, Shaw’s entire critique of Dawkins is rendered hypocritical (if not entirely
moot) in light of his own shoddily-supported assertions. After all, the scientific method,
and any theory it yields, permits (in both principle and in practice) counterargument,
evidential challenge, qualification, and most importantly, falsification. Shaw’s (and
presumably Blair’s) theological construct of “God” does not. Thus, I would conclude that
it is theology, not science, that is most vulnerable to “simplistic and misinformed
assumptions.”

For an even more obvious example of baseless assertion, observe Martin Cohen’s
arguments concerning the possible existence of unicorns. He writes:
Dawkins bravely asserts that he considers unicorns not to exist, even if the
philosophers say it is impossible to be [sic] prove it. Again, however, the
point for philosophers about unicorns is not whether or not they exist, but
whether or not their properties exist - for example, whether or not they
have ‘one or two horns’ on their horsey foreheads. Unicorns are
recognised, indeed defined, to be imaginary creatures: the philosophical
debate concerns is [sic] the status of statements about such imaginary
things. Dawkins is pleased however, having ‘disproved’ the existence of
unicorns to extend his method to the question of God. “The point of all
these way out examples is that they are undisprovable, yet nobody thinks
the hypothesis of their existence is on an even footing with the hypothesis
of their non-existence” he adds.198
Such philosophical musings, when taken together with A.C. Grayling’s comments on
theology, surely demonstrates why Dawkins, in his concern about what is true, has so
little time for either.
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In his review, Douglas Groothuis argues that the problem with Dawkins’
understanding of the Bible is that
on his view, the Bible can be little more than a collection of pious fictions,
since its principle character – God – does not exist. Dawkins’s approach is
that any biblical text with a historical problem must be a palpable
falsehood. Any miracle story, moreover, is false, since there is no God to
perform such feats. In other words, the Bible is guilty until proven
innocent; but it is never proven innocent, since God does not exist. This is
a neat and convenient system of dismissal, but one lacking in academic
integrity.
A good study Bible and sources by conservative biblical scholars can
easily answer most of Dawkins’s overheated objections. For example, he
dismisses the historicity of the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ early life
because they differ in various ways, such as in their genealogies. Rather
than realizing that they were written by different authors with different
audiences to emphasize different aspects, he infers that they are
contradictory and are the result of theological agendas that invented pious
fictions. Christian thinkers have noted these kinds of issues for centuries,
and the plausible solutions they discovered are readily available, if one is
concerned to study the issue carefully.199
But let’s examine Groothuis’ own example, the differing genealogies of Jesus, as well as
his claim that they were simply “written by different authors with different audiences to
emphasize different aspects.” Could one plausibly say this about any other figure in
history and still claim that both accounts represent true history? Of course not. There
exist only two possible explanations. Either one is right, and the other is wrong. Or
perhaps they are simply both wrong. Either way, it seems that the religious’ claim to
biblical inerrancy has been called into question. But as for those “plausible solutions” of
which Groothuis speaks, allow me to present just a few. Matt Slick, writing for the
Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry explains:
There are differences of opinion with two main options being offered.
The first is that one genealogy is for Mary and the other is for Joseph. It
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was customary to mention the genealogy through the father even though it
was clearly known that it was through Mary.… Breaking up genealogies
into male and female representations was acceptable in the ancient Near
East culture since it was often impolite to speak of women without proper
conditions being met: male presence, etc. Therefore, one genealogy might
be of Mary and the other of Joseph – even though both mention Joseph. In
other words, the Mary genealogy was counted “in” Joseph and under his
headship.… Luke starts with Mary and goes backwards to Adam. Matthew
starts with Abraham and goes forward to Joseph. The intents of the
genealogies were obviously different which is clearly seen in their styles.
Luke was not written to the Jews, Matthew was. Therefore, Matthew
would carry the legal line (from Abraham through David) and Luke the
biological one (from Adam through David). Also, notice that Luke’s first
three chapters mention Mary eleven times; hence, the genealogy from her.
Fourth, notice Luke 3:23, “And when He began His ministry, Jesus
Himself was about thirty years of age, being supposedly the son of Joseph,
the son of Eli,” This designation “supposedly” seems to signify the Marian
genealogy since it seems to indicate that Jesus is not the biological son of
Joseph. Finally, in the Joseph genealogy is a man named Jeconiah. God
cursed Jeconiah (also called Coniah), stating that no descendant of his
would ever sit on the throne of David, “For no man of his descendants will
prosper sitting on the throne of David or ruling again in Judah,” (Jer.
22:30). But Jesus, of course, will sit on the throne in the heavenly
kingdom. The point is that Jesus is not a biological descendant of
Jeconiah, but through the other lineage – that of Mary. Hence, the
prophetic curse upon Jeconiah stands inviolate. But, the legal adoption of
Jesus by Joseph reckoned the legal rights of Joseph to Jesus as a son, not
the biological curse. This is why we need two genealogies: one of Mary
(the actually biological line according to prophecy), and the legal line
through Joseph.200
One wonders if, à la Martin Cohen, this metaphorical unicorn has but one horn or two.

In his article, “The academic who read The God Delusion then turned to God,”
Francis Phillips writes:
Indeed, Babarsky found Dawkins’ arguments so unsatisfactory, coupled
with his own atheistic and fundamentalist stance, that they prompted her to
examine for the first time what Christianity was all about. Her
examination was to lead to her conversion to Catholicism. “In reading to
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refute Dawkins as well as educate myself.… I discovered the God-man
Jesus Christ. Not only did the Catholic view resonate with me emotionally
but… it was intellectually honest.”
She read Benedict XVI’s Jesus of Nazareth and came to realise the
inadequacy of the scientific method that demanded laboratory-type proof
of the existence of God. She concludes, “I choose to believe in a
supernatural God.… I believe in miracles. I believe that, while science has
many valuable insights to offer us, it is not the final word. I believe that
some things are beyond our understanding, certainly now and perhaps
forever. I believe that God is great and that man, created in His image and
with free will, has made wonderful discoveries about the natural world
that we inhabit. I choose to believe in God and that he is no delusion, nor
am I delusional.”201
To this I will once again allow Dawkins himself to respond. Following a lecture at the
Eden Court Theater, Dawkins was asked by a Christian gentleman in the audience to
once again defend his atheistic arguments, since he himself could not afford to base his
life on a delusion. What follows is Dawkins’ response:
If you had been born in India, I daresay you would be saying the same
thing about Lord Krishna and Lord Shiva. If you had been born in
Afghanistan, I daresay you would be saying the same thing about Allah. If
you had been born in Viking Norway, you would be saying the same thing
about Wotan. If you’d been born in Olympian Greece, you’d be saying the
same thing about Zeus and Apollo. The human mind is extremely
susceptible to hallucination.… You are obviously sincere, but obviously I
do not share your beliefs. And I think you are hallucinating. That’s all I
can say. I don’t doubt your sincerity.202
I think the reply works equally well here.

In his article, “What Should Christians Know about The God Delusion?”, R.
Douglas Geivett writes:
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Dawkins is a scientist, not a philosopher – and it shows in his reckless
forays into philosophy. He ridicules one argument for the existence of God
without naming a single individual who actually endorses that argument –
or even stating the argument clearly. He simply says it’s a “popular strand
of argument” that links “the existence of great art to the existence of God”
(pages 86-87). Dawkins doesn’t understand Pascal’s wager, which doesn’t
seek to convince people of God’s existence, but simply invites reasonable
agnostics to “bet on God” by living their lives as if God exists. And
Dawkins miscasts C. S. Lewis’ “Liar, Lord or Lunatic” trilemma as an
argument from Scripture for God’s existence. Lewis’s famous argument
doesn’t come from Scripture, and it doesn’t seek to prove God’s existence.
It’s an argument for the deity of Jesus Christ – an argument that
presupposes reasonable belief in God.203
But rather than subject you, dear reader, to another rebuttal against the same sort of
theological (non)argument, I’d like to close, instead with a few of fellow New Atheist
Daniel Dennett’s comments on The God Delusion, taken from his own review of the
book. He writes:
Both Dawkins and I have to deal with the frustrating problem of the game
of intellectual hide-and-seek that “moderate” believers play to avoid being
pinned down to the underlying absurdities of their traditions. “Don’t be so
literal-minded!” they chortle, marveling at the philistinism of anyone who
would attempt to take them at their word and ask them for their grounds
for asserting that, for instance, God actually answers prayers (here, now,
in the real world, by performing miracles). But then as soon you start
playing the metaphor game with them, they abuse the poetic license you
have granted them, and delight in dancing around the truth, getting away
with all sorts of nonsense because they are indeed playing intellectual
tennis without a net. Dawkins’ solution is to adopt a rather less patient
attitude than I have done. As a philosopher, I cannot comfortably adopt
this policy, since I was trained to hunt for treasure in the confused and
confusing gropings of brilliant explorers, and am always encouraging my
students to go out of their way to find charitable interpretations. I must
say, however, that I’m warming to the rhetorical leverage it provides.204
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As to why Dennett is himself leaning toward adopting Dawkins’ “less patient” attitude,
he explains:
The social psychologist and game theorist Anatol Rapoport (creator of the
winning Tit-for-Tat strategy in Robert Axelrod’s legendary prisoner’s
dilemma tournament) once promulgated a list of rules for how to write a
successful critical commentary on an opponent’s work. First, he said, you
must attempt to re-express your opponent’s position so clearly, vividly and
fairly that your opponent says “Thanks, I wish I’d thought of putting it that
way.” Then, you should list any points of agreement (especially if they are
not matters of general or widespread agreement), and third, you should
mention anything you have learned from your opponent. Only then are
you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or criticism. I have
found this a salutary discipline to follow – or, since it is challenging, to
attempt to follow. When it succeeds, the results are gratifying: your
opponent is in a mood to be enlightened and eagerly attentive. But this is
well-nigh impossible when the arguments you wish to rebut are too flimsy.
For one thing, you fear that hyper-patience will appear patronizing and
simply drive other, swifter readers away. For another, we are dealing here
with arguments that in most instances no longer have identifiable living
exponents. Who stands by the Ontological Argument today? There are
historians of philosophy and theology aplenty who will lovingly teach the
argument (and its variants and rebuttals and the rebuttals of the rebuttals)
but with few exceptions they don’t defend it. It is treated as an interesting
historical example, a Worthy Attempt, a jewel in the treasure-house of
religion and philosophy, but not as a consideration that demands a
response in today’s arena of argument. That being so, giving the argument
the Full Rapoport Treatment would be misplaced effort, comically
earnest.… Perhaps it is all for the best that some readers will probably
come away from the book more impressed by Dawkins’ disrespect than
persuaded by his arguments. Dawkins might even add that when ideas are
contemptible, to conceal one’s contempt is dishonest – and since he is so
very good at expressing and defending the scientific ideas for which he
has respect, this very contrast may, in the end, be a more potent
consciousness-raiser than any argument. Perhaps some claims should just
be laughed out of court.205
With this, I (and presumably Dawkins) wholeheartedly concur.
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CHAPTER TWO: BREAKING THE SPELL: DENNETT AND HIS DISCONTENTS
Introduction

As a philosopher predominantly concerned with explaining the nature of
consciousness, Daniel Dennett’s pathway to becoming a preeminent critic of religion may
seem far more circuitous (and strewn with thorns) than those of his fellow Horsemen.
After all, it wasn’t until his publication of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, in 1995, that
Dennett ostensibly took up the study of evolution in earnest, and thereby laid the
groundwork for his 2006 Breaking the Spell with which this chapter is primarily
concerned. Upon closer examination, however, one quickly discovers that, like fellow
atheist Richard Dawkins, every step of Dennett’s intellectual journey has in some way
prepared him to safely and productively traverse it.
From his first book in 1969 (Content and Consciousness) to his fifth in 1991
(Consciousness Explained), Dennett primarily dedicates himself to explaining and
espousing the so-called “multiple drafts theory” of consciousness. Though superficially
complex, as Joshua Rothman explains in his 2017 profile of Dennett for The New Yorker,
this concept can be effectively distilled into the following idea: “Picture the brain… as a
collection of subsystems that ‘sort of’ know, think, decide, and feel. These layers build
up, incrementally, to the real thing. Animals have fewer mental layers than people do – in
particular, they lack [syntactic] language, which Dennett believes endows human mental
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life with its complexity and texture – but this doesn’t make them zombies.”206 In other
words, possession of consciousness is not a dichotomous either/or proposition. It is
instead a broad spectrum of potential experience, one likely possessed by many disparate
species… if only to differing degrees, according to the environmentally-specific,
evolutionarily-acquired attributes of each.
While such a naturalist hypothesis rebukes the traditional mind-body dualism of
Rene Descartes (and others) and places Dennett firmly within the physicalist camp on
consciousness, it also provides him with uncommon insight and opportunity with which
to consider this age-old philosophical problem anew. If consciousness is itself an evolved
(and still evolving) phenomenon, then perhaps its contents have likewise evolved and
continue to do so in a presumably advantageous, similarly discernible fashion. Although
the connection to religious belief may not yet be obvious, it is precisely this facet of
human conscious experience that Dennett places under the microscope in Breaking the
Spell. Conceived as a case study of sorts, his intention herein is to examine the
emergence, evolution, and continued existence of religious belief in humans within the
confines and scientific context of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In essence,
Dennett is asking his reader to consider whether religious belief (as an emergent, rather
than divinely bestowed, property of consciousness) might have historically provided a
competitive advantage to humans not altogether unlike upright posture or the opposable
thumb. Answering in the affirmative, Dennett then wonders whether such belief
continues to benefit the species as a whole or if its persistent presence should instead now
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be viewed as largely vestigial, having outlived its original purpose, and thus destined to
disappear as humanity continues to imperceptibly, yet inexorably evolve.

There is no evidence that man was aboriginally endowed with the ennobling belief in the
existence of an Omnipotent God. On the contrary there is ample evidence, derived not
from hasty travellers, but from men who have long resided with savages, that numerous
races have existed, and still exist, who have no idea of one or more gods, and who have
no words in their languages to express such an idea.... If, however, we include under the
term “religion” the belief in unseen or spiritual agencies, the case is wholly different; for
this belief seems to be universal with the less civilised races. Nor is it difficult to
comprehend how it arose. As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder,
and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed,
man would naturally crave to understand what was passing around him, and would have
vaguely speculated on his own existence.207
Part I: Breaking the Spell

In the preface to Breaking the Spell, Daniel Dennett identifies both the central
concern of and the target audience for his treatise on religion.
America is strikingly different from other First World nations in its
attitudes to religion, and this book is, among other things, a sounding
device intended to measure the depths of those differences. I decided I had
to express the emphases found here if I was to have any hope of reaching
my intended audience: the curious and conscientious citizens of my native
land – as many as possible, not just the academics. (I saw no point in
preaching to the choir.)208
That is not to say that Dennett sees no value in such strictly academic endeavors; only
that it is not his intention to similarly limit his own focus and readership with this
207
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particular project. As he subsequently explains in the opening chapter: “other authors
have recently written excellent books and articles on the scientific analysis of religion
that are directed primarily to their fellow academics. My goal here is to play the role of
ambassador, introducing (and distinguishing, criticizing, and defending) the main ideas of
that literature.”209
Of course, before one can subject religion to any sort of serious scientific
scrutiny, several terms must be clearly defined and/or distinguished. In Chapter One,
“Breaking Which Spell?” Dennett attempts to do so. He defines religion as a social
system “whose participants avow belief in a supernatural agent or agents whose
approval is to be sought.”210 This is an important distinction because it immediately
excludes those of a more deistic or simply spiritual persuasion from those who profess to
believe in an anthropomorphic, intervening entity or entities. Dennett elaborates: “If what
they call God is really not an agent in their eyes, a being that can answer prayers,
approve and disapprove, receive sacrifices, and mete out punishment or forgiveness,
then, although they may call this Being God, and stand in awe of it (not Him), their creed,
whatever it is, is not really a religion according to my definition.”211
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With religion now clearly demarcated, Dennett explains precisely how and why
he considers it to be a distinctly natural (not supernatural) enterprise. “[It] is a human
phenomenon composed of events, organisms, structures, patterns, and the like that all
obey the laws of physics or biology, and hence do not involve miracles.”212 This is not to
say that the notion of miracles or the presumed existence of a supernatural agent or
agents must be abandoned by his readers before continuing with Dennett’s analysis; only
that such beliefs must be separated from the individuals and communities who hold them
and the way(s) in which they do so. As he explains, “it could be true that God exists, that
God is indeed the intelligent, conscious, loving creator of us all, and yet still religion
itself, as a complex set of phenomena, is a perfectly natural phenomenon.”213
For clarification on this point, Dennett references two common subjects, sports
and medicine, whose individual manifestations routinely have the term miraculous
attached to them, though only in a colloquial or hyperbolic sense; his examples include
the Immaculate Reception and the seemingly improbable cancer cure.214 Though both of
these phenomena are commonly referred to as miraculous, Dennett argues that “sports
and cancer are the subjects of intense scientific scrutiny by researchers working in many
disciplines and holding many different religious views. They all assume, tentatively and
for the sake of science, that the phenomena they are studying are natural phenomena.”215
Though he acknowledges that there are likely those who would take exception with his
rather dismissive stance toward miracles, Dennett reminds us that “the only hope of ever
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demonstrating this [that miracles do occur] to a doubting world would be by adopting the
scientific method, with its assumption of no miracles, and showing that science was
utterly unable to account for the phenomena… a point long recognized by the Roman
Catholic Church, which at least goes through the motions of subjecting the claims of
miracles made on behalf of candidates for sainthood to objective scientific
investigation.”216 In other words, even should one wish to disprove Dennett’s hypothesis,
he insists that the scientific method remains the only reliable means of doing so.
With these preliminary, yet principal, concepts thus adequately defined, Dennett
begins Chapter Two by asking “Some Questions About Science.” Given the evidence he
was able to marshal in the previous chapter, one needn’t wonder at the answer to his (at
least partially) rhetorical first question, “Can science study religion?” Obviously, he
thinks it can. His second question, however, “Should science study religion?” is one that
Dennett believes we must all earnestly consider before proceeding. After envisioning a
variety of hypotheses about the ultimate fate of religion, none of which he believes can be
considered either impossible or inevitable, Dennett ultimately concludes that “whether
you want religion to flourish or perish, whether you think it should transform itself or just
stay as it is, you can hardly deny that whatever happens will be of tremendous
significance to the planet.”217 He subsequently explains: “recent history strongly suggests
that religion is going to garner more and more attention, not less, in the immediate future.
If it is going to receive attention, it had better be high-quality attention, not the sort that
hysterics, paranoids, and boodlers on all sides engage in.”218
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Of course, there are those who maintain that such “high-quality attention” might
ultimately unravel the shroud of religious raiments and therefore result in the
disillusionment of the formerly faithful to such an extent that life might no longer be
worth living. This is, after all, the spell to which Dennett’s title alludes. (To be clear,
Dennett is not conceding that such fears are inherently justified, only that their existence
and presumed validity have historically proven themselves sufficient in stifling and/or
stopping the conversation he would very much like to have.) His rebuttal takes the shape
of an extended analogy crafted between religion and music. In the section “Might music
be bad for you?” Dennett asks his reader to contemplate a simple, albeit unlikely
scenario, in which music has been scientifically proven to be deleterious to one’s health
and societal well-being. He explains his reasons thusly:
I recognize that many people feel about religion the way I feel about
music…. music may be what Marx said religion is: the opiate of the
masses, keeping working people in tranquilized subjugation, but it may
also be the rallying cry of revolution, closing up the ranks and giving heart
to all. On this point, music and religion have quite similar profiles. In
other regards, music looks far less problematic than religion… no crusades
or jihads have been waged over differences in musical tradition, no
pogroms have been instituted against the lovers of waltzes or ragas or
tangos. Whole populations haven’t been subjected to obligatory scaleplaying or kept in penury in order to furnish concert halls with the finest
acoustics or instruments. No musicians have had fatwas pronounced
against them by musical organizations, not even accordionists.… I’m
prepared to look hard at the pros and cons of music, and if it turns out that
music causes cancer, ethnic hatred, and war, then I’ll have to think
seriously about how to live without music.219
So, too, he implies, must the religious. The problem, Dennett argues, is that “the first
spell – the taboo – and the second spell – religion itself – are bound together in a curious
embrace. Part of the strength of the second may be – may be – the protection it receives
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from the first.”220 But he reminds us that “knowledge really is power, for good and for ill.
Knowledge can have the power to disrupt ancient patterns of belief and action, the power
to subvert authority, the power to change minds…. there is risk and even pain involved,
but it would be irresponsible to use that as an excuse for ignorance.”221
To those unconvinced that the potential rewards for such intellectual courage are
worth the acknowledged risks that must necessarily accompany them, Dennett offers the
following example:
More recently, another taboo was broken, with even greater outcry. Alfred
C. Kinsey, in the 1940s and 1950s, began the scientific investigation of
human sexual practices in America that led to the notorious Kinsey
Reports…. There were substantial flaws in Kinsey’s studies…. Kinsey’s
research tools were interviews and questionnaires, but soon William H.
Masters and Virginia Johnson got up the nerve to subject human sexual
arousal to scientific investigation in the laboratory, recording the
physiological responses of volunteers engaged in sexual acts.… By
shining the bright light of science on what had heretofore been conducted
in the dark (with a huge measure of secrecy and shame), they dispelled a
host of myths, revised the medical understanding of some kinds of sexual
dysfunction, liberated untold numbers of anxious people whose tastes and
practices had been under a cloud of socially inculcated disapproval, and –
wonder of wonders – improved the sex lives of millions. It turns out that
in this case, at least, you can break the spell and yet not break the spell at
the same time. You can violate the taboo against dispassionate study of a
phenomenon – there's one spell broken – and not destroy it in the process
– there's a spell one can still blissfully fall under.222
Chapter Three, “Why Good Things Happen,” is primarily concerned with
establishing the modus operandi of evolution by natural selection and the ways in which
it manifests itself on both the biological and cultural levels. As Dennett explains
“whatever else religion is as a human phenomenon, it is a hugely costly endeavor, and
evolutionary biology shows that nothing so costly just happens…. evolution is

220

Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 48, 53.
222
Ibid., 46-7.
221

122

remarkably efficient at sweeping pointless accidents off the scene, so if we find a
persistent pattern of expensive equipment or activity, we can be quite sure that something
benefits from it in the only stocktaking that evolution honors: differential
reproduction.”223 But what does this mean exactly? Who or what benefits? In order to
understand the implications of such questions, a few more terms must be introduced and
clearly defined.
The first is a term that Dennett himself coined in 1983: free-floating rationale. As
is his custom, Dennett proceeds by way of an example.
People generally say that we like some things because they are sweet, but
this really puts it backwards: it is more accurate to say that some things are
sweet (to us) because we like them! (And we like them because our
ancestors who were wired up to like them had more energy for
reproduction than their less fortunately wired-up peers.)…. both parties –
animals and plants – benefitted, and the system improved itself over the
eons. What paid for all the design was the differential reproduction of
frugivorous and omnivorous animals and edible-fruit-bearing plants…. it
all made perfectly good sense, economically; it was a rational transaction,
conducted at a slower-than-glacial pace… and of course no plant or
animal had to understand any of this in order for the system to flourish.
This is… what I call a free-floating rationale.224
Dennett maintains that such coevolutionary processes can occur on a strictly biological
level, as in the previous case, or in tandem with more cultural developments. He explains
by way of another (this time, briefer) example. “Lactose tolerance is concentrated in
human populations that have descended from dairying cultures, whereas lactose
intolerance is common in those whose ancestors were never herders of dairy animals,
such as the Chinese and Japanese. Lactose intolerance is genetically transmitted, but
223
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pastoralism, the disposition to tend herds of animals, on which the genetic trait depends,
is culturally transmitted.”225 This cultural transmission Dennett identifies as a meme, a
term originally introduced by fellow New Atheist, Richard Dawkins, in his
groundbreaking 1976 work, The Selfish Gene.
As Dawkins would subsequently expound in his 1998 book, Unweaving the
Rainbow, “memes can be good ideas, good tunes, good poems, as well as driveling
mantras. Anything that spreads by imitation, as genes spread by bodily reproduction or
by viral infection, is a meme. The chief interest of them is that there is at least the
theoretical possibility of a true Darwinian selection of memes, to parallel the familiar
selection of genes. Those memes that spread do so because they are good at
spreading.”226 Note that this in no way implies universal or permanent benefits to those
all involved, a point Dennett, himself, is quite keen to make. “A good bargain can lapse,”
he says. “Our sweet tooth is a good example… our ancestors lived on very tight energy
budgets… a practically insatiable appetite for sweets made good sense then… now that
we have developed methods for creating a superabundance of sugar, that insatiability has
become a serious design flaw.”227
In order to determine whether the religion meme remains (or ever was) a good
bargain from the standpoint of humanity, Dennett explores several of the more prominent
theories about how such a complex relationship might conceivably have evolved. Among
these are symbiont theories, in which religion is considered somewhat akin to bacteria
present in the human body, sexual selection theories, in which religious propensities are
seen as sexually attractive characteristics (in much the same way a male peacock’s
225
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dazzling tale distinguishes it from its less spectacular competition and thus wins the
reproductive attentions of the female), or pearl theories, in which “religion is simply a
beautiful by-product… [that] doesn’t benefit any gene, or individual, or group, or cultural
symbiont… [it is merely] something that just happens to captivate us human agents, who
have an indefinitely expandable capacity for delighting in novelties and curiosities.”228
In the case of symbionts, Dennett argues that some religions (like bacteria) may
be mutualists: “enhancing human fitness and even making human life possible,” others
may be commensals: “neither good nor bad for us, but along for the ride,” and still others
may be parasites: “deleterious replicators that we would be better off without.”229 But
regardless of which theory one seems most inclined to, Dennett recognizes the natural
aversion one would likely have to contemplating the parasitic scenario. He, nevertheless,
cautions, that such considerations are necessary in order to achieve as exhaustive and
unbiased a study as possible.
Your religion probably seems obviously benign to you, and other religions
may well seem to you to be just as obviously toxic to those infected by
them, but appearances can deceive. Perhaps their religion is providing
them with benefits that you just don't understand yet, and perhaps your
religion is poisoning you in ways that you have never suspected. You
really can't tell from the inside. That's how parasites work: quietly,
unobtrusively, without disturbing their hosts any more than is absolutely
necessary. If (some) religions are culturally evolved parasites, we can
expect them to be insidiously well designed to conceal their true nature
from their hosts, since this is an adaptation that would further their own
spread.230

228

Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 84.
230
Ibid., 85.
229

125

Though he subsequently admits that “these hypotheses do not all pull in the same
direction,” he still insists that “the truth about religion might well by an amalgam of
several of them (plus others).”231
With his logistical framework in place, Dennett outlines, in the following five
chapters, what he considers to be a (one presumes the most) plausible evolutionary
history of religion. Chapter Four, “The Roots of Religion,” introduces the reader to one
final concept, which in many ways serves as the lynchpin of Dennett’s entire argument:
the intentional stance. Dennett describes this as certain animals’ inherent ability to “treat
some other things in the world as agents with limited beliefs about the world, specific
desires, and enough common sense to do the rational thing given those beliefs and
desires.”232 Despite the (human) intuition that such an ability must be conscious and
deliberate, Dennett reminds us:
The utility of the intentional stance in describing and predicting animal
behavior is undeniable, but that doesn't mean that the animals themselves
are clued in about what they are doing. When a low-nesting bird leads the
predator away from her nestlings by doing a distraction display, she is
making a convincing sham of a broken wing, creating the tempting
illusion of an easy supper for the observing predator, but she need not
understand this clever ruse. She does need to understand the conditions of
likely success, so that she can adjust her behavior the better to fit the
variations encountered, but she no more needs to be aware of the deeper
rationale for her actions than does the fledgling cuckoo when it pushes the
rival eggs out of the nest in order to maximize the food it will get from its
foster parents.233
Although undoubtedly a useful tool for navigating the uncertainties of a
mysterious and often perilous world, the problem for humans is that our particular
inclination to adopting the intentional stance is so strong that it becomes difficult to know
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when it is not (or at the very least, when it is no longer) appropriate to employ it. To
illustrate this, Dennett discusses our species’ tendency to continue to ascribe agency to
someone we knew even after they have died, and the ways in which we evolved to do this
culturally without impeding our biological imperative to survive and reproduce.
What keeps many habits in place is the pleasure we take from indulging in
them. And so we dwell on them, drawn to them like a moth to a candle.
We preserve relics and other reminders of the deceased persons, and make
images of them, and tell stories about them, to prolong these habits of
mind even as they start to fade. But there is a problem: a corpse is a potent
source of disease, and we have evolved a strong compensatory innate
disgust mechanism to make us keep our distance.… What seems to have
evolved everywhere, a Good Trick for dealing with a desperate situation,
is an elaborate ceremony that removes the dangerous body from the daily
environment either by burial or burning, combined with the interpretation
of the persistent firing of the intentional-stance habits shared by all who
knew the deceased as the unseen presence of the agent as a spirit, a sort of
virtual person created by the survivors' troubled mind-sets, and almost as
vivid and robust as a live person.234
Though one could hardly call this phenomenon religion, when coupled with humanity’s
historical propensity for likewise ascribing agency to such (mindless) events as natural
disasters and disease, one can begin to see just how this undoubtedly useful
predisposition could eventually evolve to outstrip its efficacy in the governance of some
aspects of our daily lives.
In Chapter Five, “Religion, the Early Days,” Dennett explains just how this
process might sensibly unfold. “Clouds certainly don't look like agents with beliefs and
desires, so it is no doubt natural to suppose that they are indeed inert and passive things
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being manipulated by hidden agents that do look like agents: rain gods and cloud gods
and the like – if only we could see them.”235 He continues:
The memorable nymphs and fairies and goblins and demons that crowd
the mythologies of every people are the imaginative offspring of a
hyperactive habit of finding agency wherever anything puzzles or
frightens us. This mindlessly generates a vast overpopulation of agentideas, most of which are too stupid to hold our attention for an instant;
only a well-designed few make it through the rehearsal tournament,
mutating and improving as they go. The ones that get shared and
remembered are the souped-up winners of billions of competitions for
rehearsal time in the brains of our ancestors.236
And though Dennett acknowledges that, while this accounts for the advent and
sustainment of superstition, “Hunting for elves in the garden or the bogeyman under your
bed is not (yet) having a religion.”237 For this, stewardship [i.e. mindful maintenance] is
required, and that is the concern of Chapter Six.
Both folk and organized religion require some degree of conscientious
stewardship in order to survive and thrive in the highly competitive struggle for the hearts
and minds of their would-be adherents.238 Dennett argues that “Like every conscientious
worker, shamans can be expected to notice or suspect shortcomings in their own
performance and then experiment with alternative methods: ‘I'm losing customers to that
other shaman; what is he doing that I'm not doing? Is there a better way to do the healing
rituals?’”239 What is different between the two is the role that faith (i.e. belief) must play
in order for them to ultimately triumph over their rivals. “In a tribal society in which
‘everyone knows’ that you need to sacrifice a goat in order to have a healthy baby, you
235
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make sure that you sacrifice a goat. Better safe than sorry. This feature marks a profound
difference between folk religion and organized religion: those who practice a folk
religion don't think of themselves as practicing a religion at all…. where there is no
ambient doubt to speak of, there is no need to speak of faith.”240 In other words, in order
to transition (or evolve) from folk to organized religion, this conscientious stewardship
must be expanded beyond the confines of the shaman or priest and into the minds of the
faithful.241 Chapter Seven, “The Invention of Team Spirit,” addresses this topic.
As Dennett explains:
What is good all things considered may not coincide with what is good for
the institution, which may not be what makes life easiest for the
institution's leader, but these different benchmarks have a way of being
substituted for one another under the pressure of real-time reflective
control. When this happens, the free-floating rationales that are blindly
sculpted by earlier competitions can come to be augmented or even
replaced by represented rationales, rationales that are not just anchored in
individual minds, in diagrams and plans, and in conversations but used –
argued over, reasoned about, agreed upon. People thus become conscious
stewards of their memes, no longer taking their survival for granted the
way we take our language for granted, but taking on the goal of fostering,
protecting, enhancing, spreading the Word.242
In terms of how this might realistically be accomplished, he offers the following
hypothesis: “memes that foster human group solidarity are particularly fit (as memes) in
circumstances in which host survival (and hence host fitness) most directly depends on
hosts' joining forces in groups. The success of such meme-infested groups is itself a
240
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potent broadcasting device, enhancing outgroup curiosity (and envy) and thus permitting
linguistic, ethnic, and geographic boundaries to be more readily penetrated.”243 This
describes not only the way in which individual adherents can aspire to more meaningful
and inclusive relationships with their fellow members, but also the way in which these
advocates might ultimately transcend the traditional boundaries of folk religion and usher
in more universal alternatives. However, such proselytizing trends are not without their
own pitfalls and presumptions. One of the least perceptible yet most pervasive, the belief
in belief, is the subject of Chapter Eight.
Early in the chapter, Dennett states that “once our ancestors became reflective
(and hyperreflective) about their own beliefs, and thus appointed themselves stewards of
the beliefs they thought most important, the phenomenon of believing in belief became a
salient social force in its own right, sometimes eclipsing the lower-order phenomena that
were its object.”244 Under the auspices of traditional folk religion, this trend is somewhat
difficult to discern, but once organized religion takes root, the shift from belief to belief in
belief becomes much more noticeable in the acts of the faithful (which are, after all, the
only things to which we as individuals are ultimately privileged with regard to our fellow
human beings).
The transition from folk religion to organized religion is marked by a shift
in beliefs from those with very clear, concrete consequences to those with
systematically elusive consequences – paying lip service is just about the
only way you can act on them. If you really believe that the rain god won't
provide rain unless you sacrifice an ox, you sacrifice an ox if you want it
to rain. If you really believe that your tribe's god has made you
243
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invulnerable to arrows, you readily run headlong into a swarm of deadly
arrows to get at your enemy.… If you really believe that your God is
watching you and doesn't want you to masturbate, you don't masturbate.
(You wouldn't masturbate with your mother watching you! How on earth
could you masturbate with God watching you? Do you really believe God
is watching you? Perhaps not.) But what could you do to show that you
really believe that the wine in the chalice has been transformed into the
blood of Christ?... There is really only one action you can take to
demonstrate this belief: you can say that you believe it, over and over, as
fervently as the occasion demands.245
In other words, organized religion is (and indeed must be) more preoccupied with
the public professions of faith and/or mere observations of ritual and tradition than with
privately and sincerely held convictions or doubts. There remain more tangible ways in
which to express one’s bona fides within the confines of folk religion, while the
inconsequential issue of belief lingers harmlessly in the recesses of society’s collective
consciousness as little more than an assumed reality. This is a fact that even some
organized religions have reluctantly been forced to concede, as Dennett relates.
“Recognizing that the very idea of commanding someone to believe something is
incoherent on its face, an invitation to insincerity or self-deception, many Jewish
congregations reject the demand for orthodoxy, right belief, and settle for orthopraxy,
right behavior.”246 Ostensibly, this would seem to be a rather serious flaw in the overall
design of organized religion. After all, how can belief in belief possibly be considered of
greater importance in an area of one’s life where faith itself is traditionally considered to
be both presumed and paramount?247 From a moral, historical, or even sociological
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perspective, it must be admitted that this is at least somewhat problematic,248 but from an
evolutionary standpoint, Dennett reminds us, “as long as the formulas get transmitted
down through the ages, the memes will survive and flourish.”249
The final three chapters Dennett dedicates to examining religion in today’s social,
political, and intellectual climate(s). In Chapter Nine, “Toward a Buyer’s Guide in
Religion,” Dennett outlines and then attempts to refute some of the most common
contemporary arguments against placing religion under the scientific microscope. These,
he identifies as “the love barrier, the academic-territoriality barrier, and the loyalty-toGod barrier.”250 The love barrier, as it relates to religion, he compares to the allencompassing, undeniable adoration and loyalty that most of us feel toward another
human being at some point in our personal lives. “I am suggesting… that their
unquestioning loyalty, their unwillingness even to consider the virtues versus the vices, is
a type of love, and more like romantic love than brotherly love or intellectual love.”251 In
other words, to doubt one’s love would be to betray a sacred trust and risk potentially
severing a bond that one would never wish to break. And though this impulse can be
strong, Dennett reminds us that it is nevertheless fraught with potential difficulties. “Even
if it is true that nothing could matter more than love, it wouldn't follow from this that we
don't have reason to question the things that we, and others, love. Love is blind, as they
248
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say, and because love is blind, it often leads to tragedy: to conflicts in which one love is
pitted against another love, and something has to give, with suffering guaranteed in any
resolution.”252 But, Dennett argues, we must not shy away from this potential suffering,
out of fear (or even certainty) that our love would not survive the inquest. Instead, he is
asking us to consider whether a love so fragile and fickle as to be unable to withstand
even rudimentary criticism or doubt is worthy of such adoration in the first place. If the
answer is no, then the course of action seems obvious, but if the answer is yes, then the
logical result would simply be a more secure and steadfast a foundation upon which that
love can grow. He substitutes his own love of evolution in the hopes of making his point
that a reasonable love needn’t be a lesser love, but in fact, quite the contrary.
We who love evolution do not honor those whose love of evolution
prevents them from thinking clearly and rationally about it! On the
contrary, we are particularly critical of those whose misunderstandings
and romantic misstatements of these great ideas mislead themselves and
others. In our view, there is no safe haven for mystery or
incomprehensibility. Yes, there is humility, and awe, and sheer delight, at
the glory of the evolutionary landscape, but it is not accompanied by, or in
the service of, a willing (let alone thrilling) abandonment of reason.253
The second obstacle to the scientific study of religion, Dennett calls the academicterritoriality barrier. This he ascribes to the “scholarly friends of religion, many of whom
are atheistic or agnostic connoisseurs, not champions of any creed.”254 Referencing
passages from Emil Durkheim and Mircea Eliade, both of whom argued that only the
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religious should undertake studies in religion,255 Dennett then sums up the position
thusly:
Only women are qualified to do research on women (according to some
radical feminists), because only they can overcome the phallocentrism that
renders males obtuse and biased in ways they can never acknowledge and
counteract. Some multiculturalists insist that Europeans (including
Americans) can never really cancel out their disabling Eurocentrism and
understand the subjectivity of Third World people. It takes one to know
one, according to this theme in all its variations. Well, then, should we all
just hunker down in our isolationist enclaves and wait for death to
overtake us, since we can never understand one another?256
Though aware of the tightrope he must walk to avoid seeming either flippant or strident
in his rebuttal, Dennett responds by demonstrating not only the senselessness but also the
self-defeating limitations that such thinking ultimately engenders:
It would be dereliction of duty for us to let pedophiles insist that only
those who appreciate a commitment to pedophilia can really understand
them at all. So what we may say to those who insist that only those who
believe, only those with a deep appreciation of the sacred, are to be
entrusted with the investigation of religious phenomena, is that they are
simply wrong, about both facts and principles. They are mistaken about
the imaginative and investigative powers of those they would exclude, and
they are wrong to suppose that it might be justifiable on any grounds to
limit the investigation of religion to those who are religious. If we say this
politely, firmly, and often, they may eventually stop playing this card and
let us get on with our investigations, hampered though we may be by our
lack of faith.257
The final impediment to the scientific study of religion Dennett describes as the
loyalty-to-God barrier. In essence, one could view these arguments as little more than the
inevitable result of the oft-repeated biblical command, “Do not put the Lord your God to
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the test,” (Deut. 6:16, Matt. 4:7, Luke 4:12). This warning notwithstanding, early efforts
in this regard have taken the shape of longevity and health studies, happiness surveys,
and an examination of the demonstrable effects of intercessory prayer on those of a
religious persuasion. Given that the preliminary results have been somewhat mixed,
Dennett notes that both camps have reacted in rather surprising ways. “The early results
are impressive enough to have provoked knee-jerk skeptical dismissals from some
atheists who haven't stopped to consider how independent these questions are from
whether or not any religious beliefs are true,” noting that “false belief to improve human
capacities is already established.”258 The religious, by contrast, have vacillated between
cautious optimism and buyer’s remorse. Dennett acknowledges:
They… have a tough call here. The stakes are high, since, if the studies are
performed properly and show no positive effect, the religions that practice
intercessory prayer would be obliged by the principles of truth in
advertising to renounce all claims to its efficacy.… On the other hand, a
positive result would stop science in its tracks. After five hundred years of
steady retreat in the face of advancing science, religion could demonstrate,
in terms that the scientists would have to respect, that its claims to truth
were not all vacuous.259
All Dennett is ultimately claiming is that either result would be preferable (to both
parties) than the taboo-protected, maddeningly uncertain status quo that currently stands
in its stead. If, for example, correlations between health, happiness, supernatural
intercession and religious activity could be empirically demonstrated, then science would
have to respect those results. If, on the other hand, no correlations could be ascertained
(or other reasons for such positive results could be separately provided) the faithful
would be permitted the opportunity to reexamine their convictions anew, possibly with an
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eye toward better understanding their biological and psychological selves and the deeprooted reasons their faith has (or had) been so appealing to them in the first place.
Chapter Ten, “Morality and Religion,” examines the age-old question of whether
or not the former can ultimately survive in a world stripped of the latter. To make his case
for the affirmative, Dennett builds upon the work of previous chapters and reminds us
that “the fact that your faith is so strong that you cannot do otherwise just shows (if you
really can't) that you are disabled for moral persuasion, a sort of robotic slave to a meme
that you are unable to evaluate.”260 In other words, ascribing morality to any action taken
or belief held where no alternative(s) existed or could even be envisioned is to
misunderstand and misuse the notion entirely. Those who cannot do or think otherwise
must by definition be amoral, and it is certainly not they who should be placed in the
stewardship of morality.261 As Dennett explains, “it is time for the reasonable adherents
of all faiths to find the courage and stamina to reverse the tradition that honors helpless
love of God – in any tradition. Far from being honorable, it is not
even excusable. It is shameful.”262 He goes on to caution that “those who maintain
religions, and take steps to make them more attractive, must be held similarly responsible
for the harms
produced by some of those whom they attract and provide with a cloak of
respectability.”263
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In closing the chapter, Dennett attempts to counter the notion that morality and
spirituality are (and must forever be) inextricably linked; his argument is two-pronged.
First, he seeks to demonstrate that many of the tenets (or trappings) of religious
conviction are themselves without moral quality. “The misalignment of goodness with
the denial of scientific materialism has a long history, but it is a misalignment. There is
no reason at all why a disbelief in the immateriality or immortality of the soul should
make a person less caring, less moral, less committed to the well-being of everybody on
Earth than somebody who believes in ‘the spirit.’”264 The second part of his argument
complements the first by focusing on the ways in which spirituality can exist without
morality. “Plenty of ‘deeply spiritual’ people – and everybody knows this – are cruel,
arrogant, self-centered, and utterly unconcerned about the moral problems of the world.”
However, Dennett maintains that even those spiritual individuals without the first three of
those undesirable characteristics still cannot be considered moral unless and until they are
willing to likewise dispense with the last.
Consider, for instance, those contemplative monks, primarily in Christian
and Buddhist traditions, who, unlike hardworking nuns in schools and
hospitals, devote most of their waking hours to the purification of their
souls, and the rest to the maintenance of the contemplative lifestyle to
which they have become accustomed. In what way, exactly, are they
morally superior to people who devote their lives to improving their stamp
collections or their golf swing? It seems to me that the best that can be
said of them is that they manage to stay out of trouble.265
It seems, once again, that Dennett is at least as interested in refashioning the debate as he
is in winning it. As he has demonstrated, morality simply cannot be compelled. If it is,
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then it is not moral. Similarly, morality cannot be recognized internally.266 Instead, it is
only to be found in the concerted and communal interactions between living beings.
Perhaps Dennett has failed to prove that such true instances of morality cannot or do not
occur within religious traditions, but he has certainly demonstrated that they are at least
as likely to occur outside them.
In the concluding chapter, “Now What Do We Do?” Dennett offers a suggestion
as to how we might put our newfound knowledge (rudimentary though it is) to work for
our fellow man in a manner that is both serviceable to their heads and respectful to their
sentiments. As such, it must appeal to both reason and individual freedom. Were it to do
otherwise, then it would hardly be worthy of the status we’ve afforded it thus far. He
suggests:
Maybe people everywhere can be trusted, and hence allowed to make their
own informed choices. Informed choice! What an amazing and
revolutionary idea! Maybe people should be trusted to make choices, not
necessarily the choices we would recommend to them, but the choices that
have the best chance of satisfying their considered goals. But what do we
teach them until they are informed enough and mature enough to decide
for themselves? We teach them about all the world's religions, in a matterof-fact, historically and biologically informed way, the same way we teach
them about geography and history and arithmetic. Let's get more education
about religion into our schools, not less. We should teach our children
creeds and customs, prohibitions and rituals, texts and music, and when
we cover the history of religion, we should include both the positive – the
role of the churches in the civil-rights movement of the 1960s, the
flourishing of science and the arts in early Islam, and the role of the Black
Muslims in bringing hope, honor, and self-respect to the otherwise
shattered lives of many inmates in our prisons, for instance – and the
negative – the Inquisition, anti-Semitism over the ages, the role of the
Catholic Church in spreading AIDS in Africa through its opposition to
condoms. No religion should be favored, and none ignored. And as we
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discover more and more about the biological and psychological bases of
religious practices and attitudes, these discoveries should be added to the
curriculum, the same way we update our education about science, health,
and current events. This should all be part of the mandated curriculum for
both public schools and home-schooling.267
In the end, a simple, yet elegant solution. Inform people of the realities of science,
religion, spirituality, morality, and education, and then allow them to construct their own
worldviews upon them. Those whose faiths are truly positive forces for good in the world
have nothing to fear from such an act. After all, should their conviction or their religion
perish under such scrutiny, then neither must have been what they thought they were, and
we should no more mourn them than we do alchemy, humorism, phrenology, any other
now-defunct idea or perspective that the passage of time and the light of reason have
shown us to be in error. As Dennett himself concludes:
It's just an idea… but it should appeal to freedom lovers everywhere: the
idea of
insisting that the devout of all faiths should face the challenge of making
sure their creed is worthy enough, attractive and plausible and meaningful
enough, to withstand the temptations of its competitors. If you have to
hoodwink – or blindfold – your children to ensure that they confirm their
faith when they are adults, your faith ought to go extinct.268

Part II: Criticisms and Rebuttals
In his article, “The God Genome,” Leon Wieseltier writes:
The question of the place of science in human life is not a scientific
question. It is a philosophical question. Scientism, the view that science
can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as
physical, is a superstition, one of the dominant superstitions of our day;
and it is not an insult to science to say so. For a sorry instance of presentday scientism, it would be hard to improve on Daniel C. Dennett’s book.
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“Breaking the Spell” is a work of considerable historical interest, because
it is a merry anthology of contemporary superstitions.… Dennett’s book is
also a document of the intellectual havoc of our infamous polarization,
with its widespread and deeply damaging assumption that the most
extreme statement of an idea is its most genuine statement. Dennett lives
in a world in which you must believe in the grossest biologism or in the
grossest theism, in a purely naturalistic understanding of religion or in
intelligent design, in the omniscience of a white man with a long beard in
19th-century England or in the omniscience of a white man with a long
beard in the sky.269
One is left consequently to assume that, in his cursory reading of Breaking the Spell,
Wieseltier must have somehow missed Dennett’s prefatory statement that “it could be
true that God exists, that God is indeed the intelligent, conscious, loving creator of us all,
and yet still religion itself, as a complex set of phenomena, is a perfectly natural
phenomenon.”270 For this statement alone would seem to refute not only Wieseltier’s
charge of scientism, but also his dubious casting of Dennett as the dichotomizing villain
in his own trenchant morality tale. For in suggesting that one’s scientific appreciation of
Darwin’s theory (or one’s underlying adherence to the rigorous methodology that was/is
employed in examining it) is in any way analogous to absolute and unfalsifiable belief in
an omniscient deity, I would argue that it is Wieseltier who is guilty of wreaking “the
intellectual havoc of our infamous polarization, with its widespread and deeply damaging
assumption that the most extreme statement of an idea is its most genuine statement.”271
Nevertheless, Wieseltier proceeds in his critique by arguing that Dennett
fundamentally misrepresents the writings and ideology of philosopher David Hume. He
states:
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Hume began “The Natural History of Religion,” a short incendiary work
that was published in 1757, with this remark: “As every enquiry which
regards religion is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in
particular which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its
foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature.”
These words serve as the epigraph to Dennett’s introduction to his own
conception of “religion as a natural phenomenon.” “Breaking the Spell”
proposes to answer Hume’s second question, not least as a way of
circumventing Hume’s first question. Unfortunately, Dennett gives a
misleading impression of Hume’s reflections on religion. He chooses not
to reproduce the words that immediately follow those in which he has just
basked: “Happily, the first question, which is the most important, admits
of the most obvious, at least, the clearest, solution. The whole frame of
nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after
serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary
principles of genuine Theism and Religion.”272
But once again, one could easily accuse Wieseltier of the same intellectual misconduct
for which he would so readily indict Dennett. For instance, in the conclusion to the same
paragraph from which both of the above citations are taken, Hume writes:
The first religious principles must be secondary; such as may easily be
perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose operation too, in
some cases, may, by an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, be
altogether prevented. What those principles are, which give rise to the
original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its
operation, is the subject of our present enquiry.273
In other words, Dennett is not attempting to circumvent Hume’s first question (any more
than Hume is). Both are simply stating that such religious concerns/beliefs are subsequent
to and dependent upon our ability to satisfactory uncover the underlying natural
conditions upon which they are ultimately predicated and thus made possible.
As for Wieseltier’s suggestion that Hume might have been tacitly endorsing some
form of basic theism in his aforementioned remarks, I cite the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy article entitled, “Hume on Religion.” In it, Paul Russell writes:
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Even with respect to the minimalism of thin theism, Hume goes well
beyond a soft skepticism that simply “suspends belief” on these issues. His
arguments are harder than this and present grounds for denying theism,
both thick and thin. On this basis we may conclude that Hume’s skeptical
commitments are hard and not soft with respect to the theist hypothesis in
all its forms and, as such, constitute a non-dogmatic form of atheism.274
Thus, it seems that Wieseltier’s posthumous conversion attempts must remain unrequited
and cannot therefore serve to put any sort of ideological distance between Hume’s
original enterprise and Dennett’s current endeavor. In light of this, Wieseltier’s
subsequent comments can now be taken with the appropriate grain(s) of salt.
[Hume’s] God was a very wan god. But his God was still a god; and so his
theism is as true or false as any other theism. The truth of religion cannot
be proved by showing that a skeptic was in his way a believer, or by any
other appeal to authority. There is no intellectually honorable surrogate for
rational argument. Dennett’s misrepresentation of Hume… is noteworthy,
therefore, because it illustrates his complacent refusal to acknowledge the
dense and vital relations between religion and reason, not only historically
but also philosophically.275
It appears that someone has indeed been complacent in their claims, but I would contend
that this demonstrates it is Wieseltier, not Dennett, who is guilty.
That said, I wish to include one final passage from Wieseltier’s article, one that I
think sufficiently summarizes his main criticism(s) of Dennett’s argument as well as
inadvertently demonstrates the logical and scientific insufficiency and oxymoronic nature
of his own.
It will be plain that Dennett’s approach to religion is contrived to evade
religion’s substance. He thinks that an inquiry into belief is made
superfluous by an inquiry into the belief in belief. This is a very revealing
mistake. You cannot disprove a belief unless you disprove its content. If
you believe that you can disprove it any other way, by describing its
origins or by describing its consequences, then you do not believe in
274
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reason. In this profound sense, Dennett does not believe in reason. He will
be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism.
But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is
merely a creaturely reason. Dennett’s natural history does not deny reason,
it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and
as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural
selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument
for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of
reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to
mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke
the power of reason even as it destroys it.276
In essence, Wieseltier is arguing that science is inherently less rational than religious
mysticism because science does not admit of a supernatural cause or explanation for its
own existence. Of course, one might point out that this is simply the content of
Wieseltier’s belief, and thus (as he so fittingly explains) beyond the purview of science’s
“creaturely reason” to dispute. How coincidentally convenient for him.277

In his article, “Beyond Belief,” Andrew Brown writes:
If you’re really trying to produce a naturalistic account of religion,
“memes” distract from the worrying and frightening questions. People like
Dennett and Dawkins, who pride themselves on their tough-minded,
ruthless, reductionist approach to biology, never seem to apply this kind of
reasoning to human society. Why should we expect religions to behave for
the benefit of professors in Cambridge or Oxford, or even for the benefit
of humanity?... If we are going to be atheists, and to regard religions as
human constructions serving human ends, we should not shrink from the
idea that these ends are likely to be sometimes inimical to other humans
outside the group. For all the rhetoric about the wickedness of religious
belief, I don’t think Dennett takes this idea very seriously.… Religions are
276
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one of the ways in which humans understand and create their own
societies. Thus they are essential to warlike societies as much as to
peaceful ones. The urgent question isn’t whether religion provokes warlike
behaviour. It is whether warlike behaviour benefits those who carry it out,
for if it does, religions will surely find ways to justify it.278
So according to Brown, one worrying and frightening question is “whether warlike
behavior benefits those who carry it out.” But how might Dennett’s (or Dawkins’)
discussion of memes distract from such an inquiry? If anything, I would argue that such a
discussion in fact provides a rational basis for the necessarily complicated answer to
Brown’s question, which must be yes and no, depending upon any number of
situationally-specific variables.
For instance, unsuccessful warlike behavior on the part of the individual and/or
the society can lead to dire, perhaps even fatal, consequences for both. But even when
effectively employed, warlike behavior is still very dangerous for the individual and can
even occasionally lead to societal ruin as well (the notion of a pyrrhic victory comes
immediately to mind). In other words, belligerence seems to frequently harm and
occasionally benefit those who choose to employ it. What, then, might account for its
seeming ability to consistently endure and to manifest itself in almost all societies to
some degree or another, regardless of its wildly varying degrees of success between
them? Perhaps warlike behavior is simply an imitable, self-perpetuating meme. If so, then
its relation to each individual or society would be immaterial to its reproductive fitness.
Given the prolific presence yet potentially extinctual nature of war in the nuclear age, this
seems a most reasonable, if unfortunate, conclusion. Consequently, I would counter that
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Dawkins’ and Dennett’s memetic theory actually adds to, rather than distracts from, such
undoubtedly worthwhile conversations.
For instance, in an interview with Ronald Bailey, Dennett was once asked, “Why
are people who claim to be alien abductees looked upon askance while those who see the
Virgin Mary [are] not?”279 He replied:
There are good reasons to believe that many who claim to be alien
abductees have actually had a traumatic sexual experience at the hands of
some abusing member of the family, or other sexual abuser. For them this
is just the socially easiest way of “explaining” their traumatic memories,
and their PTSD symptoms, and they may be entirely sincere in their
hallucinated memories. (So John Mack was probably half right: these
people had indeed had a terrible experience; it just wasn’t with aliens.)
The phenomenon should be studied with a suitably rigorous methodology
(not the way Whitley Strieber “investigated” it). But that’s tough, since
ethical and legal problems arise immediately. That’s no accident. It’s an
instance of Nicholas Humphrey’s Argument from Unwarranted Design (in
his excellent book LEAPS OF FAITH). Now why should it be that the
juiciest and most contagious tales of horror and wonder always seem to
involve circumstances that are systematically difficult to investigate?
These myths spread because they can spread, just like the virus for the
common cold.280
Nevertheless, one soon discovers the reason for Brown’s digression about warlike
behavior. He subsequently writes:
Few of us in this culture are in favour of fanaticism; but it is obviously
possible to be a fanatical atheist, so it turns out to be fanaticism that’s the
problem, not religion. More profoundly, a scientific or evolutionary
analysis of fanaticism might ask what use it was to fanatics and the answer
is clearly that sometimes it was very useful indeed – at least to their
surviving relatives and to their tribe. This may be difficult for us to see
because the myth we learnt was that fanaticism was a substitute for high
technology. Fanatics were the guys galloping towards the machine guns
while reasoned, logical, scientific people sat behind the machine guns and
calmly mowed them down.281
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According to Brown, fanaticism, not religion, is the problem. Fair enough. But to cite the
mimetic nature of fanaticism, after exerting such effort to discredit the usefulness of the
theory itself, seems a bit hypocritical and self-serving. Brown is also guilty of
establishing the same sort of false dichotomy with which Wieseltier accused Dennett in
the previous section. Historically, religious fanaticism has been accompanied by a great
deal of “warlike behavior.” Atheism (of every stripe), however, has not, and has instead
been largely confined to the heretical words of a few intrepid souls. This is not to say that
warlike behavior has strictly been the province of believers; only that belief itself can
serve as motivation to such action, while absence of said belief cannot.282 Therefore, I
would argue that to presume a similarity of behavior between religious fanatics and
atheistic rationalists is quite akin to equating Darwinian science to fundamentalist
doctrine. And despite Brown’s claim, fanaticism has never been considered a substitute
for high technology; historically, it has been a substitute for reason itself.

In his article, “The Unbearable Brightness of Being Right,” Rupert Sheldrake
makes a similar attempt to turn Dennett’s discussion of memes against him. He writes:
Dennett wants to reach “as wide an audience of believers as possible,” but
he has an ambiguous attitude to his intended audience. Sometimes he is
scornful, as when he compares religion to nicotine addiction, echoing Karl
282
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Marx’s dictum that religion is “the opium of the people,” or when he
follows Dawkins in treating religious beliefs as “memes” – defined as
“cultural replicators” – that leap from brain to brain like viruses.… I
ought to have been an ideal reader: I am a Christian, an Anglican, not a
bright. I am a strong believer in the value of scientific enquiry. I used to be
an atheist myself. But I didn’t find myself being reconverted by reading
Breaking the Spell, and I was put off by Dennett’s one-sidedness and
dogmatic certainty. His commitment to atheism makes him dismiss out of
hand the significance of religious experiences. For example, many people
have experienced a sense of the presence of God, or overwhelming love,
or a feeling of unity with nature, or visions, or transformative near-death
experiences. In the 1970s, the Oxford biologist Sir Alister Hardy initiated
a scientific enquiry into religious experiences in Britain, and found that
that they were far more common than most atheists – and even most
believers – had imagined.… But Dennett rules all such evidence out of
court. Powerful personal experiences “can’t be used as contributions to the
communal discussion that we are now conducting.” He assumes that
religious experiences are generated inside the brain, and that they are
illusory. How can Dennett be so sure? In the end, it all comes down to his
own beliefs. Bright memes have infected him and taken over his brain.
Those memes are now trying to leap from his brain into yours through the
medium of Breaking the Spell.283
In other words, according to Sheldrake, Dennett isn’t wrong about memes; he is simply
more right than he knows. His brain has been taken over by “bright memes” that have
caused him to exhibit “an ambiguous attitude to his intended audience,” not to mention
scornfulness, one-sidedness, dogmatism, and dismissiveness. But despite Sheldrake’s
claims to the contrary, Dennett is not dismissing all such claims of religious experience
“out of court.” He is merely stating that “however convinced some people may be by
their powerful personal experiences, such revelations don’t travel well.”284 So, yes,
Dennett does assume “that religious experiences are generated inside the brain,” but this
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in no way implies “that they are illusory.” Of this, he is “dogmatically” uncertain. They
are simply irrelevant to his enterprise.
Sheldrake’s misunderstanding/misrepresentation becomes even more
disconcerting when one considers that, in his own professed Christianity, he
(presumably) sees none of the potential pitfalls he seems to have encountered in
Dennett’s position. After all, in his defense of individual religious experiences as
evidence of their truth, Sheldrake is in fact the only person taking such a dogmatic
position in the first place, apart from Adam Kirsch, who in his review for The New York
Sun goes even a step further. He writes:
At the heart of organized religion, whether one accepts or rejects it, is the
truth that metaphysical experience is part of human life. Any adequate
account of religion must start from this phenomenological fact. Because
Mr. Dennett ignores it, treating religion instead as at best a pastime for
dimwits, at worst a holding cell for fanatics, he never really encounters the
thing he believes he is writing about.285
As a result, I would suggest that it is Sheldrake’s and Kirsch’s argument, not Dennett’s,
that ultimately “comes down to [their] own beliefs.”286

In his review of Breaking the Spell, Kenan Malik writes:
Much of the controversy about the book has centered on Dennett’s
atheism and his attempt to deconstruct religion with the tools of science.
In fact his frank disbelief is refreshing, even if his condescension towards
believers (‘I wonder if any believers in the End Times will have the
intellectual honesty and courage to read this book through’) can often be
trying. And his project of putting religion under rational scrutiny is surely
to be welcomed in an age in which faith seems to shape so much of
people’s responses to political and social issues. The real problem is that
285
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Dennett’s explanation of religion is less than convincing. It may be true
that humans possess certain psychological dispositions that open them to
religious ideas. But uncovering such traits is not the same as explaining
the origins, let alone the contemporary attractions, of religion.… What is
missing from Breaking the Spell is any sense of religion as a social or
historical, as opposed to a purely natural, phenomenon. Dennett dismisses
as unscientific the long and rich history of scholarship into the social roots
of religion. The result is a seriously distorted analysis and a curiously arid
book. There is no sense here of any engagement with religion as it is
actually lived or experienced, rather than as Dennett would like to imagine
it in theory. ‘Do some research!’ Dennett exhorts believers. It’s good
advice for philosophers too.287
Perhaps Malik is right; perhaps “uncovering such traits is not the same as explaining the
origins, let alone the contemporary attractions, of religion.” However, one could claim
that Malik is simply reviewing the book he wished Dennett had written as opposed to the
one he actually did. Furthermore, I would contend that any attempt to explain either the
origins or the contemporary attractions of religion that does not take such biological
considerations into account is unlikely to produce a more complete and thoughtful
analysis. As Aristotle once explained:
Man is by nature a political animal.… And why man is a political animal
in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For
nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the
animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and
pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their
nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful
and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is
designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also
the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction
from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and
right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these
things that makes a household and a city-state.… Therefore the impulse to
form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man
who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of
benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is
the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For unrighteousness
is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born
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possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible
to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue
man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to
sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice on the other hand is an element of
the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just,
is the regulation of the political partnership.288
In other words, man’s ability to form political bonds and indeed just societies is
predicated upon our natural ability to reason and to communicate with our fellow man.289
Without these intrinsic characteristics, neither development would even be conceivable,
let alone possible. The same undoubtedly holds for Malik’s critique. Until we identify
humanity’s specific traits and natural predispositions for religious ideology and behavior,
any discussions on the sociological or historical origins of the phenomenon seems
destined to remain secondary and incomplete.290

In his article, “Religion from the Outside,” Freeman Dyson writes:
Dennett defines scientific inquiry in a narrow way, restricting it to the
collection of evidence that is reproducible and testable. He makes a sharp
distinction between science on the one hand and the humanistic disciplines
of history and theology on the other. He does not accept as scientific the
great mass of evidence contained in historical narratives and personal
experiences. Since it cannot be reproduced under controlled conditions, it
does not belong to science. He quotes with approval and high praise
several passages from The Varieties of Religious Experience, the classic
description of religion from the point of view of a psychologist, published
by William James in 1902. He describes James’s book as “a treasure trove
288
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of insights and arguments, too often overlooked in recent times.” But he
does not accept James’s insights and arguments as scientific.291
But as Dennett himself explained in his response to Dyson:
Freeman Dyson imposes a curious meaning on the word “prejudice” in his
review of my book Breaking the Spell [NYR, June 22]. He has his own
prejudice “from the inside” in favor of religion, he says, while I have my
prejudice “from the outside” leading to “the opposite conclusion.”…. Is
there no possibility of a nonprejudiced approach to religion? In Dyson’s
world view, religion can have only friends and enemies, no interested but
uncommitted bystanders. This mindset seems to have prevented him from
seeing that my book strenuously attempts to avoid both biases – and I
think it succeeds – in the only way we have ever found to explore any
complicated and controversial phenomenon objectively: by adhering to the
methods and working assumptions of science, expanded to encompass the
work of historians and other investigators in the humanities – not
excluding theologians, but not granting them the deference and immunity
from rational criticism to which they are accustomed.292
Thus, Dennett has no desire to reject or exclude the work of historians, philosophers, and
theologians. He only wishes to subject them to the same sort of “rational criticism” to
which science is currently held accountable. As he goes on to explain:
Contrary to what Dyson says, I not only don’t dismiss the work of
nonscientific explorers of religion as nonscientific; I go to elaborate –
some would say tedious – lengths to show how to incorporate it into a
unified and ideology-free (and mutually respectful) investigation. How
could such a brilliant thinker as Dyson misunderstand this? I suspect it is
because he, like some other religious readers, are so accustomed to the
hyper-respect their “faith” is normally vouchsafed that when somebody
treats it with deliberate matter-of-fact curiosity, they take offense, and
cease to think and read carefully.293
Echoing Malik’s and Dyson’s social sciences critiques, socialist James Brookfield
argues:
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Dennett’s decision to ignore the Marxist critique of religion is the most
severe handicap in the direction that he has adopted in Breaking the Spell
and amounts to a type of intellectual dereliction of duty. Dennett defines
himself as a philosopher, not simply a popularizer of science or advocate
of atheism. Considering this point, it is not justifiable for him to look past
what Marxism has to say on the subject of religion.294
But what exactly does Marxism have to say on the subject? Brookfield continues:
The most common alternative notion among those who study religion is an
idealized conception. What Engels wrote of Feuerbach could be justly
applied to Dennett: “In the form he is realistic since he takes his start from
man; but there is absolutely no mention of the world in which this man
lives; hence, this man remains always the same abstract man who
occupied the field in the philosophy of religion.” To put it somewhat
differently, because Dennett never really examines the social history of
man, his hypotheses about the development of religion after agricultural
societies arose have a contrived feel to them. Man as Dennett imagines
him, naturalistically, substitutes for historical man. An imagined history is
substituted for the real one. The danger of adopting an excessively
speculative, somewhat imagined starting point for inquiry is demonstrated
rather clearly in another way in Breaking the Spell. Dennett’s relative
disinterest in the actual social dimensions of human society renders him
vulnerable to complete misunderstandings of the present political
situation.295
Unfortunately, like Malik and Dyson before him, Brookfield seems to have missed
Dennett’s central point that any social, historical, or economic accounts of religious
history must themselves be grounded in a fundamentally naturalistic understanding of
man as a biological, evolved, and still evolving entity. Or as Dennett himself explains:
“Everything we value – from sugar and sex and money to music and love and religion –
we value for reasons. Lying behind, and distinct from, our reasons are evolutionary
reasons, free-floating rationales that have been endorsed by natural selection.”296 In other
words, such sociological accounts of religion as Malik, Dyson, and Brookfield would
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presumably like to see would undoubtedly help us to discover our reasons for adhering to
and exhibiting such otherwise perplexing behavior. Dennett’s account is simply searching
for those underlying evolutionary reasons, of which we may be presently unaware, but
which once discovered might shed some evidential light upon the enterprise as a whole.
Thus, they represent complementary, not conflicting, components of the same search for
knowledge.

Commenting on Freeman Dyson’s review, behavioral psychologist Howard
Rachlin writes:
But Dyson… believes that all debates about religion – not only the
question of innate goodness or badness – are orthogonal to scientific
inquiry. Religion, Dyson feels, can be usefully studied only from the
inside, in religious terms, as William James did in The Varieties of
Religious Experience (James, 1902/1982), not scientific ones. Dennett’s
proposal to establish a scientific dialog on religion is thus rejected by
some of the very people he is trying so hard to reach. As a behaviorist I
find it hard to muster any sympathy for Dennett’s failure in this regard
because, in one crucial area, the behavior of individual organisms, Dennett
is a thoroughgoing creationist. Just as some critics unfairly accuse Dennett
of trivializing religion, Dennett (1978) has unfairly accused behaviorists in
general and Skinner in particular of trivializing human cognition.297
In order to defend his labeling of Dennett as a “thoroughgoing creationist,” Rachlin
employs the following anecdote:
I have an old friend from the Bronx who is a professional actor. I see him
at very long intervals – 10 years on the average. Invariably I come away
confused. I don’t know if he’s really a nice guy or is just acting like a nice
guy. (I’m not sure whether he knows either.) Having a conversation with a
professional actor is like sparring with a professional boxer; they’re in
absolute control. How could I have resolved my confusion after my
conversations with my actor friend? What information did I need that I
didn’t have? According to Dennett, the information I needed was inside
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my friend at the time of my conversations with him in the form of a set of
mechanisms in his brain which, if I only knew how they were organized
and their state at the time, would tell me what he was really thinking as he
said what he said. It is the collective state of these mechanisms that
constitute, for Dennett, the actor’s mental state. And it is his mind that
directly causes him to say what he says; that is, his behavior is created by
his mind and his mind is inside his head. That seems to me nonsense.
What I need is not information about my friend’s internal state but
information about his overt behavior over extended periods during the
previous 10 years (and, as it comes in, information about his overt
behavior over the next 10 years). A frank conversation about him with his
children and wife would tell me far more about what he was really
thinking at the time we met than would any kind of examination of his
insides.298
Leaving aside for the moment that this critique is completely unrelated to
Dennett’s current project, I would argue that Rachlin has not only misunderstood
Dennett’s position on behaviorism, but in so doing, he has set up yet another false
dichotomy in which behavior and belief are construed as mutually exclusive explanations
of human action. (As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Behaviorism
explains, “Arguably, a version of analytical or logical behaviorism may also be found in
the work of Daniel Dennett on the ascription of states of consciousness via a method he
calls ‘heterophenomenology’ (Dennett 2005, pp. 25–56). (See also Melser 2004.)”299 So
not only is Dennett not a “thoroughgoing creationist” when it comes to behaviorism, his
notion of heterophenomenology is actually an attempt to bridge the divide between it and
constructivism.) But whether or not one believes that behaviorists “trivialize cognition,”
Dennett’s argument that the motivation for some human behavior might be dependent
upon their biology (and thus distinct from their own cognitive reasons) would seem to
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suggest that such concerns are secondary at best (if not themselves trivial) to his overall
enterprise. What’s more, I would contend that any behaviorist account of religious (or
indeed any other category of human) behavior which does not in some way consider any
correlation between it and the various internal mental and/or physical states of the
evolved brain is deficient by default.
Nevertheless, Rachlin continues:
Behaviorists, following Skinner (1990), are far more consistent
Darwinians than Dennett is.… That is, the behavior analyst approaches the
study of a human being in exactly the same way as the evolutionary
biologist approaches the study of a nonhuman animal.… It is important to
specify exactly how an evolutionary view of complex individual behavior
patterns differs from Dennett’s intentional stance. For Dennett, memes are
passed down from the minds of parents to the minds of children. But what
exactly are memes and where exactly are they located? Dennett admits (p.
349), “…it is unlikely that any independently identifiable common brain
structures, in different brains, could ever be isolated as the material
substrate for a particular meme” (italics in original). Instead, he argues,
each meme, like each thought, wish, belief, etc. is a compound of small
mechanisms most likely distributed across various places in our nervous
systems. He quotes himself (approvingly) as follows (p. 302): “Yes we
have a soul; but it’s made of lots of tiny robots” (italics in original). Thus,
for Dennett, our beliefs reside not in our verbal and nonverbal behavioral
patterns but in a set of mechanisms (the tiny robots) in our brains. The
data Dennett recommends for cognitive science are behavioral; cognitive
science is distinct from neurophysiology. But those data are to be
interpreted as evidence for internal mechanisms (the tiny robots) – not
indeed neural connections but flow diagrams where the boxes have labels
like memory, imagination, thought, and so forth.300
So having failed to illustrate Dennett’s supposed hostility to behaviorism, Rachlin’s
subsequent charge is that behaviorists such as himself are “far more consistent
Darwinians than Dennett is.” So whereas the majority of critics argue that Dennett’s
account is too focused upon evolutionary biology, Rachlin ultimately argues that it is not
attentive enough to its approach. He does, however, concede:
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No complete understanding of human behavior can be achieved without
understanding internal mechanisms, [but even] if you knew everything
there is to know about those tiny robots (and the tinier robots inside them,
and those inside them) you would still not understand why people do the
things they do and why they say the things they say. You will have
ignored the most important scientific fact – the most important Darwinian
fact – about those patterns (including religious patterns): their function in
the person’s environment (including the social environment).301
Once again, it would seem that an either/or explanation of religious behavior/belief that
excluded either Rachlin’s insights into behaviorism or Dennett’s cognitive contributions
would be substantially less valuable as a result of its omission. Why, then, if “no
complete understanding of human behavior can be achieved without understanding
internal mechanisms,” does Rachlin feel the need to make this distinction and argue for
such an extreme ideological separation of the two in the first place? I honestly don’t
know, but to employ Rachlin’s own words in service of a possible explanation: “It is his
mind that directly causes him to say what he says; that is, his behavior is created by his
mind and his mind is inside his head.” Of course, Dennett would add that their might be
underlying psychological or biological reasons (separate from Rachlin’s conscious
reasons) for believing and acting as he does, but whatever his motivations for doing so,
Rachlin’s resultant behavior “seems to me nonsense.”
It would seem that even Rachlin was eventually forced to admit as much:
Behaviorists disagree with each other about whether complex behavioral
patterns of whole organisms are usefully labeled by terms from our mental
vocabulary. Skinner (1990) thought not. I believe, on the contrary, that
mental terms are useful in behavior analysis (Rachlin, 1994). You could
call this the teleological stance. Imagination, for example, may be seen,
from this perspective, not as an image in your head but as a functional
mode of behavior – behaving in the absence of some state of affairs as you
normally would in its presence. Suppose two people in a room are both
asked to imagine a lion. The first person closes her eyes and says, “Yes, I
see it; it has a mane and a tail.” The second person runs screaming from
301
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the room. The first person is imagining a picture or a movie of a lion but
the second is imagining a lion itself. What is the function of such
behavior? Imagination is a necessary part of perception. If perception (as
distinct from sensation) is current discrimination of complex, temporally
extended sequences of stimuli (as distinct from simpler, immediate
stimuli), then the immediate discriminative response, especially if made
early in the sequence, involves a sort of gamble – behaving as if the
extended sequence had occurred. For example, at any given moment I
treat my wife as the person she is in the long run not as the particular
bundle of sensations she presents to me at that moment. It is in connection
with such premature but necessary discrimination (the universal arising
out of particular instances) that Aristotle gives us his famous analogy of
soldiers in a rout turning one by one and making a stand (Rachlin, 1994, p.
72). The function of the soldiers’ behavior is to create an abstraction (the
renewed formation) out of individual actions. The first soldier to turn is
behaving as he would if all the others had already turned; he is imagining
that they had already turned. His imagination is what he does, not what the
robots in his head are doing. The functions of our ordinary imaginations
are to allow us to get around in the world on the basis of partial
information. We do not have to carefully test the floor of every room we
walk into. Imagination is also necessary in self-control. One cigarette
refusal by a smoker is utterly worthless – like only one soldier in a rout
turning and making a stand. Refusal of an individual cigarette is never
reinforced – not now, not later, not symbolically, not internally. Only an
extended series of cigarette refusals is reinforced. Refusal of the first
cigarette is thus an act of imagination – behaving as you would if a state of
affairs existed when it does not (yet) exist. Such complex long-term
imaginative acts would be shaped from simpler short-term acts. The
function of such behavior is clear. Getting up in the morning, at least for
me, is an act of imagination.302
Thus it would seem that, at the end of the day, Rachlin’s teleological stance, specifically
as it relates to “the behavior” of imagination, is simply employing a mirrored
methodology to Dennett’s intentional stance and consequently amounts to a distinction
without a difference. For if Rachlin truly believes “that mental terms are useful in
behavior analysis,” then I would argue that he has already endorsed Dennett’s entire
analytical framework in the process.
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Inadvertently demonstrating this is in his own review of Breaking the Spell is
John C. Greene. He writes:
How would a scientist set out to prove that, in principle, miracles can
never occur? The question whether they have occurred in any particular
case must be settled by historical evidence, but Dennett shows very little
interest in history or in historians like Thomas Cahill, Garry Wills, and
John Pairman Brown who have taken the trouble to master the languages
and perspectives of the ancient world. Like David Hume, one of his
favorite philosophers, he excludes miracles as incompatible with the laws
of nature (Hume’s criterion) or with “scientific or philosophical
materialism” (Dennett’s criterion). But there is nothing scientific about
materialism as a philosophy, which the Oxford American Dictionary
defines as “the opinion that nothing exists but matter and its movements
and modifications.” Among philosophers the mathematician-logicianphilosopher Alfred North Whitehead took the lead in rejecting the concept
of matter and expanding the idea of experience to embrace all natural
entities, each entity prehending (taking into its own being the rest of the
universe in some degree) in its occasions of experience. Among scientists
the population geneticist Sewall Wright concluded that for humans
“reality consists primarily of streams of consciousness. This fact must take
precedence over the laws of nature of physical science in arriving at a
unified philosophy of science, even though it must be largely ignored in
science itself” (1977: 80). In science, he adds, the richness of the stream of
consciousness is impoverished because the scientist restricts his
investigation to “the so-called primary properties of matter” (p 80), which,
ironically, can be measured only by voluntary actions. Wright concludes
that we must acknowledge the necessity “of dealing with the universe as
the world of mind” (p 85).303
Essentially, Greene is arguing that there is nothing scientific about scientific materialism,
that evidence for the existence of miracles can only be historically ascertained on a caseby-case basis and can never be principally prohibited by science (a challenge that any
scientist would surely accept), and that matter in motion must necessarily take an
ideological backseat to conscious experience when constructing a viable model of reality.
Not only is Greene’s critique of Dennett utterly at odds with Rachlin’s (for certainly,
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Dennett cannot be simultaneously obsessed with and dismissive of “the world of the
mind,”), I would actually contend that Green’s criticisms are not even criticisms.
For instance, Dennett’s argument explicitly brackets miracles as an area of nonconcern for his study. But even should one wish to prove a particular miracle, Dennett
reminds us that “the only hope of ever demonstrating this to a doubting world would be
by adopting the scientific method, with its assumption of no miracles, and showing that
science was utterly unable to account for the phenomena. Miracle-hunters must be
scrupulous scientists or else they are wasting their time.”304 As for Greene’s (and Sewell
Wright’s) claims concerning Dennett’s admitted materialism, I see no reason why a
commitment to physicalism in any way diminishes, obscures, or refutes the notion of
conscious experience. Just because mental experience is rooted in the physical brain does
not mean that materialism is unconcerned with its contents. Thus, it would seem that,
again contrary to Rachlin, Greene is arguing that Dennett’s materialism somehow renders
him a behaviorist. And as I previously stated, he cannot both endorse and be dismissive
of a particular school of thought at the same time. So not only have Greene and Rachlin
failed to make their respective cases, in their attempts, they have inadvertently refuted
one another’s primary criticisms of Dennett.
This fact notwithstanding, Greene haughtily (and tellingly) concludes:
“What is truth?” said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer,”
wrote Francis Bacon, an early advocate of experimental science. Bacon
does not answer Pilate’s question, but in an essay “Of Goodness and
Goodness of Nature” he links goodness to the character of the Deity and to
the theological virtue of charity. He writes: “The desire of power in excess
caused the angels to fall; the desire of knowledge in excess caused man to
fall: but in charity there is no excess; neither can angel nor man come in
danger by it.… But above all if he [the good man] have St Paul’s
perfection… it shows much of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity
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with Christ himself.”… Apparently this early prophet of a new kind of
science based on observation and experiment had none of the animus
against religion which inspires the author of Breaking the Spell.305
In other words, as far as Greene is concerned, Dennett’s core problem is his imprudent
quest for excessive knowledge. If only he would content himself with his ignorance and
subsequently with only the search for goodness (instead of truth), a much better man
would he be. I would counter that the only animus apparent in the preceding paragraph is
that of Greene toward science. What’s more, I would contend that his belief that truth and
goodness are somehow mutually exclusive says far more about him than it does about
Dennett.

In his article, “A Scientific Approach to Atheism,” Jack Miles argues:
Intellectual outbursts emotionally akin to “Let’s step outside and settle
this, shall we?” keep intruding. Thus we read: “If theists would be so kind
as to make a short list of all the concepts of God they renounce as
balderdash before proceeding further, we atheists would know just which
topics were still on the table, but, out of a mixture of caution, loyalty, and
unwillingness to offend anyone ‘on their side,’ theists typically decline to
do this.” Perhaps so, but then is Dennett prepared to perform a comparable
triage for the favorite topics of his fellow atheists? Where do “we atheists”
stand, for example, with regard to fellow atheist Howard Stern? We theists
would like to know, if Dennett would be so kind, though we fear that out
of a mixture of caution, loyalty and unwillingness to offend, he may pass
over America’s most influential single atheist in silence.306
You might want to read that again. Effectively, Miles is arguing that Dennett’s challenge
to the religious to precisely define what they mean by “God” is roughly comparable to a
religious person’s challenge to Dennett to address, explain, and/or defend Howard Stern’s
comments (on religion, presumably) at some point during his analysis. Not only does this
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Greene, “Review: Breaking the Spell.”
Jack Miles, “A Scientific Approach to Atheism,” The Washington Post, 28 June 2006, accessed
22 August 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/28/AR2006062802144.html.
306

160

confuse belief with the absence of belief, but it also confers an egalitarian authority upon
both groups that is neither warranted nor desired. Whether or not one believes that the
Pope can speak for all Catholics, such a position would undoubtedly be based upon one’s
understanding of the commonality and uniformity of Catholic beliefs. But regardless of
one’s perspective on that particular issue, the analogy simply cannot be extended to
anyone who does not share any ostensibly unifying beliefs which would allow them to
speak out either for or against an idea or individual from a position of comparable
authority.307 Nevertheless, even were one to grant Miles’ request, I fail to see how either
the theists’ or Stern’s responses could serve to derail, discount, or disprove Dennett’s
overarching argument that religion is a natural phenomenon. It is simply hair-splitting of
the most tedious and telling sort.

In her article, “Escaping Illusion,” Kim Sterelny argues that
religious commitment cannot both be the result of natural selection for (for
example) enhanced social cohesion and be a response to something that is
actually divine. A cohesion-and-cooperation model of religion just says
that believers would believe, whether or not there was a divine world to
which to respond. If a secular theory of the origin of religious belief is
true, such belief is not contingent on the existence of traces of the divine
in our world. So although a secular and evolutionary model of religion
might be (in a strict sense) neutral on the existence of divine agency, it
cannot be neutral on the rationality of religious conviction.308
Essentially, Sterelny is arguing that the failure is not in Dennett’s execution of his
argument, but rather in its foundational premise: that religion can be studied as a strictly
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natural phenomenon. This would seem to suggest that William James and Freeman
Dyson were correct, and that religion can only be holistically examined and understood
from within, by those who share (at least some form of) its faith.
But would we say this about any other subject? Could, for instance,
totalitarianism only be studied by those who lived under such staunch political
oppression? Or, if the seemingly universal tendency of human beings to safeguard and
care for their young could be found to have a biological imperative (as indeed it has for
all mammals), would that in any way diminish the emotional bond between parent and
child? What’s more, would one’s knowledge of the role of pheromones in the
development of feelings of physical attraction destroy one’s capacity to experience
romantic love? The answer to all of these questions is in a very significant sense no. So
perhaps Sterelny is right that Dennett “cannot be neutral on the rationality of religious
conviction,” but if it can be shown that such convictions do result in “enhanced social
cohesion and cooperation,” as Sterelny claims and as Dennett’s study seeks to
demonstrate, then surely such beliefs can continue to be rationalized (if not always
rational) by those who profess to possess them.

In his article, Troy Jollimore writes:
the desire to appeal both to proponents and skeptics of religion makes for
an oddly disjointed, tonally inconsistent and somewhat baggy book.
Partly, too, this is a result of Dennett’s desire to answer any and all
objectors to his project, be they religious conservatives or postmodernist
skeptics about science. One understands the desire, but the result is
unfortunate: Since most of these objections are highly abstract, they push
the book too often in the direction of arid and intangible conceptualization
and away from the concrete details of religion as manifested in people’s
actual lives. A more compelling way of proving the legitimacy of the
naturalistic approach might have been to find more points of contact
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between the theoretical suggestions and people’s actual religious
practices.309
Perhaps Jollimore’s suggestion is correct that a “more compelling way of proving the
legitimacy of the naturalistic approach might have been to find more points of contact
between the theoretical suggestions and people’s actual religious practices.” Of course, I
would argue that Dennett’s intention was to lay the evolutionary groundwork so that such
social and historical accounts could more informatively be written. But as for Jollimore’s
claims that Dennett’s responses to anticipated objections made for a disjointed and baggy
book, I would hope that the highly abstracted criticisms I have considered up to this point
demonstrate that Dennett’s efforts were neither pedantic nor pointless. I would contend
that this is because Dennett has so effectively traversed the terrain upon which such
conventional attacks might otherwise have been mounted. To challenge him, one must
effectively label him as either a behaviorist, a rationalist, a materialist, or indeed simply a
sophist, because the more concrete avenues of assault have all been effectively and
preventatively walled-off by his so-called disjointed digressions.

In his article, “Daniel Dennett Hunts the Snark,” David Bentley Hart writes:
The Bellman – like almost all of [Lewis] Carroll’s characters – is a
rigorously, even remorselessly rational person and is moreover a figure
cast in a decidedly heroic mould. But, if one sets out in pursuit of beasts as
fantastic, elusive, and protean as either Snarks or religion, one can proceed
from only the vaguest idea of what one is looking for. So it is no great
wonder that, in the special precision with which they define their
respective quarries, in the quantity of farraginous detail they amass, in
their insensibility to the incoherence of the portraits they have produced –
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in fact, in all things but felicity of expression – the Bellman and Dennett
sound much alike.310
This is quite akin to Jack Miles’ criticism that
though Dennett pays lip service to the need for Darwinian theorists of
religion to acquaint themselves with actual religion as patiently as Darwin
acquainted himself with actual animal breeding, in practice he rarely does
so. He defines religion, for example, in a parochially Western way as
“social systems whose participants avow belief in a supernatural agent or
agents whose approval is to be sought.” A religion without gods, he adds,
is “like a vertebrate without a backbone.” But this is a definition that does
not begin to cope with Buddhism, a religious tradition that seeks not
divine approval but an enlightenment that Pankaj Mishra has aptly
characterized as “direct knowledge of the unstable and conditioned nature
of the mind and the body.” Dennett waves off the Buddhist exception to
his rule as a temporary inconvenience to be addressed by later research.311
Thus, it seems that both Hart’s and Miles’ disapproval of Dennett’s approach
stems from the fact that he defines religion too narrowly for their tastes, and in so doing,
leaves no room for “nontheistic religions” such as (Zen) Buddhism or liberal Christian
theology, such as that espoused by Paul Tillich. However, I would argue that both
criticisms are ultimately misguided, for Buddha’s and Tillich’s conceptions of “god”
effectively render them agnostic and/or pantheistic philosophers, not theologians (at least
not as traditionally conceived).312 As a result, their ideologies are much more akin to
those of Socrates and Spinoza than to any of the other sages and saints of either
Buddhism or Christianity. For as Thich Nhat Hanh explains:
The Buddha always told his disciples not to waste their time and energy in
metaphysical speculation. Whenever he was asked a metaphysical
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question, he remained silent. Instead, he directed his disciples toward
practical efforts. Questioned one day about the problem of the infinity of
the world, the Buddha said, “Whether the world is finite or infinite,
limited or unlimited, the problem of your liberation remains the same.”
Another time he said, “Suppose a man is struck by a poisoned arrow and
the doctor wishes to take out the arrow immediately. Suppose the man
does not want the arrow removed until he knows who shot it, his age, his
parents, and why he shot it. What would happen? If he were to wait until
all these questions have been answered, the man might die first.” Life is so
short. It must not be spent in endless metaphysical speculation that does
not bring us any closer to the truth.313
This would seem to suggest that Buddha’s position on the existence of the gods was
decidedly agnostic, and thus, by definition, not religious. And as for Buddha’s ideological
relation to Socrates, Thomas Huxley once wrote:
Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which
lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. That principle is of
great antiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, “Try
all things, hold fast by that which is good” it is the foundation of the
Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that every man should be
able to give a reason for the faith that is in him; it is the great principle of
Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern science. Positively the
principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason
as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And
negatively: In matters of the intellect do not pretend that conclusions are
certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the
agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be
ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in
store for him.314
As for Tillich’s attempts to deanthropomorphize the Christian God, Eric Steinhart writes:
Tillich says he’s a Christian. But here it’s worth pointing out that Tillich’s
“God” is so far from the God of the Bible (and traditional Christian
theology) that it’s hard to take his claim of being Christian very seriously.
And Tillich has widely been criticized by Christians as offering a strange
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new theory of the divine. Some might say that Tillich was a Christian
atheist.… For Tillich, God is both “the power of being in everything and
above everything”. I’d say that’s absurd – for Tillich, God is both
immanent and transcendent. But it’s impossible to be both immanent and
transcendent. To be sure, if Tillich wants to claim to remain within
Christianity, then he’s got to affirm the transcendence of being-itself. But
it makes very little sense to do so. Much of Tillich’s first volume of
Systematic Theology looks like a pantheistic or pagan theology onto which
a superficial layer of exhausted Christian ideology is painted. That paint
peels off easily.315
The same could be said of Richard Heffern’s criticism in the article, “Authors
Criticize Shallowness of Contemporary Atheism.” In it, he writes that
an impoverished viewpoint results when these secular intellectuals dismiss
theology because it’s not derived from science, Fr. Haught writes. They
are almost completely ignorant of what’s going on in the world of
theology. They talk about the most fundamentalist and extremist versions
of faith, and they hold these up as though they’re the normative, central
core. They miss the moral core of Judaism and Christianity, the theme of
social justice, which takes those who are marginalized and brings them to
the center of society. They give us an extreme caricature of faith and
religion.” The new atheism is thus theologically unchallenging, says Fr.
Haught, consisting of breezy over-generalizations that leave out almost
everything that theologians would want to highlight in their own
contemporary discussions of God.316
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So in essence, I would argue that Dennett is right to dismiss the nontheistic, modernist
traditions of Zen Buddhism and Tillichian Christianity (or any other contorted forms of
contemporary and/or liberal theology) as decidedly nonreligious. It is Hart, Miles, and
Heffern who are mistaken in believing that such philosophical notions, once divorced
from their foundational metaphysical doctrines, can still be defined as in any way
religious without simultaneously redefining the term itself. Or to put it in terms Hart
might appreciate, there is indeed a Snark on the loose, but it is not Dennett who is so
enthusiastically on the hunt.
Hart’s criticism of Dennett’s (and Dawkins’) theory of memes is even more
ironic. For instance, he writes:
Of course, human beings most definitely are shaped to some degree by
received ideas and habits, and copy patterns of behavior, craft, and thought
from one another, and alter and refine these patterns in so doing. But,
since human beings are also possessed of reflective consciousness and
deliberative will, memory and intention, curiosity and desire, talk of
memes is an empty mystification, and the word’s phonetic resemblance to
genes is not quite enough to render it respectable. The idea of memes
might provide Dennett a convenient excuse for not addressing the actual
content of religious beliefs and for concentrating his attention instead on
the phenomenon of religion as a cultural and linguistic type, but any
ostensible science basing itself on memetic theory is a science based on a
metaphor – or, really, on an assonance. Dennett, though, is as
indefatigable as the Bellman in his pursuit of that ghostly echo. He is
desperate to confine his thinking to a strictly Darwinian model of human
behavior but just as desperate to portray religion as a kind of “cultural
symbiont” that is more destructive than beneficial to the poor unsuspecting
organisms it has colonized. And so memes, for want of more plausible
parasites, are indispensable to his tale.317
Thus, in a single paragraph, Hart is arguing that Dennett’s notion of memes is essentially
correct, only imprecisely applied to religion. However, Hart’s first sentence would seem
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to show that they are as indispensable to his tale as they are to Dennett’s. Nevertheless,
he continues:
In fact, the presupposition that all social phenomena must have an
evolutionary basis and that it is legitimate to attempt to explain every
phenomenon solely in terms of the benefit it may confer (the “ cui bono?
question,” as Dennett likes to say) is of only suppositious validity.
Immensely complex cultural realities like art, religion, and morality have
no genomic sequences to unfold, exhibit no concatenations of material
causes and effects, and offer nothing for the scrupulous researcher to
quantify or dissect.… An evolutionary sociologist, for instance, might try
to isolate certain benefits that religions bring to societies or individuals
(which already involves attempting to define social behaviors that could
be interpreted in an almost limitless variety of ways), so as then to
designate those benefits as the evolutionary rationales behind religion. But
there is no warrant for doing so. The social and personal effects of
religion, even if they could be proved to be uniform from society to
society or person to person, may simply be accidental or epiphenomenal to
religion. And even if one could actually discover some sort of clear
connection between religious adherence and, say, social cohesion or
personal happiness, one still would have no reason to assume the causal
priority of those benefits; to do so would be to commit one of the most
elementary of logical errors: post hoc ergo propter hoc – “thereafter, hence
therefore” (or really, in this case, an even more embarrassing error: post
hoc ergo causa huius – “thereafter, hence the cause thereof”). In the end,
the most scientists of religion can do is to use biological metaphors to
support (or, really, to illustrate) an essentially unfounded philosophical
materialism.318
“The social and personal effects of religion, even if they could be proved to be uniform
from society to society or person to person, may simply be accidental or epiphenomenal
to religion.” This is Dennett’s primary argument! His notion of memes and, more
particularly, of “free-floating rationales” establishes this very point. There may or may
not be genomic sequences to unfold where art, religion, and morality are concerned, but
there are almost certainly memetic ones “lying behind, and distinct from, our reasons,”
and Hart’s attempt to argue otherwise inevitably descends into a shameless tactic he once
sarcastically lambasted Dennett for criticizing. “And then there is his silly tendency to
318
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feign mental decrepitude when it serves his purposes, as when he pretends that the
concept of God possesses too many variations for him to keep track of, or as when he acts
scandalized by the revelation that academic theology sometimes lapses into a technical
jargon full of obscure Greek terms like apophatic and ontic.”319 But perhaps I have
misunderstood Hart’s argument and am consequently guilty of having committed the
same embarrassing error of post hoc ergo causa huius. If so, I ironically beg forgiveness.
Unconvinced (and/or unaware), Hart continues:
These are all minor annoyances, really. The far profounder problem with
Breaking the Spell is that, ultimately, it is a sublimely pointless book,
for… even if Dennett’s theory of the phylogeny of religion could be
shown to be largely correct, not only would it fail to challenge belief, it
would in fact merely confirm an established tenet of Christian theology
and a view of “religion” already held by most developed traditions of
faith.320
What’s more, Hart argues that Dennett’s hypothesis is ultimately self-defeating because
there is, in fact, no such thing as religion in the first place. He writes:
Questions of method, important as they are, need not be raised at all until
the researcher can first determine and circumscribe the object of his
studies in a convincing way. And here it seems worth mentioning—just
for precision’s sake—that religion does not actually exist. Rather there are
a great number of traditions of belief and practice that, for the sake of
convenience, we call religions but that could scarcely differ from one
another more. It might seem sufficient, for the purposes of research,
simply to identify general resemblances among these traditions, but even
that is notoriously hard to do, since the effort to ascertain what sort of
things one is looking at involves an enormous amount of interpretation
and no clear criteria for evaluating any of it. One cannot establish where
the boundaries lie between religious systems and magic, or folk science, or
myth, or social ceremony.321
So to summarize Hart’s various critiques: 1) Dennett defines religion too narrowly (for he
does not count agnostic and/or pantheistic philosophy amongst its many manifestations);
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2) memes necessarily exist (and are indispensable to societal development) but are
separate and superfluous to the study of religion; 3) even if Dennett’s theory about
religion turns out to be true, the various “developed traditions of faith” will be able to
intellectually accommodate it, and; 4) there is no such thing as religion anyway. Since
even these criticisms cannot all be true, I would submit that, despite his comprehensive
efforts to add metaphorical insult to metaphysical injury, Hart has done little beyond
suggest the soundness of Dennett’s claims and thus the importance of his work.
But when his “logical” and semantic critiques have failed, Hart must finally rely
on that which truly motivated him all along: his faith. He states:
Certainly the Christian should be undismayed by the notion that religion is
natural “all the way down.” Indeed, it should not matter whether religion
is the result of evolutionary imperatives, or of an inclination toward belief
inscribed in our genes and in the structure of our brains, or even (more
fantastically) of memes that have impressed themselves on our minds and
cultures and languages. All things are natural. But nature itself is created
toward an end – its consummation in God – and is informed by a more
eminent causality – the creative will of God – and is sustained in existence
by its participation in the being that flows from God, who is the infinite
wellspring of all actuality. And religion, as a part of nature, possesses an
innate entelechy and is oriented like everything else toward the union of
God and his creatures. Nor should the Christian expect to find any lacunae
in the fabric of nature, needing to be repaired by the periodic interventions
of a cosmic maintenance technician. God’s transcendence is absolute: He
is cause of all things by giving existence to the whole, but nowhere need
he act as a rival to any of the contingent, finite, secondary causes by which
the universe lives, moves, and has its being in him.322
Argue with that.

In his article, “Daniel Dennett – Belief in Belief,” Ken Ammi writes:
It would certainly be as fallacious as Dennett’s claim to lack of polemics
in religious matters to assert that atheists, even the most militant activist
sorts, do not accept and engage upon polemics regarding atheism. Yet,
322
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their belief in unbelief and unbelief in belief comes through in their shock
at the fact that they have to bother responding, that they actually have to
bother defending a conclusion as obvious as atheism. This is part of the
reason that their talks and books are so heavy on emotion and so light on
well, anything else. They are quick to condemn, quick to assert arguments
from personal preference, arguments from outrage, arguments to ridicule,
arguments to embarrassment, etc. Yet, slow to provide premises that go
beyond that which they personally prefer in general and slow to go
anywhere beyond well-within-the-box-atheist-group-think-talkingpoints.323
Such a statement is almost comical not only for its lack of insight (for why is it that the
religious position is so vulnerable to such ridiculing and embarrassing attacks), but also
because, in writing it, Ammi commits practically every offense for which he would so
scornfully condemn Dennett. This becomes obvious when Ammi (somewhat
incredulously) argues:
Belief in unbelief is often expressed in terms of considering atheism to be
the default position. However, it is not. Rather, supernaturalism is the
default position. Until such time as absolute materialism can and does
account for all natural phenomena – from consciousness, to life in general,
not to mention the whole universe and everything in it – supernaturalism
can account for these phenomena (at the philosophic level of what, and
perhaps why but not the scientific level of how – a level which is not at all
advantageous to materialism). This is because, let us say partly
scientifically and partly philosophically, materialism cannot account for
said phenomena while supernaturalism can.324
In other words, Dennett is wrong to so automatically presume that atheism or materialism
can adequately explain all natural phenomena. For Ammi, supernaturalism already
manages to satisfactorily do so. The fact that he holds this (non)explanation at least as
ardently and assuredly as any advocate for philosophical or scientific materialism ever
has is, for Ammi, irrelevant. But the real irony is that Ammi is attributing such faithbased fallaciousness to the methodology of science and not to his own suppositional
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claims. What’s more, he concludes that even should philosophical or scientific
materialism eventually account for all natural phenomena, then his appeal to the
supernatural would still be viable and necessary. He writes:
The assertion is that everything has a purely materialistic explanation and
even if we do not know what the explanation is; some day – thy
materialism come – it will be explained thusly. And even if it is not
explained materialistically this view demands that one restrict their
thinking and simply believe by “faith” that the explanation is materialistic
– this is anti-freethought. Meanwhile, it may be of import to note; the
theist can consider material explanations, ever mounting material causes
for material effects, by noting that yes indeed; God created the material
realm wherein there functions a system of material causes and material
effects.325
So, for Ammi, the explanation that “God did it,” is already sufficient. No scientific
advance or philosophical argument could ever shake his conviction that God is still
ultimately responsible for everything. In fact, it would only serve to confirm what he
already “believes” to be true. Unbeknownst to Ammi, it is this very spell – wherein no
amount of evidence could serve to alter one’s convictions – that Dennett is so fervently
attempting to break. For no matter how hard Ammi tries to square the semantic circle,
unbelief in belief is simply not the same as belief in unbelief, and thus it cannot be
considered as methodologically akin to the religious’ belief in belief. Unbelief requires
evidence and logical cohesion, whereas belief (of any sort) renders them both as either
obsolete or superfluous.
Or as Robert Graves writes in his review of Breaking the Spell:
Breaking the Spell is a challenge to the religious to drop the defensive
shroud shielding religious belief from criticism and submit their religions
to rational inquiry. For the most part Dennett’s tone in this book strikes me
as forthright and reasonable, but some will find Dennett’s tone blunt and
some of his arguments offensive. For example, comparisons of religions
with infectious organisms, though apt in light if Dennett’s memetic
325
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analysis, will doubtlessly offend many. This offense is likely in part a
result of the very shielding of religion from critique that Dennett
opposes.326
In his article, “Holy Communion,” Richard Norman chastises Dennett for
criticizing the specific unfounded and inhumane beliefs of those whose otherwise
humanist predilections might prove useful in collectively combatting the numerous
problems facing humanity as a whole. He writes:
We have problems enough in the world. The threats of climate change,
global poverty, war and repression and intolerance can never be countered
unless we are prepared to work together on the basis of a shared humanity.
Simplistic generalizations about religion don’t help. In Dawkins’s
terminology, that means working with the “moderates” to counter the
“extremists”, but it’s actually more complicated than that. Some of our
allies against creationism may be deeply prejudiced against gays. Some of
the best people working to combat global poverty may be Catholic antiabortionists. Some of the Muslim allies we need to counter Islamist
violence may have deeply sexist attitudes to women. It all demonstrates
what a deeply contradictory phenomenon religion is. But we know that.
And if religion is so contradictory, that’s probably because human beings
are a deeply contradictory species.327
Leaving aside for the moment that this is a quintessentially immoral and ultimately selfdefeating argument, what Norman seems to be suggesting is that we overlook certain
flaws in our would-be allies so that we can tap into their ideological zealotry in other
areas. Such a policy amounts to an acceptance of the proverbial “deal with the devil”
mentality in which we knowingly partner with those who are moderate or accepting
towards one group or cause and ignore their otherwise extremist and intolerant
position(s), not to mention those poor individuals whom we are tacitly allowing to suffer
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as a result of our own disregard for their wellbeing. Such a policy could never result in
the sort of “shared humanity” to which Norman supposedly aspires.
Perhaps human beings are an intrinsically contradictory species, but a resigned
acceptance of that reality, such as that proposed by Norman, is unlikely to offer any
insight into this fact, nor does it allow for the emergence of any truly universal action to
overcome it. For instance, arguing that the fight against poverty might be better waged in
concert with those whose medieval views on reproductive rights are themselves a large
contributing factor to the existence of poverty is to add insult to injury to those he
supposedly desires to help. The same could be said of a critique of creationism espoused
by those who would still see same-sex couples marginalized within their ostensibly more
scientific and inclusive view of humanity. In much the same way, I would argue that one
cannot hope to counter Islamist violence by continuing to exercise or excuse it against
half the human race. Such action is not a means to an end for lessening the suffering of
others; rather, it constructs an ideological shield to shelter and encourage it. What
Dennett understands (and Norman seemingly does not) is that in order for a “shared
humanity” to ever emerge, we must first be willing to delve deeper into our common
experiences than an automatic, yet mutually incompatible, respect for irreconcilable
doctrine can allow. Or as Tony Houston explains:
Dennett’s point about religion being a “worthy alternative” rather than a
“sacred cow” (p. 300) was the idea that most resonated with me from this
book. As a humanist concerned with social and economic justice, I am
open to alliances with interfaith groups, but not to extolling faith as a
virtue. Atheists engaged in interfaith activism will have to confront this
dilemma. The problem is that the word “interfaith” communicates a faithin-faith message and a gratuitous marginalization of atheists. Dennett is
perhaps the most persuasive of the Four Horsemen because he is not easily
dismissed on the grounds of stridency. Dennett carefully avoids straw-man
arguments, as a good philosopher should. He even prefaces his more
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pointed indictments of religion with a preemptive apology of sorts. These
passages read like a friend about to tell you an uncomfortable truth about
yourself.328
Or as Dennett himself once said in an interview with Julian Baggini:
Think of how horrible it would be to have to go around and tell people
they had been taken in by Bernie Madoff. Think of the pain of learning
that you’ve been made a complete fool of by Bernie Madoff. Do we have
to tell those people? Yes. Do we really? Well, yeah, they’ve lost
everything and we have to tell them and no matter how we tell them
they’re going to feel rotten. Now why isn’t it like that?”329
Why, indeed?

In the article, “Getting the Arguments for God Wrong,” the anonymous
Remonstrant (i.e. Dutch Protestant) author, in reference to Dennett’s concise dismissal of
the ontological argument for God’s existence, writes:
Notice this interesting caveat at the end of his, less than half a page,
critique:
“Unless you have a taste for mathematics and theoretical physics
on the one hand, or the niceties of scholastic logic on the other,
you are not apt to find any of this compelling, or even fathomable.”
Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell, p.242.
I don’t understand it therefore it’s wrong! Well, it almost sounds like it.
Dennett avoids directly misrepresenting the ontological argument but his
treatment goes no further than pointing to Gaunilo’s objection (although
modified from an island to an ice-cream sundae) but, of course, he does
not mention any of the many responses made to Gaunilo’s objection. The
most famous modern philosopher who has contended for the veracity of
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the ontological argument (Alvin Plantinga) is, not surprisingly, completely
ignored.330
But let us examine Plantinga’s version of the argument to determine whether Dennett’s
decision to omit it from his discussion was warranted or not. On his website
reasonablefaith.com, William Lane Craig addresses this very issue, via a Q & A session
with a writer named Kamal. In his letter to Professor Craig, Kamal writes:
In his version of the argument, Plantinga conceives of God as a being
which is “maximally excellent” in every possible world. Plantinga takes
maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience,
omnipotence, and moral perfection. A being which has maximal
excellence in every possible world would have what Plantinga calls
“maximal greatness.” So Plantinga argues:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally
great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists
in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists
in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally
great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.331
After having a discussion with one of his own instructors who stated that “I recall a
professor of mine saying once that every philosopher sooner or later comes to the
conclusion that the proof is right, but we don’t know how, and later comes to the
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conclusion that the proof is wrong, but we don’t know why,” Kamal asks Professor Craig
for his opinion. His response follows. I would ask that, as you read it, you consider
Dennett’s original criticism of the argument.332 Craig writes:
I’m afraid that your professor is mostly incorrect in what he says, Kamal.
Your prof errs in thinking that the ontological argument goes back earlier
than Anselm and in thinking that Anselm’s version is the best version of
the argument. As Plantinga (as well as Leibniz) has explained, Anselm’s
version needs reformulation; moreover, Plantinga’s version is not
susceptible to your prof’s objections.
For example, his objection to (2) is based upon an apparent unfamiliarity
with possible worlds semantics. To say that some entity exists in a
possible world is just to say that such an entity possibly exists. It isn’t
meant that the entity actually exists somewhere. Look again at my
explanation: “To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say
that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement
‘God exists’ as part of that description.” Only if that description is true
will the entity, in this case God, actually exist. So (2) is definitionally true.
Again, (3) is virtually definitionally true. A maximally great being is one
that has, among other properties, necessary existence. So if it exists in one
world, it exists in all of them! In that sense, such a being is different than
contingent beings, which exist in only some possible worlds. A unicorn,
for example, exists in some possible world, but not in all of them, for its
existence is possible but not necessary. So your prof is right that there is
something special, not about a maximally excellent being (which, you’ll
recall, is defined to be a being which is all-powerful, all-knowing, and allgood), but about a maximally great being, which is defined as a being
which has maximal excellence in every possible world. If such a being
exists in any world, that is to say, if it is possible that such a being exists,
then it exists in every possible world, including the actual world.
332
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Logic doesn’t falter here. It all hangs on whether you think that (1) is true.
(2)-(5) are true whether or not (1) is true. But if all the premises are true,
the conclusion logically follows.333
I would suggest that, in light of this pseudo-intellectual non-explanation and scholastic
sleight of hand, Dennett’s original critique surely stands.

Finding little with which to quibble in the heart of Dennett’s argument, David
Sloan Wilson is left to argue that it is Dennett’s proposed solution to the problem that is
ultimately misguided:
His primary recommendation is universal religious education. If only
religious believers could be introduced to the full panoply of religious
belief, they would become less deluded about their own. I doubt that this
policy would have a meaningful impact on the worldwide problems
associated with religion. In America, for example, fundamentalist
religions are immersed in a larger cultural milieu teeming with “memes”
from secular life and other religions. Like a cell maintaining osmotic
pressure, a given religion is designed to pump out contrary memes and
maintain an internal environment containing the appropriate memes.
Elsewhere in the world, does Dennett really believe that we’ll solve the
problems of the Middle East (for example) by teaching the Palestinians
about Judaism and the Israelis about Islam? His policy recommendation
might be well-meaning, but it is likely to be ineffective.334
But rather than countermanding Dennett’s proposal, I would actually argue that Wilson
has just inadvertently endorsed it. For instance, when he rightly claims that “In America,
for example, fundamentalist religions are immersed in a larger cultural milieu teeming
with “memes” from secular life and other religions,” he is confirming Dennett’s point,
which is that passing familiarity and misinformation regarding other faiths is likely to
prove insufficient in breaking the spell of one’s own. Comparable engaged study, on the
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other hand, which is what Dennett is actually proposing, would quite reasonably produce
distinctly different results. And as for Wilson’s remarks concerning the Israelis and
Palestinians, whose conflict (though geographically rooted) is inescapably religious in
nature,335 I would argue that increased knowledge of one another’s ideological/political
positions (not to mention the mutual human suffering that results from their respective
reluctance to moderate them) would likely produce a moment of humanitarian empathy in
their otherwise incessant infighting. And while such knowledge alone is unlikely to result
in a cessation of hostilities, I would contend that no such ceasefire could ever hope to
hold without explicitly addressing such underlying and deeply-held convictions as are
professed on both sides of the ideological divide.336

Like Wilson, Darren Hynes and Bernard Wills are equally unconvinced of the
viability of Dennett’s religious education proposal. They, however, view it not as naïve or
ineffectual, but rather as duplicitous and ultimately self-serving. They write:
Working out Dennett’s political program turns out to be a bit of a
challenge. Nowhere does he mention the problem of the role of religion in
democracy, but his whole philosophical discussion seems to be predicated
on that question. His account in chapter 11 of the political consequences
of his new science is a masterpiece of evasion. Read one way, it says
almost nothing. Dennett would have us (somehow) build liberal schools in
the Islamic world, teach the world’s religions to children in a biologically
informed way, and take careful thought about the hormones of young
Chinese men deprived of wives by the one-child policy. There is hardly
anything more specific than this. Yet Dennett conveys his real intention in
the metaphors he uses and the irrelevant digressions with which he
peppers his work. He will give the reader ample hints about what he is too
335
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tactful or too fearful to openly say, that religious believers in general are
the greatest threat to our future and that evolutionary naturalism ought to
be the public philosophy in advanced democratic countries and if possible
elsewhere too, to whatever extent it is practical to enforce it. Dennett’s
political vision embraces at very least the rule of a philosophy, if not the
rule of philosophers. Political authority is founded in truth, and truth is
what he claims to possess. If one likes, one may call this Darwinian
theocracy.337
Detailing precisely how this Darwinian theocracy might ultimately be made manifest,
Hynes and Wills continue:
Nothing could be easier than to draw an authoritarian political agenda
from this ‘‘memetic’’ science of religion. It is a perfect and disturbing fit
for projects like the war on terror and the profiling of Muslim citizens.
After all, if your Muslim neighbour is, as Dennett says he might well be,
the carrier of a toxic parasite that controls his actions, shouldn’t your
reaction be to quarantine him? Where does one put a man infested with a
bad meme but in an institution? Now, we do not know for sure whether
this meme has some beneficial properties, for science has yet to tell us, but
until we have determined this question, is it not better to be safe than
sorry? After all, this meme could acquire an atomic weapon, and then
what would we do? This is where Dennett’s reduction of culture to nature,
his reduction of agency to mechanism starts to have real-world
consequences. Its implied theoretical dehumanization of a visible class of
people coincides with an actual real-world dehumanization going on even
as he writes. I do not know what Dennett thinks of the war on terror, but
he has (wittingly or not) penned the perfect justification for it. At very
best, this bespeaks an astonishing political innocence.338
In other words, Hynes and Wills are arguing that Dennett’s principle reason for wishing
to break the spell of religion is so that he can cast a Darwinian doppelganger in its place.
Rather than wishing to educate and enlighten his fellow human beings, as he claims,
Dennett secretly seeks to indoctrinate or imprison them, but only after having realized
Plato’s long anticipated dream of The Republic, and ordained himself its first Philosopher
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King. Never mind that Dennett never implies anything of the sort in his book,339 or that
the work is itself intended as an inoculation of sorts against the type of unreasoned
paranoia exhibited by religious fanatics, and isolationists of every stripe, not to mention
ostensibly sophistic philosophers such as Hynes and Wills themselves. After all, we need
not continually quarantine those who have become infected if a workable vaccine or
widespread immunization initiative can be developed and disseminated to counteract the
virulent meme, gene, or contagion in the first place.

Nevertheless, Armin Geertz echoes Hynes’ and Will’s criticism, arguing that
Dennett’s only actual concern is personal economic gain. He writes:
There is the question, of course, of priorities. But I argue that Dennett’s
priorities are wrong. If he had dropped a hundred pages or so of rhetoric,
he could have produced a more respectable treatise. As it stands now,
everyone will be disappointed: The general (more or less religious) public
will be turned off by the rhetoric and hostility, the professional community
of comparative religion will definitely be turned off by the arrogance and
ignorance, the cognitive scientists of religion will be turned off by the lack
of depth and the religious fanatics won’t read it anyway. In fact, I bet that
a large number of conservative congregations across the U.S. have already
been given explicit instructions not to read the book. The politicians will
only be irritated and might even consider him to be a dangerous liberal.
“Brights” will become a term of mockery. Well, at least the book will sell
because Dennett is a big name. So someone will gain from it.340
That said, Geertz goes on to accuse Dennett of an underlying political motivation as well.
He continues:
Dennett is dealing with a topic that is of the utmost importance to the
study of religion, namely its evolution. No science worthy of its name can
339
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ignore issues of origin and evolution. But it must be done with
sophistication and fairness to those who have seriously thought about
these matters before we did. Standing on the shoulders of giants, we catch
fleeting glimpses of the future. We also look back with the knowledge of
hindsight. We think bigger because we stand taller. We learn more
because we have been diligent students. We advance science because
many have done the groundwork for us already. Because of all this
industry and the many sacrifices that it has cost us, we need to hold on to
the sobering thought that misrepresentation in the name of politics,
however well-meaning it may be, is not the way forward.341
So even if Dennett is not the avaricious charlatan that Geertz apparently believes him to
be, his treatise can never accomplish what it sets out to do until it first recognizes the
efforts (both insightful and erroneous) of those who came before him. A sound point; this
is undoubtedly why every astronomy course invariably begins with a discussion of the
signs of the zodiac and every introductory chemistry course first discusses the various
merits and methods of alchemical “science.” By acknowledging the established and
dismissing the indefensible, Dennett is merely upholding the basic principles and
practices upon which the entire (scientific) discipline is founded: the importance of the
empirical precedent, the verifiability of the scientific method, and a consideration of the
numerous theories that have thus far survived its scrutiny. To suggest otherwise is, quite
simply, absurd.

In his article, “Dangerous Ideas: The Spell of Breaking the Spell,” Lars Albinus
betrays a fundamental misunderstanding not only of Dennett’s primary purpose, but also
of Darwin’s theory of natural selection which serves to underwrite it. He argues:
As scientists we should not commit ourselves to any untimely respect
towards the feelings of religious people, and maybe Dennett is right that
many of them, let alone the entire human race, would in fact be better off
not believing in a dangerously zealous and commanding God, but the
341
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spell-breaking proceedings of natural science may not be the only way,
nor even an adequate way, of disenchantment in this regard. Proceeding
from the self-understanding of our own values, including various scientific
enterprises, we may actually show quite another and very relevant kind of
respect in taking people’s beliefs seriously as beliefs, that is,
understanding their internal coherence, their symbolic structure, their ways
of self-reflection in theological traditions. This is also part of science,
albeit a human science. This is certainly not to say that every belief has to
be respected or credited as rational on its own accounts, quite the contrary,
and I am not arguing that we should want to exclude contributions from
cognitive, neural or socio-biological sciences. However, since the fall of
metaphysics we should give up the dream of finding one closed set of
criteria that enable us to own the whole package of truth. Such a dream
will probably always turn out to be a dream, and people will be right to
turn it down as such, choosing their own traditional stories instead. Let’s
try to put the theory of natural selection in its proper place. It is a theory,
neither verifiable, nor falsifiable, but at best a plausible theory, a good
guess, that may point to eye-opening mechanisms in the way in which
certain ideas, including religious ones, transmit themselves through the
medium of the culturally adapted brain. It cannot sufficiently explain
culture, let alone religion, it cannot even explain itself as a theory. If you
really think it can, if you are convinced of its all-encompassing truth, it
has simply succeeded in becoming a new spellbinder, and then it will
become just another dangerous idea just like those it tries to put to the
test.342
In other words, Albinus is arguing that Dennett is right that religion is undeserving of the
level of respect it receives from all other avenues of human thought and interaction.
What’s more, he concedes that the natural sciences will undoubtedly have a part to play
in dislodging religion from its lofty and unmerited perch far above the killing fields it has
long helped to create and to sustain. However, Darwin’s theory is ultimately only that: a
theory. And if you believe otherwise, then you are just as credulous as those who have
bought into some religious ideology of one sort or another. Contrary to Albinus, I would
argue that the distance between the proper places of natural selection and religion in the
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explanatory landscape of human culture can be measured by the mountain of evidence
produced in support of the former that towers over the vacuous chasm that has resulted
from the absence of such evidence for the latter. To suggest the two simply reside on
opposing peaks is to misrepresent the geographical realities of both and to chart a most
unrealistic course between them.

In his article, “Delusions and Dark Materials: New Atheism as Naïve Atheism
and its Challenge to Theological Education,” Michael W. DeLashmutt argues:
New Atheism, or naïve atheism, is a cultural product which is produced
and consumed by well educated, middle class elites (principally in North
America) who pursue this ideology less as a result of considered
argumentation than as a consequence of their preconceived sensibilities.
As Tina Beattie notes, “In their representation of religion, these popular
authors owe their success partly to the fact that in a media-driven culture
the opinions of the famous often count for more than the thoughtful
analyses of those who have studied a subject and are aware of its
complexities and ambiguities” (Beattie 2008: 8).343
In other words, the main reason Dennett (and Dawkins and Harris and Hitchens) have
been successful is because we live in a culture that reveres and respects celebrity to the
point of obsession. Not only does this equate uninformed popular opinion with logical
and scientifically-sound erudition (such as when Jack Miles suggested that Dennett
discuss Howard Stern’s atheistic opinions), it is also a way of summarily dismissing the
contents of the New Atheists’ arguments without ever having been made to actually
wrestle with them. However, after chastising them for their populist appeal, DeLashmutt
paradoxically states that
the medium through which New Atheism has chosen to voice its critique
(television, film, popular academic writing, and advertising) further
343
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undermines the seriousness of the argument. This is not to say that it is
unimportant for scholars of religion to attend to popular cultural forms
such as television, film, popular books or advertising. Popular culture is
the agora of the postmodern world; it is the place where deeply held
values are expressed and discussed. However, when entering into an
analysis of this postmodern agora we must learn to read the more diffuse
and subtle influences of the cultural milieu. To this end, there is something
to be learned about the nature of the New Atheist message which can only
be discovered by attending explicitly to the medium of its communication.
New Atheism is part of popular culture, and though atheism itself may be
grounded in nuanced, complex, and frankly persuasive reasoning; the
popular writings of Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and indeed Pullman, seem
more orientated towards persuasion through saturation than persuasion
through argumentation. As such, I suggest that we scrutinize the
implications of pre-critical naïve atheism within the cultural milieu, rather
than engaging in a polemical and apologetic debate.344
So, in order to engage with the New Atheists, DeLashmutt hypocritically suggests that
theologians must be willing to simultaneously “stoop to their level” and engage with a
popular audience. This is obviously why his final suggestion, that they “scrutinize the
implications of pre-critical naïve atheism within the cultural milieu, rather than engaging
in a polemical and apologetic debate,” becomes so important. For surely the New
Atheists have demonstrated that traditional theology and apologetics simply cannot
contend with modern-day science and reason. And since it cannot compete on an equal
playing field, DeLashmutt concedes that it may be necessary to change the rules. He
explains:
Speaking as a theologian, I find it exceedingly helpful to advise students
to think about the knowledge of God (insofar as it is possible to assert
such a thing) as epistemologically distinct from other forms of knowledge.
My colleague Mike Higton has written a wonderful description of
theological knowledge in his undergraduate textbook, Christian Doctrine.
He distinguishes the knowledge of God from internal sense perception
(e.g. hunger), relational knowledge (e.g. partners and friends), and
objective knowledge (e.g. the green chair in my office) and encourages his
reader to think about the knowledge of God in terms of one’s knowledge
of a piece of music (Higton 2008: 47–48). Knowing a piece of music, as a
344
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musician, involves a kind of participation within the music. Yet as anyone
who has ever played an instrument can attest to, it is often a kind of
knowledge which is exceedingly difficult to pin down. When I used to
play the piano, I would at times lose myself in playing a well-rehearsed
song. Yet as soon as I would reflect upon the task of playing the piece, I
would often cease being able to play the very same music that only
seconds before had felt second-nature. Like the knowledge of music, the
knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge which can never be fully
attained. It is a knowledge which always leads to a kind of unknowing.
The epistemological humility of Christian theology is in stark contrast to
the sense of epistemological limitlessness asserted by the New Atheists.345
In other words, religious knowledge is distinct from and cannot be held to the same
standards as philosophical or scientific knowledge. It must instead remain ethereal and
incomplete. If only Dennett and the other New Atheists would consider religious
knowledge “in terms of one’s own knowledge of a piece of music,” instead of as the
various truth claims about cosmology, human nature, and institutional morality that it
actually is, then surely they would discover the error of their ways and realize that truth
often exists beyond the bounds of empirical evidence. Of course, DeLashmutt’s
“epistemological humility” only extends as far as the Christian scriptures and traditions
will allow. For in combatting the so-called naiveté of the New Atheism, DeLashmutt
would certainly never go so far as to entertain the validity of Islamic or Buddhist
knowledge (of God or anything else). To do so would undermine his entire case, and in
the process, effectively endorse Dennett’s.

But to those who would argue that Dennett is simply replacing the religious spell
with the scientific, or that his secular vision, if realized, would not allow for the
emotional wants and needs of his fellow human beings, I will allow Dennett himself to

345

Ibid., 591.

186

respond. In an article entitled, “Thank Goodness,” composed whilst recuperating from a
life-threatening heart operation in 2006, he writes:
Do I worship modern medicine? Is science my religion? Not at all; there is
no aspect of modern medicine or science that I would exempt from the
most rigorous scrutiny, and I can readily identify a host of serious
problems that still need to be fixed. That’s easy to do, of course, because
the worlds of medicine and science are already engaged in the most
obsessive, intensive, and humble self-assessments yet known to human
institutions, and they regularly make public the results of their selfexaminations. Moreover, this open-ended rational criticism, imperfect as it
is, is the secret of the astounding success of these human enterprises.
There are measurable improvements every day.346
And when again accused of substituting one bad metaphor for another, Dennett explains
just how distinct the notions of God and goodness are in practice, if not also in principle,
and thus why he wishes to thank the latter (and not the former) for his recovery.347 He
writes:
The best thing about saying thank goodness in place of thank God is that
there really are lots of ways of repaying your debt to goodness – by setting
out to create more of it, for the benefit of those to come. Goodness comes
in many forms, not just medicine and science. Thank goodness for the
music of, say, Randy Newman, which could not exist without all those
wonderful pianos and recording studios, to say nothing of the musical
contributions of every great composer from Bach through Wagner to Scott
Joplin and the Beatles. Thank goodness for fresh drinking water in the tap,
and food on our table. Thank goodness for fair elections and truthful
journalism. If you want to express your gratitude to goodness, you can
plant a tree, feed an orphan, buy books for schoolgirls in the Islamic
world, or contribute in thousands of other ways to the manifest
improvement of life on this planet now and in the near future.
Or you can thank God – but the very idea of repaying God is ludicrous.
What could an omniscient, omnipotent Being (the Man Who has
Everything?) do with any paltry repayments from you? (And besides,
according to the Christian tradition God has already redeemed the debt for
346
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all time, by sacrificing his own son. Try to repay that loan!) Yes, I know,
those themes are not to be understood literally; they are symbolic. I grant
it, but then the idea that by thanking God you are actually doing some
good has got to be understood to be just symbolic, too. I prefer real good
to symbolic good. 348
So shouldn’t we all.
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CHAPTER THREE: A TRUE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: THE CONSCIENTIOUS
CONTRARIANISM OF CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS
Introduction

As the title of this chapter suggests, Christopher Hitchens was never one to shy
away from controversy. In fact, he quite often (and quite deliberately) seemed to court it.
As he once remarked, “Sit me down across a table with an ashtray and a bottle on it, and
cue the other person to make an argument, and I am programmed by the practice of a
lifetime to take a contrary position.”349 Hence a contrarian by nature and a gadfly by
choice, Hitchens made a career out of challenging the accepted wisdoms and timehonored traditions of the West, not to mention those whom he felt most espoused or best
embodied them. As a journalist, social critic, and public intellectual extraordinaire,
Hitchens often reserved his most savage critiques for those ideas and individuals deemed
by society to be either incontrovertible or untouchable (or both). These include, but are
hardly limited to, such idealized notions as capitalism and Christianity, and such persons
as then-president and first lady Bill and Hillary Clinton (in 1999’s No One Left to Lie To:
The Values of the Worst Family) as well as soon-to-be-saint Teresa (in 1995’s The
Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice).
While it is true that most of Hitchens’ personal attacks were aimed at those whom
he felt exhibited either a cognitive ethical dissonance (as with Teresa) or a deliberately
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ingratiating hypocrisy (as with the Clintons), those assaults waged against what he
perceived to be institutional injustices were almost always borne of a single allconsuming concern: the supplanting of individual freedom with coerced conformity. In
this light, his critiques upon capitalism and Christianity can be considered as opposite
sides of the same ideological coin, the former compelling competitive action, the latter
unquestioned belief, and both as the only viable paths to prosperity (whether temporal or
celestial). It is this assault upon freewill and the right to self-determination that most
offended Hitchens’ contrarian sensibilities, and it was these wrongs his writings most
often sought to right. Such was undoubtedly his intention in god is Not Great.
However, unlike Dawkins’ critique, Hitchens’ inspirational ire was more firmly
rooted in historical reality than in scientific theory, and his more worldly tone and
plethora of anecdotal examples are evidence not only of this intention, but also of the
depths of his implausibly-expansive intellect. What’s more, unlike Dennett’s analysis,
Hitchens was utterly unconcerned with maintaining observer objectivity, achieving
ideological consensus, or in cultivating a culture of mutual respect. god is Not Great was
intended precisely as the diatribe many subsequent critics believe they are maligning it to
be. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in the majority of the religious world’s increased
attention and incipient hostility towards the New Atheists falling squarely (and in some
cases, solely) on Hitchens’ physically round, yet intellectually broad Atlas-like
shoulders… a burden he intended, anticipated, and was only too happy to bear.

So long as man remains free he strives for nothing so incessantly and so painfully as to
find someone to worship. But man seeks to worship what is established beyond dispute,
so that all men would agree at once to worship it. For these pitiful creatures are
concerned not only to find what one or the other can worship, but to find something that
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all would believe in and worship; what is essential is that all may be together in it. This
craving for community of worship is the chief misery of every man individually and of all
humanity from the beginning of time. For the sake of common worship they’ve slain each
other with the sword. They have set up gods and challenged one another, “Put away your
gods and come and worship ours, or we will kill you and your gods!” And so it will be to
the end of the world, even when gods disappear from the earth; they will fall down before
idols just the same.350
Part I: god is Not Great

In the opening chapter of his 2007 god is Not Great, Christopher Hitchens argues
that “there still remain four irreducible objections to religious faith: that it wholly
misrepresents the origins of man and the cosmos, that because of this original error it
manages to combine the maximum of servility with the maximum of solipsism, that it is
both the result and the cause of dangerous sexual repression, and that it is ultimately
grounded on wish-thinking.”351 Unlike Dawkins (who sought simply to diagnose the
delusion), and Dennett (who endeavored to break the spell), Hitchens enthusiastically and
unapologetically seeks to embarrass the believer and embolden the skeptic. With
characteristic vim and vitriol, he begins by distinguishing, once and for all, between the
faithful flock and those birds of a decidedly different feather.
Here is the point, about myself and my co-thinkers. Our belief is not a
belief. Our principles are not a faith. We do not rely solely upon science
and reason, because these are necessary rather than sufficient factors, but
we distrust anything that contradicts science or outrages reason. We may
differ on many things, but what we respect is free inquiry, open
mindedness, and the pursuit of ideas for their own sake. We do not hold
our convictions dogmatically: the disagreement between Professor
Stephen Jay Gould and Professor Richard Dawkins, concerning
“punctuated evolution” and the unfilled gaps in post-Darwinian theory, is
quite wide as well as quite deep, but we shall resolve it by evidence and
reasoning and not by mutual excommunication.352
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In other words, Hitchens wishes, at the onset, to dispense with the notion that
those of a more secular, scientific disposition are in any way beholden to the flappings
and trappings of faith. Science, he argues, is indifferent to the whims and wishes of its
practitioners in a way that religion never can be. And though routinely labeled as
arrogant for its efforts, Hitchens maintains that proper science actually necessitates a
sense of humility on the part of its participants and a commitment to falsifiability on the
part of its hypotheses that are both woefully lacking in religion and the religiouslyminded. Despite all their claims to the contrary, he states that it is the religious person
whose superficially modest faith ultimately belies a belief in the incontestable truth of his
tenets and to the singular importance of his personal role in the divine master plan. Of
such individuals, Hitchens is blatantly dismissive. He holds that “the person who is
certain, and who claims divine warrant for his certainty, belongs now to the infancy of
our species. It may be a long farewell, but it has begun and, like all farewells, should not
be protracted.”353 And so it is with faith that Hitchens most wishes to quarrel, because he
believes that it “is the foundation and origin of all arguments, because it is the beginning
– but not the end – of all arguments about philosophy, science, history, and human
nature. It is also the beginning – but by no means the end – of all disputes about the good
life and the just city.”354 In the chapters to follow, Hitchens will examine each of these
arguments in detail, ultimately concluding that, for all its claims to health and happiness,
in fact, “religion poisons everything.”
In Chapter Two, Hitchens identifies what he believes to be the principle problem
with faith and the faithful.
353
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The level of intensity fluctuates according to time and place, but it can be
stated as a truth that religion does not, and in the long run cannot, be
content with its own marvelous claims and sublime assurances. It must
seek to interfere with the lives of nonbelievers, or heretics, or adherents of
other faiths. It may speak about the bliss of the next world, but it wants
power in this one. This is only to be expected. It is, after all, wholly manmade. And it does not have the confidence in its own various preachings
even to allow coexistence between different faiths.355
In an effort to demonstrate this, Hitchens recalls an encounter with religious broadcaster
Dennis Prager, in which he was asked the following question: “I was to imagine myself
in a strange city as the evening was coming on. Toward me I was to imagine that I saw a
large group of men approaching. Now – would I feel safer, or less safe, if I was to learn
that they were just coming from a prayer meeting?”356 Hitchens responded: “Just to stay
within the letter ‘B,’ I have actually had that experience in Belfast, Beirut, Bombay,
Belgrade, Bethlehem, and Baghdad.”357
In Belfast, Hitchens saw “whole streets burned out by sectarian warfare between
different sects of Christianity, and interviewed people whose relatives and friends have
been kidnapped and killed or tortured by rival religious death squads, often for no other
reason than membership of another confession.”358 In Beirut, he witnessed the
shortsightedness of an accommodationist attempt at sectarian governance, in which “the
president by law had to be a Christian, usually a Maronite Catholic, the speaker of the
parliament a Muslim, and so on. This never worked well, because it institutionalized
differences of belief as well as of caste and ethnicity.”359 He notes how the wars of
religion that were eventually fought there also served to “introduce us to the beauties of
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suicide bombing,” undoubtedly referring to the 1983 Shiite attack against a U.S. Marine
barracks in Lebanon.360 Hitchens recalls how Bombay, formerly one of India’s most
diverse and pluralistic of cities, ultimately succumbed to “Mr. Bal Thackeray and his
Shiv Sena Hindu nationalist movement, who in the 1990s decided that Bombay should be
run by and for his coreligionists, and who loosed a tide of goons and thugs onto the
streets,” to ensure that it was so.361
In Belgrade, Hitchens remembers how the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars
that resulted from it, were couched in largely nationalist lingo, when in truth, the
religious labels of Catholic (Croat), Orthodox (Serb), and Muslim (Bosnians) might have
been more accurate. “But confessional terminology was reserved only for ‘Muslims,’
even as their murderers went to all the trouble of distinguishing themselves by wearing
large Orthodox crosses over their bandoliers, or by taping portraits of the Virgin Mary to
their rifle butts. Thus, once again, religion poisons everything, including our own
faculties of discernment.”362 In Bethlehem, Hitchens call to mind the traditional
arguments against a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, noting that
surely something so self-evident was within the wit of man to encompass?
And so it would have been, decades ago, if the messianic rabbis and
mullahs and priests could have been kept out of it. But the exclusive
claims to god-given authority, made by hysterical clerics on both sides and
further stoked by Armageddon-minded Christians who hope to bring on
the Apocalypse (preceded by the death or conversion of all Jews), have
made the situation insufferable, and put the whole of humanity in the
position of hostage to a quarrel that now features the threat of nuclear
war.363
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In Baghdad, during the reign of Saddam Hussein, Hitchens insists that “those
who regarded his regime as a ‘secular’ one are deluding themselves… at least since his
calamitous invasion of Iran in 1979, which led to furious accusations from the Iranian
theocracy that he was an ‘infidel,’ Saddam Hussein had decked out his whole rule –
which was based in any case on a tribal minority of the Sunni minority – as one of piety
and jihad.”364 He concludes by saying “No, Mr. Prager, I have not found it a prudent rule
to seek help as the prayer meeting breaks up. And this, as I told you, is only the letter ‘B.’
In all these cases, anyone concerned with human safety or dignity would have to hope
fervently for a mass outbreak of democratic and republican secularism.”365
To these barbarous “B” examples, Hitchens adds the lamentable instances of the
West’s cowardly desertion of Salman Rushdie in 1989 following the publication of The
Satanic Verses, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell’s ill-conceived explanation that 9/11 was
“a divine judgment on a secular society that tolerated homosexuality and abortion,” and
the eschatological hopes of many members of the American Religious Right that our
most recent war in Iraq might spur us on to Armageddon.366 The point of all this,
Hitchens explains, is that in every case:
religion has been an enormous multiplier of tribal suspicion and hatred,
with members of each group talking of the other in precisely the tones of
the bigot. The Christians eat defiled pig meat and they and Jews swill
poisonous alcohol. Buddhist and Muslim Sri Lankans blamed the wineoriented Christmas celebrations of 2004 for the immediately following
tsunami. Catholics are dirty and have too many children. Muslims breed
like rabbits and wipe their bottoms with the wrong hand. Jews have lice in
their beards and seek the blood of Christian children to add flavor and zest
to their Passover matzos. And so it goes on.367
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In Chapter Three, “A Short Digression on the Pig; or, Why Heaven Hates Ham,”
Hitchens offers his own hypothesis for the advent of the Judaic (and later, Islamic)
prohibitions against consuming pork, as well as the medieval Christian tendency to
employ pork consumption as a sort of conversion confirmation test. He suggests that
according to many ancient authorities, the attitude of early Semites to
swine was one of reverence as much as disgust. The eating of pig flesh
was considered as something special, even privileged and ritualistic. (This
mad confusion between the sacred and the profane is found in all faiths at
all times.) The simultaneous attraction and repulsion derived from an
anthropomorphic root: the look of the pig, and the taste of the pig, and the
dying yells of the pig, and the evident intelligence of the pig, were too
uncomfortably reminiscent of the human. Porcophobia – and porcophilia –
thus probably originate in a nighttime of human sacrifice and even
cannibalism at which the “holy” texts often do more than hint. Nothing
optional – from homosexuality to adultery – is ever made punishable
unless those who do the prohibiting (and exact the fierce punishments)
have a repressed desire to participate. As Shakespeare put it in King Lear,
the policeman who lashes the whore has a hot need to use her for the very
offense for which he plies the lash.368
In support of this supposition, Hitchens references both George Orwell’s Animal Farm
(often banned in Muslim countries) and William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, in which
the pig (or pig’s head on a stick, as the case may be) are metaphorically understood to
represent the darker, more malevolent aspects of human nature. But whatever the reason
for this love-hate relationship that seems to permeate all the monotheistic traditions,
Hitchens wryly notes that “it would be merely boring and idiotic to wonder how the
designer of all things conceived such a versatile creature and then commanded his highermammal creation to avoid it altogether or risk his eternal displeasure. But many
otherwise intelligent mammals affect the belief that heaven hates ham.”369
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Chapter Four, “A Note on Health, to Which Religion Can Be Hazardous,”
enumerates the various ways in which (and the accompanying reasons why) religion so
often sets itself opposed to the tools and practice of modern medicine. He describes the
relationship between religion and medicine (as well as science) as:
always necessarily problematic and very often necessarily hostile. A
modern believer can say and even believe that his faith is quite compatible
with science and medicine, but the awkward fact will always be that both
things have a tendency to break religion’s monopoly, and have often been
fiercely resisted for that reason. What happens to the faith healer and the
shaman when any poor citizen can see the full effect of drugs and
surgeries, administered without ceremonies or mystifications? Roughly the
same thing as happens to the rainmaker when the climatologist turns up, or
to the diviner from the heavens when schoolteachers get hold of
elementary telescopes.370
As evidence for this claim, Hitchens offers the recent African examples of Muslim
condemnations of the polio vaccine (as a secret US-backed conspiracy to sterilize the
faithful) in Nigeria in 2005, which resulted in the reemergence there of a previously
vanquished disease, as well as the Catholic prohibitions against condom usage in Kenya,
on the grounds that it was condoms themselves that transmitted the AIDS virus.371
But lest one believe such incidents are now confined to the third world, Hitchens
goes on to remind us that while a vaccine to prevent the human papillomavirus (HPV)
has been available for some time now in the United States, various elements within the
Bush administration “oppose[d] the adoption of this measure on the grounds that it fails
to discourage premarital sex. To accept the spread of cervical cancer in the name of god
is no different, morally or intellectually, from sacrificing these women on a stone altar
and thanking the deity for giving us the sexual impulse and then condemning it.”372 He
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provides another example, in which a middle-aged mohel from New York, who happened
to have herpes, inadvertently transmitted the illness to several small boys during the
course of their circumcisions; two of the boys later died as a result. Hitchens
incredulously recalls that, in the immediate aftermath, “Mayor [Michael] Bloomberg
overrode the reports by distinguished Jewish physicians who had warned of the danger of
the custom, and told his health care bureaucracy to postpone any verdict. The crucial
thing, he said, was to be sure that the free exercise of religion was not being infringed.”373
Hitchens subsequently notes that “the relationship between physical health and
mental health is now well understood to have a strong connection to the sexual function,
or dysfunction. Can it be a coincidence, then, that all religions claim the right to legislate
in matters of sex? The principal way in which believers inflict on themselves, on each
other, and on nonbelievers, has always been their claim to monopoly in this sphere.”374
He offers the modern-day attitudes of Islam as both a prevalent and prurient example.
When I read the Koran, with its endless prohibitions on sex and its corrupt
promise of infinite debauchery in the life to come: it is like seeing through
the “let’s pretend” of a child, but without the indulgence that comes from
watching the innocent at play. The homicidal lunatics – rehearsing to be
genocidal lunatics – of 9/11 were perhaps tempted by virgins, but it is far
more revolting to contemplate that, like so many of their fellow jihadists,
they were virgins. Like monks of old, the fanatics are taken early from
their families, taught to despise their mothers and sisters, and come to
adulthood without ever having had a normal conversation, let alone a
normal relationship, with a woman. This is disease by definition.
Christianity is too repressed to offer sex in paradise – indeed it has never
been able to evolve a tempting heaven at all – but it has been lavish in its
promise of sadistic and everlasting punishment for sexual backsliders,
which is nearly as revealing in making the same point in a different
way.375
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In closing the chapter, Hitchens reminds us once again how frequently religious
belief is accompanied by a morbid desire to witness the world’s end, or at least the parts
and peoples of it that have already “fallen.” This, he justifies by the self-satisfied, almost
gleeful “I told you so’s” that pour from the lips of many believers in the aftermath of a
hurricane, earthquake, volcano, or tsunami (events which they believe to be likewise
causally linked to the events of Noah and the Flood or Sodom and its destruction). He
does, however, believe that it is yet possible to counter such nihilistic, self-destructive
tendencies, and offers the following anecdote in service of that cause.
There is a celebrated story from Puritan Massachusetts in the late
eighteenth century. During a session of the state legislature, the sky
suddenly became leaden and overcast at midday. Its threatening aspect – a
darkness at noon – convinced many legislators that the event so much on
their clouded minds was imminent. They asked to suspend business and go
home to die. The speaker of the assembly, Abraham Davenport, managed
to keep his nerve and dignity. “Gentlemen,” he said, “either the Day of
Judgment is here or it is not. If it is not, there is no occasion for alarm and
lamentation. If it is, however, I wish to be found doing my duty. I move,
therefore, that candles be brought.” In his own limited and superstitious
day, this was the best that Mr. Davenport could do. Nonetheless, I second
his motion.
In Chapter Five, Hitchens sets out to prove that “The Metaphysical Claims of
Religion are False.” He states his case openly.
Religion comes from the period of human prehistory where nobody – not
even the mighty Democritus who concluded that all matter was made from
atoms – had the smallest idea what was going on. It comes from the
bawling and fearful infancy of our species, and is a babyish attempt to
meet our inescapable demand for knowledge (as well as for comfort,
reassurance, and other infantile needs).376
This is not to say, however, that Hitchens sees no value in studying the individual and
collective efforts of those who labored under such undesirable conditions, only that we
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should not attempt to similarly confine ourselves to the necessarily limited horizons of
their own worldviews. As he explains:
The scholastic obsessives of the Middle Ages were doing the best they
could on the basis of hopelessly limited information, ever-present fear of
death and judgment, very low life expectancy, and an audience of
illiterates. Living in often genuine fear of the consequences of error, they
exerted their minds to the fullest extent then possible, and evolved quite
impressive systems of logic and the dialectic…. they tried their hardest to
square the circle. We have nothing much to learn from what they thought,
but a great deal to learn from how they thought.377
What separates us from those pliable and pitiable scholastics is, quite simply, the
works of Newton, Darwin, and Einstein (among others), which have collectively given us
a plausible and demonstrable alternative theory of knowledge, writ large, both for
ourselves and for the cosmos in which we reside. It is for this reason, Hitchens believes,
that religions now focus on more conciliatory measures than on cosmological proofs.
“Many religions now come before us with ingratiating smirks and outspread hands, like
an unctuous merchant in a bazaar. They offer consolation and solidarity and uplift,
competing as they do in a marketplace. But we have a right to remember how
barbarically they behaved when they were strong and were making an offer that people
could not refuse.”378 In other words, what these men of science and learning have given
us is choice. And as Hitchens explains “the end of god-worship discloses itself at the
moment, which is somewhat more gradually revealed, when it becomes optional, or only
one among many possible beliefs. For the greater part of human existence, it must always
be stressed, this ‘option’ did not really exist.”379 But thanks to the efforts of many sincere
agnostics and disavowed skeptics (the majority of whom we shall never know), that
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choice now exists, and thus more than half of the battle is already won. He concludes
with the hopeful message that once “religion’s monopoly has been broken, it is within the
compass of any human being to see these evidences and proofs as the feeble-minded
inventions that they are.”380
In Chapter Six, “Arguments from Design,” Hitchens attempts to demonstrate his
claims from the previous chapter. Taking a decidedly different turn from Dawkins and
Dennett, Hitchens seeks to ridicule the notion of design from a more observational,
commonsense perspective. Therefore, rather than arguing against design, he grants
creationists their assumption (albeit solely for show) and then argues for either complete
incompetence or callous indifference on the part of the supposed designer. He states that
the stamp of the lowly origin is to be found in our appendix, in the now
needless coat of hair that we still grow (and then shed) after five months in
the womb, in our easily worn-out knees, our vestigial tails, and the many
caprices of our urinogenital arrangements. Why do people keep saying,
“God is in the details”? He isn’t in ours, unless his yokel creationist fans
wish to take credit for his clumsiness, failure, and incompetence. Those
who have yielded, not without a struggle, to the overwhelming evidence of
evolution are now trying to award themselves a medal for their own
acceptance of defeat. The very magnificence and variety of the process,
they now wish to say, argues for a directing and originating mind. In this
way they choose to make a fumbling fool of their pretended god, and
make him out to be a tinkerer, an approximator, and a blunderer, who took
eons of time to fashion a few serviceable figures and heaped up a junkyard
of scrap and failure meanwhile. Have they no more respect for the deity
than that?381
This he compounds by noting that
molecular biology shows us that approximately 98 percent of all the
species that have ever appeared on earth have lapsed into extinction. There
have been extraordinary periods of life explosion, invariably succeeded by
great “dyings out.” In order for life to take hold at all on a cooling planet,
it had first to occur with fantastic profusion. We have a micro-glimpse of
this in our little human lives: men produce infinitely more seminal fluid
380
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than is required to build a human family, and are tortured – not completely
unpleasantly – by the urgent need to spread it all over the place or
otherwise get rid of it. (Religions have needlessly added to the torture by
condemning various simple means of relieving this presumably
“designed” pressure.) The exuberant teeming variety of insect life, or
sparrow or salmon or codfish life, is a titanic waste that ensures, in some
but not all cases, that there will be enough survivors.382
In other words, some design! Rather than seeking to give all the credit and
ensuing glory to god for this magnanimous enterprise, Hitchens argues that the faithful
should instead be searching for someone or something else upon which to place blame for
this capricious boondoggle. But hyperbole aside, Hitchens argues that it is precisely
because of science that no such efforts are any longer required.
Skepticism and discovery have freed them from the burden of having to
defend their god as a footling, clumsy, straws-in-the-hair mad scientist,
and also from having to answer distressing questions about who inflicted
the syphilis bacillus or mandated the leper or the idiot child, or devised the
torments of Job. The faithful stand acquitted on that charge: we no longer
have any need of a god to explain what is no longer mysterious.383
In Chapters Seven and Eight, Hitchens highlights some of the more abhorrent
examples of Old and New Testament immorality. Though much of the ground he covers
has already been traversed by either Dawkins or Dennett, Hitchens does provide a few
unique footprints of his own along the path. His discussion of the Decalogue is one such
instance. After a rather Carlinesque riff on the numerous repetitions, inconsistencies, and
impossible commands contained within, Hitchens returns to his central thesis:
It would be harder to find an easier proof that religion is manmade. There
is, first, the monarchical growling about respect and fear, accompanied by
a stern reminder of omnipotence and limitless revenge, of the sort with
which a Babylonian or Assyrian emperor might have ordered the scribes
to begin a proclamation. There is then a sharp reminder to keep working
and only to relax when the absolutist says so. A few crisp legalistic
reminders follow, one of which is commonly misrendered because the
382
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original Hebrew actually says “thou shalt do no murder.” But however
little one thinks of the Jewish tradition, it is surely insulting to the people
of Moses to imagine that they had come this far under the impression that
murder, adultery, theft, and perjury were permissible.384
Hitchens subsequently introduces the reader to a term he wishes to revive:
“antitheism.” Although originally defined simply as active opposition toward (instead of
the mere omission of) religious practice and belief, Hitchens here intends it to possess an
emancipatory quality as well. He explains that “we ought to be glad that none of the
religious myths has any truth to it, or in it. The Bible may, indeed does, contain a warrant
for trafficking in humans, for ethnic cleansing, for slavery, for bride-price, and for
indiscriminate massacre, but we are not bound by any of it because it was put together by
crude, uncultured human mammals.”385 He goes on to say that
moreover, the context is oppressively confined and local. None of these
provincials, or their deity, seems to have any idea of a world beyond the
desert, the flocks and herds, and the imperatives of nomadic subsistence.
This is forgivable on the part of the provincial yokels, obviously, but then
what of their supreme guide and wrathful tyrant? Perhaps he was made in
their image, even if not graven?386
In his discussion of the New Testament, Hitchens once again demonstrates the
inconsistencies of scripture, this time by illustrating the utter incompatibility, both with
logic and with each other, of the so-called canonical gospels. He scoffs that
the scribes cannot even agree on the mythical elements: they disagree
wildly about the Sermon on the Mount, the anointing of Jesus, the
treachery of Judas, and Peter’s haunting “denial.” Most astonishingly, they
cannot converge on a common account of the Crucifixion or the
Resurrection. Thus, the one interpretation that we simply have to discard
is the one that claims divine warrant for all four of them. The book on
which all four may possibly have been based, known speculatively to
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scholars as “Q,” has been lost forever, which seems distinctly careless on
the part of the god who is claimed to have “inspired” it.387
He goes on to note that several quintessentially Catholic doctrines, such as the
“Immaculate Conception” and the “Assumption,” become necessary only under the guise
of fulfilling Old Testament prophecies and shoring up otherwise weak points in the
narrative. (After all, how could Jesus have come to redeem the so-called original sin of
Adam, if he too was tainted by it? Or, if Mary did not suffer the blemish of original sin,
thanks to the doctrine of the “Immaculate Conception,” then shouldn’t she have been
exempt from the agonies of death? Thus, the need for the “Assumption.”) He also
reminds us of their recent arrival on the scene: 1852 and 1950, respectively.
Hitchens then broadens his previous discussion by elaborating on the
(comparatively) recently discovered Coptic Gospel of Judas, which claims that Judas did
not betray Jesus (as is canonically claimed), but was rather a willing and key participant
in the plot allowing Jesus to fulfill his divinely-inspired purpose. Though as unreliable
and unfalsifiable as its accepted counterparts, Hitchens nevertheless argues that “it makes
infinitely more sense than the everlasting curse placed on Judas for doing what somebody
had to do, in this otherwise pedantically arranged chronicle of a death foretold. It also
makes infinitely more sense than blaming the Jews for all eternity.”388
Of course, one could claim that neither of these criticisms of the New Testament
necessarily leads to evil. For this, Hitchens returns to the illustrious words of C.S. Lewis,
who once claimed that to consider Jesus to be merely a moral exemplar and mortal
teacher of ethics is to utterly miss the point of his existence. In Mere Christianity, Lewis
writes:
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That is the one thing we must not say. A man who was merely a man and
said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher. He
would either be a lunatic – on a level with the man who says he is a
poached egg – or else he would be the Devil of Hell. You must make your
choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman and
something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and
kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at His feet and call Him Lord and
God. But let us not come with any patronizing nonsense.389
Thus, it seems that there can be no middle ground. Either one accepts the literal,
historical, and moral truth of the scriptures, or else one cannot partake of the earthly or
heavenly rewards they promise. This, Hitchens argues, is precisely the sort of abject
absolutism and false dichotomy that leads to intolerance in the first place. That said,
Hitchens concludes with praise of a sort for his ideological opponent. “I do credit him
with honesty and with some courage. Either the Gospels are in some sense literal truth, or
the whole thing is essentially a fraud and perhaps an immoral one at that. Well, it can be
stated with certainty, and on their own evidence, that the Gospels are most certainly not
literal truth.”390 No doubt Lewis would disagree, but his statement does seem to preclude
the sort of highly selective readings of scripture in which many modern day adherents
seek to indulge.
In Chapter Nine, Hitchens enumerates the various ideological and textual links
between the Old and New Testaments with those of the supposedly last revelation
(apologies to Joseph Smith): the Koran. He notes that “quite rightly, Islam effectively
disowns the idea that it is a new faith, let alone a cancellation of the earlier ones, and it
uses the prophecies of the Old Testament and the Gospels of the New like a perpetual
crutch or fund, to be leaned on or drawn upon. In return for this derivative modesty, all it
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asks is to be accepted as the absolute and final revelation.”391 What is it, then, that has not
allowed for the same sort of textual criticism and scholarly investigations to occur in
Islam as they have in the Jewish and Christian traditions?
Hitchens identifies two principal difficulties: the problem with translation and the
absence of a reformation. As he explains, these difficulties are substantially compounded
as a result of their mutually-detrimental and reciprocally-limiting relationship.
The written Arabic language has two features that make it difficult for an
outsider to learn: it uses dots to distinguish consonants like “b” and “t,”
and in its original form it had no sign or symbol for short vowels, which
could be rendered by various dashes or comma-type marks. Vastly
different readings even of Uthman’s version were enabled by these
variations. Arabic script itself was not standardized until the later part of
the ninth century, and in the meantime the undotted and oddly voweled
Koran was generating wildly different explanations of itself, as it still
does.392
Thus, a definitive translation, much less a non-Arabic translation, seems unlikely.
This problem is greatly enlarged by the fact that the Muslim faith has never
undergone anything remotely similar to the Christian Protestant Reformation, initiated by
Martin Luther and his 95 Theses in 1517. Hitchens notes that, “there would have been no
Protestant Reformation if it were not for the long struggle to have the Bible rendered into
the vernacular and the priestly monopoly therefore broken.”393 He also reminds us that
“not only did Islam begin by condemning all doubters to eternal fire, but it still claims the
right to do so in almost all of its dominions, and still preaches that these same dominions
can and must be extended by war. There has never been an attempt in any age to
challenge or even investigate the claims of Islam that has not been met with extremely
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harsh and swift repression.”394 In other words, where the right to challenge or question
does not exist, reform is unlikely to follow.
Unable to help himself, Hitchens concludes the chapter by referencing the work
of Christophe Luxenburg, whose 2000 Syriac-Aramaic Version of the Koran argued that
a great many words within the Koran are themselves not of Arabic origin. As Hitchens
gleefully notes, “his most celebrated example concerns the rewards of a ‘martyr’ in
paradise: when retranslated and redacted the heavenly offering consists of sweet white
raisins rather than virgins.”395 Here, one cannot help but be reminded of the old Catholic
joke which likewise deals with issues of (mis)translation: “We missed the ‘r’! We missed
the ‘r’! It says celebrate, not celibate!”
In Chapter Ten, Hitchens examines the discrepancies of both size and scope
between miracles supposedly witnessed in the ancient and modern worlds. To begin, he
returns to the writings of David Hume, who once defined a miracle as “a disturbance or
interruption in the expected and established course of things.”396 As to the likelihood and
frequency of their existence, Hume memorably suggested that
if you seem to witness such a thing, there are two possibilities. The first is
that the laws of nature have been suspended (in your favor). The second is
that you are under a misapprehension, or suffering from a delusion. Thus
the likelihood of the second must be weighed against the likelihood of the
first. If you only hear a report of the miracle from a second or third party,
the odds must be adjusted accordingly before you can decide to credit a
witness who claims to have seen something that you did not see. And if
you are separated from the “sighting” by many generations, and have no
independent corroboration, the odds must be adjusted still more
drastically.397
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What’s more, Hitchens reminds us that, even if we are willing to suspend our skepticism
and grant their (possible) existence, “miracles in any case do not vindicate the truth of the
religion that practices them: Aaron supposedly vanquished Pharaoh’s magicians in an
open competition but did not deny that they could perform wonders as well.”398
With all this in mind, Hitchens proceeds to examine the central miracle of the
Christian faith, Christ’s resurrection, as well as the surrounding claims which
simultaneously suggest that it both did and did not occur. Assuming that it did, Hitchens
recalls that Matthew 27:52-53 says that at the moment of Jesus’ death, “the graves were
opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after
his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.” Hitchens claims
that “this supposed frequency of resurrection can only undermine the uniqueness of the
one by which mankind purchased forgiveness of sins. And there is no cult or religion
before or since, from Osiris to vampirism to voodoo, that does not rely on some innate
belief in the ‘undead.’”399 Therefore, even if Christ’s resurrection could be proven to be
true (which it can’t), that in and of itself would hardly suffice in unilaterally supporting
his claims to divinity. Hitchens then notes that many believers both inside and out of the
Christian tradition contradictorily claim that the resurrection never actually took place.
For instance, there are Muslims who maintain that Jesus was raised bodily into heaven,
while an unfortunate doppelganger was sacrificed in his place. There are also Christians
who believe that the resurrection is meant to be understood allegorically, and thus do not
affirm the miracle in the truest sense of the word. Both alternative views would also be a
problem, as Hitchens explains: “the action of a man who volunteers to die for his fellow
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creatures is universally regarded as noble. The extra claim not to have ‘really’ died makes
the whole sacrifice tricky and meretricious. (Thus, those who say ‘Christ died for my
sins,’ when he did not really ‘die’ at all, are making a statement that is false in its own
terms.)”400
Of course, the faithful rarely make such bold claims today. In fact, many modernday miracles seem rather tawdry and banal when compared to the awe-inspiring biblical
marvels of times gone by. To illustrate and to hint at the reason(s) why this is so,
Hitchens examines two recent “miracles,” and asks that we consider Hume’s criteria for
examining them as we go along. For the first of these, Hitchens recounts that in 2001, he
was invited by the Vatican to attend (and testify against) the beatification of Mother
Teresa. Hitchens, however notes that “even as they appeared to be asking me this in good
faith, their colleagues on the other side of the world were certifying the necessary
‘miracle’ that would allow the beatification (prelude to full canonization) to go
forward.”401 The miracle, as Hitchens describes it, revolves around the supposedlyspontaneous healing of a uterine tumor after an amulet formerly owned by Mother Teresa
was placed (by two nuns) upon the abdomen of the afflicted woman, one Monica Besra.
Despite the fact that three of Ms. Besra’s doctors, as well as her own husband, all
subsequently claimed that she had been cured by “ordinary, regular medical treatment,”
general belief and acceptance of the miracle as first reported endured.402 As Hitchens
prophetically noted:
there will soon come a day in Rome when a vast and solemn ceremony
will proclaim the sainthood of Mother Teresa, as one whose intercession
can improve upon medicine, to the entire world. Not only is this a scandal
400
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in itself, but it will further postpone the day when Indian villagers cease to
trust quacks and fakirs. In other words, many people will die needlessly as
a result of this phony and contemptible “miracle.”403
As it turns out, that day was September 4, 2016.404
In closing, Hitchens examines the merits of a miracle more close to home. He
explains:
When the debris had eventually settled on Ground Zero, it was found that
two pieces of mangled girder still stood in the shape of a cross, and much
wondering comment resulted. Since all architecture has always involved
crossbeams, it would be surprising only if such a feature did not emerge. I
admit that I would have been impressed if the wreckage had formed itself
into a Star of David or a star and crescent, but there is no record of this
ever having occurred anywhere, even in places where local people might
be impressed by it. And remember, miracles are supposed to occur at the
behest of a being who is omnipotent as well as omniscient and
omnipresent. One might hope for more magnificent performances than
ever seem to occur.405
Why does god no longer part the waters, cause the sun to stand still, or strike down the
firstborn of his chosen people’s oppressors? Hitchens believes the answer is simple.
Those “miracles” occurred a time when knowledge of the cosmos was limited and the
scientific enterprise did not yet exist to challenge the inherent provinciality of such
claims. Today’s miracles must necessarily be more limited in scope and trivial in
appearance. Anything more could never withstand the piercing eye of reason and the
eviscerating critique of science.
In Chapter Eleven, “‘The Lowly Stamp of Their Origin’: Religion’s Corrupt
Beginnings,” Hitchens suggests that “if we watch the process of a religion in its
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formation, then we can make some assumptions about the origins of those religions that
were put together before most people could read.”406 For his examples, Hitchens chooses
three modern manifestations of the religious impetus – the various Melanesian “cargo
cults” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the incredible story of the “infant
phenomenon” evangelical preacher Marjoe Gortner, and the spurious foundations and
scandalous history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints – and then seeks to
discover, for each, the “man (or motivation) behind the curtain.”
Though instances of the so-called cargo cult can be traced back to the midnineteenth century, perhaps the most well-known expressions took place during World
War II. First the Japanese, and then subsequently the Allied forces who opposed them,
crisscrossed the Melanesian islands, bringing with them an absolute cornucopia of
“Western” aircraft, weapons, and supplies. The Melanesians, unaccustomed to such
modern marvels, understandably attached divine attributes to the objects and to those
individuals who brought them. As a result, they began to construct rudimentary runways,
complete with bamboo communication antennae and firelight flares, with the intention of
attracting or otherwise enticing the airplanes to land, bringing with them a new
consignment of wonders from the gods. After the frequency of such encounters
diminished with the end of the war, religions and rituals began to develop in their
absence, each prophesying the return of an aviator savior of sorts, complete with a
material reward for their continued reverence and faith in the interim. Hitchens notes that
each time one of these cargo cults emerged, it was always in the hope of attaining some
level of measurable wealth and bodily comfort (whether in this life or the next). This, he
believes, is a desire that likewise drives many western faiths to this day.
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Some people may be insulted at even the suggestion of a comparison here,
but are not the holy books of official monotheism absolutely dripping with
material yearning and with admiring – almost mouthwatering –
descriptions of Solomon’s wealth, the thriving flocks and herds of the
faithful, the rewards for a good Muslim in paradise, to say nothing of
many, many lurid tales of plunder and spoils? Jesus, it is true, shows no
personal interest in gain, but he does speak of treasure in heaven and even
of “mansions” as an inducement to follow him. Is it not further true that all
religions down the ages have shown a keen interest in the amassment of
material goods in the real world?407
In support of this claim, Hitchens examines “the mind-numbing story of Marjoe
Gortner.”408 Almost from birth, young Marjoe (1944- ) was systematically physically and
emotionally abused by his parents, effectively brainwashed into believing he was divinely
ordained to preach in the Pentecostal Church. From the ages of four to sixteen, Marjoe
and his parents traveled around the United States, participating in countless revivals and
other religious festivals, grossing no less than three million dollars for their efforts.
Following a period of disillusionment and bitterness toward his parents, Marjoe returned
to his former hucksterism in his early twenties, until a crisis of conscience caused him to
reevaluate his life and to atone for his sins, as it were, by allowing a film crew to
document his farewell tour on the revivalist circuit in 1971. In the resultant film, Marjoe,
the young evangelist exposes every tool and trick of his duplicitous trade, showing how
easily he is able to separate the salvation seekers from their own hard-earned savings,
with the ethereal promise of greater rewards to follow. As Hitchens notes:
One knew, of course, that the whole racket of American evangelism was
just that: a heartless con run by the second-string characters from
Chaucer’s “Pardoner’s Tale.” (You saps keep the faith. We’ll just keep the
money.) And this is what it must have been like when indulgences were
openly sold in Rome, and when a nail or a splinter from the Crucifixion
could fetch a nice price in any flea market in Christendom. But to see the
crime exposed by someone who is both a victim and a profiteer is
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nonetheless quite shocking even to a hardened unbeliever. After such
knowledge, what forgiveness? The film Marjoe won an Academy Award
in 1972, and has made absolutely no difference at all.409
Of course, there are many who will argue that neither the cargo cults of Melanesia
nor the lamentable life of Marjoe Gortner are truly indicative of the more mainstream
faiths and their supposedly low origins that Hitchens desires to expose. In response to
this, he turns his attentions to a religion whose similarly recent inception has not served
as a stumbling block to general acknowledgement and acceptance: Mormonism.
Comparing it to Islam, Hitchens maintains that the Mormon religion:
was founded by a gifted opportunist who, despite couching his text in
openly plagiarized Christian terms, announced that “I shall be to this
generation a new Muhammad” and adopted as his fighting slogan the
words, which he thought he had learned from Islam, “Either the Al-Koran
or the sword.” He was too ignorant to know that if you use the word al you
do not need another definite article, but then he did resemble Muhammad
in being able only to make a borrowing out of other people’s bibles.410
Anticipating an immediate objection, Hitchens continues:
Mormon partisans sometimes say, as do Muslims, that this cannot have
been fraudulent because the work of deception would have been too much
for one poor and illiterate man. They have on their side two useful points:
if Muhammad was ever convicted in public of fraud and attempted
necromancy we have no record of the fact, and Arabic is a language that is
somewhat opaque even to the fairly fluent outsider. However, we know
the Koran to be made up in part of earlier books and stories, and in the
case of Smith it is likewise a simple if tedious task to discover that twentyfive thousand words of the Book of Mormon are taken directly from the
Old Testament…. (The great Mark Twain famously referred to it as
“chloroform in print,” but I accuse him of hitting too soft a target, since
the book does actually contain “The Book of Ether.”)411
To drive the final nail into the coffin, Hitchens examines Mormonism’s troubled
history with the American Civil Rights movement, noting that Smith and his followers
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were staunch opponents of abolitionism and equality, both before and well after the
events of the Civil War unfolded. He concludes:
If anything proves the human manufacture of religion, it is the way that
the Mormon elders resolved this difficulty. Confronted by the plain words
of one of their holy books and the increasing contempt and isolation that it
imposed upon them, they did as they had done when their fondness for
polygamy would have brought federal retribution upon god’s own Utah.
They had still another “revelation” and, more or less in time for the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, had it divinely disclosed to them
that black people were human after all.412
In Chapter Twelve, “A Coda: How Religions End,” Hitchens recounts the story of
Sabbatai Sevi, a seventeenth century mystic whose self-messianic claims in many ways
rival those of Jesus of Nazareth, and whose life and teachings almost resulted in a
similarly religious revolution. Hitchens notes that “all the elements of a true (and a false)
prophecy were present. Sabbatai’s devotees pointed to his equivalent of John the Baptist,
a charismatic rabbi called Nathan of Gaza. Sabbatai’s enemies described him as an
epileptic and a heretic, and accused him of violating the law.”413 The Ottoman authorities,
like the Roman ones of old, recognized that, were Sabbatai “to claim kingdom over all
kings, let alone to claim a large tract of their province in Palestine, then he was a secular
challenger as well as a religious one.” Needing an intimate betrayal to round out the
narrative, Hitchens cheekily remarks that “the script was almost complete when a former
disciple of Sabbatai’s, one Nehemiah Kohen, came to the grand vizier’s headquarters in
Edirne and denounced his former master as a practitioner of immorality and heresy.”414
Here, however, the story takes a rather surprising turn.
Summoned to the vizier’s palace, and allowed to make his way from
prison with a procession of hymn-singing supporters, the Messiah was
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very bluntly asked if he would agree to a trial by ordeal. The archers of the
court would use him as a target, and if heaven deflected the arrows he
would be adjudged genuine. Should he refuse, he would be impaled. If he
wished to decline the choice altogether, he could affirm himself to be a
true Muslim and be allowed to live. Sabbatai Zevi did what almost any
ordinary mammal would have done, made the standard profession of
belief in the one god and his messenger and was awarded a sinecure.415
Thus, unlike Jesus, Sabbatai did not opt for a martyr’s death. He chose instead the
more sensible, if less dramatic, option: conversion to Islam and exile into oblivion. And
as Hitchens notes, many of his followers didn’t quite know what to make of this deviation
in script. “There were those who refused to believe in his conversion or apostasy. There
were those who argued that he had only become a Muslim in order to be an even greater
Messiah. There were those who felt that he had only adopted a disguise. And of course
there were those who claimed that he had risen into the heavens.”416 What is the point of
this digression, one might ask. Hitchens explains: “had [Sabbatai] been put to death, we
should be hearing of it still, and of the elaborate mutual excommunications, stonings, and
schisms that [his] followers would subsequently have engaged in.”417 It is therefore in the
“almost” and the “might-have-been” religions that one can most clearly witness the
tragic, yet predictable, tract to which such messianic faiths are invariably tethered.
In Chapter Thirteen, Hitchens attempts to answer the age-old question, “Does
Religion Make People Behave Better?” In keeping with his episodic style, Hitchens
offers a comparison between Martin Luther King, Jr. and the man for whom he was
named, both of whom claimed to have been spurred on to action by the tenets and
teachings of their respective faiths. Hitchens argues that
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when Dr. King’s namesake nailed his theses to the door of Wittenberg
Cathedral in 1517 and stoutly announced, “Here I stand, I can do no
other,” he set a standard for intellectual and moral courage. But Martin
Luther, who started his religious life being terribly frightened by a nearmiss lightning strike, went on to become a bigot and a persecutor in his
own right, railing murderously against Jews, screaming about demons, and
calling on the German principalities to stamp on the rebellious poor. When
Dr. King took a stand on the steps of Mr. Lincoln’s memorial and changed
history, he too adopted a position that had effectually been forced upon
him. But he did so as a profound humanist and nobody could ever use his
name to justify oppression or cruelty. He endures for that reason, and his
legacy has very little to do with his professed theology. No supernatural
force was required to make the case against racism.418
In other words, like the ideology upon which it was based, Dr. King’s movement
managed to transcend the confines of religion and speak to all of humanity, not just an
elect few.
As counterexamples, Hitchens recalls the horrific events of Rwanda in 1994 and
Uganda in 2005, the latter of which he was an eyewitness to. As a nation, Rwanda boasts
one of the highest percentage of Christians, per capita, in all of Africa (roughly 93%).
However, the events of 1994 demonstrate that such religiosity in no way predicts
morality. In an attack reminiscent of the Nazi’s Final Solution, the Hutu majority
systematically massacred no less than 70% of their Tutsi brethren, on the grounds that it
was the Tutsi who were solely to blame for the various misfortunes that had befallen the
nation. And just like in Germany, the Church’s actions and attitude throughout the
carnage are decidedly mixed. Though some individuals did speak out against the
atrocities, the official position of both the Catholic Church and many of the protestant
sects ranged from tacit approval to active support, employing an inverted version of the
Hamitic racial theory as a justification for their actions. Even the foundational document
of the genocidal movement came to be known as the “Hutu Ten Commandments.” And
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so in this instance as well as that of Dr. King and his namesake, to conflate religiosity
with morality, or more specifically to believe the latter to be entirely dependent upon the
former, is to completely miss the point.
This is also true in Uganda, where the ostensibly Christian “Lord’s Resistance
Army,” and its fanatical leader, Joseph Kony, have waged a decades-long war against
apostates and infidels with the ultimate intention of creating a sort of Christian caliphate
in the region, where the Ten Commandments would serve a similar function to Sharia
law in Islam. Describing how children were kidnapped, drugged, and forced to take part
in atrocities, all the while being indoctrinated by the charismatic Kony, Hitchens states
that “he baptized by oil and water, held fierce ceremonies of punishment and purification,
and insured his followers against death. His was a fanatical preachment of
Christianity.”419 What do these admittedly extreme examples demonstrate? Hitchens
answers:
At a minimum, this makes it impossible to argue that religion causes
people to behave in a more kindly or civilized manner. The worse the
offender, the more devout he turns out to be. It can be added that some of
the most dedicated relief workers are also believers (though as it happens
the best ones I have met are secularists who were not trying to proselytize
for any faith). But the chance that a person committing the crimes was
“faith-based” was almost 100 percent, while the chances that a person of
faith was on the side of humanity and decency were about as good as the
odds of a coin flip. Extend this back into history, and the odds become
more like those of an astrological prediction that just happens to come
true. This is because religions could never have got started, let alone
thrived, unless for the influence of men as fanatical as Moses or
Muhammad or Joseph Kony, while charity and relief work, while they
may appeal to tenderhearted believers, are the inheritors of modernism and
the Enlightenment. Before that, religion was spread not by example but as
an auxiliary to the more old-fashioned methods of holy war and
imperialism.420

419
420

Ibid., 189.
Ibid., 192.

217

In Chapter Fourteen, Hitchens pointedly argues that “There is No Eastern
Solution.” In it, he notes that “an extraordinary number of people appear to believe that
the mind, and the reasoning faculty – the only thing that divides us from our animal
relatives – is something to be distrusted and even, as far as possible, dulled. The search
for nirvana, and the dissolution of the intellect, goes on. And whenever it is tried, it
produces a Kool-Aid effect in the real world.”421 After recounting the socio-religious
wars in Sri Lanka, in which the Hindu Tamil separatists are fighting against the Buddhist
Sinhalese majority, Hitchens admits that “conceivably, some readers of these pages will
be shocked to learn of the existence of Hindu and Buddhist murderers and sadists.
Perhaps they dimly imagine that contemplative easterners, devoted to vegetarian diets
and meditative routines, are immune to such temptations?”422
The point, of course, is not to rehash the same arguments from Chapter Thirteen.
It is simply to demonstrate that
a faith that despises the mind and the free individual, that preaches
submission and resignation, and that regards life as a poor and transient
thing, is ill-equipped for self-criticism. Those who become bored by
conventional “Bible” religions, and seek “enlightenment” by way of the
dissolution of their own critical faculties into nirvana in any form, had
better take a warning. They may think they are leaving the realm of
despised materialism, but they are still being asked to put their reason to
sleep, and to discard their minds along with their sandals.423
In Chapter Fifteen, “Religion as an Original Sin,” Hitchens examines a number of
commonly-held western religious tenets and traditions – such as the doctrine of eternal
reward and/or punishment, the doctrine of impossible tasks and rules, the doctrine of
blood sacrifice, and the doctrine of atonement – and then asks whether or not such
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practices originated with religion and whether or not they can be extinguished while the
flame of faith yet burns. After briefly reviewing the notion of ancestral sin (in which
descendants must continue to answer and atone for the supposed crimes of their forbears),
Hitchens proceeds to dismiss as distinctly immoral the ideas of Augustinian “Original
Sin,” and the subsequent Christian condemnation of the Jews as “Christ killers.” Why,
then, has the practice endured? He explains, “the key to its reluctance is easy to find. If
you once admit that the descendants of Jews are not implicated, it becomes very hard to
argue that anyone else not there present was implicated, either. One rent in the fabric, as
usual, threatens to tear the whole thing apart.”424
Like Professor Dawkins before him, Hitchens also discounts the Orwellian notion
of “thoughtcrime,” in which the imagining of a sin is considered the same as the physical
committing of that sin. One is held to such a high standard that failure (and the ensuing
feelings of guilt that accompany it) is all but assured… hence the need for a savior.
Similarly, Hitchens contends that the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself is
equally impossible. As he explains:
Humans are not so constituted as to care for others as much as themselves:
the thing simply cannot be done (as any intelligent “creator” would well
understand from studying his own design). Urging humans to be
superhumans, on pain of death and torture, is the urging of terrible selfabasement at their repeated and inevitable failure to keep the rules.425
But perhaps Hitchens’ most intriguing argument revolves around the notion of
blood sacrifice, particularly as it relates to the supposed necessity of Jesus’ crucifixion as
an atoning for the sin(s) of Adam. Here, his words are especially cutting.
We cannot, like fearridden peasants of antiquity, hope to load all our
crimes onto a goat and then drive the hapless animal into the desert. Our
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everyday idiom is quite sound in regarding “scapegoating” with contempt.
And religion is scapegoating writ large. I can pay your debt, my love, if
you have been imprudent, and if I were a hero like Sidney Carton in A
Tale of Two Cities I could even serve your term in prison or take your
place on the scaffold. Greater love hath no man. But I cannot absolve you
of your responsibilities. It would be immoral of me to offer, and immoral
of you to accept. And if the same offer is made from another time and
another world, through the mediation of middlemen and accompanied by
inducements, it loses all its grandeur and becomes debased into wishthinking or, worse, a combination of blackmailing with bribery.426
Essentially, Hitchens is arguing that the circumstances surrounding the unnecessary
(near)sacrifice of Isaac by his father Abraham and the “absolutely necessary” sacrifice of
Jesus by his heavenly father, is ultimately a distinction without a difference. Whether it is
one’s faith being tested or one’s redemption being purchased, the idea that another living
creature can be substituted and sacrificed in one’s place is the epitome of immorality and
thus hardly a practice to praise and certainly not one to repeat.
In Chapter Sixteen, Hitchens asks “Is Religion Child Abuse?” Because it in many
ways echoes Richard Dawkins’ sentiments in Chapter Nine of The God Delusion, my
treatment of it here will be comparatively brief and intended solely to supplement, and
not revisit, those previous remarks. Focusing on the decidedly sinful aspects of religion,
such as the constant specter of eternal damnation, the monstrous act of genital mutilation,
and the unconditional proscriptions against abortion, masturbation, and sexual expression
in all its extramarital forms, Hitchens ultimately agrees with Professor Dawkins that such
wickedness is infinitely compounded by the fact that it is visited most frequently upon the
young. He states:
If religious instruction were not allowed until the child had attained the
age of reason, we would be living in a quite different world. Faithful
parents are divided over this, since they naturally hope to share the
wonders and delights of Christmas and other fiestas with their offspring
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(and can also make good use of god, as well as of lesser figures like Santa
Claus, to help tame the unruly) but mark what happens if the child should
stray to another faith, let alone another cult, even in early adolescence.
The parents will tend to proclaim that this is taking advantage of the
innocent. All monotheisms have, or used to have, a very strong prohibition
against apostasy for just this reason.427
In other words, even the religious recognize the abusiveness of faith-based indoctrination,
so long as it is the faith of another upon which they are focusing. Unfortunately, such
insight seems to fail when concentrated on a more introspected image. More’s the pity,
since this failure and its consequences are not theirs alone to bear, but instead result in the
continuation of this all-too-tragic cycle of abuse.
Expanding upon the latter half of Dawkins’ Seventh Chapter in The God
Delusion, Hitchens’ seventeenth chapter examines “The Last-Ditch Case Against
Secularism.” At the onset, he observes that “the examples most in common use – those of
the Hitler and Stalin regimes – show us with terrible clarity what can happen when men
usurp the role of gods. When I consult with my secular and atheist friends, I find that this
has become the most common and frequent objection that they encounter from religious
audiences. The point deserves a detailed reply.”428 To begin, he notes sardonically what
such an objection implicitly entails: “that people of faith now seek defensively to say that
they are no worse than fascists or Nazis or Stalinists. One might hope that religion had
retained more sense of its dignity than that.”429 Hitchens then proceeds to demonstrate
how the so-called secularist regimes of the twentieth century are simply theocracies of a
different sort, repurposing more than rewriting the old religious playbook.
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Quoting from George Orwell’s 1946 essay, “The Prevention of Literature,”
Hitchens writes that “‘from the totalitarian point of view, history is something to be
created rather than learned. A totalitarian state is in effect a theocracy, and its ruling
caste, in order to keep its position, has to be thought of as infallible.’”430 This applies not
only to the regimes of Hitler and Stalin, but also to “Calvin’s Geneva” (who silenced any
and all opposition to his rule) and to current government of North Korea (whose various
leaders have likewise done the same). After echoing Dawkins comments that “those who
invoke ‘secular’ tyranny in contrast to religion are hoping that we will forget two things:
the connection between the Christian churches and fascism, and the capitulation of the
churches to National Socialism,” Hitchens notes that “the North Korean state was born at
about the same time that Nineteen Eighty-Four was published, and one could almost
believe that the holy father of the state, Kim Il Sung, was given a copy of the novel and
asked if he could make it work in practice.”431 He ultimately concludes that “the
alternative to these grotesque phenomena is not the chimera of secular dictatorship, but
the defense of secular pluralism and of the right not to believe or be compelled to believe.
This defense has now become an urgent and inescapable responsibility: a matter of
survival.”432
Hitchens begins Chapter Eighteen, “The Resistance of the Rational,” by repeated
that oft-quoted phrase from Psalms 14: “The fool has said in his heart, there is no God.”
He goes on to boast that “all that we can tell for sure from the otherwise meaningless
assertion is that unbelief – not just heresy and backsliding but unbelief – must have been
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known to exist even in that remote epoch.”433 In what follows, Hitchens attempts to
highlight the contributions of several of these proto-secularists and the trials and
tribulations they so often faced. After recounting the trial and death of Socrates as well as
the subsequent condemnation by Jewish (and later Christian) authorities of Epicurean
materialistic philosophy, both on the charge of impiety, Hitchens laments not only that
“all major confrontations over the right to free thought, free speech, and free inquiry have
taken the same form – of a religious attempt to assert the literal and limited mind over the
ironic and inquiring one,” but also how frequently such attempts have been successful.434
Hitchens also unreservedly praises the life and works of Benedict Spinoza, whose
connective concept of pantheism in many ways presaged the work of Mendel and Darwin
by centuries. As Hitchens recounts:
This derided heretic is now credited with the most original philosophical
work ever done on the mind/body distinction, and his meditations on the
human condition have provided more real consolation to thoughtful people
than has any religion. Argument continues about whether Spinoza was an
atheist: it now seems odd that we should have to argue as to whether
pantheism is atheism or not. In its own expressed terms it is actually
theistic, but Spinoza’s definition of a god made manifest throughout the
natural world comes very close to defining a religious god out of
existence.435
After dedicating ample space to recap some of the invaluable contributions from
such Enlightenment thinkers as Franklin, Jefferson, Paine, and Voltaire, Hitchens goes on
to acknowledge the more recent accomplishments of individuals such as Einstein, Freud,
Kafka, and Marx.436 His decision to close, then, with a retelling of the Maccabean Revolt
may seem strange and oddly out of place. Hitchens, however, uses it to illustrate what
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should be, by now, a fairly obvious point. For every example we have of skepticism and
honest inquiry, there are countless others whose voices have been effectively silenced
(and in some cases, whose lives have been declared forfeit) by the very institutions they
dared to question. As he explains:
The Maccabees, who founded the Hasmonean dynasty, were forcibly
restoring Mosaic fundamentalism against the many Jews of Palestine and
elsewhere who had become attracted by Hellenism. These true early
multiculturalists had become bored by “the law,” offended by
circumcision, interested by Greek literature, drawn by the physical and
intellectual exercises of the gymnasium, and rather adept at philosophy.
They could feel the pull exerted by Athens, even if only by way of Rome
and by the memory of Alexander’s time, and were impatient with the stark
fear and superstition mandated by the Pentateuch. They obviously seemed
too cosmopolitan to the votaries of the old Temple – and it must have been
easy to accuse them of “dual loyalty” when they agreed to have a temple
of Zeus on the site where smoky and bloody altars used to propitiate the
unsmiling deity of yore. At any rate, when the father of Judah Maccabeus
saw a Jew about to make a Hellenic offering on the old altar, he lost no
time in murdering him. Over the next few years of the Maccabean
“revolt,” many more assimilated Jews were slain, or forcibly circumcised,
or both, and the women who had flirted with the new Hellenic
dispensation suffered even worse. Since the Romans eventually preferred
the violent and dogmatic Maccabees to the less militarized and fanatical
Jews who had shone in their togas in the Mediterranean light, the scene
was set for the uneasy collusion between the old-garb ultra-Orthodox
Sanhedrin and the imperial governorate. This lugubrious relationship was
eventually to lead to Christianity (yet another Jewish heresy) and thus
ineluctably to the birth of Islam. We could have been spared the whole
thing.437
In Hitchens’ final chapter, he unabashedly calls for a new enlightenment.
Claiming that “in our hands and within our view is a whole universe of discovery and
clarification, which is a pleasure to study in itself, gives the average person access to
insights that not even Darwin or Einstein possessed, and offers the promise of nearmiraculous advances in healing, in energy, and in peaceful exchange between different
cultures,” Hitchens argues that to cling to the edifice of religion in an age of such
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scientific and self-discovery is “as if someone, offered a delicious and fragrant out-ofseason fruit, matured in a painstakingly and lovingly designed hothouse, should throw
away the flesh and the pulp and gnaw moodily on the pit.”438 How might one overcome
this seemingly ingrained tendency? Hitchens responds:
Above all, we are in need of a renewed Enlightenment, which will base
itself on the proposition that the proper study of mankind is man, and
woman. This Enlightenment will not need to depend, like its predecessors,
on the heroic breakthroughs of a few gifted and exceptionally courageous
people. It is within the compass of the average person. The study of
literature and poetry, both for its own sake and for the eternal ethical
questions with which it deals, can now easily depose the scrutiny of sacred
texts that have been found to be corrupt and confected. The pursuit of
unfettered scientific inquiry, and the availability of new findings to masses
of people by easy electronic means, will revolutionize our concepts of
research and development. Very importantly, the divorce between the
sexual life and fear, and the sexual life and disease, and the sexual life and
tyranny, can now at last be attempted, on the sole condition that we banish
all religions from the discourse. And all this and more is, for the first time
in our history, within the reach if not the grasp of everyone.439

Part II: Criticisms and Rebuttals
In his article, “Christopher Hitchens’ Lies do Atheism no Favors,” Curtis White
claims:
one enormous problem with Hitchens’s book is that it reduces religion to a
series of criminal anecdotes. In the process, however, virtually all of the
real history of religious thought, as well as historical and textual
scholarship, is simply ignored as if it never existed. Not for Hitchens the
rich cross-cultural fertilization of the Levant by Hellenistic, Jewish, and
Manichaean thought. Not for Hitchens the transformation of a Jewish
heretic into a religion that Nietzsche called “Platonism for the masses.”
Not for Hitchens the fascinating theological fissures in the New Testament
between Jewish, Gnostic, and Pauline doctrines. Not for Hitchens the
remarkable journey of the first Christian heresy, Arianism, spiritual origin
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of our own thoroughly liberal Unitarianism. (Newton was an Arian and
anti-Trinitarian, which made his presence at Trinity College permanently
awkward.) Not for Hitchens the sublime transformation of Christian
thought into the cathartic spirituality of German Idealism/ Romanticism
and American Transcendentalism. And, strangely, not for Hitchens the
existential Christianity of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Karl Jaspers, Paul
Tillich, Martin Buber, and, most recently, the religious turn of
poststructural thought in Jacques Derrida and Slavoj Žižek. (All of these
philosophers sought what Žižek calls Christianity’s “perverse core.”)440
Echoing this reproach, Douglas Groothuis, in his review of god is Not Great,
notes:
Hitchens gives no concessions to religion in this book. He instead
prosecutes a scorched earth (or heaven) policy on every page. Amid his
chronicling of various religious people who supported or who failed to
oppose Nazism, for example, Hitchens injects but one sentence about
Protestant pastor and theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s opposition to Hitler
(p. 241). Hitchens says nothing of The Barmen Declaration (1934), a
document written principally by German theologian Karl Barth, which
unequivocally opposed Nazism for theological reasons. Neither does
Hitchens mention the heroism of the Protestant Le Chambon-sur-Lignon
village community in France, which bravely sheltered six thousand Jews
to protect them from the Nazis. This is typical of his approach: expose
religious vices, and ignore or redefine religious virtues.441
Although a common criticism of the New Atheists generally, one could easily refute
White’s and Groothuis’ charge of anecdotalism in one of two ways. First, one might
simply claim that their counterexamples, selectively chosen as they are, represent a
similar effort to tip the scales of argument in their favor, all the while ignoring the
numerous historical skeletons in their own ideological closet(s). But finding that critique
inadequate, mean-spirited, and/or equally self-serving, one could just as easily reply that
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the real problem with Hitchens’ treatise is that it judges religion, first and foremost, by
the contents of its own holy books.
And though White and Groothuis seemingly object to such a practice, I would
presume it to be an obvious and innocuous statement that any religious community
(irrespective of its professed liberality or lack thereof) that has managed to abandon,
evolve, or otherwise obscure its foundational texts and teachings is no longer part of that
tradition upon which it is supposedly based. (As Hitchens might say, chemistry is not
reformed alchemy; astronomy is not liberal astrology, etc.) For instance, even though
many of Aristotle’s views were, to some degree, a product of his exposure to the
teachings of Plato, his subsequent founding of the Peripatetic School was rightly never
considered to be in any way, shape, or form (pun intended) Platonic, but rather a
philosophical horse of an altogether different color. I would argue that the same
classification system applies to Unitarians, Religious Poststructuralists, and other quasireligionists whose piecemeal adoption and revisionist understanding of scripture belies
their inherent, underlying irreligiosity.
Nevertheless, White continues:
a large part of his book is devoted to denouncing the stupidity of religious
metaphysics, especially the idea that God is an entity outside of the
ordinary workings of nature. But Hitchens has his own metaphysical
claims, claims for which he seems not to feel any need to create
arguments. In opposition to religion he proposes Enlightenment reason.
What is “reason” for Hitchens? Your guess is as good as mine. Is it the
rules of logic? Is it the scientific method? Is it Thomas Paine’s common
sense? Some combination of the above? Hitchens seems to feel that, of
course, everyone already knows what reason is and there is no need to
elaborate its function or its virtues. But this “of course” is the marker of
ideology, and the ideologist resists examining his own assumptions
because to do so would be to make vulnerable his claims to authority. So
eager is Hitchens to get on to the next item in his concatenation of
religious insults to reason that he can’t be bothered to say what he means

227

by the term. The one thing that he does seem to be sure of is that reason is
something that shouldn’t be “outraged.” Nevertheless, there is no real
difference between Hitchens’s outrage to reason and an evangelical’s
outrage to God.442
No real difference? Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines reason as “the power of the
mind to think and understand in a logical way.”443 God, however, is defined as “the
perfect and all-powerful spirit or being that is worshipped especially by Christians, Jews,
and Muslims as the one who created and rules the universe.”444 Of these two, I would
suggest that the latter requires much more contextualization and explication than the
former.
White’s logic is even more circular when concerning the nature and existence of
“conscienceness” (not to be confused with consciousness). He writes:
Isn’t Hitchens’s own book testimony against his superficial claim that
there is something called conscience? He claims that religion is “poison,”
but is he suggesting that religion made men cruel in spite of themselves?
All of them? Millions upon millions of people over thousands of years
zealously and destructively defending the faith… in spite of their own
innate sense of good and evil? Isn’t it more likely that killing the heathens
and the heretics and the free thinkers was always something that could be
done in perfectly good conscience insofar as it was done for Yahweh,
Allah, or Mother Church? If it weren’t for the Predators circling overhead,
I think the Taliban would sleep quite soundly, never mind that they’ll get
up the next day and cut off someone’s ear for listening to an iPod.445
I must confess to being somewhat bewildered by these self-contradicting statements.
First, it appears that White is arguing that conscience is an illusion, and Hitchens’ book is
evidence of that. Then, he seems to argue that religion can bend conscience to its will,
claiming that “killing the heathens and the heretics and the free thinkers was always
442
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something that could be done in perfectly good conscience insofar as it was done for
Yahweh, Allah, or Mother Church.” Thus, it appears that either conscience doesn’t
actually exist, or if it does, it can be molded to shape even the most callous and inhumane
of actions. How would either of these realities reasonably be considered a refutation of
Hichens’ argument or, for that matter, a defense of White’s?
Seemingly ignorant of the ideological corner he has painted himself into, White
furiously flails his way to a conclusion.
And what of Hitchens himself?... Is he not himself an example of how
conscience is about what suits one’s purposes? Personal ethics tend to
reflect cultural ethics, and cultural ethics usually follow tribal interests.
For Hitchens, too, has a tribe: the “reasonable,” the clean, the well-spoken,
the “right sort,” the Oxford men, the ones who know and revel in their
difference from the ignorant, the slaves, the Baptist rubes, the ones who
don’t go to Cambridge and don’t eat good lunches. Hitchens was of the
oligarchs and shared their most intense privilege: the right not to have to
take seriously their own lies and misdeeds.446
In other words, having failed to demonstrate Hitchens’ sophistry, White must be content
to argue that, at the end of the day, Hitchens is (at least) as immoral, self-centered, and
tribalistic as the rest of us; no worse perhaps, but, as far as White is concerned, certainly
no better. The only difference, it would seem, is that Hitchens is an intellectual elitist who
privileges knowledge above its lack.

Mary Riddell, in her article “The Gospel according to Hitch,” actually argues that
on the evidence of this book, Hitchens has spent too much time around
religion, not too little. Like an ex-smoker who grows to loathe the habit
more than those who have not tasted nicotine, he abominates God with the
zealotry implicit in dictatorial faith. Anyone who has grown up in the
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shadow of hellfire evangelism will recognise some answering echo here.
This is a papal bull for the non-believer.447
That is to say that, despite White’s claims, Hitchens’ problem is actually not a lack of
familiarity with religion, but rather a superfluous overfamiliarity. He simply knows too
much. One presumes, then, that Riddell believes had Hitchens been either less fluent in
the language of faith or less informed of the history that accompanies it, he could have
written a better book. (I wonder if Riddell would say the same of recuperated drug
addicts who decide to become substance abuse counselors? Should their knowledge
likewise be considered a hindrance rather than a help? Should they, too, defer to those
who know and have experienced less on the subject of addiction and recovery?)
And though Riddell ultimately concurs with most of Hitchens’ points about the
dangers of religion, she still feels the need to remind us, in her conclusion, that
secular society has still not devised rites of passage to welcome people in
to the world and usher them out of it. Like Hitchens, people still get their
marriages honoured and their children baptised in the name of a hollow
God. Science and reason have all the answers, but the spiritual solace they
lack is also missing in an encyclical whose many qualities include no
shred of tolerance or doubt. Hitchens’s book will be manna to the
converted, but his explicit aim is to win believers to his cause. I doubt that
he will reclaim a single soul.448
In essence, she is arguing that, while Hitchens is right to disbelieve in the spiritual safety
net that religion claims to provide, it is inexcusably rude to pull the rug out from under
believers until science can satisfactorily cushion their fall. However, I would contend that
such was never his intention nor ultimately his responsibility. Like Socrates’ allegorical
philosopher discovered long ago in the cave, truth can free the mind and unshackle the
feet, but the impetus for one’s journey outward must invariably come from within, and
447

Mary Riddell, “The Gospel According to Hitch,” The Guardian, 3 June 2007, accessed 29
August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/jun/03/society.
448
Ibid.

230

even so, the transcendent light of day will still prove dazzling and disorienting until one’s
eyes adjust to the new reality. That is the price of enlightenment.

Speaking of Socrates, in his article, “In God, Distrust,” Michael Kinsley writes
that
Hitchens is an old-fashioned village atheist, standing in the square trying
to pick arguments with the good citizens on their way to church. The book
is full of logical flourishes and conundrums, many of them entertaining to
the nonbeliever. How could Christ have died for our sins, when
supposedly he also did not die at all? Did the Jews not know that murder
and adultery were wrong before they received the Ten Commandments,
and if they did know, why was this such a wonderful gift? On a more
somber note, how can the “argument from design” (that only some kind of
“intelligence” could have designed anything as perfect as a human being)
be reconciled with the religious practice of female genital mutilation,
which posits that women, at least, as nature creates them, are not so
perfect after all? Whether sallies like these give pause to the believer is a
question I can’t answer.449
But despite his misgivings about tenor and tone, Kinsley ultimately concurs with Riddell:
Hitchens has outfoxed the Hitchens watchers by writing a serious and
deeply felt book, totally consistent with his beliefs of a lifetime. And God
should be flattered: unlike most of those clamoring for his attention,
Hitchens treats him like an adult.450
In his review of Hitchens’ book, Mark Roberts states that
the obvious fact that god is not Great contains many apparent facts,
therefore, gives us an advantage in trying to evaluate its overall
truthfulness. If Hitchens tends to get his facts right, then we would do well
to pay close attention to his claims, even those that are not factual per se.
He will have shown himself to be a reliable witness and a careful thinker.
If, on the contrary, he gets many of his facts wrong, then we would rightly
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be inclined to doubt what he writes about many things and chalk it up to
sloppy thinking.451
In service of this end, Roberts announces that he has “found fifteen errors in Hitchens’s
treatment of the New Testament, as well as sixteen misunderstandings or distortions.
Some of the clear errors are not major in terms of content, but they reveal a kind of
sloppiness that is unsettling.”452 So let us examine some of these so-called errors and see
if they, in any way, discredit Hitchens’ overarching claims.
First, Roberts notes that, “nobody, to my knowledge, dates the birth of Jesus to
AD 4. Every scholar puts his birth earlier than 4 BC (the date of King Herod’s death).
The most likely date for Jesus’s birth seems to be around 6 BC. My guess is Hitchens
remembered the ‘4’ correctly but not the era. A minor mistake, but an unsettling one.”453
Perhaps, but when one examines the context within which Hitchens made this “minor
mistake,” one is forced to conclude that the thrust of his argument (that Christian
predictions for Armageddon in the year 2000 were completely unfounded) remains
undiminished.
As to Roberts’ explicit preference for the year 6 BC, I would respond in two
ways. First, his argument for that particular date is clearly an effort to make
chrono/logical sense of Luke’s account:
In those days Caesar Augustus issued a decree that a census should be
taken of the entire Roman world. (This was the first census that took place
while Quirinius was governor of Syria.) And everyone went to their own
town to register. So Joseph also went up from the town of Nazareth in
Galilee to Judea, to Bethlehem the town of David, because he belonged to
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the house and line of David. He went there to register with Mary, who was
pledged to be married to him and was expecting a child.454
As Roberts writes:
In the Annals of the Roman historian Tacitus there is a reference to a
document produced under Augustus that contained a description of “the
number of citizens and allies under arms, of the fleets, of subject
kingdoms, provinces, taxes” and so on,” in other words, a census.… But
we don’t even need to go to a Roman historian to find evidence for the
censuses of Augustus. In “The Deeds of the Divine Augustus” written by
Augustus himself and published throughout the empire in 14 AD, we read
of three censuses conducted under Augustus’s authority (in 28 BC, 8 BC,
and 14 AD; see Acts of Augustus, section 8). If Augustus decreed a census
in 8 BC, as he claims, it’s quite possible that this was the census described
in Luke 2, which was not finished in Judea until a year or two later.455
Unfortunately, Quirinius didn’t become governor of Syria until 6 AD,456 and so it seems
that Luke is just as error prone as Hitchens, and that, “we would rightly be inclined to
doubt what he writes about many things and chalk it up to sloppy thinking.” Somehow I
doubt Roberts would concur.
Another example Roberts feels compelled to mention is that “Hitchens twice
refers to the scholar Bart D. Ehrman as ‘Barton Ehrman’ (p. 120, 142). To my
knowledge, ‘Bart’ is Mr. Ehrman’s full first name. So, unless he has a nickname
unknown to me, it’s an error to call the man ‘Barton.’”457 Perhaps Roberts is right, but
again, I would ask how does this in any way refute Hitchens’ arguments concerning
Ehrman’s scholarship. What’s worse, his summary suggestion that one read Timothy
Paul Jones’ Misquoting Truth: A Guide to the Fallacies of Bart Ehrman’s Misquoting
Jesus is an academic passing of the buck (and burden) of the first order.
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As for the validity of the Old Testament, Carlo Delora notes in his article, “‘God
is not great’: Christopher Hitchens is not a liar,”:
“The reality is that there is no evidence whatsoever that the Jews were
ever enslaved in Egypt. Yes, there’s the story contained within the bible
itself, but that’s not a remotely historically admissible source. I’m talking
about real proof; archeological evidence, state records and primary
sources. Of these, nothing exists.” (Emphasis mine)
That’s not some “new-atheist,” irreligious source. That’s from Haaretz,
Israel’s oldest daily newspaper, supporting a well-established historical
consensus that there was no mass Jewish flight from Egypt, nor
widespread Jewish indentured servitude. Most shocking, however, is the
fact that James Hoffmeier – the expert quoted by both White and Hamblin
– is the former chair of Illinois’ Wheaton College of Biblical, Theological,
Religious and Archaeological Studies. A school that recommends
archaeology as “an indispensable tool for interpreting the Bible because it
provides cultural, historical, social, religious, and linguistic information
that sheds light on the context of biblical passages.” This is not an issue
with two secular sides, one conveniently ignored by Hitchens to further his
fundamentalist form of atheism.458
But now for an example of what Roberts considers to be a more substantial
mistake. He observes that
Hitchens writes that the “multiple authors” of the Gospels “cannot agree
on anything of importance.” This is plainly wrong, unless, I suppose, we
allow Hitchens to fill in the blanks of what counts as important. He might
say that nothing of importance at all is addressed in the Gospels. (Later he
will say that “Thanks to the telescope and the microscope, [religion] no
longer offers an explanation of anything important.” [282]). Be that as it
may, his point on page 111 is that the Gospels are full of disagreement,
especially about the things that matter about Jesus, as the context makes
clear. This is simply not true. Though it is true that the New Testament
Gospels show considerable diversity in their portraits of Jesus, they agree
on many, many things, including matters that are most important both to
the Gospel writers and to Christian believers.… The Gospel writers share
a common view of reality, one that includes a personal, creator God who
has been active in human affairs, especially those of Israel, and so forth
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and so on. Someone from a culture not influenced by Judeo-Christianity
would undoubtedly see commonalities that I take for granted.459
One could grant Roberts’ assertions, were it not for the fact that the various gospels are
not simply internally inconsistent, but rather that they downright contradict one another
in numerous ways. For instance, every a brief comparison between the so-called synoptic
gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) and the Gospel of John will demonstrate that they
disagree on many substantial issues. These include: articulation of the virgin birth, the
evidence/need of Jesus’ baptism, the nature of the miracles he supposedly performed, the
means of attaining the salvation to which he alludes, the length of Jesus’ ministry, the
date of the last supper, and the location of Jesus’ first post-resurrection appearance to his
disciples, to name but a few.460 Despite centuries of attempts to harmonize the gospels,
these discrepancies would seem, at the very least, to support Hitchens’ skepticism of their
historical accuracy and thus of their collective (or respective) claims to inerrancy.
Nevertheless, Roberts asserts:
Virtually every scholar I’ve read, including the most skeptical, would
agree that the Gospels are “in some sense literal truth.” The proof is that
virtually every scholar who says anything about Jesus of Nazareth bases
his or her history on the “facts” of the Gospels. So when a scholar states
that Jesus was crucified under the authority of Pontius Pilate, this scholar
takes at least that part of the Gospel account as literal truth. It’s hard to
know what Hitchens means by saying that the Gospels, “on their own
evidence . . . are most certainly not literal truth.” But whatever he means,
this cannot be sustained by a close reading of the Gospels. Now, let me
add, that very few scholars, including conservative Christians, would
argue that the Gospels are merely literal truth. They believe there is
something more in the text. They are literal truth shaped in light of
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theological conviction. This isn’t a new idea. The Gospel writers say this
very thing (see Luke 1:1-4, for example).461
“Literal truth shaped in the light of theological conviction.” Indeed. And as Luke 1:1-4
states:
Many have undertaken to draw up an account of the things that have been
fulfilled among us, just as they were handed down to us by those who
from the first were eyewitnesses and servants of the word. With this in
mind, since I myself have carefully investigated everything from the
beginning, I too decided to write an orderly account for you, most
excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the certainty of the things you
have been taught.462
In this light (of theological conviction), Hitchens’ claim that the discrepancy within the
gospels demonstrates “that many of the ‘sayings’ and teachings of Jesus are hearsay upon
hearsay upon hearsay, which helps explain their garbled and contradictory nature,” seems
ever more reasonable.463 It would appear that even Roberts must eventually (albeit
unconsciously) concede this point. He admits:
The Gospel writers don’t disagree at all about the Sermon on the Mount
because that “sermon” only appears in the Gospel of Matthew. Luke has a
similar “sermon,” sometimes called “The Sermon on the Plain” but it’s not
the same discourse. Furthermore, if you look closely at the different
Gospel accounts of the anointing of Jesus, the treachery of Judas, and
Peter’s denial, you will see some differences. The story of Peter’s denial,
for example, is found in Matthew 26:69-75, Mark 14:66-72, and Luke
22:54-62. The three accounts are very similar, both in English and in the
original Greek. The major difference has to do with whether the rooster
crowed once or twice. But this could hardly be an example of the Gospel
writers disagreeing wildly.464
Perhaps not, but at the very least, these discrepancies would seem to suggest that same
sort of “sloppy thinking” that Roberts warned us of previously.
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Once exhausted of these so-called mistakes and distortions, Roberts is reduced to
making more semantic arguments against Hitchens. Witness the following example:
The claim that some of Jesus’s teachings are “flat-out immoral” deserves
careful scrutiny. Who would you choose to be a judge of what is moral?
Jesus? Or Christopher Hitchens? Now before you vote for Hitchens,
please note that his example of the immorality of Jesus’s teachings is
based on a serious misinterpretation of Jesus’s meaning. From a passage
where Jesus is teaching people not to worry, Hitchens thinks that Jesus is
somehow against “thrift, innovation, family life, and so forth.” His textual
proof is “Take no thought for the morrow,” which appears in Matthew
6:34 in the King James Version of the Bible. In fact, the verb translated
four centuries ago as “take no thought” means “do not worry” (Greek,
merimnao), as is seen in every modern translation I consulted. If Hitchens
had made an effort to understand what Jesus was actually saying, then
he’d be relieved to know that Jesus doesn’t oppose sensible preparation,
just anxious preoccuption [sic].465
Presuming Roberts means to distinguish between preparation and preoccupation, one can
certainly forgive his spelling error. But even so, his distinction seems to be more
superficial than substantial, and in many ways represents a simple difference in degree
rather than one in kind.
However, in other instances, Roberts is forced to abandon reason altogether and
instead to make arguments solely on the basis of faith. For instance, he writes:
one might argue that the frequency of resurrections in the New Testament
actually strengthens the case for their historicity, but for obvious reasons
Hitchens doesn’t go there. What he misunderstands is the unique nature of
Jesus’s resurrection. The other people raised from the dead were raised to
ordinary life. We have every reason to believe that, after their coming
back to life, they lived ordinary lives and died like everybody else. Jesus’s
resurrection was in a unique category as the beginning of resurrection to
life in the age to come. Jesus’s resurrection body was different from other
bodies, as is seen from the Gospel accounts and 1 Corinthians 15. None of
this proves that Jesus actually rose from the dead, of course, or that His
resurrection purchased forgiveness of sins (which, by the way, was more
about His death than resurrection). But it does show that Hitchens simply
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does not understand what the writers of the New Testament believed about
the resurrection of Jesus.466
In response to this, I would simply refer Roberts to an axiom sometimes referred to as
Hitchens’ razor: “That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without
evidence.”467 To that standard, I too shall hold.

Douglas Groothuis finds himself on similarly unsteady terrain in his argument
that
the best way to assess Hitchens’s jeremiad or lengthy grievance is to grant
him the idea of “god,” while defending the one true God of biblical
revelation. The Bible proclaims that there are many false gods. Christians
have no need to defend religion in general, since Christianity by its very
nature claims to be the exclusive and final revelation of God to humanity
(see John 14:1‑6; Acts 4:12; and Gal. 1:6‑11). Christians, consequently,
can accept many of Hitchens’s attacks on religion as criticisms of false
gods without thereby engaging in special pleading for their own view.
Some of Hitchens’s attacks on the core beliefs of non-Christian religions
are cogent; his attacks on Christianity, however, are far less convincing.…
Hitchens’s treatment of Mormonism (161–168) exposes its corrupt
origination, bizarre claims, and unsavory history. This exposé, however,
does not argue for atheism per se; a Christian (or a Jew) could read it and
grant much of its force, since the gods of Mormonism are false gods.468
In other words, Hitchens is right, god is not great; God, however, is. I would say that
Hitchens’ razor applies just as equally and forcefully to this argument as it did to
Roberts’.
When he attempts to refute Hitchens’ appeals to science, and particularly
evolution, as illustrative of our condition, Groothuis ventures even farther from the shores
of reason. He writes:
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Hitchens ridicules the argument from design more than he rationally
challenges it. He uses the standard argument that nature manifests too
many defects to be designed. (He claims, e.g., that the human eye is
inefficiently designed and ineptly fashioned, although the stock argument
for this is false.) In so doing, Hitchens never thoughtfully interacts with
the design inference advanced by the Intelligent Design (ID) movement.
In a nutshell, William Dembski argues that if something in nature cannot
be accounted for on the basis of chance and/or natural law, then the best
explanation for its basic structure is design – that is, intelligent causation.
For example, the complex and specified informational patterns in DNA
cannot be the result of natural laws because they are too complicated; nor
can their specificity be explained by chance combinations because these
are too improbable. The best explanation for this genetic language,
therefore, is a designer. ID theorists grant that a design inference is not
sufficient to prove all of the important attributes of God, but their
arguments spell trouble for naturalism, which attempts to account for
everything in nature on the basis of impersonal chance and necessity.469
However, as Dawkins and Dennett have demonstrated, there is nothing random about
natural selection, and so this argument represents a fatal flaw not in Hitchens’, but in
Groothuis’ (and presumably Dembski’s) understanding of evolutionary theory.470 Given
his previous statements concerning Hitchens’ “mistaking” of god for God, I suppose we
should not be surprised.

In her article, “God-bothering,” Amy Bragg argues that
in [Hitchens’] view, all religious faith in all manifestations and at all levels
of intensity is the product of either ignorance or stupidity. Now that our
scientific knowledge has finally caught up with our psychological needs,
his argument runs, we have no need of what he refers to as “the myths of
the tribe and the cave and the blood sacrifice.” Quite apart from the fact
that well over half the humans on Earth have little or no awareness of this
scientific knowledge (and quite apart from the fact that what constitutes
scientific knowledge is a Hell of a lot more fluid than he seems to want to
believe), Hitchens allows no middle ground, no crevice where the heart
469
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can creep through. For a book about how religion poisons everything, god
[sic] is Not Great has virtually nothing to say about faith.471
I think Hitchens would find very little to disagree with in Bragg’s statement. However, I
do not see how widespread scientific ignorance, or that fact that science itself is far more
open to challenge and change (when merited by evidence), are criticisms. Even if
religion’s claim to prominence is that it holds open a “crevice where the heart can creep
through,” that hardly speaks to its truth or its inherent irreplaceability as counselor or
consoler.
Nevertheless, Bragg argues that
pronouncements like the following [from Hitchens] begin to sound shrill
and dense:
There would be no such churches in the first place if humanity had
not been afraid of the weather, the dark, the plague, the eclipse,
and all manner of other things now easily explained.
It’s hardly an overstatement to say a man who maintains that Salisbury
Cathedral, that the Parthenon, that Notre Dame itself was built because
men were afraid of the dark has (as the late Frank Herbert would say) left
the path of reason.472
Perhaps, but why were they built? The answers to such questions, though undoubtedly
edifying to both Hitchens’ and Bragg’s point(s), are far more likely to lend support for
the former and scorn for the latter. Fear of the dark may indeed be too simplistic a charge,
but (to stay solely within the D’s) fear of damnation, death, or disavowal/disownment by
the deity might just as easily (and logically) be substituted. Either way, the heart of
Hitchens’ critique remains undamaged by the assault.

471

Amy Bragg, “God-bothering,” OpenLettersMonthly.com, 1 June 2007, accessed 30 August
2016, http://www.openlettersmonthly.com/god-bothering/.
472
Ibid.

240

Bragg’s defense of intelligent design, in the face of Hitchens’ critique, is even
more inadequate.
Take this passage, for example [from Hitchens]:
When it comes to the whirling, howling wilderness of outer space,
with its red giants and white dwarfs and black holes, its titanic
explosions and extinctions, we can only dimly and shiveringly
conclude that the “design” hasn’t been imposed quite yet, and
wonder if this is how the dinosaurs “felt” when the meteors came
smashing through the earth’s atmosphere and put an end to the
pointless bellowing rivalry across primeval swamps.
The reason this is disturbing, as is readily apparent after even a middlingclose read, is that for all its vocabulary and syntactical fluidity, it is, in
fact, gibberish. Pull at any part of any one sentence, and the whole thing
comes apart like a ball of yarn. For an entire book, Hitchens has been
saying scientific knowledge will set mankind free from all its ancient
blood-cults, but here that very scientific knowledge (red giants and white
dwarfs and all the other Lucasfilm special effects) is what leaves mankind
dim and shivering? And is he somehow implying that believers in socalled “intelligent design” maintain that God is not the creator of
wilderness too? And what in blazes is that dinosaur stuff? Aside from that
quaint mention of “primeval swamps,” is Hitchens trying to say an
awareness of the immensity of space should make us humble? If so, why
does he sound throughout so arrogant about such scientific awareness,
boasting that even his children are better than Moses because of it? And if
not, is he instead trying to say that heedlessness in the face of such
immense knowledge has doomed us, like the dinosaurs? And if so, why
use dinosaurs as the example, since, lacking telescopes, they had no choice
but to be heedless? It’s like Hitchens was smart enough to stick those
distancing quotes over ‘felt’ but lazy enough not to pick a metaphor that
isn’t nonsense.473
Bragg’s discomfort and derision aside, Hitchens’ point was simply that the design
argument only makes sense when viewed from a very narrow perspective of human
historical space and time (such as the typical creationist account of six or so thousand
years). When viewed, however, through the immensities of cosmological or even
geological time, our own species’ significance within the overarching story is undeniably
473
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diminished. By even the most conservative archeological evidence, dinosaurs roamed the
earth for at least 165 million years. Humans, by contrast, came onto the scene only some
200,000 (or 6,000, if you like) years ago. Thus, to presume or suggest that earthly
creation was undertaken with our species specifically in mind is to ignore the evidence
and, in so doing, to shoulder an arrogance at which even Hitchens would shudder.
But perhaps Bragg’s conclusion provides insight into the impossible bar she
would set for Hitchens in his task. Referring to the same sort of “arrogance” to which she
alluded above, Bragg writes:
It’s evident everywhere in this sour, foul-tempered book: a Hitchens who
infuriates is customary; a Hitchens who provokes thought is what gained
him our attention in the first place; a Hitchens who is careless with his
words is a new thing, dire and troubling.
Although to be fair to him, no amount of eloquence could have saved a
work so brittle, one that is so willing to dismiss any faith that isn’t laced
with hate, one that has only one tarring brush for the uncountable billions
of faithful who’ve walked this planet since Neanderthals first held
elaborate funeral rites for their dead. Such faith – even in the face of all
the evils it’s done (even in the face of all it’s legitimately poisoned),
deserves better than these stones cast by he who is most certainly not
without sin. god [sic] is Not Great does nothing to further any kind of
inquiry into religion’s ills – it just adds one more voice to the worldwide
chorus of intolerance it spends its length denouncing.474
In other words, for Bragg, it appears that any attack on faith is doomed to fail – despite
the historical, scriptural, and/or experiential support one could muster in its cause –
unless it is accompanied by some sort of pseudo-apologist rhetoric to explain or excuse
the unfortunate truths of its past, present, and (one fears) future.

In his review of Hitchens’ book, Ross Douthat argues:
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I’m unpersuaded that the Catholic Church’s stance on birth control has
been a major factor in the spread of AIDS around the world, though again
I’m merely relying on statistics – African infection rates, for instance, are
highest in heavily Protestant countries; most studies suggest that serious
religious practice correlates with lower rates of risky sexual behavior,
even among people already infected with HIV – while Hitchens has the
irrefutable power of anecdote on his side, specifically a few dumb
statements about condoms from Third World churchmen.475
It appears that Douthat is unaware that both Pope John Paul II and his successor,
Pope Benedict XVI, made numerous pronouncements against the use of artificial
contraception during their papacies. For instance, these are Pope Benedict’s comments
from a March 2009 interview: “I would say that this problem of AIDS cannot be
overcome merely with money, necessary though it is. If there is no human dimension, if
Africans do not help [by responsible behaviour], the problem cannot be overcome by the
distribution of prophylactics: on the contrary, they increase it.”476 Similarly, the Pontifical
Council for the Family stated in its 1995 publication, “The Truth and Meaning of Human
Sexuality,” that
abuse occurs whenever sex education is given to children by teaching
them all the intimate details of genital relationships, even in a graphic
way. Today this is often motivated by wanting to provide education for
“safe sex”“, above all in relation to the spread of AIDS. In this situation,
parents must also reject the promotion of so-called “safe sex” or “safer
sex”, a dangerous and immoral policy based on the deluded theory that the
condom can provide adequate protection against AIDS. Parents must insist
on continence outside marriage and fidelity in marriage as the only true
and secure education for the prevention of this contagious disease.477
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I will certainly agree that claims such as these are indeed “dumb statements,” but as their
sources demonstrate, they are hardly confined to the utterances of a few “Third World
churchmen.”
However, Douthat goes on to argue that
I’m also unconvinced that male circumcision is quite the species of
totalitarianism that God Is Not Great makes it out to be, though I am
perhaps suffering from what Hitchens, in his Marxist phase, would have
described as “false consciousness.” Nor do I believe that the doctrine of
hell has wrecked quite so many millions of childhoods as he claims
(though he does have citations from James Joyce and Mary McCarthy on
his side); or that religion has likewise ruined the act of coitus (a difficult
thing to do, one might hazard) for untold numbers of believers; or that the
difference between the Spanish Inquisition and the U.S. military
chaplaincy is a matter of degree and not of kind. Although Hitchens may
be entirely correct that an atheist need “never again confront the
impressive faith of an Aquinas or a Maimonides,” because faith of “the
sort that can stand up at least for a while in a confrontation with reason”
no longer exists, I wish he had risked the confrontation.478
While I assume the arguments about the psychological damage inflicted on children by
religion’s incessant admonitions of impending and eternal damnation for all unrepentant
sinners, as well as those concerning the unwarranted restrictions and denouncements of
various forms of sexual congress (particularly those between members of the LGBTQ
community), need little defense beyond that which commonsense can provide, Douthat’s
arguments concerning male circumcision do merit a brief digression/retort.
According to a 2007 joint report by the World Health Organization and UNAIDS:
Male circumcision is medically indicated for only a few conditions. There
is substantial evidence that circumcised men have a lower risk of some
reproductive tract infections, as well as penile cancer, but some of these
conditions are rare while others are uncommon or treatable, and routine
neonatal circumcision is not currently recommended on medical grounds.
The safety of male circumcision depends crucially on the setting,
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equipment and expertise of the provider. Neonatal circumcision is a
simpler procedure than adult circumcision, and has very low rates of
adverse events. Adolescent or adult circumcision in clinical settings can
cause bleeding, haematoma or sepsis, but with no long-term sequelae
when undertaken in a clinical setting by experienced, well-trained
providers. In contrast, circumcisions undertaken in unhygienic conditions,
by inexperienced providers with inadequate instruments, or with poor
after-care, can result in serious complications and even death.479
The report concludes:
There is already some evidence of increased demand for male
circumcision in southern Africa, and this is likely to increase further now
that results from the Kenyan and Ugandan trials have confirmed those of
the South African trial. Major concerns about increased uptake of male
circumcision services are safety, acceptability and risk compensation.
Recent studies of acceptability among non-circumcising communities with
high incidence of HIV in southern Africa were fairly consistent in finding
that a majority of men would be willing to be circumcised if it were done
safely and at minimal cost. In addition, the large numbers of men recruited
into the trials in noncircumcising communities in South Africa, Uganda
and Kenya, and the increased demand for male circumcision in Swaziland
and Zambia, suggest that uptake of circumcision could be rapid if there
was confidence in provision of safe and affordable surgery. To date, there
is modest evidence of risk compensation following adult male
circumcision, and care must be taken to embed any male circumcision
provision within existing HIV prevention packages that include intensive
counselling on safer sex, particularly regarding reduction in number of
concurrent sexual partners and correct and consistent use of male and
female condoms. Further data, both from the recently completed trials and
from observational studies of men pre- and post- elective circumcision, are
needed.480
However, even the more recent studies conducted by the WHO, while demonstrating a
correlation between (male) circumcision and lower rates of HIV/AIDS, ultimately
caution that
male circumcision provides only partial protection, and therefore should
be only one element of a comprehensive HIV prevention package which
includes: the provision of HIV testing and counseling services; treatment
479

“Male circumcision: Global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety and acceptability,”
World Health Organization and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2007, accessed 30 August
2016, http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/jc1360_male_circumcision_en_0.pdf.
480
Ibid.

245

for sexually transmitted infections; the promotion of safer sex practices;
the provision of male and female condoms and promotion of their correct
and consistent use.481
In other words, when coupled with religious prohibitions against the usage of
prophylactics, the practice of male circumcision is unlikely to provide much relief in
stamping out the African AIDS crisis. Thus, at best, Douthat’s claims are fragmentary
and misleading. At worst, they represent a callous and deliberate resignation to the status
quo suffering of millions.
Therefore, we can be similarly dismissive, or at the very least contextually
remonstrative, when Anthony Gottlieb and others like him smugly note that
after rightly railing against female genital mutilation in Africa, which is an
indigenous cultural practice with no very firm ties to any particular
religion, Hitchens lunges at male circumcision. He claims that it is a
medically dangerous procedure that has made countless lives miserable.
This will come as news to the Jewish community, where male
circumcision is universal, and where doctors, hypochondria, and
overprotective mothers are not exactly unknown. Jews, Muslims, and
others among the nearly one-third of the world’s male population who
have been circumcised may be reassured by the World Health
Organization’s recent announcement that it recommends male
circumcision as a means of preventing the spread of AIDS.482
Attempting to criticize Hitchens’ appeals to reason and science, Kabir Helminski,
in his article, “Christopher Hitchens is Not Great,” claims that
Hitchens’ verbal weaponry is formidable, and sometimes even
entertaining. Much of what he criticizes deserves criticism, but he
conflates the excesses and abuses of authoritarian religion with the whole
spiritual enterprise, because he is essentially clueless about the spiritual
dimension of human experience. He offers, instead, a picture of human
endeavor that amounts to enjoying your martini and not allowing yourself
481
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to be bored by the idiots trying to tell you what God does and doesn’t want
you to do. Never does he admit to anything noble, virtuous, or beautiful in
faith. Never does he exalt anything but the critical mind.483
To this, I would respond: yes and no. While it is true that Hitchens does exalt the critical
mind above all else, Darwin himself reminds us:
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the
higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life,
with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms
or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to
the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most
beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.484
As for Helminksi’s claim that such exaltation is to the exclusion of all else, I will allow
Hitchens to speak for himself and his fellow secularists.
We are not immune to the lure of wonder and mystery and awe: we have
music and art and literature, and find that the serious ethical dilemmas are
better handled by Shakespeare and Tolstoy and Schiller and Dostoyevsky
and George Eliot than in the mythical morality tales of the holy books.
Literature, not scripture, sustains the mind and – since there is no other
metaphor – also the soul.485
Reminiscent of Groothuis’ arguments concerning the distinction Hitchens
supposedly failed to make between god and God, Helminski goes on to claim that
the God of the mystic is not necessarily the God of sectarian religion. The
mystical conception of Divinity goes beyond the narrow sectarian
conceptions of God that rule in some religious circles. The Divine
Creative Power, from a mystical perspective, is that which has created
human nature in its own image, imbuing all human beings, not just
religious believers, with a capacity to act selflessly and generously, to
follow impulses other than one’s own self-interest, and that this tendency
is innate, or latent, in the human condition itself. Therefore, human virtue,
whether it is rationalized by religious belief or not, is essentially inspired
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by the Divine Compassion inherent in existence. Mercy and Compassion
are intrinsic to the universe and thus they are experienced in the interior
spiritual life of every human being unless they are obscured by some other
pathology or conditioning.486
Thus, in light of Darwin’s and Hitchens’ comments above, and despite his presumed
intention, I would argue that Helminski has inadvertently crafted a quite palatable
defense of deism, and in so doing, has effectively made Hitchens’ case against religion
for him. At best, it is redundant; at its worst, it is a pathological obscurant to that innate
humanity we all already share.

In his “Brief Response to Christopher Hitchens’ god is Not Great,” Neil Shenvi
writes:
Anthropology would affirm that there are many, many religions which
would not claim that God or the gods are necessarily good at all. For
instance, the ancient Greeks knew that the gods were not absolutely good,
that they were given to bouts of pettiness, were easily enraged, and
generally made humans miserable. Humans may wish for a kind, wise,
beneficent God who loves them. But to the ancient Greeks, the gods on
Olympus were very real and unfortunately not very nice. From the
perspective of biblical monotheism, the charge that God is not good is
indeed meaningful, since the Bible affirms everywhere that God is very,
very good. But as objections to the existence of some generic supernatural
Creator, Hitchens’ arguments are actually very poor.487
To respond, I would remind Dr. Shenvi of Bertrand Russell’s analogy, which has come to
be known as “Russell’s teapot.” In it, Russell states:
I ought to call myself an agnostic; but, for all practical purposes, I am an
atheist. I do not think the existence of the Christian God any more
probable than the existence of the Gods of Olympus or Valhalla. To take
another illustration: nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth
and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks
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this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice. I think the
Christian God just as unlikely.488
In other words, failure to disprove a particular hypothesis does not immediately grant that
its likelihood of proving true is a 50/50 proposition.
Nevertheless, where Jesus is concerned, Shenvi is forced to make an
uncomfortable admission:
Almost everyone recognizes, as do Dawkins and Harris, that Jesus was a
man of love, meekness and compassion who frequently violated social,
political, and economic norms to reach out to those who most needed
forgiveness and love. So far, so good. No one (in the West) objects to the
Jesus of love and meekness. Yet any honest study of the New Testament
shows that Jesus was not only a man of love and meekness, but also a man
of integrity, justice, and legitimately terrifying righteousness. He did not
preach a fuzzy message of self-acceptance. He taught that we ought to
pursue God with our whole heart, mind, soul, and strength (Mark 12:30).
He taught that we ought to fear sin more than we fear the amputation of a
limb or even physical death (Matthew 18:8-9). He taught that God would
one day judge the world and cast those who broke His law into hell for all
eternity (Matthew 25:31-46). This is not a message we like to hear. I don’t
like to hear it. But this is the Jesus we find in Scripture.489
In addition, while attempting to refute fundamentalist arguments for the inerrancy of
scripture, Shenvi inadvertently confirms them, for both the Old and New Testaments. He
writes:
I would certainly affirm that it is possible to be a Christian without
believing in the inerrancy of the Bible, since the earliest Christians did not
even possess the whole Bible and since the Bible affirms that Christianity
is a matter of our faith in Jesus. But when I become a follower of Christ, it
is almost impossible to avoid noticing his reverence for, trust in, and
saturation with the Old Testament. An examination of the life of Jesus
reveals that he believed the Hebrew Scriptures to be God’s inspired words
to humanity. He cited the Scriptures constantly, He referred to it in all his
teaching, and he even quoted it in the depths of his misery in the Garden
of Gethsemane and on the cross. Additionally, in numerous places within
the gospels, Jesus appoints his disciples to preach his message and to
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record his teaching. In the letters and accounts that make up the bulk of
the New Testament, Jesus’ closest followers carried out this commission,
explaining to new Christians the significance of Jesus’ life, death, and
Resurrection. So if we take Jesus seriously, then we will necessarily take
the Bible seriously.490
Shenvi’s response to Hitchens’ claims regarding the “maximum of servility” that
religion imposes upon mankind is even more telling. He writes of Hitchens that
it is this bowing and scraping, this lying in the dust, this prostrate attitude
towards God that he ultimately cannot bear. Now certainly, almost all
religions feature some element of humility and prostration before God
simply because of who He is. After all, if the personal God of theism
exists, then He created the Universe. He knit us together in our mother’s
womb and invented the laws of quantum electrodynamics. If we tremble to
meet a local celebrity, and gaze in awe at the night sky, it would be
implausible to the highest degree if real contact with God did not move us
to any kind of reverence.491
True, but to what “real contact” is Shenvi referring? I would also argue that words such
as reverence and awe have distinctly different connotations from tremulousness and
servility, and thus to hint at their interchangeableness in this, or any other, context is to
duplicitously skew the conversation.
But perhaps the most interesting section of Shenvi’s essay concerns his attempt(s)
to reconcile the doctrines of grace and original sin with the overarching notion of a
Heavenly Father who loves his children unconditionally. Shenvi writes:
Even our best deeds cannot make us acceptable to God. Sin has tainted our
every action and every thought. So we ought to come away from the
biblical doctrine of sin deeply humbled and broken of our selfrighteousness. Our wound is incurable and we have no strength in
ourselves to heal it.… [But] because I am forgiven on the basis of Jesus’
death and Resurrection, I can have assurance that I am completely
acceptable to God.… The gospel keeps me from the trap of hypocrisy and
self-righteousness because it tells me clearly and unflinchingly of my sin. I
can finally look squarely at God’s law and be honest about my own
failures. I seek to live a good life and to honor God not because I think I
490
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am earning his approval, but because He has already given me his
approval.492
Unfortunately for Shenvi, Hitchens, in his debate with former British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, produced the following retort:
Once you assume a creator and a plan, it makes us objects in a cruel
experiment, whereby we are created sick, and commanded to be well…
over us, to supervise this, is installed a celestial dictatorship, a kind of
divine North Korea. Greedy, exigent, greedy for uncritical praise from
dawn until dusk and swift to punish the original sins with which it so
tenderly gifted us in the very first place.493
In “A Response to Hitchens’ god is Not Great,” Father Raniero Cantalamessa
accuses Hitchens of cherry-picking his examples, and using semantics to sway his
audience and imply his point. He writes:
Tertullian becomes a “church father” so that his “credo quia absurdum” – I
believe because it is absurd – can be interpreted as the thought of
Christianity as a whole, whereas it is well known that when he wrote these
words (here interpreted outside of their proper context and in an inexact
way) the Church considered Tertullian a heretic.
Strange that the author should criticize Tertullian, because if there is one
apologist he resembles, like a reversed reflection in a mirror, it is precisely
the African: The same energetic style, the same will to triumph over his
adversary by burying him under a mass of apparently – but only
apparently – insuperable arguments: quantity replacing quality of
argument.494
Let us examine these claims. First, it is true that the quote is “here interpreted outside of
[its] proper context and in an inexact way.” A more accurate translation would be “it is
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by all means to be believed, because it is absurd.”495 As for the context: the quote is taken
from Tertullian’s “On the Flesh of Christ,” when the author was in the process of
denouncing the so-called Marcion heresy, which (among other things) argued against the
corporeal nature of Jesus. As Tertullian writes:
The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs
be ashamed of it. And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be
believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact
is certain, because it is impossible. But how will all this be true in Him, if
He was not Himself true – if He really had not in Himself that which
might be crucified, might die, might be buried, and might rise again? I
mean this flesh suffused with blood, built up with bones, interwoven with
nerves, entwined with veins, a flesh which knew how to be born, and how
to die, human without doubt, as born of a human being.496
What’s more, Marcionism additionally argued that the vengeful God of the Old
Testament was completely incompatible with the more benevolent New
Testament teachings of Jesus Christ. Thus in one sense, it actually seems fairer to
consider Hitchens more closely aligned with Marcion than with Tertullian, who
sought the former’s condemnation and excommunication tirelessly. And as to the
Tertullian impulse to condemn those with whom he disagrees, I can allow
Hitchens to speak for himself.
And here is the point, about myself and my co-thinkers. Our belief is not a
belief. Our principles are not a faith. We do not rely solely upon science
and reason, because these are necessary rather than sufficient factors, but
we distrust anything that contradicts science or outrages reason. We may
differ on many things, but what we respect is free inquiry, open
mindedness, and the pursuit of ideas for their own sake. We do not hold
our convictions dogmatically: the disagreement between Professor
Stephen Jay Gould and Professor Richard Dawkins, concerning
“punctuated evolution” and the unfilled gaps in post-Darwinian theory, is
495
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quite wide as well as quite deep, but we shall resolve it by evidence and
reasoning and not by mutual excommunication.497
And so although it would be slightly more accurate to compare Hitchens to Marcion than
to Tertullian, in the end, to compare him to either is to completely misrepresent his (and
their) true intentions.

In his article, “The Unbeliever,” Stephen Prothero writes:
Among religious leaders only the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. comes off
well. But in the gospel according to Hitchens whatever good King did
accrues to his humanism rather than his Christianity. In fact, King was not
actually a Christian at all, argues Hitchens, since he rejected the sadism
that characterizes the teachings of Jesus. “No supernatural force was
required to make the case against racism” in postwar America, writes
Hitchens. But he’s wrong. It was the prophetic faith of black believers that
gave them the strength to stand up to the indignities of fire hoses and
police dogs. As for those white liberals inspired by Paine, Mencken and
Hitchens’s other secular heroes, well, they stood down.498
Nathan Raab, however, in an article for Forbes magazine argued that “Excluding The
Bible, which he [King] quoted often, his literary references go back nearly four centuries
and cover at least four continents. Better than most, Dr. King peppered his addresses and
writings with powerful proverbs, quotations, and complex metaphors, some of which he
explained and others which would speak for themselves.”499 Of these, Raab refers
specifically to the writings and ideologies of ten individuals: Thomas Carlyle, William
Cullen Bryant, James Russell Lowell, John Donne, Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, Leo
Tolstoy, Washington Irving, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, and Ralph Waldo Emerson.
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As to King’s reliance upon scripture, I should once again allow Hitchens to mount
his own defense. (Among other things, one will notice that Hitchens spoke of King’s
departure from the “sadism” of the Old Testament, not from the teachings of Jesus, as
Prothero claimed. Of course, as Neil Shenvi has demonstrated, “an examination of the
life of Jesus reveals that he believed the Hebrew Scriptures to be God’s inspired words to
humanity. He cited the Scriptures constantly.… [consequently] if we take Jesus seriously,
then we will necessarily take the Bible seriously.”)500 Hitchens writes:
But the examples King gave from the books of Moses were, fortunately
for all of us, metaphors and allegories. His most imperative preaching was
that of nonviolence. In his version of the story, there are no savage
punishments and genocidal bloodlettings. Nor are there cruel
commandments about the stoning of children and the burning of witches.
His persecuted and despised people were not promised the territory of
others, nor were they incited to carry out the pillage and murder of other
tribes. In the face of endless provocation and brutality, King beseeched his
followers to become what they for a while truly became; the moral tutors
of America and of the world beyond its shores. He in effect forgave his
murderer in advance: the one detail that would have made his last public
words flawless and perfect would have been an actual declaration to that
effect. But the difference between him and the “prophets of Israel” could
not possibly have been more marked. If the population had been raised
from its mother’s knee to hear the story of Xenophon’s Anabasis, and the
long wearying dangerous journey of the Greeks to their triumphant view
of the sea, that allegory might have done just as well. As it was, though,
the “Good Book” was the only point of reference that everybody had in
common.501
And, as he subsequently stated in an interview with Jon Weiner:
The people who actually organized the March on Washington, Bayard
Rustin and A. Phillip Randolph, were both secularists and socialists. The
whole case for the emancipation of black America had already been made
perfectly well by secularists. I don’t particularly object to the tactic of
quoting the Bible against the white Christian institutions that maintained at
first slavery and then segregation. But there’s no authority in the Bible for
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civil rights – none whatever. There is authority for slavery and
segregation.502
But undaunted, Prothero continues:
Hitchens claims that some of his best friends are believers. If so, he
doesn’t know much about his best friends. He writes about religious
people the way northern racists used to talk about “Negroes” – with
feigned knowing and a sneer. God Is Not Great assumes a childish
definition of religion and then criticizes religious people for believing such
foolery. But it is Hitchens who is the naïf. To read this oddly innocent
book as gospel is to believe that ordinary Catholics are proud of the
Inquisition, that ordinary Hindus view masturbation as an offense against
Krishna, and that ordinary Jews cheer when a renegade Orthodox rebbe
sucks the blood off a freshly circumcised penis. It is to believe that faith is
always blind and rituals always empty – that there is no difference
between taking communion and drinking the Kool-Aid.503
Notice how, having failed to make his case, Prothero is reduced to relating Hitchens’
remarks to either inadvertent racism and/or indiscriminate ignorance. Of course, one need
look no further than the holy texts in question for a ready supply of support for such
inhumane/indefensible positions. But this fact notwithstanding, Prothero then claims that
Hitchens believes the religious are “proud” of their numerous offences over the centuries.
Not so; Hitchens is merely asking the faithful (moderate and fundamentalist alike) to
acknowledge that such atrocities were not the result of a misinterpretation of scripture,
but rather of a literal reading of its contents. And because they hold (in at least some
sense) to the same texts and teachings as their religious forebears, the modern-day
faithful must either admit their tacit approval of such historical misdeeds or else
announce their outright condemnation and apostasy. The problem is that, almost without
exception, they are willing to do neither.
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For his part, Preston Jones, in his article, “Christopher Hitchens Explains It All
for You,” resorts to more piecemeal assaults. For instance, he writes that
Hitchens notices that human beings have a need to worship, but he denies
that anything is to be worshipped. He criticizes the Bible for not standing
up to the rigors of contemporary forensics, but he knows that ancient
literature is fundamentally different from government reports. (It really is
absurd to critique Genesis for not mentioning plesiosaurs and
pterodactyls.) Hitchens hymns the praises of the knowledge gained from
the Human Genome Project, but he doesn’t mention what he surely knows
– that the project’s leader, Francis Collins, has made his Christian
commitment quite public.504
There are at least two problems with Jones’ statement, and I shall deal with the latter first.
Admittedly, Francis Collins was the head of the Human Genome Project, and he was and
is a Christian. However, his elevation to that position was based solely on his
professional and scientific credentials, not upon his evangelism. As Collins himself states
in an interview for PBS:
On the one hand, we have scientists who basically adopt evolution as their
faith, and think there’s no need for God to explain why life exists. On the
other hand, we have people who are believers who are so completely sold
on the literal interpretation of the first book of the Bible that they are
rejecting very compelling scientific data about the age of the earth and the
relatedness of living beings. It’s unnecessary. I think God gave us an
opportunity through the use of science to understand the natural world.
The idea that some are asking people to disbelieve our scientific data in
order to prove that they believe in God is so unnecessary.505
Despite the many issues Hitchens would undoubtedly take with such a statement, it
nevertheless demonstrates that, for Collins, science is sufficient to understand the natural
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world. Thus, one could logically argue that the Human Genome Project is sufficiently
sheltered from the narrow intentions and concerns of incompatibility that often come
from religious conviction. It is a strictly scientific enterprise.
As to Jones’ astonishment that Hitchens would admonish Old Testament authors
for their lack of archeological and geologic knowledge, Hitchens responds:
No dinosaurs or plesiosaurs or pterodactyls are specified, because the
authors did not know of their existence, let alone of their supposedly
special and immediate creation. Nor are any marsupials mentioned,
because Australia – the next candidate after Mesoamerica for a new
“Eden” – was not on any known map. Most important, in Genesis man is
not awarded dominion over germs and bacteria because the existence of
these necessary yet dangerous fellow creatures was not known or
understood.… This is forgivable on the part of the provincial yokels,
obviously, but then what of their supreme guide and wrathful tyrant?
Perhaps he was made in their image, even if not graven?... And [even] if it
had been known or understood, it would at once have become apparent
that these forms of life had ‘dominion’ over us, and would continue to
enjoy it uncontested until the priests had been elbowed aside and medical
research at last given an opportunity. Even today, the balance between
Homo sapiens and Louis Pasteur’s “invisible army” of microbes is by no
means decided, but DNA has at least enabled us to sequence the genome
of our lethal rivals, like the avian flu virus, and to elucidate what we have
in common.506
Still, Jones continues:
But here we come to the really relevant point about this book’s
irrelevance. The overwhelming majority of people who have lived and
who live now are “religious” in some way. Add to that the obvious fact
(pointed to so nicely in the early chapters of Genesis) that, given enough
time, human beings will screw up everything. “Religion” isn’t the
problem. This book could have just as easily been titled People Are
Stupid. Hitchens knows this, and he has the decency to acknowledge the
mind-bending atrocities committed by atheist governments such as existed
in Stalin’s Soviet Union and Pol Pot’s Cambodia. There’s a reason why
people need salvation.507
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Indeed. (Some) people are stupid and in need of salvation. Hitchens would only argue
that it is salvation from ignorance, not sin, that is most warranted and that will ultimately
help us to escape our current wanderings in the windswept deserts of unfounded faith.

In his article, “An Atheist Critique of Christopher Hitchens,” Phil Ebersole argues
that “religious congregations provide people with community, ritual, moral ideals and a
way to understand their feelings of transcendence. I have been impressed throughout my
life by the simple, unpretentious goodness of ordinary religious people. Hitchens was
unable to acknowledge this.”508 However, Ebersole goes on to demonstrate Hitchens’
point that such benefits need not be the province of religious faith alone. He writes:
What religion does for people is to make them stronger, not necessarily
better. Following a religion can empower you to overcome addiction,
laziness, cowardice and other sins of the flesh, but it only makes you more
kindly, forgiving, humble, patient and dutiful if you want these qualities to
begin with; religion equally well reinforces intolerance, chauvinism,
ignorance and ruthlessness.
I am a Unitarian Universalist, a member of a small sect which affirms
certain religious values, but requires no pretense of belief in any religious
doctrines. I have no answers for the metaphysical questions that religion
claims to answer. Unitarian-Universalism gives me community, ritual and
moral support. I have secular humanist friends who have no need for that.
This is fine. It doesn’t mean there’s anything wrong with them; it doesn’t
mean there’s anything wrong with me.509
According to the Unitarian Universalist Association, their “faith” is based upon
seven basic principles. These are as follows:
1st Principle: The inherent worth and dignity of every person;
2nd Principle: Justice, equity and compassion in human relations;
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3rd Principle: Acceptance of one another and encouragement to spiritual
growth in our congregations;
4th Principle: A free and responsible search for truth and meaning;
5th Principle: The right of conscience and the use of the democratic
process within our congregations and in society at large;
6th Principle: The goal of world community with peace, liberty, and
justice for all;
7th Principle: Respect for the interdependent web of all existence of which
we are a part.510
However, these principles are prefaced by the following remarks from the “Reverend”
Barbara Wells ten Hove: “The Principles are not dogma or doctrine, but rather a guide for
those of us who choose to join and participate in Unitarian Universalist religious
communities.”511 I would first argue that nothing in these seven principles, especially
when considered en masse, is even reminiscent of any sort of religious ideology with
which I am familiar. But even should one dispute that statement, these contextualizing
remarks from Wells ten Hove (claiming that even the principles themselves are open to
subjective interpretation and voluntary adherence or rejection) demonstrates that they are
in fact an utterly secularist community, politely and politically hidden beneath a pseudoreligious, and thus socially acceptable, veneer. Of course, Hitchens might disagree.
In an interview with Jennie Rosenberg Gritz, Hitchens once said:
I’ve spoken at Unitarian churches very often. It seems to me, again, that
they don’t give me enough to disagree with. But as for lumping them in,
I’ll say this. Have you read Camus’s La Peste? At the end, the plague is
over, the nightmare has dissipated, the city has returned to health.
Normality has resumed. But he ends by saying that underneath the city, in
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the pipes and in the sewers, the rats were still there. And they’d one day
send their vermin up again to die on the streets of a free city. That’s how I
feel about religion. Thanks to advances of science, education, political
tolerance, pluralism and so on, religion can now be one option among
many – who cares who’s a Unitarian or who’s a Congregationalist? But in
the texts, the actual texts, there is always this toxin that’s ready to be
revived. What I say is, “Do you believe this stuff or don’t you?” In other
words, “In what respect are you different from a humanist?” The authority
of the texts is always on the side of the extremists, because they do say
what they say. So be aware of this danger. That’s all I’m arguing.512
Either way, it seems that both Hitchens and Ebersole ultimately recognize that
“community, ritual, and moral support,” can be found when and wherever two human
beings convene with such intentions in mind.

Even Hitchens’ own brother, Peter, argues that Christopher’s impressions of
religion are somewhat inaccurate, or at the very least, incomplete. Speaking of god is Not
Great, Peter argues:
There is one chapter in this book whose implications are sinister. It is
Chapter 16, which attempts to suggest that religion is child abuse. On the
basis of such arguments, matched by similar urgings from Professor
Richard Dawkins, I can see a movement growing to outlaw the teaching of
faith to children. Then what? Liberal world reformers make the grave
mistake of thinking that if you abolish a great force you don’t like, it will
be replaced by empty space. We abolished the gallows, for example, and
found we had created an armed police and an epidemic of prison suicides.
We abolished school selection by exams, and found we had replaced it
with selection by money. And so on.513
However, this argument is tantamount to a camel in search of that proverbial final straw,
because as Christopher once noted:
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If you don’t know what’s in King James and how it sounds, you won’t
understand a lot of what’s in Shakespeare or Milton or John Donne or
George Herbert, to name only a few examples. Enormous numbers of
phrases in common use would be opaque to you. You wouldn’t know
where they came from. They would be empty.… Religion was our first
attempt at philosophy. It was the first and the worst, but it’s still part of
our history and tradition. As it is, children don’t know where anything
comes from – they don’t know the literary canon or the historical record.
So I think to be religiously literate is very important. I also think if you
start showing them the stuff as they approach the age of literacy and
reason, there isn’t the slightest chance they’re going to believe in it.514
As Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, and Hitchens have all repeatedly argued, a well-rounded
knowledge of all the world’s major faiths (in contrast to the teachings solely of one’s
own) is required not only for an appreciation of history and literature, but also as a
foundational prerequisite of becoming a true and productive citizen of the world. As
Dawkins once stated:
The Bible Literacy Report published in Fairfax, Virginia… provides many
examples, and cites overwhelming agreement by teachers of English
literature that biblical literacy is essential to full appreciation of their
subject. Doubtless the equivalent is true of French, German, Russian,
Italian, Spanish and other great European literatures. And, for speakers of
Arabic and Indian languages, knowledge of the Qur’an or the Bhagavad
Gita is presumably just as essential for full appreciation of their literary
heritage. Finally, to round off the list, you can’t appreciate Wagner (whose
music, as has been wittily said, is better than it sounds) without knowing
your way around the Norse gods.515
As a result, (to my knowledge) none of the New Atheists have suggested removing world
religion from any educational curriculums. Quite the opposite: they would like to see
such efforts expanded. Odd then that so many of the faithful do not share in their wishes.

In his editorial, “God is Greater than Christopher Hitchens,” Shmuley Boteach
notes that
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in his book, Hitchens mocks the Ten Commandments. Didn’t the ancient
Israelites already know that thievery and murder were wrong? Quite right.
Mankind would have easily legislated much of the morality contained in
the Bible even without God. But then the whole point of the Ten
Commandments is the establishment of absolute, divine morality. These
are not laws legislated by man and subject, therefore, to human tampering.
They are the absolute rules that dare never be changed - at any time, at any
place, under any circumstances.516
I admit to being somewhat confused by this statement. On the one hand, it appears that
Rabbi Boteach is arguing that “absolute, divine morality,” is inherently superior to the
(more malleable) human variety. On the other, he claims that (all else being equal) both
could and would have arrived at precisely the same list of commandments and
proscriptions. What, then, distinguishes one from the other? According to Boteach, it is
that the rules inspired by divine morality are absolute and not “subject… to human
tampering.”
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that a number of the commandments do not
deal with moral issues of any kind (divine or otherwise), I would respond that it seems
Boteach is conflating moral absolutism with basic humanism. For instance, someone who
absolutely believes “thou shalt do no murder” is unequivocally bound by that
commandment, and may admit of no exception (even in the possession of subsequent
divine permission). So either God is immoral for ordering the murder of the Amalekites
(1 Samuel 15:3) or his people are immoral for ignoring his previous commandment, or
both. On the contrary, humanism might likewise admit of a near-universal morality, but
in this instance, it would be based on the commonality of the human condition and thus
open to revision and improvement whenever humanity deems it logically or evidentially
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appropriate.517 (As a result, one doubts that it could have so callously commanded, or
even sanctioned, such genocide, no matter the circumstance.) This is how the United
States of America reasonably and even simultaneously manages to both revere and
amend its constitution, and I would suggest that it is also the reason the other 603
commandments contained within the Bible are not all still considered as absolutist or
morally binding as Rabbi Boteach’s words would imply. What’s more, I would contend
that it is this ability to revise and to improve upon our understanding of ethics and the
treatment of our fellow man that makes any of our actions or beliefs truly moral in the
first place.

In his otherwise approving article, “Unbelievable,” even fellow New Atheist Dan
Dennett argues that
at their best, [Hitchens’] indictments are trenchant and witty, and the book
is a treasure house of zingers worthy of Mark Twain or H. L. Mencken. At
other times, his impatience with the smug denial of the self-righteous gets
the better of him, and then he strikes glancing blows at best, and
occasionally adopts a double standard, excusing his naturalist heroes for
their few lapses into religious gullibility on the grounds that they couldn’t
have known any better at the time, while leaving no such wiggle room for
the defenders of religion over the ages.518
But is this so-called double standard one of Hitchens’ making or is it instead one that has
long existed between the religious and the secular? The distinction Dennett would make
between Hitchens’ “naturalist heroes,” and “the defenders of religion over the ages” is
likely one that both groups would suggest and accept. Science admits of no certainty;
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even when the evidence rests entirely on one side of the scale, a good scientist always
acknowledges the possibility that future evidence may yet come to light… potentially
even enough to change his or her mind. The same could be said of the philosopher’s
reverence for logic: regardless of one’s personal affinity for or belief in a proposition, a
better argument could always potentially be presented (i.e. the truth will invariably out
and logic will be the means and/or mechanism by which this outing will occur). The
religious mind, by contrast, admits of no such possibility (at least where essential tenets
of the faith are concerned). There is every reason to expect that Hitchens’ naturalist
heroes would, today, willingly reexamine the evidence and, when and where reasonable
to do so, alter their opinions on science, philosophy, and faith. They can be free of their
former lack of evidence, errors of logic, or failures of the imagination in a way that the
religious can never be. No matter how far humanity progresses socially or how much we
increase our knowledge, for the religious mind, all new data must invariably be weighed
and measured against the old. One hopes Dennett might agree, and perhaps he does. Here
are the words that came immediately upon the heel of his previous comments:
But these excesses are themselves a valuable element of this wake-up call.
They say to every complacent but ignorant churchgoer: look how angry
this well-informed critic of religion is. Perhaps when you know what he
has uncovered about the words and deeds of religions around the world
you will share his sense of betrayal of what is best in humankind.519
Most of Varadaraja V. Raman ‘s criticisms seem to stem from Hitchens’ tendency
to employ somewhat inflammatory language in his attack(s) upon various members of the
religious community. In his review, he writes: “most of Hitchens’ narratives are wellreasoned, his arguments are incisive, and his anecdotes are telling. Unfortunately, some
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of them are marred by ad hominem attacks, with words like fraud, hypocrite, fool, and
idiot.”520 In choosing to punctuate his condemnations of the faith and faithful with such
provocative language, Raman believes Hitchens has neglected what should have been a
more important focus of his book:
Gone are the days when the polished language and refined reasoning of
Bertrand Russell were the model for attacks on religion. Just as the
boundary lines in movies have gradually been stretched in the use of foul
language, coarse attacks on religion are also becoming more daring and
explicit. Now you can use the word stupid half a dozen times in a book
that is less than 300 pages to make your point. Such language is quite
acceptable, except in regions and religions where the author’s physical
existence will be put at risk. Indeed, the strongest argument against
religions should be, aside from the superstitions they engender, the threats
they pose to free thought and speech wherever their spokesmen hold
power over people’s lives. Hitchens doesn’t devote enough pages to
this.521
Raman’s preoccupation with semantics and tone continues:
In making his case for why religions ought to be dispensed with, Hitchens
lists a series of charges against them (p. 205), all of which are valid up to a
point, and none of which is taken literally by countless practitioners of the
major religions in this day and age. The first of these, “presenting a false
picture of the world to the innocent and the credulous” reveals his bias: the
pictures are not false (which implies intention to cheat), but mistaken (like
the 18th century phlogiston theory), formulated centuries ago by thinkers
who did not have the benefit of the knowledge and insights we possess
today. We can in fairness blame the folks who adopt them today, but not
the originators of the ideas.522
But the distinction Raman wishes to make between false and mistaken, and the phlogiston
analogy he employs to support it, are both problematic at best. To my knowledge, no one
who upheld the phlogiston theory of combustion did so from a position of absolute
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authority and power, but rather from a perspective of and with respect toward an accepted
(albeit nascent) scientific methodology. As such, by means of experimentation, it was
eventually disproven and replaced with the more scientifically sound oxygen theory. But
in the interim and aftermath, and despite the incendiary nature of the debate, no one was
ever burned for their failure to adhere to the phlogiston theory or for their subsequent
failure to cease such allegiance when science had proven it to be mistaken. The same
simply cannot be said for those poor souls who espoused belief in Adoptionism,
Antinomianism, Apollinarism, Arianism, Marcionism, Montanism, Nestorianism,
Pelagianism, or any of the countless other so-called heresies with which Christianity has
historically concerned itself. As a result, I would argue that those who maintain that their
beliefs are unfalsifiable, and subsequently proceed to enforce that belief through
persecution, deserve all the rancor and ridicule Hitchens’ critique can manage.523
Nevertheless, Raman continues: “He lists the doctrine of blood sacrifice as
another evil. But not all religions subscribe to this: Christianity, Buddhism, Sikhism,
Jainism, and Vaishnava Hinduism are generally against this practice, and they include
vast numbers of religious people.”524 And while I would tend to agree with the majority
of this statement, Raman’s decision to include a religion that is based entirely upon blood
sacrifice (Christianity: i.e. Christ’s crucifixion) perhaps speaks to a subconscious bias of
his own.
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His refutation of the fourth and final of Hitchens’ charges is even more telling:
The fourth charge is “the doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment.”
Again, a valid criticism, but it works well among the masses. When
artifacts were stolen from the Baghdad museum after the fall of Hussein,
an Imam issued a call to the vandals, threatening them with eternal
residence in the Islamic hell: sure enough, many items promptly found
their way back to where they belonged. A misguided doctrine for sure, but
one that served a purpose.525
Excusing the immorality of such a statement, I would argue that this also serves to
demonstrate the problem of Raman’s refutation of Hitchens’ first argument concerning
false claims. As a means of control, “the doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment”
has undoubtedly served a purpose. Unfortunately, that purpose has never been to
accurately represent reality, but rather to bend our perceptions of it to the authoritative
will of religion and those who purport to lead it.

In her review of god is Not Great, Wendy Kaminer writes:
For every act of cruelty associated with religion, believers will point to
acts of compassion – for which Hitchens credits humanism, not religion.
I’m not sure what he means by humanism; I credit – and blame – human
nature. The suggestion that humanism (or any nontheistic belief system) is
responsible for all the good that men and women do, while religion,
poisoning everything, is responsible for evil seems a bit unfair. But it
complements the tendency of believers to credit “true” religion for virtue,
while blaming false religions, or no religion, for vice.526
A seemingly fair observation, until one considers just what Kaminer means by human
nature. Generally speaking, human nature is defined as those characteristics which
humans naturally possess, free from the constraints or influences of culture or creed.
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Thus when Hitchens speaks of humanism, one could reasonably argue that he is referring
to the collective efforts of humans to elevate and enlighten their fellow human beings to
their former and original status. Religion, by contrast, generally speaks to either the evils
or the incompleteness/imperfections of humanity, and is almost always one of the first
voices whispering in our ears that our human nature is tainted and thus in need of
something outside of ourselves in order to save it from itself.

In his review for Paste Magazine, Denis Covington asks:
What then of the National Socialist scientists who conducted experiments
on Jewish children in Hitler’s death camps? Clearly psychopaths and
brutes, they did not claim “a heavenly warrant” for the cruelty they
inflicted. Should they, too, have been “understood” since they were not
committing their crimes in the name of God, but in the name of science?527
But is this critique accurate? After all, the entire thrust of the Third Reich’s racist
ideology can be traced to Hitler’s mistaken belief in the so-called Aryan/Dravidian myth.
As Ishaan Tharoor explains in his article for Time Magazine:
The idea of the Aryan race has seemed historical fact ever since the Nazis
embraced its myth. Seeking a racial foil to those dubious Semites, they
arrived upon the Aryans – a tribe of all-conquering Central Asian chariotriders and horse lords who supposedly swept through India and Iran (“land
of the Aryans”) a bit less than 4,000 years ago before depositing their
linguistic legacy in what’s now Europe. The Nazis appropriated the
swastika, an ancient sign of Vedic Hinduism – itself supposedly a legacy
of the Aryans – as their totem. Heinrich Himmler, who grew obsessed
with locating his volk’s ancestral patrimony, thought of his SS as another
form of the Hindu Kshatriya, or warrior, caste and reputedly walked
around with a scroll copy of the Bhagavad Gita, that famous passage from
the epic Mahabharata that counsels man on ethical action.528
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In light of this evidence, I think it’s reasonable to conclude that Covington’s arguments,
well-intentioned though they may be, are ultimately specious. The Nazis who placed
those Jewish children in Hitler’s death camps did in fact believe they could claim “a
heavenly warrant” for their actions, only perhaps not from the one most presumably
believe.
Covington, however, continues:
When Hitchens recites the horrendous persecutions inflicted on authority
of the Church of Rome, he often leaves the impression that these were
mostly crimes committed by believers against unbelievers, but history is
rarely so neat. The Anabaptists in 16th-century Antwerp were themselves
believers in a just and loving God, but they were nonetheless burned at the
stake, buried alive, drowned, eviscerated and hanged simply because they
refused to baptize infants (their logic being that baptism should be
reserved for professing believers who had attained the age of reason). The
“rational mammal” (a Hitchens conceit) would probably conclude that the
motives for all of these crimes, even if precisely deduced, would be
immaterial; that the perpetrators were monsters, whatever their faith; and
that the victims, even if believers, shouldn’t in any way be blamed for the
horrors visited upon them.529
Again, I am confused. Covington appears to be attempting to refute Hitchens’ argument
that “religion poisons everything” by claiming that religious violence was not confined
solely to apostates and infidels but was likewise visited upon countless dissenting
viewpoints within any number of individual faiths. If so, then point taken. However, his
argument that such actions should not (indeed cannot) be blamed on faith, is completely
discredited by his own example of the Anabaptists and the reason for their slaughter at
the hands of the Catholic Church. Outside of their respective faiths and the minute
differences among them, what reasons for antagonism and persecution remain? I would
contend that the Catholics’ willingness to kill and the Anabaptists’ willingness to die can
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only be attributable to their faith. Thus, contrary to Covington’s claims, I do not think we
could even consider it to have been immaterial to the issue at hand.

In his article, “Atheist Crusaders,” Phillip E. Johnson writes:
On the frivolous side, Hitchens likes to deflate supposedly great men by
calling them “mammals,” but this derisory term brings in the problem of
self-reference. While Hitchens never refers to the authorities on his side as
“mammals,” reserving that category for those whom he wishes to belittle,
it will not escape the reader that if “great men” are only mammals, then so
are scientists, including the esteemed Charles Darwin and the not-quite-soesteemed Richard Dawkins, and so, of course, is Hitchens himself. Which
raises the question: Why should we take seriously any speculation by a
mere mammal, or even the consensus of mammal opinion, about the origin
of its species, no matter how much evidence the mammals imagine
themselves to have gathered?530
Aside from his semantic squabbling, Johnson seems to be suggesting that because the
religious and the secular are both mammalian, the enormous disparity between the
amount of evidence each side is able to bolster in support of its cause is ultimately
irrelevant. One would hope this is not the case, but as for Johnson’s criticism that
Hitchens describes only the religious as mammalian, one could argue it is a consequence
of the fact that they present nothing in the way of science or logic that would supersede
their innate and undisputed biology and thus lend credence to their claims.531
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Johnson, however, continues his semantical assault on Hitchens polemical style.
He writes:
Hitchens has two besetting faults: He does not define his terms carefully,
and he does not know where to stop. The latter quality was evident in his
obsessive efforts to hound Henry Kissinger as a war criminal and to
discredit Mother Teresa for her resolute opposition to abortion. Both faults
are evident in God Is Not Great. The subtitle of this book is How Religion
Poisons Everything, yet Hitchens throws out accusations without
bothering to define “religion” or, for that matter, “everything.” (Does the
latter include, for example, art, music, and literature?) Looseness with
definitions helps Hitchens blame whatever is wrong with the world on
“religion.”532
While it is true that Hitchens never explicitly defines religion in god is Not Great, it is
safe to say that he would have been both aware and comfortable with Daniel Dennett’s
definition in Breaking the Spell. Dennett writes, “Tentatively, I propose to define
religions as social systems whose participants avow belief in a supernatural agent or
agents whose approval is to be sought. This is, of course, a circuitous way of articulating
the idea that a religion without God or gods is like a vertebrate without a backbone.”533
As for Hitchens’ failure to define the word everything, I believe I can help. It means “all
things,” and yes, it includes art, music, and literature. While Johnson might attempt to
argue that Da Vinci’s Last Supper, Handel’s Messiah, or Milton’s Paradise Lost are
hardly poisoned by their explicitly religious contents, I would counter that the artistic,
musical, and literary genres to which they belong have undoubtedly been poisoned by the
Church’s historic impetus to ban or destroy any such offerings that did not religiously
conform to their preconceived ideas and sensibilities. Pagan and/or heretical art, music,
and literature all but assuredly suffered much the same fate as the blasphemous beliefs
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themselves. Thus, when measured by that which we’ve lost (or that which was never
permitted to be), Hitchens can rightly say that, yes, “religion poisons everything.”534

In his review, Sam Schulman writes:
At heart Hitchens is an unrelieved misanthrope. And, to his credit, he does
exhibit a deeper familiarity with human depravity than any of our other
anti-religionist authors, whose faith in the perfectibility of mankind is
almost comically touching. The question, given his root-and-branch
misanthropy, is where on earth he derives his conviction that mankind
would be better off without religion. The answer would seem to be:
nowhere. Take, for instance, the phenomenon of sexual repression, which
Hitchens blames on religion and regards (it goes without saying) as an
unmitigated evil. But sexual repression, in one form or another, has
characterized every human community in history, and always will.
Religion can be a highly efficient means of enforcing sexual repression;
but if it did not exist, some other means would have been found to impose
limitations on the expression of human sexuality.535
Admittedly, Schulman might be right. Humanity may yet find secular means of imposing
“limitations on the expression of human sexuality.” In fact, in terms of medical science’s
staunch opposition to such sexual practices as incest and pedophilia, one could argue that
it already does. (Conversely, it should be noted that the holy texts of all three Abrahamic
religions exhibit, and in some cases even appear to endorse, such despicable behavior.)
But as for the forms of sexual expression which religions most frequently abhor, namely
those of fornication and homosexuality, I would like the opportunity to examine
Schulman’s claims for myself. Unfortunately, just as “sexual repression, in one form or
another, has characterized every human community in history,” so too has religious belief
534
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of one variety or another. Before we can determine whether “some other means would
have been found,” we must first acknowledge that, in the history of civilization up to this
point, it has not yet proven necessary to do so.
Undeterred, Schulman continues:
What, then, does Hitchens wish to put in place of religion? He calls for a
new Enlightenment, and proposes that we realize its promise by imitating
the Socratic method of rational thinking – a suggestion that compels him
to engage in some fancy footwork in order to deny there was anything
supernatural in Socrates’ insistence that he had a daimon, an inner voice,
that enabled him to distinguish good from evil. But this recommendation
falls into the same morass as Hitchens’s urging of Shakespeare and
Tolstoy over the Bible as teachers of morality. In each case the point is not
only anachronistic but odd, given that none of these sages, let alone the
Enlightenment itself, is remotely conceivable apart from the religious
civilization out of which they all sprang.536
A great deal of Hannes Stein’s argument mirrors that of Schulman, as evidenced
by the following passage:
My first objection to his thesis that piety poisons everything may seem
weak. If religion is truly an evil, why could it motivate so many to great
artistic accomplishments? Somewhere Hitchens mentions in passing that
he loves Mozart’s music (which speaks for him). But what about Mozart’s
requiem: only a cold-hearted fool could not be gripped by the profound
religious seriousness that resounds there. And the spectacular mosques
built by Muslims in India? The opening of Bach’s Saint Matthew’s
Passion? His Chaconne in D minor? And finally: what about that
anthology of Hebrew writings, marketed for centuries with the Greek
name “Bible”? The Joseph story that Thomas Mann retells expansively in
his best novel? What about the grandiose and shattering Book of Job, the
dark wisdoms of Solomon, the anti-racism of the prophet Amos, the
sermon of justice of the most unhappy prophet, the seer Jeremias?
Hitchens finds in the Bible only a good phrase or some nice verse, here
and there, but nothing more. In general, he finds nothing of quality in it.
Given his evident literary sensibilities, it is difficult to believe him on this
point.537
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Or this one:
And this leads to Hitchens’s weakest argument. He claims that atheists –
in contrast to believers – don’t have to stare into the Torah to find
edification; instead he and his ilk have works of literature, since
Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Schiller, Dostoevsky, and George Eliot treat
complex ethical themes better than mythical moral stories of the sacred
texts – so he asserts. And with that, he shoots himself in the foot. Since all
the writers he cites as examples depend deeply on the Bible. To be
compelling, Hitchens’s argument would have to be purged of any JudeoChristian influence. It would run something like this: “Homer, Ovid,
Horace, and Virgil treat complex ethical conflicts better than the Old and
New Testament.” Hardly however a tenable claim (Homer’s Iliad or
Ovid’s Ars Amatoria as moral guides?)538
Again, I am forced to admit that Schulman and Stein are at least partially right.
Shakespeare and Tolstoy and the Enlightenment itself are not “remotely conceivable
apart from the religious civilization out of which they all sprang.” Unfortunately, this
does not speak to the issue Hitchens wished to raise: that in their own ways, each of them
surpassed or transcended the dogmatic views of their respective religious cultures to
better illuminate the human condition that for so long had been forced to lie dormant
underneath.539 But perhaps an analogy will better serve to demonstrate the speciousness
of Schulman’s claim. Athenian democracy was borne under the despotic shadow of
oligarchy. Would we then claim that it is only conceivable within or appropriate to that
context? Or would we instead recognize it for the transformative and humanizing
initiative it is and thus endeavor to elevate it above the humble and very specific
circumstances of its birth?540
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Referencing Hitchens’ lament on the success of the Maccabean revolt, Schulman
concludes:
Hitchens’s yearning for a world purified of Jews (and therefore of
Christians and Muslims) may remind some of Nietzsche. The comparison
is unfair, but inevitable. Hitchens’s sketch of a new Enlightenment posits
not a world of supermen but only a mild utopia, populated by men in togas
discoursing eternally on the eternal verities, a world like the one painted
by the Victorian romanticist Lawrence Alma-Tadema, or envisioned by
Oscar Wilde in his gullible, amateurish tract The Soul of Man under
Socialism. But that is just the trouble. Shorn of the culture we have, a
culture nurtured and preserved by monotheistic religion, his proffered
utopia amounts to just another invitation to barbarism. Hitchens here
shows himself to be more credulous and sentimental – and much more
insidious – than any of the religious mythmakers he so earnestly
despises.541
Humanism and enlightenment as nothing more than “another invitation to barbarism?” I
would submit that such statements say more about Schulman’s understanding of
humanity than Hitchens’, and as such, demonstrate the effect that such nurturing religion
has undoubtedly (and perhaps even unconsciously) had upon him.
Even more revealing of bias is the way in which Hannes Stein’s review comes to
a close. He writes:
This clever thinker cannot understand that Jewish monotheism is
something unique and ultimately paradoxical: a religion that is critical of
religion. The Hebrew Bible begins with a blasphemy. God created the
original chaos, in contrast to the pagan gods who emerged from it. And on
the fourth day, He set sun, moon, and stars in the heaven, as a sign for
times, days, and years. In other words, the planets and stars, which in the
rest of the Middle East were worshiped as deities, were nothing more than
lamps and clocks. This was an act of enlightenment. In its wake, man
could face creation freely. He was no longer compelled to appeal to it with
magical (and often bloody) rituals; he was not forced to fall prostrate in
front of every tree nymph or river god. His head was clear enough to
marvel at creation – an admiration we find everywhere in the Psalms – and
to study its laws with the art of astronomy.542
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Thus, the Enlightenment of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries was ultimately superfluous,
as are Hitchens’ pleas for a revitalized one now. All that is necessary is respect and
appreciation for the uniqueness of Jewish monotheism, to which, it must be noted,
Hannes Stein coincidently belongs.543

In his review, Josh Wilkerson argues that
while we as Christians may disagree with Hitchens’s claims of religion as
an immoral man-made apparition, we cannot argue against the historical
injustices performed in the name of God. While we disagree with
Hitchens’s understanding of religious doctrines, we cannot argue against
his own experience of these doctrines in practice. This is exactly the
problem for Hitchens – Christian dogmatism over matters which we do
not have authority to speak.
We misuse the Bible when we think it a political constitution or a science
textbook. The church cannot address the assertions of atheism until it first
admits to and addresses its own faults within. We can no longer attempt to
legislate conversions or to rationalize belief to people. Mr. Hitchens lives
by reason; we live by faith. Our lifestyles then should demonstrate
themselves as markedly different, ceasing to ignore the perversion of the
church in the past to fit with culture, and discontinuing the distortion of
the church to fit with the modern, rationalistic culture of today. “Let the
advocates and partisans of religion rely on faith alone, and let them be
brave enough to admit that this is what they are doing.” His remark sounds
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as if coming from the pulpit, and we should take it under exactly that
authority.544
Though a startlingly frank and refreshing admission, beneath the applause from the
religious and secular alike, one can almost hear Camus’ rats once more scurrying
frantically toward the surface.

In his critique, Tony Higton writes:
Religion, he says, is so uncertain of itself that it can’t tolerate different
faiths (p. 1) and it interferes in the lives of unbelievers. However, I would
respond that it is no part of Christianity to seek power over people or to
force religious views onto them. But it is legitimate respectfully and
without manipulation, to seek to share good news with those who do not
yet believe it.545
But here is an example of that good news Higton so desperately wishes to share:
[Hitchens] goes on to describe the idea of the atonement as God inflicting
torture and murder on his son in order to impress humans (p. 209) and that
Christians hold the immoral belief that this absolves human beings of
responsibility.… Hitchens does not understand even the basics about
Christianity, including the vicarious suffering of Christ. God, incarnate in
Jesus, decided in his infinite love to enter into the pain and suffering,
which failing human beings have brought upon themselves, in order to
redeem them. In this he shows his love and compassion for them. He also
satisfies his perfect justice (required by his utter holiness) by bearing in
himself the serious consequences of human wrongdoing. By rights
humanity should take those consequences but God provides a way of
forgiveness and eternal acceptance for those who trust him, believe that he
has done all this, and express their gratitude. The New Testament teaching
on hell refers to the consequences which those who knowingly refuse this
rescue operation choose for themselves. There is no absolving of human
responsibility. If I know that God entered into that suffering because of
human sin, including mine, to redeem us, then I deeply recognise my
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responsibility and will live a life of gratitude to and love for God, seeking
to please him through good behaviour.546
Did you catch that? In the same paragraph, Higton argues that “by rights humanity should
take those consequences but God provides a way of forgiveness and eternal acceptance
for those who trust him.… The New Testament teaching on hell refers to the
consequences which those who knowingly refuse this rescue operation choose for
themselves. There is no absolving of human responsibility.” Thus, it would seem that,
despite Higton’s claims to the contrary, both absolution and manipulation are present in
abundance, but here, I let Hitchens speak for himself.
We cannot, like fearridden peasants of antiquity, hope to load all our
crimes onto a goat and then drive the hapless animal into the desert. Our
everyday idiom is quite sound in regarding “scapegoating” with contempt.
And religion is scapegoating writ large. I can pay your debt, my love, if
you have been imprudent, and if I were a hero like Sidney Carton in A
Tale of Two Cities I could even serve your term in prison or take your
place on the scaffold. Greater love hath no man. But I cannot absolve you
of your responsibilities. It would be immoral of me to offer, and immoral
of you to accept. And if the same offer is made from another time and
another world, through the mediation of middlemen and accompanied by
inducements, it loses all its grandeur and becomes debased into wishthinking or, worse, a combination of blackmailing with bribery.547
Nevertheless, Higton continues:
Hitchens criticises Jesus for forbidding people even to think about
coveting goods or to look upon a woman in the wrong way.… He confuses
temptation and sin. Of course people will be tempted by covetousness and
sexual desire. That will be a real experience. But the fact is that Christian
Faith can help the individual to refuse to entertain that temptation or to fall
to it in practice. Hitchens’ deterministic view of humans not being
constituted to love their neighbour as themselves is sad. Again there is
much evidence that, by the grace of God, people can obey that
commandment.548
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Unfortunately, it seems that in this instance Higton, not Hitchens, has fundamentally
misunderstood Jesus’ commandment. After all, the passage in question, Matthew 5:28,
reads: “But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed
adultery with her in his heart.”549 Consequently, to claim that “Christian Faith can help
the individual to refuse to entertain that temptation or to fall to it in practice,” is the
spiritual equivalent of offering a life jacket to an already-drowned man: while we may
appreciate and applaud the intention behind the gesture, it is simply too little, too late to
be of any real value.

In his review entitled, “This Book is not Good,” Gene McCarraher writes:
As Mark Twain once mused, give a man a reputation as an early riser and
he can sleep until noon. With God Is Not Great, a caustic polemic on the
evils of religion, Hitchens has earned the dubious honor of confirming
Twain’s aphorism. Anyone expecting a masterful demolition of all things
sacred will be disappointed. Bullying and shallow, God Is Not Great is a
haute middlebrow tirade, a stale venting of outrage and ridicule. Beneath
his Oxbridge talent at draping glibness in the raiment of erudition,
Hitchens proves to be an amateur in philosophy, an illiterate in theology,
and a dishonest student of history. Too belligerent to be nimble and too
parochial to be generous, the once-captivating Hitchens demonstrates why
he has forfeited any claim on our attention.550
In his attempt to refute Hitchens’ arguments on design and the problem of an
infinite regress for the designer, McCarraher offers two separate but equally insubstantial
explanations:
The notion of a creator, he observes, raises “the unanswerable question of
who...created the creator” – an objection that theologians “have
consistently failed to overcome.” Really? Any decent freshman survey
could have informed Hitchens that, as Aquinas and many others have
patiently explained, God is not an entity and thus is not ensnared in any
549
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serial account of causality. Not a thing himself, God is rather the condition
of there being anything at all. Thus, “creation” is not a gargantuan act of
handicraft but rather the condition of there being something rather than
nothing. Creation didn’t happen long ago; it’s right now, and forever.
(This is why “creationism” is bad science – because it’s bad theology.)...
Wittgenstein came to much the same conclusion. In the Philosophical
Investigations, he disposed of Hitchens’s allegedly insuperable objection.
Just because you can always build another house in the village,
Wittgenstein noted, does not change the fact that there is a last house right
now. Explanations must end somewhere, as he famously conceded: “I
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.” It’s no real irony, then,
that the godfather of linguistic analysis could respect and share the wonder
of mysticism. “Not how the world is, is the mystical,” he wrote in the
Tractatus, “but that it is.”551
Better theology perhaps, but a better explanation, hardly.
What’s even worse, at least according to McCarraher, is that Hitchens’ particular
brand of atheism is itself an implicit tribute to… capitalism. Incredibly, he writes:
Today’s atheism pays extravagant homage to idols dear to the professional
and managerial ranks. Science as truth; the technological mastery of
nature; credentialed expertise as the only credible form of learning;
efficiency and profit as the sole ends of economic and political life: these
shibboleths comprise the mental universe of the Western middle classes.
Colored by an incoherent blend of Darwinism and environmentalism, a
bland infatuation with science and technology is the bourgeois halo around
instrumental reason, and nothing in the new secularism of Dawkins, Harris
et al. serves to exorcise that enchantment. While Hitchens likes to bask in
the grand tradition of atheism (he throws out allusions to every great
skeptic from Lucretius to Bertrand Russell), his ill-tempered tract rarely
ventures outside the boundaries of the suburban moral imagination, even
as it manages to flatter a corporate executive’s every conceit.552
Thus for McCarraher, Hitchens’ appreciation for science and technology, his respect for
higher education, as well as his championing of Darwinism and environmentalism can all
be either reduced or attributed to an underlying suburban desire for personal and/or
economic aggrandizement, his seeming desire to share these values with and to the
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benefit of his fellow man notwithstanding. This of course, also seems to contradict not
only the bulk of Hitchens’ lifework but also his final message. As Andrew Sullivan notes:
As he lay dying, [Hitchens] asked for a pen and paper and tried to write on
it. After a while, he finished, held it up, looked at it and saw that it was an
illegible assemblage of scribbled, meaningless hieroglyphics. “What’s the
use?” he said to Steve Wasserman. Then he dozed a little, and then roused
himself and uttered a couple of words that were close to inaudible. Steve
asked him to repeat them. There were two:
“Capitalism.”
“Downfall.”
In his end was his beginning.553

But not wishing to end on such a sour, melancholy note, I would instead conclude
with Hitchens’ closing remarks from a debate he participated in with William Dembski in
2010, five months after his cancer diagnosis and just over a year before his untimely
death. Understandably, the question of his own mortality was raised, and the need for a
speedy conversion (to Christianity) subsequently suggested. Here is how Hitchens
responded:
I’ll close on the implied question that Bill asked me earlier: Why don’t
you accept this wonderful offer? Why wouldn’t you like to meet
Shakespeare, for example?
I don’t know if you really think that when you die you can be corporeally
reassembled, and have conversations with authors from previous epochs.
It’s not necessary that you believe that in Christian theology, and I have to
say that it sounds like a complete fairy tale to me. The only reason I’d
want to meet Shakespeare, or might even want to, is because I can meet
him, any time, because he is immortal in the works he’s left behind. If
you’ve read those, meeting the author would almost certainly be a
disappointment.
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But when Socrates was sentenced to death for his philosophical
investigations, and for blasphemy for challenging the gods of the city –
and he accepted his death – he did say, well, if we are lucky, perhaps I’ll
be able to hold conversation with other great thinkers and philosophers
and doubters too. In other words the discussion about what is good, what
is beautiful, what is noble, what is pure, and what is true could always go
on.
Why is that important, why would I like to do that? Because that’s the
only conversation worth having. And whether it goes on or not after I die,
I don’t know. But I do know that that’s the conversation I want to have
while I’m still alive. Which means that to me, the offer of certainty, the
offer of complete security, the offer of an impermeable faith that can’t
give way, is an offer of something not worth having. I want to live my life
taking the risk all the time that I don’t know anything like enough yet; that
I haven’t understood enough; that I can’t know enough; that I’m always
hungrily operating on the margins of a potentially great harvest of future
knowledge and wisdom. I wouldn’t have it any other way.
And I’d urge you to look at… those people who tell you, at your age, that
you’re dead till you believe as they do – what a terrible thing to be telling
to children! And that you can only live by accepting an absolute authority
– don’t think of that as a gift. Think of it as a poisoned chalice. Push it
aside however tempting it is. Take the risk of thinking for yourself. Much
more happiness, truth, beauty, and wisdom will come to you that way.554
What could I possibly add to that?
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUPERSEDING THE SUPERNATURAL: SAM HARRIS AND
THE END OF FAITH
Introduction

Separated from his elder Horsemen by a generation or more, it is perhaps ironic
that it was Sam Harris’ 2004 The End of Faith that in many ways ignited the New Atheist
movement. Though begun in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist
attacks of 2001 (when Harris was still a graduate student at UCLA), his treatise should
not be construed as the Islamophobic, reactionist, propaganda piece that so many of his
critics maliciously malign it to be. That characterization is at once too confining and, at
the same time, too charitable. For it is not only the religious extremism of the Islamic
world with which Harris is concerned, but also the politically-correct pleas for (and
proponents of) religious toleration in the more democratically-inclined, ostensiblyChristian nations of the West; the latter of whom he believes are directly responsible for
the propagation and propitiation of the former. According to Harris, the problem is not
only that we have turned a blind eye to the intolerable beliefs and behaviors of others, but
also that we have enshrined the principle of multiculturalism as both a defense of our
inaction as well as the pinnacle achievement of our supposedly enlightened society. But
despite our collective hopes to the contrary, blind eyes simply cannot claim
Enlightenment.
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This paradoxical and potentially problematical notion was perhaps best summed
up by the philosopher of science Karl Popper in his 1945 The Open Society and its
Enemies, in which he argues:
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we
extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not
prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them....
We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to
tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching
intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider
incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, exactly as we should
consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping; or as we should consider
incitement to the revival of the slave trade.555
This is, in essence, the plea of Harris’ book. We must not, he argues, characterize
as inherently and/or holistically intolerant the practice of chastising specifically intolerant
ideas, individuals, or cultures. While this should, of course, encompass such aspects of
secular human interaction as oppressive political policy, evident economic exploitation,
and other socially-sanctioned forms of physical and/or psychological abuse, Harris
believes, as we shall see, that all of these characteristics (and more) are either
demonstrably present or plausibly permissible in most, if not all, of the world’s extant
religions. As a neuroscientist and philosopher, he believes the remedy for the often
incompatible ethics of various religious doctrines and traditions isn’t the abject embrace
of cultural or moral relativism, but instead the adoption and advancement of a so-called
science of morality in their stead, one grounded upon both the evidentially discernible
achievements of the scientific method as well as the foundational appreciation for logic
and reason that would serve to undergird and enlighten the better angels of our collective
natures, thus allowing them to finally and fruitfully take flight. Thus in prefacing a
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newfound science of ethics, one begins to understand the importance of Harris’ clarion
call for The End of Faith.

Christianity has done all it possibly could to draw a circle round itself, and has even
gone so far as to declare doubt itself to be a sin. We are to be precipitated into faith by a
miracle, without the help of reason, after which we are to float in it as the clearest and
least equivocal of elements – a mere glance at some solid ground, the thought that we
exist for some purpose other than floating, the least movement of our amphibious nature:
all this is a sin! Let it be noted that, following this decision, the proofs and demonstration
of the faith, and all meditations upon its origin, are prohibited as sinful. Christianity
wants blindness and frenzy and an eternal swan-song above the waves under which
reason has been drowned!556
Part I: The End of Faith
In the opening chapter of The End of Faith Sam Harris suggests that “the idea that
any one of our religions represents the infallible word of the One True God requires an
encyclopedic ignorance of history, mythology, and art even to be entertained – as the
beliefs, rituals, and iconography of each of our religions attest to centuries of
crosspollination among them.”557 And yet, Harris laments, “If our polls are to be trusted,
nearly 230 million Americans believe that a book showing neither unity of style nor
internal consistency was authored by an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent
deity.”558 What accounts for this sort of sustained credulity and willful ignorance? As the
title of his treatise implies, Harris believes that, above all, faith is to blame. He
elaborates:
Two myths now keep faith beyond the fray of rational criticism, and they
seem to foster religious extremism and religious moderation equally: (1)
most of us believe that there are good things that people get from religious
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faith (e.g., strong communities, ethical behavior, spiritual experience) that
cannot be had elsewhere; (2) many of us also believe that the terrible
things that are sometimes done in the name of religion are the products not
of faith per se but of our baser natures – forces like greed, hatred, and fear
– for which religious beliefs are themselves the best (or even the only)
remedy. Taken together, these myths seem to have granted us perfect
immunity to outbreaks of reasonableness in our public discourse.559
It is these so-called “myths” that Harris most wishes to challenge, for as he
explains, religious moderation is no more to be desired than religious extremism, since
the former always necessarily entails the potential resurrection of the latter (and thus can
never truly be considered its ideological antidote or antithesis).560
Rather than bring the full force of our creativity and rationality to bear on
the problems of ethics, social cohesion, and even spiritual experience,
moderates merely ask that we relax our standards of adherence to ancient
superstitions and taboos, while otherwise maintaining a belief system that
was passed down to us from men and women whose lives were simply
ravaged by their basic ignorance about the world.561
And so long as this overall framework of faith is allowed to remain in place, the religious
house of cards, shoddily-constructed though it may be, is unlikely to buckle even under
the heartiest skepticism and most sustained scientific scrutiny.
Of course, there are those who would argue that Harris’ decision to cast religious
moderates in the same unflattering light as extremists is to minimize or otherwise ignore
the obvious differences between the two. Harris, however, responds that “the only reason
anyone is ‘moderate’ in matters of faith these days is that he has assimilated some of the
fruits of the last two thousand years of human thought (democratic politics, scientific
advancement on every front, concern for human rights, an end to cultural and geographic
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isolation, etc). The doors leading out of scriptural literalism do not open from the
inside.”562 He subsequently elaborates: “Religious moderation is the product of secular
knowledge and scriptural ignorance – and it has no bona fides, in religious terms, to put it
on a par with fundamentalism.”563 Thus, for Harris, religious moderation (sensible though
it may seem) is tantamount to the sort of intellectual fence-sitting that true reasoning
simply cannot abide. Those who advocate it are, in a very real sense, hoping to have their
cake and eat it too.
To attack this appeal to religious moderation from a different angle, Harris goes
on to argue that “most of what we currently hold sacred is not sacred for any reason other
than that it was thought sacred yesterday.”564 In proof of this point, he asks us to consider
the following hypothetical situation:
What if all our knowledge about the world were suddenly to disappear?
Imagine that six billion of us wake up tomorrow morning in a state of utter
ignorance and confusion. Our books and computers are still here, but we
can't make heads or tails of their contents. We have even forgotten how to
drive our cars and brush our teeth. What knowledge would we want to
reclaim first? Well, there’s that business about growing food and building
shelter that we would want to get reacquainted with. We would want to
relearn how to use and repair many of our machines. Learning to
understand spoken and written language would also be a top priority,
given that these skills are necessary for acquiring most others. When in
this process of reclaiming our humanity will it be important to know that
Jesus was born of a virgin? Or that he was resurrected? And how would
we relearn these truths, if they are indeed true? By reading the Bible? Our
tour of the shelves will deliver similar pearls from antiquity – like the
“fact” that Isis, the goddess of fertility, sports an impressive pair of cow
horns. Reading further, we will learn that Thor carries a hammer and that
Marduk’s sacred animals are horses, dogs, and a dragon with a forked
tongue. Whom shall we give top billing in our resurrected world? Yaweh
or Shiva? And when will we want to relearn that premarital sex is a sin?
Or that adulteresses should be stoned to death? Or that the soul enters the
zygote at the moment of conception? And what will we think of those
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curious people who begin proclaiming that one of our books is distinct
from all others in that it was actually written by the Creator of the
universe?565
In other words, religious conviction is, in many ways, simply religious convention, and
despite all claims to the contrary, one’s geography and temporality are every bit as
foundational in the development of one’s faith as one’s belief in the universality and
eternality of his or her particular doctrine. Harris believes that once one comes to this
realization, blind faith can finally be seen for the self-inflicted ideological injury it always
was.
How, then, are we to rescue reason from the faith-imposed exile in which it
currently suffers? Harris believes the solution must be multi-faceted. First and foremost,
we must start to demand the same sort of empirical evidence for religious claims
(particularly those containing hypotheses involving natural phenomena) that we (even the
faithful among us) insist upon for all others. Our collective failure to do so has resulted in
a sort of cognitive dissonance from which we are all now obliged to suffer. Harris
demonstrates:
Tell a devout Christian that his wife is cheating on him, or that frozen
yogurt can make a man invisible, and he is likely to require as much
evidence as anyone else, and to be persuaded only to the extent that you
give it. Tell him that the book he keeps by his bed was written by an
invisible deity who will punish him with fire for eternity if he fails to
accept its every incredible claim about the universe, and he seems to
require no evidence whatsoever.566
Secondly, we must confront our seemingly-ingrained fears about death and the
spiteful uncertainty it represents, and realize the role that such fears continue to play in
the proliferation of religious moderates and extremists alike. As Harris explains “our felt
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sense of what is real seems not to include our own death. We doubt the one thing that is
not open to any doubt at all.… A single proposition – you will not die – once believed,
determines a response to life that would be otherwise unthinkable.”567 Using modern-day
Islam as an example, Harris illustrates: “Subtract the Muslim belief in martyrdom and
jihad, and the actions of suicide bombers become completely unintelligible, as does the
spectacle of public jubilation that invariably follows their deaths; insert these peculiar
beliefs, and one can only marvel that suicide bombing is not more widespread.”568
Though apparently only an example of extremism, Harris argues that even the seeminglybenign agnosticism of religious moderates toward the specter of death “represents a
failure to criticize the unreasonable (and dangerous) certainty of others.”569 In order to
demonstrate the ways in which religious moderation often leads to fundamentalist
domination, Harris offers the following projection: “In our next presidential election, an
actor who reads his Bible would almost certainly defeat a rocket scientist who does not.
Could there be any clearer indication that we are allowing unreason and otherworldliness
to govern our affairs?”570
Finally, Harris argues, we must endeavor to separate our notion of spirituality
from the various religious creeds and supernatural claims to which it has historically been
tethered and subjected. Although many of his fellow atheists consider such a task to be
little more than a fool’s errand, Harris argues that “spirituality can be – indeed, must be –
deeply rational, even as it elucidates the limits of reason. Seeing this, we can begin to
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divest ourselves of many of the reasons we currently have to kill one another.”571 In
support of his position, Harris admits:
We cannot live by reason alone. This is why no quantity of reason, applied
as antiseptic, can compete with the balm of faith, once the terrors of this
world begin to intrude upon our lives.… It is time we realized that we
need not be unreasonable to suffuse our lives with love, compassion,
ecstasy, and awe; nor must we renounce all forms of spirituality or
mysticism to be on good terms with reason. 572
Although a seemingly Herculean undertaking, Harris believes that is already
within both our reach and our grasp to accomplish it.
Our primary task in our discourse with one another should be to identify
those beliefs that seem least likely to survive another thousand years of
human inquiry, or most likely to prevent it, and subject them to sustained
criticism. Which of our present practices will appear most ridiculous from
the point of view of those future generations that might yet survive the
folly of the present? It is hard to imagine that our religious preoccupations
will not top the list. It is natural to hope that our descendants will look
upon us with gratitude. But we should also hope that they look upon us
with pity and disgust, just as we view the slaveholders of our all-toorecent past. Rather than congratulate ourselves for the state of our
civilization, we should consider how, in the fullness of time, we will seem
hopelessly backward, and work to lay a foundation for such refinements in
the present. We must find our way to a time when faith, without evidence,
disgraces anyone who would claim it. Given the present state of our world,
there appears to be no other future worth wanting.573
Only if and when we are successful we will finally be able to answer Robert Browning’s
ostensibly rhetorical question, “what’s a heaven for?”
In Chapter Two, “The Nature of Belief,” Harris opens with a bold claim: “we are
no more free to believe whatever we want about God than we are free to adopt unjustified
beliefs about science or history, or free to mean whatever we want when using words like
571

Ibid., 43.
Ibid.
573
Ibid., 48. Of course, there are those who would note that faith with evidence equates to
knowledge and thus can no longer be properly understood as faith. To reply, I would simply state that while
faith without evidence may indeed be merely a redundant description of faith itself, this definition also
implies that such unfounded belief should never be considered as synonymous with knowledge (or
considered as grounds for its professed possession by the faithful).
572

290

‘poison’ or ‘north’ or ‘zero.’ Anyone who would lay claim to such entitlements should
not be surprised when the rest of us stop listening to him.”574 Unlike Dawkins and
Dennett who sought to explain and/or expose religious belief as a by-product of
evolution, Harris is primarily concerned with establishing precisely what such belief
necessarily implies and entails. He explains:
We can believe a proposition to be true only because something in our
experience, or in our reasoning about the world, actually speaks to the
truth of the proposition in question.… if a person believes in God because
he has had certain spiritual experiences, or because the Bible makes so
much sense, or because he trusts the authority of the church, he is playing
the same game of justification that we all play when claiming to know the
most ordinary facts. This is probably a conclusion that many religious
believers will want to resist; but resistance is not only futile but
incoherent. There is simply no other logical space for our beliefs about the
world to occupy.575
How, then, has religious belief managed to endure without evidence, in a climate
and culture that otherwise requires it? Harris thinks the explanation is two-fold. First, he
argues that our ability to accurately perceive our own surroundings, satisfactorily
synthesize the consequent data, and form logically coherent assumptions as a result has
been greatly exaggerated. He recounts how “studies of ‘change blindness,’ for instance,
have revealed that we do not perceive nearly as much of the world as we think we do,
since a large percentage of the visual scene can be suddenly altered without our
noticing.”576 But even if our abilities had not been overstated, we would still be faced
with another, even more insurmountable, procedural problem:
If perfect coherence is to be had, each new belief must be checked against
all others, and every combination thereof, for logical contradictions. But
here we encounter a minor computational difficulty: the number of
necessary comparisons grows exponentially as each new proposition is
574
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added to the list. How many beliefs could a perfect brain check for logical
contradictions? The answer is surprising. Even if a computer were as large
as the known universe, built of components no larger than protons, with
switching speeds as fast as the speed of light, all laboring in parallel from
the moment of the big bang up to the present, it would still be fighting to
add a 300th belief to its list.577
In other words, personal embellishments and perceptual failures aside, the human
mind is simply not capable of presenting a complete and consistently coherent image of
the “outside” world. What’s more, such observational shortcomings are invariably
compounded by the fact that those beliefs and conceptualizations that are possible simply
cannot be checked against all previous assumptions and assertions. One wonders how the
human mind does not immediately drown in such an overcrowded and overstimulating
sea of information. For an explanation, Harris returns to the work of Benedict Spinoza.
He states: “Spinoza thought that belief and comprehension were identical, while disbelief
required a subsequent act of rejection. Some very interesting work in psychology bears
this out. It seems rather likely that understanding a proposition is analogous to perceiving
an object in physical space. Our default setting may be to accept appearances as reality
until they prove to be otherwise.”578 This is Harris’ second point, and it explains how
religious faith has survived. It is precisely because so many of its tenets cannot be
empirically disproven that faith has not fallen victim to scientific scrutiny in the same
way that almost every other previously held implausible notion has.
Despite such seemingly-defeatist connotations, Harris does not believe that our
species’ biological limitations must forever render faith off-limits to science. He defiantly
insists that “faith is an impostor.… It is the search for knowledge on the installment plan:
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believe now, live an untestable hypothesis until your dying day, and you will discover
that you were right.”579 He continues:
The truth is of paramount concern to the faithful themselves; indeed, the
truth of a given doctrine is the very object of their faith. The search for
comfort at the expense of truth has never been a motive for religious
belief, since all creeds are chock-full of terrible proposals, which are no
comfort to anyone and which the faithful believe, despite the pain it causes
them, for fear of leaving some dark corner of reality unacknowledged.…
People of faith claim nothing less than knowledge of sacred, redeeming,
and metaphysical truths: Christ died for your sins; He is the Son of God;
All human beings have souls that will be subject to judgment after death.
These are specific claims about the way the world is.… faith in a doctrine
is faith in its truth.… Thus, if a Christian made no tacit claims of
knowledge with regard to the literal truth of scripture, he would be just as
much a Muslim, or a Jew – or an atheist – as a follower of Christ.580
But how does this discovery result in the end of faith Harris so fervently longs
for? He elaborates: “we have names for people who have many beliefs for which there is
no rational justification. When their beliefs are extremely common we call them
‘religious’; otherwise, they are likely to be called ‘mad,’ ‘psychotic,’ or ‘delusional.’…
The danger of religious faith is that it allows otherwise normal human beings to reap the
fruits of madness and consider them holy.”581 Essentially, Harris is arguing that
we must begin speaking freely about what is really in these holy books of
ours, beyond the timid heterodoxies of modernity – the gay and lesbian
ministers, the Muslim clerics who have lost their taste for public
amputations, or the Sunday churchgoers who have never read their Bibles
quite through. A close study of these books, and of history, demonstrates
that there is no act of cruelty so appalling that it cannot be justified, or
even mandated, by recourse to their pages. It is only by the most acrobatic
avoidance of passages whose canonicity has never been in doubt that we
can escape murdering one another outright for the glory of God.582
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It has often been said that “misery loves company.” Harris is, in effect, challenging us to
see whether or not the same holds true for shame.
Chapter Three, “In the Shadow of God,” Harris dedicates to analyzing
Christianity’s historical antipathy towards heretics, witches, and Jews. Like Dawkins’
and Hitchens’ chapters on the Old and New Testaments, Harris’ primary purpose here is
to demonstrate the immense immoral lengths to which religion can drive an otherwise
ethical and intelligent person. In order to demonstrate this tendency in both the medieval
and modern worlds, he decides to examine both the Catholic Inquisition and the Jewish
Holocaust.
To begin, Harris reminds us of the initial target of the Inquisition’s
inextinguishable wrath was neither witchcraft nor Judaism; it was instead Catharism, a
particularly austere form of Manicheanism and/or Gnosticism in which the material joys
of this world were shunned on the promise of eternal bliss in the next one. Of precisely
what were the Cathars guilty? Harris recalls the testimony of Saint Bernard, an outspoken
critic of Catharism: “‘As to [the Cathars’] conversation, nothing can be less
reprehensible… and what they speak, they prove by deeds. As for the morals of the
heretic, he cheats no one, he oppresses no one, he strikes no one; his cheeks are pale with
fasting…. his hands labor for his livelihood.’”583 In other words, the Cathars’
unpardonable crimes were ultimately victimless ones, consisting of little more besides
unorthodox views on creation and the ascetic ideal. Nevertheless, “heresy is heresy.”584
Harris subsequently recounts a number of instances where heretics, fornicators, infidels,
and other religious nonconformists were impulsively accused, inhumanely tortured,
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unjustly convicted, and summarily put to death (usually by fire), before ultimately
concluding:
There really seems to be very little to perplex us here. Burning people who
are destined to burn for all time seems a small price to pay to protect the
people you love from the same fate. Clearly, the common law marriage
between reason and faith – wherein otherwise reasonable men and women
can be motivated by the content of unreasonable beliefs – places society
upon a slippery slope, with confusion and hypocrisy at its heights, and the
torments of the inquisitor waiting below.585
When describing the almost unspeakable horrors borne by some 40,000 – 50,000
persons (over a period of three centuries) suspected of witchcraft, Harris laments that
“even the relentless torture of the accused was given a perverse rationale: the devil, it was
believed, made his charges insensible to pain, despite their cries for mercy. And so it was
that, for centuries, men and women who were guilty of little more than being ugly, old,
widowed, or mentally ill were convicted of impossible crimes and then murdered for
God's sake.”586 What finally brought about an end to such despicable behavior? In a
word, science. Harris notes how the Catholic Church’s decision to end its persecution of
witches did not occur until the mid-nineteenth century, when “the germ theory of disease
emerged, laying to rest much superstition about the causes of illness.”587 And thus it no
longer made sense to accuse women of crimes which they were, all intentions aside,
utterly incapable of committing. What’s more, microorganisms are all but impossible to
see and nowhere near as entertaining to burn.
When describing the plight of the Jews, Harris states that anti-Semitism “is as
integral to church doctrine as the flying buttress is to a Gothic cathedral, and this terrible
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truth has been published in Jewish blood since the first centuries of the common era.”588
Besides the obvious reason of bearing the ultimate responsibility for Jesus’ untimely
death (which nevertheless had to occur), Harris raises the medieval fears of “blood libel”
and “host desecration” as both evidence and explanation of Christianity’s unceasing
antipathy towards Judaism. Like the belief that a witch’s curse could produce illness,
medieval Christians were convinced that their blood (particularly that of their newborn
children) was required in the performance of a number of Jewish rituals. He elaborates:
It was well known that all Jews menstruated, male and female alike, and
required the blood of a Christian to replenish their lost stores. They also
suffered from terrible hemorrhoids and oozing sores as a punishment for
the murder of Christ…. Christian blood was also said to ease the labor
pains of any Jewess fortunate enough to have it spread upon pieces of
parchment and placed into her clenched fists. It was common knowledge,
too, that all Jews were born blind and that, when smeared upon their eyes,
Christian blood granted them the faculty of sight. Jewish boys were
frequently born with their fingers attached to their foreheads, and only the
blood of a Christian could allow this pensive gesture to be broken without
risk to the child.589
Where host desecration was concerned, Harris recounts how the doctrine of
transubstantiation inadvertently led to fears that “the Jews would seek to harm the
Son of God again, knowing that his body was now readily accessible in the form
of defenseless crackers? Historical accounts suggest that as many as three
thousand Jews were murdered in response to a single allegation of this imaginary
crime.”590
As one might imagine, it was once again emergent science, not spontaneous
sympathy, that ultimately demonstrated both the senselessness of these fears and the
ridiculousness of the belief(s) that inspired them. Unfortunately, not even modern-day
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scholarship was able to translate such scientific advances into societal acceptance.
Centuries of mistrust and misinformation between Christian Europe and its sorrowful,
sojourning Jewish population(s) would eventually result in one of the most tragic events
in the history of the world: the Holocaust. As Harris explains:
Nazism evolved out of a variety of economic and political factors, of
course, but it was held together by a belief in the racial purity and
superiority of the German people. The obverse of this fascination with
race was the certainty that all impure elements – homosexuals, invalids,
Gypsies, and, above all, Jews – posed a threat to the fatherland. And while
the hatred of Jews in Germany expressed itself in a predominately secular
way, it was a direct inheritance from medieval Christianity. For centuries,
religious Germans had viewed the Jews as the worst species of heretics
and attributed every societal ill to their continued presence among
the faithful.591
In proof of this inheritance (and this unconscious/unconscionable relationship), Harris
notes that
throughout this period, the church continued to excommunicate
theologians and scholars in droves for holding unorthodox views and to
proscribe books by the hundreds, and yet not a single perpetrator of
genocide – of whom there were countless examples – succeeded in
furrowing Pope Pius XII's censorious brow…. Although not a single
leader of the Third Reich – not even Hitler himself – was ever
excommunicated, Galileo was not absolved of heresy until 1992.592
But today, while the evils of Christianity seem comparatively muted or mild and the
number of its inquisitors appears to be on a precipitous decline, a proliferation of both
seems to be occurring, virtually unchecked and unchallenged, within the Muslim world.
This is the subject of Harris’ next Chapter, “The Problem with Islam.”
Harris maintains that “Islam and Western liberalism remain irreconcilable.
Moderate Islam – really moderate, really critical of Muslim irrationality – scarcely seems
to exist. If it does, it is doing as good a job at hiding as moderate Christianity did in the
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fourteenth century (and for similar reasons).”593 Elsewhere he states: “A future in which
Islam and the West do not stand on the brink of mutual annihilation is a future in which
most Muslims have learned to ignore most of their canon, just as most Christians have
learned to do. Such a transformation is by no means guaranteed to occur, however, given
the tenets of Islam.”594
Such a position is controversial for a number of reasons. First, it appears to single
out Islam as being especially intractable to revision and reform, and thus shifts the
impetus for change solely upon the so-called moderate Muslims who “scarcely seem to
exist.” Second, it seems to minimize the various political and economic crises throughout
the Muslim world, which have undoubtedly coalesced and helped to create the present
instability and reciprocal antagonism. Finally, such a position ostensibly ignores the fact
that such social and political chaos is largely the result of Western intervention and
imperialism. In what follows, Harris will address each criticism, in turn, with an ultimate
eye toward demonstrating that all three fundamentally misinterpret or misrepresent
Muslim ideology.
Harris begins by critiquing the work of Kenneth Pollack:
Like most commentators on these matters, Pollack seems unable to place
himself in the position of one who actually believes the propositions set
forth in the Koran – that paradise awaits, that our senses deliver nothing
but evidence of a fallen world in desperate need of conquest for the glory
of God. Open the Koran, which is perfect in its every syllable, and simply
read it with the eyes of faith.… On almost every page, the Koran instructs
observant Muslims to despise nonbelievers. On almost every page, it
prepares the ground for religious conflict. Anyone who… still [does] not
see a link between Muslim faith and Muslim violence should probably
consult a neurologist.595
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In order to drive his point home, Harris cites several dozen verses from the Koran, all of
which vilify the infidel and encourage (if not outright demand) that violence be visited
upon him. Harris then wryly notes that “this is what the Creator of the universe
apparently has on his mind (when he is not fussing with gravitational constants and
atomic weights).”596
To those who would claim that the conflict between East and West is primarily
political and only superficially religious, Harris argues:
I take it to be more or less self-evident that whenever large numbers of
people begin turning themselves into bombs, or volunteer their children
for use in the clearing of minefields (as was widespread in the Iran-Iraq
war), the rationale behind their actions has ceased to be merely political.
This is not to say that the aspiring martyr does not relish what he imagines
will be the thunderous political significance of his final act, but unless a
person believes some rather incredible things about this universe – in
particular, about what happens after death – he is very unlikely to engage
in behavior of this sort. Nothing explains the actions of Muslim
extremists, and the widespread tolerance of their behavior in the Muslim
world, better than the tenets of Islam.597
He allocates additional space for refuting the claims of Fareed Zakaria:
According to Zakaria, “if there is one great cause of the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab
world.” Perhaps. But “the rise of Islamic fundamentalism” is only a
problem because the fundamentals of Islam are a problem. A rise of Jain
fundamentalism would endanger no one. In fact, the uncontrollable spread
of Jainism throughout the world would improve our situation immensely.
We would lose more of our crops to pests, perhaps (observant Jains
generally will not kill anything, including insects), but we would not find
ourselves surrounded by suicidal terrorists or by a civilization that widely
condones their actions.598
But perhaps the most intriguing section of the chapter is Harris’ argument with
Noam Chomsky. Noting that Chomsky has long been a decrier of United States’ foreign
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policy, Harris begins by agreeing with a great many of his criticisms, before arguing that
they are ultimately beside the point.
We have surely done some terrible things in the past. Undoubtedly, we are
poised to do terrible things in the future. Nothing I have written in this
book should be construed as a denial of these facts, or as defense of state
practices that are manifestly abhorrent. There may be much that Western
powers, and the United States in particular, should pay reparations for.
And our failure to acknowledge our misdeeds over the years has
undermined our credibility in the international community. We can
concede all of this, and even share Chomsky's acute sense of outrage,
while recognizing that his analysis of our current situation in the world is a
masterpiece of moral blindness.599
What is this moral blindness to which he alludes? Harris argues that it is Chomsky’s
decision to consider Western and Eastern (specifically Muslim) intentions as (im)moral
equivalents. Though both sides are undoubtedly responsible for a great deal of death and
destruction:
nothing in Chomsky's account acknowledges the difference between
intending to kill a child, because of the effect you hope to produce on its
parents (we call this “terrorism”), and inadvertently killing a child in an
attempt to capture or kill an avowed child murderer (we call this
“collateral damage”). In both cases a child has died, and in both cases it is
a tragedy. But the ethical status of the perpetrators, be they individuals or
states, could hardly be more distinct.… Where ethics are concerned,
intentions are everything.600
What, then, can we do? Harris has two suggestions, one semantic, the other
substantive. First, we must realize and publically acknowledge that the conflict between
East and West is, at its core, a religious/ideological one. Such an admission would not
only recast our respective efforts in an entirely new light, but it would also serve to
reflect some of that light back on a scarcely-visible problem we still have at home. As
Harris explains:
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Western leaders who insist that our conflict is not with Islam are mistaken;
but, as I argue throughout this book, we have a problem with Christianity
and Judaism as well. It is time we recognized that all reasonable men and
women have a common enemy. It is an enemy so near to us, and so
deceptive, that we keep its counsel even as it threatens to destroy the very
possibility of human happiness. Our enemy is nothing other than faith
itself.601
Harris thinks that such an acknowledgment would help us to distinguish and define
precisely what it is, in terms of values and beliefs, that separates us from our adversaries.
And by recognizing faith as a common foe, as opposed to the common friend it is
currently believed to be, Harris believes that our respective causes could ultimately
transcend their tribalistic tendencies and at long last attain truly humanistic status. This is
his second suggestion.
What constitutes a civil society? At minimum, it is a place where ideas, of
all kinds, can be criticized without the risk of physical violence. If you live
in a land where certain things cannot be said about the king, or about an
imaginary being, or about certain books, because such utterances carry the
penalty of death, torture, or imprisonment, you do not live in a civil
society. It appears that one of the most urgent tasks we now face in the
developed world is to find some way of facilitating the emergence of civil
societies everywhere else.602
But lest one think that our problems rest solely, or even primarily, in the East
under the iron fist of Islam, Harris’ fifth chapter, “West of Eden,” reminds us that there
are still many obstacles we have yet to overcome at home. Harris opens the chapter with
an especially distressing example. “For many years U.S. policy in the Middle East has
been shaped, at least in part, by the interests that fundamentalist Christians have in the
future of a Jewish state. Christian ‘support for Israel’ is, in fact, an example of religious
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cynicism so transcendental as to go almost unnoticed in our political discourse.”603
Similarly, when commenting on the war on terror,
undersecretary of defense for intelligence at the Pentagon, William Boykin, once stated
that “our enemy is a guy named Satan.”604 And although such comments seemed to raise
a skeptical eyebrow or two in the media, Harris laments that “most Americans probably
took them in stride. After all, 65 percent of us are quite certain that Satan exists.”605 But it
is not just in matters of foreign policy where the specter of faith casts its ominous
shadow.
Harris recalls how former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay once “attributed
the shootings at the Columbine High School in Colorado to the fact that our schools teach
the theory of evolution,” and how former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia had often
referenced his faith to vindicate America’s continued belief in the morality and justice of
capital punishment.606 He then notes how our perpetual war on drugs, as well as the
particular moral and judicial vigilance we display toward private matters engaged in
either individually or between consenting adults (recreational drug use, the viewing of
pornography, prostitution, sodomy, etc.) are almost always victimless crimes. From a
strictly economic perspective, it scarcely makes sense that we, as a nation, should spend
upwards of $4 billion in an effort to curtail marijuana usage, while allocating only $93
million to securing our seaports, and only $2 billion to rebuilding Afghanistan’s
devastated infrastructure. It also seems strange that “more people are imprisoned for
nonviolent drug offenses in the United States than are incarcerated, for any reason, in all
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of Western Europe (which has a larger population).”607 However, when one considers
that “the idea of a victimless crime is nothing more than a judicial reprise of the Christian
notion of sin,” such behavior begins to make (at least some kind of) sense.608 Harris
explains:
It is no accident that people of faith often want to curtail the private
freedoms of others. This impulse has less to do with the history of religion
and more to do with its logic, because the very idea of privacy is
incompatible with the existence of God. If God sees and knows all things,
and remains so provincial a creature as to be scandalized by certain sexual
behaviors or states of the brain, then what people do in the privacy of their
own homes, though it may not have the slightest implication for their
behavior in public, will still be a matter of public concern for people of
faith.609
The implications of such actions are harmful enough at home, but their damage extends
far beyond our physical and ideological borders. As Harris describes: “Such a bizarre
allocation of resources is sure to keep Afghanistan in ruins for many years to come. It
will also leave
Afghan farmers with no alternative but to grow opium. Happily for them, our drug laws
still render this a highly profitable enterprise.”610
But perhaps Harris’ most illustrative example is his discussion of the debate over
stem cell research. He states:
Here is what we know. We know that much can be learned from research
on embryonic stem cells. In particular, such research may give us further
insight into the processes of cell division and cell differentiation. This
would almost certainly shed new light on those medical conditions, like
cancer and birth defects, that seem to be merely a matter of these
processes gone awry. We also know that research on embryonic stem cells
requires the destruction of human embryos at the 150-cell stage. There is
not the slightest reason to believe, however, that such embryos have the
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capacity to sense pain, to suffer, or to experience the loss of life in any
way at all. What is indisputable is that there are millions of human beings
who do have these capacities, and who currently suffer from traumatic
injuries to the brain and spinal cord. Millions more suffer from Parkinson's
and Alzheimer's diseases. Millions more suffer from stroke and heart
disease, from burns, from diabetes, from rheumatoid arthritis, from
Purkinje cell degeneration, from Duchenne muscular dystrophy, and from
vision and hearing loss. We know that embryonic stem cells promise to be
a renewable source of tissues and organs that might alleviate such
suffering in the not too distant future.611
Thus, the allegations of immorality that often swirl around stem cell research are, at best,
stagnating in murky, ill-conceived waters. As Harris notes, “In neurological terms, we
surely visit more suffering upon this earth by killing a fly than by killing a human
blastocyst, to say nothing of a human zygote (flies, after all, have 100,000 cells in their
brains alone).… Those opposed to therapeutic stem-cell research on religious grounds
constitute the biological and ethical equivalent of a flat-earth society.”612 He ultimately
concludes:
Faith drives a wedge between ethics and suffering. Where certain actions
cause no suffering at all, religious dogmatists still maintain that they are
evil and worthy of punishment (sodomy, marijuana use, homosexuality,
the killing of blastocysts, etc.). And yet, where suffering and death are
found in abundance their causes are often deemed to be good (withholding
funds for family planning in the third world, prosecuting nonviolent drug
offenders, preventing stem-cell research, etc). This inversion of priorities
not only victimizes innocent people and squanders scarce resources; it
completely falsifies our ethics. It is time we found a more reasonable
approach to answering questions of right and wrong.613
This is precisely what Harris sets out to do in his final two chapters, “A Science
of Good and Evil,” and “Experiments in Consciousness.” He begins by stating that “our
ethical intuitions must have their precursors in the natural world, for while nature is
indeed red in tooth and claw, it is not merely so. Even monkeys will undergo
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extraordinary privations to avoid causing harm to another member of their species.
Concern for others was not the invention of any prophet.”614 But just what shape might a
science of morality take?615 Harris admits that the question is “one for which I do not
have a detailed answer – other than to say that whatever answer we give should reflect
our sense of the possible subjectivity of the creatures in question.”616 In other words, the
various anthropocentric (human-based) and theocentric (god-based) moralities of religion
must eventually yield to more inclusive forms in which consideration and compassion is
extended to all living creatures deemed capable of suffering from its absence.617 But
whatever the form, Harris thinks the answer will invariably be tied to the advancements
(and perhaps limitations) of neuroscience. After all, this has already occurred in several
other areas of study. As Harris explains: “To say that a person is ‘color-blind’ or
‘achromatopsic’ is now a straightforward statement about the state of the visual pathways
in his brain, while to say that he is ‘an evil sociopath’ or ‘lacking in moral fiber’ seems
hopelessly unscientific. This will almost certainly change.”618
In addition to faith, Harris identifies a number of other obstacles standing between
us and a science of good and evil. The two most prominent and most pressing, he
believes, are relativism and intuition. Harris notes how the first, relativism, has found
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favor in many intellectual circles inside and out of the university, and in so doing has
“placed all worldviews more or less on an equal footing. No one is ever really right about
what he believes; he can only point to a community of peers who believe likewise.”619
Harris dismisses this view out of hand by demonstrating just how logically incoherent it
truly is.
The general retort to relativism is simple, because most relativists
contradict their thesis in the very act of stating it. Take the case of
relativism with respect to morality: moral relativists generally believe that
all cultural practices should be respected on their own terms, that the
practitioners of the various barbarisms that persist around the globe cannot
be judged by the standards of the West, nor can the people of the past be
judged by the standards of the present. And yet, implicit in this approach
to morality lurks a claim that is not relative but absolute. Most moral
relativists believe that tolerance of cultural diversity is better, in some
important sense, than outright bigotry. This may be perfectly reasonable,
of course, but it amounts to an overarching claim about how all human
beings should live. Moral relativism, when used as a rationale for
tolerance of diversity, is self-contradictory.620
But while the problem of relativism may have proven itself to be at least
somewhat substantive, the issue of intuition Harris considers to be far more semantic in
scope. After noting that the principal issue practitioners of science and logic have
traditionally taken with intuition is its ostensibly oppositional stance to reason, Harris
argues that this belief is actually a false dichotomy of sorts. He explains:
Reason is itself intuitive to the core, as any judgment that a proposition is
“reasonable” or “logical” relies on intuition to find its feet. One often
hears scientists and philosophers concede that something or other is a
“brute fact” – that is, one that admits of no reduction. The question of why
physical events have causes, say, is not one that scientists feel the slightest
temptation to ponder. It is just so. To demand an accounting of so basic a
fact is like asking how we know that two plus two equals four. Scientists
presuppose the validity of such brutishness – as, indeed, they must.621
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That is, those in favor of a more scientifically-sound notion of ethics and morality need
not divorce themselves of their intuitive sense or sensibility. These can instead be
repurposed to labor in the service of science in a way that is both collaborative and
constructive to the overall enterprise.
Perhaps an example or two of the ways in which relativism and intuition currently
function in our moral discourse will serve to demonstrate Harris’ ultimate point that both
are in need of reconsideration and revision. In the case of relativism, Harris suggests that
we “consider the practice of ‘honor killing.’”622 Where intuition is concerned, he chooses
to deliberate on our intuitive sense of right and wrong within the context and the confines
of our current war on terror. I include both instances below.
On honor killing, Harris writes:
What can we say about this behavior? Can we say that Middle Eastern
men who are murderously obsessed with female sexual purity actually
love their wives, daughters, and sisters less than American or European
men do? Of course, we can. And what is truly incredible about the state of
our discourse is that such a claim is not only controversial but actually
unutterable in most contexts.… Any culture that raises men and boys to
kill unlucky girls, rather than comfort them, is a culture that has managed
to retard the growth of love. Such societies, of course, regularly fail to
teach their inhabitants many other things – like how to read. Not learning
how to read is not another style of literacy, and not learning to see others
as ends in themselves is not another style of ethics. It is a failure of
ethics.623
As for intuition, specifically how it relates to our acceptance of warfare and our
simultaneous aversion to torture, Harris states:
The difference between killing one man and killing a thousand just doesn't
seem as salient to us as it should…. In many cases we will find the former
far more disturbing. Three million souls can be starved and murdered in
the Congo, and our Argus-eyed media scarcely blink. When a princess
dies in a car accident, however, a quarter of the earth's population falls
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prostrate with grief. Perhaps we are unable to feel what we must feel in
order to change our world.… Whenever we consent to drop bombs, we do
so with the knowledge that some number of children will be blinded,
disemboweled, paralyzed, orphaned, and killed by them. It is curious that
while the torture of Osama bin Laden himself could be expected to
provoke convulsions of conscience among our leaders, the unintended
(though perfectly foreseeable, and therefore accepted) slaughter of
children does not.624
In other words, perplexing moral quagmires such as these can and will continue to result
so long as our intuition is permitted to exist and to operate outside of and in opposition to
science and reason. Only when all such forces combine can a true science of morality
finally emerge.
In his final chapter, “Experiments in Consciousness,” Harris makes the intriguing
case that spirituality can indeed be sequestered from all forms of belief and that what
remains can be empirically studied and/or experientially confirmed by almost everyone.
Though a controversial claim, in the eyes of both the religious as well as his fellow
atheists, Harris explains:
The history of human spirituality is the history of our attempts to explore
and modify the deliverances of consciousness through methods like
fasting, chanting, sensory deprivation, prayer, meditation, and the use of
psychotropic plants. There is no question that experiments of this sort can
be conducted in a rational manner. Indeed, they are some of our only
means of determining to what extent the human condition can be
deliberately transformed. Such an enterprise becomes irrational only when
people begin making claims about the world that cannot be supported by
empirical evidence.625
Unlike Hitchens, Harris believes that some Eastern traditions, Buddhism in particular,
may have certain insights to offer the West in its quest, particularly those of mindfulness
meditation and the illusory nature of self. He argues:
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Even the contemporary literature on consciousness, which spans
philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience, cannot
match the kind of precise, phenomenological studies that can be found
throughout the Buddhist canon.… The fundamental insight of most
Eastern schools of spirituality, however, is that while thinking is a
practical necessity, the failure to recognize thoughts as thoughts, moment
after moment, is what gives each of us the feeling that we call “I,” and this
is the string upon which all our states of suffering and dissatisfaction are
strung.… Once the selflessness of consciousness has been glimpsed,
spiritual life can be viewed as a matter of freeing one’s attention more
and more so that this recognition can become stabilized.626
In the epilogue, Harris reiterates his original thesis:
We do not know what awaits each of us after death, but we know that we
will die. Clearly, it must be possible to live ethically – with a genuine
concern for the happiness of other sentient beings – without presuming to
know things about which we are patently ignorant. Consider it: every
person you have ever met, every person you will pass in the street today, is
going to die. Living long enough, each will suffer the loss of his friends
and family. All are going to lose everything they love in this world. Why
would one want to be anything but kind to them in the meantime? ... There
need be no scheme of rewards and punishments transcending this life to
justify our moral intuitions or to render them effective in guiding our
behavior in the world. The only angels we need invoke are those of our
better nature: reason, honesty, and love. The only demons we must fear
are those that lurk inside every human mind: ignorance, hatred, greed, and
faith, which is surely the devil's masterpiece.627

Part II: Criticisms and Rebuttals
In his aptly-entitled “Long Response to Harris’ The End of Faith,” Neil Shenvi
writes:
The End of Faith… is not actually a reasoned argument, as one might
expect from the title. Instead, the book is a very well-constructed polemic,
a careful cutting diatribe against the very idea of a personal,
communicative God and the abuses that Harris feels such an idea
necessarily entails.… Rather than achieve some purely intellectual
626
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refutation of God’s existence, Harris mounts an emotional attack against
the havoc that religion has wreaked against the average person in terms of
emotional and physical suffering.628
Shenvi’s rejection of Harris’ thesis seems to hang primarily on two basic
misconceptions regarding the roles that “intuition” and “authority” play in the overall
framework of Harris’ arguments. Observe the following passage:
We have to ask the question: if we disallow any appeal to faith, then
exactly which sources are allowed as valid sources of knowledge?
Certainly, Harris affirms that reason and observation must be accepted as
sources of truth. But what about intuition? ... Even at our least generous,
we have to admit that what is truly intuitive to one person may be wildly
counterintuitive to another. What might seem obviously true to me might
seem unclear or even obviously false to you. So should we allow intuition
as a valid means to knowledge or should it be dismissed along with faith
as irrational and subjective?629
Even a cursory examination of Harris’ thoughts on the subject will demonstrate that
Shenvi has misunderstood them entirely. As Harris explains in Chapter Six, even
something as inherently subjective as intuition can be put to the same sort of evidentiary
test as any other hypothesis. He writes:
Is it reasonable to believe, as many Chinese apparently do, that tiger-bone
wine leads to virility? No, it is not. Could it become reasonable? Indeed it
could. We need only be confronted with a well-run, controlled study
yielding a significant correlation between tiger bones and human prowess.
Would a reasonable person expect to find such a correlation? It does not
seem very likely. But if it came, reason would be forced to yield its
present position, which is that the Chinese are
destroying a wondrous species of animal for no reason at all.630
In other words, for Harris, intuition (on both the individual and cultural levels) represents
only the beginning of the process, not the end, as Shenvi suggests. So long as it is
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subsequently subjected to the rigors of science and logic, intuition can remain a most
valuable, indeed indispensable, tool in the skeptic’s analytical handbag.
Much the same can be said of Shenvi’s criticisms of authority. He states:
History has shown us time and again that any appeal to the authority of
experts is necessarily limited by the prevalent scientific understanding of a
given culture. The geocentric universe, the four elements, and the moral
influence theory of disease have all been in agreement with the
overwhelming consensus of experts. The fact that these ideas were all
eventually overturned is terrifying, not reassuring.631
Except for the final point on whether such history is terrifying or reassuring, I think
Shenvi and Harris would find themselves very much in agreement for most of the
preceding paragraph. There is just one problem: “The geocentric universe, the four
elements, and the moral influence theory of disease,” were all theories first formed well
before the dawn of modern science (and the adoption of the scientific method as its
evidentiary foundation). And in each instance, it was science, not appeals to some
unknown or unknowable authority, which ultimately came to demonstrate that each
previously-held assumption was indeed false. It seems, therefore, that science is
particularly well-positioned in its authoritative posture, precisely because it requires
either a falsifiable hypothesis or a reproducible result.
In seeming anticipation of this rebuttal, Shenvi argues that
As human beings, we are always left appealing to some standard of truth
with which there can be no argument. This standard could be the
testimony of experts, our own intuition, or our own sensory perceptions,
but in the end it all comes down to bare belief. Even an appeal to reason
itself depends on an ultimately unreasoned assurance in the validity of
reasoning.…When push comes to shove, there may not be a strict,
rigorous, philosophical difference between believing in gravity and
believing in the Tooth Fairy. Both might ultimately depend on our appeal
to some infallible source.632
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To anyone who would argue that the practice of placing a tooth under one’s pillow and
awaiting monetary reward implies the same sort of reliance on “intuition” or “the
testimony of experts” that leaping from one’s roof does, I can only shake my head in
amazement and ask that one not take my word for it, but rather test that hypothesis for
themselves.633
Shenvi’s comments concerning the supposed conflict between the search for truth
and the desire for happiness are also particularly revealing. He writes:
For a Christian, the very real temporal conflict between truth and
happiness is ultimately resolved only by the existence of a good, personal
God. Not only is a personal knowledge of our Creator the ultimate good
which can be experienced by even the most abject and miserable of human
beings, but God promises that a personal relationship with Him is
ultimately eternal. So even in the present, Christians who suffer will find
real comfort and real happiness in knowing that they are rightly related to
their Creator. What is more, because God is eternal, a Christian can know
that no amount of present suffering can ever be compared to the future and
eternal glory that God has promised to those He has forgiven (see Romans
8:18-39 or the famous C.S. Lewis sermon The Weight of Glory ). Thus, a
Christian can always choose the truth knowing that truth and happiness
will never ultimately conflict. But this affirmation depends absolutely on
the real existence of the Christian God. How such an affirmation can be
made by an atheist is a mystery to me.634
Although Shenvi seems to think this tension between truth and happiness represents a
fundamental flaw in Harris’ thinking, I would argue that it is actually a perfect example
of the sort of faith that Harris references in Chapter Two: “it is the search for knowledge
on the installment plan: believe now, live an untestable hypothesis until your dying day,
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and you will discover that you were right.”635 In other words, by setting itself up to be
ultimately undisprovable, faith in the eventual reconcilability between truth and
happiness proves that it is founded upon nothing more than the shifting sands of wishful
thinking and thus does not merit any serious attention from those concerned with
reasonableness of any sort or stripe.
Shenvi also describes what he believes to be an insurmountable semantic problem
with Harris’ overall thesis: the “is-ought” distinction, sometimes referred to as the
“naturalistic fallacy.” He writes:
The tragic failure of Harris’ worldview is this inability to reckon with the
unavoidable “ought”. By redefining morality in objective terms, Harris
can certainly bring “good” and “evil” into the realm of the observable.
But he still cannot tell us why we “ought” to seek the good and abhor the
evil. Any true free thinker, any Nietzschean Superman willing to flout
Harris’ definitions and ask the truly difficult questions will find no answer.
We “ought” to seek the global happiness of our neighbor at the expense of
our own happiness simply because everyone else does or because it will
make society run smoothly or because it is encoded in our genes. By
disposing of any transcendental basis for the “ought” of moral value,
Harris destroys moral value as a category altogether. Again, this is the
same obstacle that has been approached time and again by great atheist
thinkers of the past. Nihilism, existentialism, and postmodernism are all
valid materialistic responses to this problem. To me, it is fairly clear that
Harris ultimately makes no more progress than they do.636
Although a seemingly difficult challenge to Harris’ framework, a look at the way in
which Shenvi “solves” this problem through the lens of his own faith will, I believe,
serve to demonstrate that religion hardly provides a more satisfying explanation. Shenvi
argues:
The tripersonality of God clarifies the nature of moral obligation.
Obviously the doctrine of the Trinity is difficult and mysterious, but for
our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the Bible says that God is
intrinsically relational. In a general theistic conception of God, personal
635
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relationship did not exist until God created other beings. However, the
Bible indicates that God, within Himself, is personal so that the personal
antecedes the impersonal. This fact explains why all of the common
moral imperatives and certainly all of the biblical moral injunctions are
deeply personal. The Ten Commandments begin not with the rules
themselves but with the reminder that Yahweh brought the Israelites out of
Egypt. All real moral imperatives function in the same way; the
commands to love the poor, care for the helpless, and respect property are
all interpersonal commands that come from an interpersonal God.637
I would contend that any appeal to the tripartite nature of God as instructive (of anything)
creates more problems and raises more questions than it could ever remedy or resolve.
What’s more, a brief historical investigation into just how this doctrine eventually came
to be affirmed by the church demonstrates the many self-induced contradictions that such
a belief entails, as well as the many condemnations of unorthodox views that resulted
along the way.
Nevertheless, when attempting to establish the singular virtues of Christianity,
Shenvi makes the following case:
Every other religion would urge us to keep the moral law with the hope of
satisfying or pacifying or appeasing or pleasing God. The Bible says we
are hopeless. We have already broken the moral law a million times in a
million ways and God is now our judge. At the same time, every other
religion says that God must be satisfied or pacified or appeased by us
keeping the moral law to the best of our ability. Even Harris’ Spiritual
Atheism would tell us that our ability to live a happy and fulfilled life
depends on our ability to live up to our moral standards. But the Bible
says otherwise. It says that God will accept us simply on the basis of what
He did for us in Christ and make us good and holy and happy simply for
His own sake. The Bible is both more radically pessimistic and more
radically optimistic than any other book in history – radically pessimistic
about us and radically optimistic about God.638
This is where Shenvi’s argument truly unravels. The Bible does indeed say otherwise.
And it is certainly “radically pessimistic” of humans and “radically optimistic” about
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God. But isn’t this precisely Harris’ point? Rather than holding mankind to a higher
moral standard, religion actually provides the means of effectively circumventing its
moral teachings altogether.639 Perhaps Shenvi is right: perhaps both systems are
ultimately inimitable. But either way, it seems that Shenvi’s notion of religion opens the
door to far more regressive and inhumane behavior on the part of its adherents than
Harris’ more secular formulation could ever allow or forgive.640

In his article for The Nation, entitled “The Gods Must Be Crazy,” Daniel Lazere
doesn’t so much take aim at the tenets of Harris’ arguments as take issue with its tone. He
writes:
Harris is a doctoral student in neuroscience at UCLA, yet the nice thing is
that there is still something of the undergraduate about him. Everyone
knows the type, the smart aleck in the back of the room who isn’t afraid to
raise questions that everyone else is too polite to ask, questions like: If bad
ideas lead to bad acts, then why should we allow individuals to entertain
ideas that are incorrect? If a friend mistakenly believes he is dying of
cancer, shouldn’t we disabuse him of the notion so that he doesn’t do
something drastic, like throw himself under a train? If he believes,
similarly, that unbelievers are destined for hell, shouldn’t we disabuse him
of that so he isn’t tempted to speed the process by shooting or blowing
them up?641
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Notice how this criticism in no way refutes any of Harris’ main points. And since it
seems that Lazere can make no substantive claims against him, the only recourse open to
him is to label Harris’ entire treatise as sophomoric (as evidenced by his “something of
an undergraduate about him” remark).
He continues:
Harris is well informed in some areas, but embarrassingly bereft in others.
While he knows a fair amount about religion and philosophy, he has little
feel for politics and even less for the ironies of historical development.
Religion, as he sees it, is a bad idea that has lodged itself under the human
skull and must be driven out. “It is difficult to imagine a set of beliefs
more suggestive of mental illness than those that lie at the heart of many
of our religious traditions,” he writes. Perhaps. Yet he fails to understand
the process by which ancient thinkers, struggling to understand the
cosmos, would come up with hypotheses that seem ludicrous in our day
but were nonetheless a significant advance in their own. Citing the
Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, he wisecracks that not only can
Jesus be “eaten in the form of a cracker” as a consequence, but that “a few
Latin words spoken over your favorite Burgundy, and you can drink his
blood as well.” Yet transubstantiation was an attempt to make sense of
Jesus’ death, an event that Christians mistakenly believed had transformed
the cosmos but that we now know merely helped to transform Western
society. If Harris had any idea of the blood and passion expended over
such doctrines, he might hesitate before engaging in low-brow, frat-house
humor.642
But let’s examine Lazere’s claim that Harris “doesn’t understand the process by which
ancient thinkers” thought. His preferred example of the doctrine of transubstantiation is
particularly telling. Although Lazere ultimately seems to share Harris’ opinion that
Christians were mistaken to believe in such unsubstantiated speculation, he nevertheless
defends their efforts as worthy of reverence and respect. In so doing, he condemns
Harris’ critique as factually true, but expressively callous. When he implores Harris to
remember the “blood and passion expended over such doctrines,” one marvels at the
irony that Lazere appears not to recognize that such undue reverence and respect are far
642
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more to blame for those human losses and intellectual expenditures than the critic whose
seemingly unsophisticated claims belie an ultimately obvious truth.

Nevertheless, Lazere’s criticisms are echoed in Stephanie Merrit’s article, “Faith
No More.” In it, she writes:
Unfortunately, Harris too often allows his anger at this continued
deference to unreason to colour his tone, slipping into an incredulous
sarcasm which might appeal to readers who agree with him, but could
only succeed in alienating those who need to be persuaded.… Sadly for
the forces of reason, it is not one that a born-again President or a Prime
Minister singing the praises of faith schools is likely to heed.643
In his review of The End of Faith, Michael Orthofer concurs:
One understands Harris' frustration with the prevalence and influence of
something as far-fetched (indeed, ridiculous) as faith in what is found in
the Bible or the Koran. But stating the obvious – these are bad, bad ideas,
leading people to do bad, bad things – unfortunately doesn't really get you
very far. Those who recognize religion for what it is – literally: nonsense –
can nod in agreement and enjoy the fact that someone writes so freely
about it. Those who have faith will shake their heads at how misguided
poor Harris is, sad for him that he can't accept what to them is obvious; it
seems extremely unlikely that this book could in any way shake their
beliefs.644
What neither Merrit nor Orthofer seems to realize is that even their comparatively
congenial tones toward religion betray their inner contempt for much of its history and
many of its doctrines.645 As a result, their words would likely gain precious little traction
that Harris’ could not. This is not only patently obvious in Orthofer’s remarks, but also
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contained within Merrit’s review as well, as she subsequently (and perhaps
subconsciously) admits:
Yet his central argument in The End of Faith is sound: religion is the only
area of human knowledge in which it is still acceptable to hold beliefs
dating from antiquity and a modern society should subject those beliefs to
the same principles that govern scientific, medical or geographical inquiry
- particularly if they are inherently hostile to those with different ideas. It's
easy to laugh at the man who believes aliens are sending him messages
through his hairdryer, but we don't let him run schools or make public
broadcasts as if his view were anything other than a delusion. It's less
amusing that international policy is decided by men who believe that the
book beside their bed was written by an invisible deity and is above doubt
or questioning.646
In other words, both Merrit and Orthofer admit that Harris’ criticisms are correct; they
simply wish he would tone down his rhetoric to more respectful levels in order to reach a
wider and more receptive religious audience. Such a plea, though ostensibly reasonable,
ignores the fact that, for the vast majority of its history, organized religion could compel
the sort of unquestioning respect it would now politely request. As the inspiration and
aftermath of various ecumenical councils, excommunications, and crusades can attest
(not to mention the incalculable lives lost to the victimless crimes of heresy, blasphemy,
witchcraft, and apostasy), religion’s appeals to affability and mutual respect must be
swallowed not only with a grain of salt but also with the bitter pill of personal
accountability that science and reason have at long last forced down its throat.
When viewed in this light, the arguments of David Segal, in his article, “Atheist
Evangelist,” fall equally flat because he, too, confuses respect for individuals with respect
for ill-founded ideology.647 He writes of:
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another problem with Harris's work often cited by critics: He can preach
only to those who have left the choir. As a critique of faith, “You people
are nuts” isn't likely to change a lot of minds. There is the broader
question, too, of whether religious moderates really are enablers for
extremists. Maybe moderates are a bulwark against fanatics. If this is
really a war of ideas, it is probably not a war between no religion (which is
what Harris would like) and extremism. It’s a war between moderation
and extremism, which is a war one needs moderates to fight.648
In his review of Harris’ subsequent Letter to a Christian Nation, John Wilson
writes, with similar conviction that
If Harris is right, there can't be any genuine engagement between
reasonable people (people like Sam Harris) and Christians or other
religious believers. As Douglas Wilson observes, “It is one thing to say
that we ought to move away from politically-correct euphemisms (which I
agree with), and then to go on to say that everyone in the history of the
world outside your little atheistic society is a raving psychopathic
wackjob.”649
Of course, one could reasonably argue that were such an earthly alliance between
moderates and secularists ever to succeed in wiping out religious extremism in all its
myriad forms, the ideological conflict would likely evolve into a struggle between
moderate believers and nonbelievers themselves, or else the source of that animosity,
belief itself, would likewise find itself either summarily extinguished or violently
triumphant.

In his article, “Good and Bad in All,” David Honigmann argues that Harris’
problem is not that it alienates fundamentalists, but rather that he himself is one.
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Fundamentalist-bashing is common enough. But Harris, who is
completing a doctorate in neuroscience at UCLA, goes further than this.
He extends his condemnation even to believers who do not subscribe to
the full panoply of fundamentalist dogma. Such people often regard
themselves on many issues as allies of liberal humanists against the
fundamentalists. (The novelist Marilynne Robinson, for example, recently
bewailed the embarrassment she feels as a liberal Protestant among her
academic friends when her faith lumps her with the resurgent Christian
Right.) Not so, says Harris. Anyone who admits to any religious belief at
all - anyone who argues for respect for religious belief - creates the space
in which fundamentalism flourishes. He who is not with us is against us.
This is a grave charge – and Harris’s argument takes a leaf from the
fundamentalists’ book. In essence, he takes religions at their own
valuation: they are belief systems which logically can be either accepted
wholly or rejected utterly. Half-believing, picking and choosing, make no
sense, he says. On this point at least, he can expect a loud chorus of amens
from his opponents.650
This charge of fundamentalist atheism is perhaps the most common (and least credible)
critique leveled against Harris. In arguing for a worldview based principally upon
science, reason, and personal responsibility, Harris has somehow been conflated or
equated with those whose ideologies neither delight in nor depend upon any of them. As
a result, his arguments are seen by many to represent a dichotomy of sorts between
unqualified religious belief and absolute disbelief. This is hardly his intention. Harris
merely wishes to demonstrate that the perceived chasm between religious liberalism and
inquisitorial orthodoxy is nowhere near as wide or as deep as is commonly believed and
asserted.
To use Mr. Honigmann’s example: if Marilynne Robinson is truly embarrassed
that her liberal Protestantism has been lumped in with the “resurgent Christian Right,”
Harris would likely ask that she reconsider the source of that embarrassment. Is it truly a
result of his arguments, or is it instead that, for all their professed differences, the
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foundational beliefs of liberal Protestants and conservative Evangelicals are, at their
center, actually one and the same? Any distinctions drawn between the two, regardless of
by whom and for what purpose, must be supported from outside the pages of scripture
and freestanding from the tenets and traditions of the faith.651 (What’s more,
Honigmann’s attempt to create a false dichotomy in order to refute a similar charge
seems a somewhat duplicitous, if not downright disingenuous enterprise.)

In a vein similar to Honigmann’s, James Jones argues, in his article, “Growing Criticism
by Atheists of the New Atheism Movement,” that
many of today’s “New Atheists” reprise a nineteenth century argument
about the “warfare of science with theology” (to use the title of one of the
most well-known books of this genre by A.D. White published in the
1870s). There is a great deal of evidence that this cliché has little historical
validity. For example… many of the early pioneers of natural science were
deeply religious; Copernicus’ theory was not immediately rejected by the
Catholic Church (Copernicus held minor orders in the church and a
cardinal wrote the introduction); and certain theologically based concepts
like “natural law” were crucial for the development of science in the west.
While some religious positions conflict with science… there is little
evidence to support a grotesquely over-generalized “conflict myth”
regarding the larger story of the interaction of science and religion.652
However, what Jones neglected to mention was that, despite its initial acceptance of
Copernicus’ heliocentric theory, the Catholic Church eventually condemned it as
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For instance, while Evangelical conservatives might argue for the literal truth of New
Testament miracles, liberal Protestants might advocate a more metaphorical meaning instead. However,
liberals do not discount the existence or significance of miracles entirely because of their foundational
importance to both traditions (as evidence of God’s transformative power) and the antipathy that would
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heretical, whilst also consigning two of its most gallant proponents (Giordano Bruno and
Galileo Galilei) to similarly unpleasant fates. As Steph Solis explains in her article,
“Copernicus and the Church: What the History Books Don’t Say”:
One possible reason for the misconceptions about Copernicus is the
execution of Giordano Bruno, a philosopher who was known as a heretic
and an advocate of Copernican theory. While he was condemned for other
reasons, Bruno became known as “the first martyr of the new science”
after he was burned at the stake in 1600. However… Copernicus gained
ridicule from poets and Protestants, who condemned it [his heliocentric
theory] as heresy. While the Catholic Church initially accepted
heliocentricity, Catholics eventually joined the wave of Protestant
opposition and banned the book in 1616. The Protestant churches accepted
Copernicus’ findings after more evidence emerged to support it. The
Catholic Church, however, remained ground[ed] in its anti-Copernican
beliefs until the 19th century. The ban on Copernicus's views was lifted in
1822… the ban on his book [not] until 1835.653
This is important for two reasons. First, it goes to Harris’ point that
it is a truism to say that people of faith have created almost everything of
value in our world, because nearly every person who has ever swung a
hammer or trimmed a sail has been a devout member of one or another
religious culture. There has been simply no one else to do the job. We can
also say that every human achievement prior to the twentieth century was
accomplished by men and women who were perfectly ignorant of the
molecular basis of life. Does this suggest that a nineteenth-century view of
biology would have been worth maintaining? There is no telling what our
world would now be like had some great kingdom of Reason emerged at
the time of the Crusades and pacified the credulous multitudes of Europe
and the Middle East. We might have had modern
democracy and the Internet by the year 1600.654
Secondly, even if it appears that very little conflict has historically existed between
science and religion, this suggests that there are good reasons for suspecting otherwise.
Given religion’s centuries-long stranglehold on almost all aspects of Western life, it
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seems to me far more likely that controversial and potentially heretical claims, such as
those made by Copernicus, Bruno, and Galileo, were dealt with quickly and severely, and
are thus the norms of this period, not the exceptions they are so routinely professed to be.
That we know their names at all is a testament to the scientific scruples of their work, not
the (eventual) benevolent acceptance of the Church.655

Citing the work of C.J. Werleman, David Hoelscher, in his article, “New Atheism,
Worse Than You Think,” writes that
“It’s time for pluralistic and humanistic atheists to take atheism back
from” the likes of Harris, Dawkins, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, antitheists “who
peddle fear, suspicion, and hate.” Because Muslims are, by dint of
demagogic propaganda, such central targets of that toxic combination, he
wisely advises atheist organizations to reject the ugly rhetoric of the New
Atheists and to “seek opportunities to work together with other
discriminated-against minorities, like Muslim Americans.” “The road to
broader public acceptance,” Werleman writes “does not travel through the
persecution of another minority” – a belief that, while not always
descriptively true, is certainly the right ethical position.656
I would ask that one pay special attention to the first and last sentences of Hoelscher’s
statement: “It’s time for pluralistic and humanistic atheists to take atheism back,” and
“the road to broader public acceptance,” Werleman writes “does not travel through the
persecution of another minority”—a belief that, while not always descriptively true, is
certainly the right ethical position.” Does this mean that Harris and those like him, are by
comparison, exclusive and inhumane? The last sentence proves that the answer to such a
question must be no. For if a belief in pluralism and respective tolerance is not
655
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descriptively true, then it is not true in any way that truly matters.657 In fact, one should
not even claim that it is the right ethical position, only that it is currently the most
acceptable one.658
But Hoelscher continues:
As the writer Phil Rockstroh argues, it’s a politics of the most putrid and
profligate kind, “the same old, odious White Man’s Burden palaver that
Western imperialists have been churning out since the Plundering Class
got its start during the Age of Discovery.” Referring to Harris and
Hitchens, he goes on:
Their casuistry goes thus: “Those foreign jungles and
deserts are seething with savages, heathens, cannibals, and
headhunters. You just cannot reason with those heartless
primitives; therefore it is our duty, as reasonable, civilized
men to subdue them, dress and educate them in our manner,
and, of course, kill them when we must — and the fact that
the wealth of their native regions is flowing westward and
enriching the already bloated coffers of our ruling and
economic elite has absolutely nothing to do with it.659
In other words, Rockstroh (and presumably Hoelscher) are arguing that any position
other than one of abject acceptance for universally equivalent cultures is, by default,
imperialistic and self-serving. Consider the implications of such a position. Unquestioned
acceptance of general equality and the championing of such values as relativism,
657

One need look no further than the seven ecumenical councils of the early Christian Church for
evidence of numerous instances in which intolerance led to the eventual establishment of orthodoxy, as
various competing doctrines were, one after another, labeled as heretical and their proponents either exiled,
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pluralism, multiculturalism, etc., necessarily results in a self-contradiction; after all, what
is one free to do if and when another culture does not share one’s belief in pluralism and
instead seeks to supplant it with its own ideology? The true multiculturalist must either
submit or resist, but to choose either would be to demonstrate that their own ideology is
itself culturally grounded and thus not universally applicable.
But even in the absence of such extreme examples, pluralism already permits
undue and untold suffering of the very minorities it professes to respect. Callous and
cowardly acceptance of such practices as foot binding, genital mutilation, honor killing,
sati, and sexual slavery all are (or have until recently been) permitted under the shameful
guise of relativism. As you may recall, Harris addressed this very notion in Chapter Six.
Can we say that Middle Eastern men who are murderously obsessed with
female sexual purity actually love their wives, daughters, and sisters less
than American or European men do? Of course, we can. And what is truly
incredible about the state of our discourse is that such a claim is not only
controversial but actually unutterable in most contexts.660
Note that this in no way absolves the West of its many crimes against the outside world
and its inhabitants. Nor has Harris ever claimed it should. What it does, however, is allow
us to dispense with the notion of original sin (as it perhaps genuinely applies to
humanity’s seemingly-ingrained tendency to tolerate practices in others cultures it would
never permit in its own) and instead focus on elevating and enlightening those in much
more present and pressing predicaments.
Hoelscher eventually concludes that “to insist, as the New Atheists do, that
religion must be thrown onto the scrapheap of history forthwith, while at the same time
mostly ignoring the problems of poverty and inequality, is the height of irrationality. As a
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matter of pure logic, it’s really no different than believing in the existence of angels.”661
Despite its author’s intentions, I would argue that this statement actually serves to
invalidate a great portion of Hoelscher’s overall critique, once one realizes that so long as
belief in angels and an afterlife is allowed to continue unabated, the internal impetus for
alleviating “the problems of poverty and inequality” will never be given the earthly
prominence nor reasonable attention it deserves.662 One need look no further than the
“nasty, brutish, and short” lives of so many who suffered throughout the Middle Ages for
proof of this fact and the resultant religiosity it engendered.

In an interview with Cenk Uygur of “The Young Turks,” Reza Aslan argued that
the problem with not just Sam but with the New Atheists in general is that
they give atheism a bad name. My greatest intellectual heroes are all
atheists, whether I'm talking about [Arthur] Schopenhauer, or [Sigmund]
Freud, or Marx, or [Ludwig] Feuerbach. These were the people who gave
birth to the modern world. They were the people who gave birth to the
enlightenment. But they were experts in religion. They understood religion
and then criticized it from a place of expertise, and there is lots to criticize
about religion as you have rightly said.
But what is happening now is that a guy sort of sitting in his room
watching television with a blog has now become a self-described expert
on religion and espouses the most basic, uninformed, and unsophisticated
views about religion from a position of, you know, intellectualism. And I
think that that’s dangerous, because I understand your animosity towards
religions, but even you understand that religion is not going anywhere. On
661
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For evidence of this otherworldly phenomenon, I would reference an individual often credited
with leading the Catholic Church’s global fight against poverty in the 20 th century: Mother (now Saint)
Teresa. In a 2003 article for Slate entitled “Mommie Dearest,” Christopher Hitchens explained that “MT
[Mother Teresa] was not a friend of the poor. She was a friend of poverty. She said that suffering was a gift
from God. She spent her life opposing the only known cure for poverty, which is the empowerment of
women and the emancipation of them from a livestock version of compulsory reproduction.” The following
is excerpted from page 11 of his 1995 The Missionary Position, in which Hitchens notes that when once
asked whether she taught that the poor should endure their circumstance. This is how Mother Teresa
responded: “I think it is very beautiful for the poor to accept their lot, to share it with the passion of Christ.
I think the world is being much helped by the suffering of the poor people.” Consequently, I would contend
that, as long as this life is perceived as merely a means to an end (and not an end of itself), obstacles are
likely to remain to serve as either stumbling blocks for the unworthy or as hurdles for the righteous to clear.
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the contrary, religion is a growing force in the world. It's a growing force
in the United States. The most recent Pew poll showed that a majority of
Americans want more religion in public life, not less.
So this idea that religion is just “bad science,” “failed science,” that it’s
just superstition, it’s silly belief in Gods, despite the fact that a third of the
major religions in the world don't actually believe in God, that is not just a
misunderstanding and mischaracterization of religion, but it's dangerous.
Because what it does is it keeps us from having some very important and
necessary conversations about the role of religion in society, about the
problem of extremism in religious communities, and about how to
reconcile the realities of the modern world with these contextual scriptures
that so many people nowadays view incorrectly as literal and inerrant.663
There are several issues I would like to raise against Professor Aslan’s remarks. Firstly,
when providing his list of intellectual heroes (who all happen to be atheists themselves),
Aslan argues that they, unlike Harris and his fellow New Atheists, criticized religion
“from a place of expertise.” Although I would argue that their collective works
demonstrate a more than passing familiarity with religion, let us grant his assertion and
presume there indeed exists a significant scholarly discrepancy between Aslan’s heroes
and the New Atheists. What a coincidence, then, that they seem to have harbored such
comparable disdain and drawn such remarkably similar conclusions about religion’s
undeserved and all-but-unquestioned place in society.664
In the second paragraph, Aslan argues that Harris criticizes religion from a
position of intellectualism. And while I would tend to agree, I am uncertain as to why this
663
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is dangerous or even how it is, in fact, a criticism? From what position should Harris
grapple with the tenets of religious faith? If the answer comes from anywhere other than
from a place of reason, I’m afraid Aslan’s argument is dead on arrival. What’s more, he
notes that “religion is a growing force in the world,” and that a recent poll suggests that
Americans want “more religion in public life, not less.” How does either of these claims,
regardless of their veracity, in any way invalidate Harris’ arguments? If, in fact, faith is
poised to exert even more influence on the world stage in the years to come, then it would
seem that Harris’ call for a more reasonable examination of all religions and their
mutually incompatible claims to inerrancy and truth should be heeded sooner rather than
later. For in a world where religion is on the increase, clashes between its myriad
manifestations seem all but inevitable.665
Finally, Aslan argues that, unbeknownst to the New Atheists, “a third of the major
religions in the world don’t actually believe in God.” Presumably he is referring either to
religious liberalism (within the Christian tradition) or to the Eastern traditions of
Buddhism, Hinduism, and/or Jainism. But regardless, this claim is both simplistic and
deceptive. For if, as all the New Atheists maintain, a religion exists without professing
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belief of any kind in the supernatural, then it does not merit its designation as a religion.
It is merely an ideology or philosophy, not a religious faith.666
Nevertheless, Aslan goes on to contend that what such antipathy does “is it keeps
us from having some very important and necessary conversations about the role of
religion in society, about the problem of extremism in religious communities, and about
how to reconcile the realities of the modern world with these contextual scriptures that so
many people nowadays view incorrectly as literal and inerrant.” I have shown that the
New Atheists are very much interested in having the first two of these “necessary
conversations,” and their willingness to engage in such efforts speak for themselves.667
(What’s more, I would hazard that such issues are only relevant within communities that
house the other two thirds of the world’s religions that do hold supernatural beliefs.) As
for the last, one sees no reason why Harris should strive to reconcile the realities of the
modern world with the ancient, ill-informed words of scripture. One certainly cannot
envision Aslan’s heroes doing so either, no matter how loftily above Harris they may
indeed be perched.668
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But as misguided as these comments are, Aslan somehow manages to surpass
them in an article for Salon.com entitled, “Sam Harris and ‘New Atheists’ Aren’t New,
Aren’t Even Atheists.” In it, he writes:
Atheists often respond that atheism should not be held responsible for the
actions of these authoritarian regimes, and they are absolutely right. It
wasn’t atheism that motivated Stalin and Mao to demolish or expropriate
houses of worship, to slaughter tens of thousands of priests, nuns and
monks, and to prohibit the publication and dissemination of religious
material. It was anti-theism that motivated them to do so. After all, if you
truly believe that religion is “one of the world’s great evils” – as bad as
smallpox and worse than rape; if you believe religion is a form of child
abuse; that it is “violent, irrational, intolerant, allied to racism and
tribalism and bigotry, invested in ignorance and hostile to free inquiry,
contemptuous of women and coercive toward children” – if you honestly
believed this about religion, then what lengths would you not go through
to rid society of it?... There is, of course, nothing wrong with an antitheistic worldview, though I personally find it to be rooted in a naive and,
dare I say, unscientific understanding of religion – one thoroughly
disconnected from the history of religious thought. Every major religion
has, at one time or another, been guilty of the crimes that these anti-theists
accuse religion of. But do not confuse the dogmatic, polemical, militant
anti-theism of Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens and their ilk with atheism. The
former rejects religious claims; the latter is “actively, diametrically and
categorically opposed to them.”669
Notice what Aslan is attempting here. First, he suggests that Stalin and Mao
weren’t simply atheists; they were anti-theists. What’s more, it was their anti-theism that
motivated them in their quests to rid society of religion. Setting aside for the moment the
various problems and glaring omissions within that statement (recall Christopher
Hitchens’ seventeenth chapter, “An Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch Case Against
Secularism”), not to mention his attempt to associate the actions of Stalin and Mao with
those of Hitchens and Harris, Aslan then proceeds to announce that “there is, of course,

669

Reza Aslan, “Sam Harris and ‘New Atheists’ Aren’t New, Aren’t Even Atheists,” Salon.com,
21 November 2014, accessed 6 September 2016,
http://www.salon.com/2014/11/21/reza_aslan_sam_harris_and_new_atheists_arent_new_arent_even_atheis
ts/. (One assumes Aslan confused the former and latter labels in his concluding sentence.)

330

nothing wrong with an anti-theistic worldview, though I personally find it to be rooted in
a naive and, dare I say, unscientific understanding of religion.” In other words, Aslan is
arguing that it was anti-theism, not atheism, that was directly responsible for the violent,
repressive, totalitarian regimes of Stalin and Mao.670 Nevertheless, he believes that it is a
perfectly acceptable worldview to hold, albeit a little naïve and unscientific with regard to
religion.
I find it difficult to reconcile these two statements. As Douglas Hagler struggles to
articulate in his article, “Sam Harris and the Motherlode of Bad Ideas”:
Wanting to castigate a single vast religion, and call it the “mother-lode of
bad ideas”, is no more justifiable than the situation Sam Harris decries in
the United States, where there is widespread distrust of atheists, such that
it is essentially impossible to rise to high government office unless one is
at least outwardly religious. Sam Harris wants us to be able to criticize bad
ideas, but not his bad idea, which is that “Islam” is a singular entity, and is
entirely evil and to be feared. That claim makes as much sense as me
denigrating Sam Harris because Stalin killed a lot of innocent people, and
both of them are atheists.671
Although Hagler considers both Stalin and Harris to be atheists, the analogy holds for
Aslan’s characterization of both as anti-theists. In other words, if Stalin’s and Mao’s
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Unfortunately, this argument is self-contradictory. As Christopher Hitchens, who frequently
described himself as an antitheist, once remarked “once you assume a creator and a plan, it makes us
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Video, 3:51, 6 September 2014, 11 October 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a0ot00779RM. In
other words, antitheism’s ire toward religion is first and foremost a reaction against the totalitarian impulse
it implicitly entails and enforces. To suggest that authoritarian leaders such as Stalin share this ire with
antitheists is to misrepresent the ideologies and intentions of both. After all, substituting one’s own person
as the object of worship can hardly be considered a refutation of the religious impulse itself. It is, instead,
merely a repurposing of the plot and a recasting of the characters in what is otherwise a very old story.
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motivations were essentially anti-theistic, then it seems anti-theism can be considered to
bear significant if not sole responsibility for the numerous atrocities committed in its
name. In which case, it would hardly seem an acceptable worldview (thus, his
condemnations of New Atheism appear reasonable). If, however, the actions of Stalin and
Mao are attributable to motivations other than anti-theism alone (as I have repeatedly
argued), then it would seem that Aslan’s attempt to separate the two (atheism and antitheism) has resulted in little more than a distinction without a difference (which causes
his criticisms of the New Atheists suddenly to seem not only ill-considered, but also
unfounded). I would argue that Aslan must decide which of these scenarios be thinks is
correct, for it certainly cannot be both. Either way, he shows the inherent contradiction
contained within his thesis.672
Seeming to contradict himself again, Aslan continues:
Like religious fundamentalism, New Atheism is primarily a reactionary
phenomenon, one that responds to religion with the same venomous ire
with which religious fundamentalists respond to atheism. What one finds
in the writings of anti-theist ideologues like Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens
is the same sense of utter certainty, the same claim to a monopoly on truth,
the same close-mindedness that views one’s own position as
unequivocally good and one’s opponent’s views as not just wrong but
irrational and even stupid, the same intolerance for alternative
explanations, the same rabid adherents (as anyone who has dared criticize
Dawkins or Harris on social media can attest), and, most shockingly, the
same proselytizing fervor that one sees in any fundamentalist
community.673
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For the record, I would also be very interested to know Dr. Aslan’s thoughts on what a more
scientific, less naïve sort of atheism might look like.
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With one fell swoop of his pen, Aslan has managed not only to equate anti-theism with
totalitarianism, but also to conflate fundamentalism with its ideological antithesis.674
After all, it is this sense of utter certainty, the claim to a monopoly on truth, and an
unshakable conviction in the superiority of one’s own faith that the New Atheists first set
out to challenge. And no matter how much their opponents may wish otherwise, absence
of belief is not a belief. (One simply cannot be fundamentalist in one’s critique of
fundamentalism.) Presumably, Aslan believes that religious moderates are the ideological
solution to the zealotry of both New Atheists and evangelicals. However, the perceptible
difference between moderates and fundamentalists can only ever be outward expression,
not inner belief. For as Harris notes, “if a Christian made no tacit claims of knowledge
with regard to the literal truth of scripture, he would be just as much a Muslim, or a Jew –
or an atheist – as a follower of Christ.”675

In his article, “Sam Harris Uncovered,” Theodore Sayeed writes:
It is sometimes alleged of Harris that no amount of data and facts will
budge his doggedly anti-Muslim atavism. I think this is unjust; Harris does
674

The totalitarian impulse is, after all, quite akin to the religious one. The principle difference lies
not in the rejection or acceptance of absolute authority (both necessarily accept the premise), but rather in
determining one’s role in the relationship between worshipper and worshipped, saved and savior. The
structure of the relationship itself remains largely unaltered.
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evolve with the facts. But like the ever moving goal post, he does so with
stealth so as to mask his contradictions. A case in point: For years he hotly
denied the reality of Christian suicide bombers in the Middle East, defying
critics to name “Where are the Christian suicide bombers?” until a public
encounter with the distinguished anthropologist Scott Atran forced him
into a collision with just such a lot of Christians, namely the PLFP. And
since then he’s quietly dropped this denial and switched to carping at their
small numbers: “Palestinian Christians suffer the same Israeli occupation.
How many have blown themselves up on a bus in Tel Aviv? One? Two?”
Wrong. The PFLP has conducted ten suicide bombings. And that’s just
Palestinian Christians, not counting Lebanese or German.676
Though Sayeed’s intentions in the above passage are clear – he wishes to demonstrate
that Muslims should not be maligned as the only suicide bombers – it would seem that he
has inadvertently lent strength to Harris’ overarching position (that religion causes
otherwise intelligent and compassionate people to behave in a manner that is neither), all
the while extending the scope of his original critique. Essentially, Sayeed seems to be
arguing not that Harris is wrong to generalize about Muslims; it’s that he’s wrong to do
so about Christians: after all, they commit these atrocities too. His point, unintentional
though it may be, is well-taken.
Echoing the dispute between Harris and Chomsky, Sayeed goes on to accuse
Harris of believing that
there is no moral distinction between cluster bombs and Disneyland.
Death is death, so what’s the problem? The claim amounts to holding that
there is no difference between choking on a pretzel and sustaining a
nuclear attack because, well, in both cases people die. The act of raining
down “Shock & Awe” bears no likeness to the far less perilous and
unlikely accidents of theme parks which, on the rare occasion they occur,
do not make rubble of homes and infrastructure and uproot millions of
refugees. And rollercoasters invite the willing patronage of thrill seekers,
as opposed to Tomahawk missiles, whose victims do not volunteer for the
risk of being shredded. The distinction is both in scale and human agency,
between a minuscule risk undertaken freely in the knowledge that one is
676

Theodore Sayeed, “Sam Harris Uncovered,” Mondoweiss.net, 25 June 2012, accessed 6
September 2016, http://mondoweiss.net/2012/06/sam-harris-uncovered.
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strapped in by “rigorous safety precautions”, and mass lethality thrust
upon one by a hostile foreign power.677
Again, Sayeed’s point is valid. To presume no moral distinction between cluster bombs
and Disneyland would be to fundamentally misrepresent the very raison d’être of ethics.
The intentions of those who build rollercoasters and those who construct Tomahawk
missiles are most assuredly different. That was the entire purpose of Harris’ argument
with Chomsky. It appears that both Sayeed and Chomsky have failed to grasp this point.
What Harris was arguing was that to make no distinctions between the intentional horrors
of terrorism with the unavoidable collateral damage of one’s response to it, is to be
equally guilty of misrepresenting the entire ethical enterprise. As Harris says, “Where
ethics are concerned, intentions are everything.”678
So when Chomsky himself responds to Harris that “since you profess to be
concerned about ‘God-intoxicated sociopaths,’ perhaps you can refer me to your
condemnation of the perpetrator of by far the worst crime of this millennium because
God had instructed him that he must smite the enemy,” he is absolutely right.679 The
eschatological longing and irrational certainty of George W. Bush were/are a problem.
So, too, were those of Osama bin Laden. As long as religious faith is allowed to play such
a pivotal role in development and implementation of our foreign policy, we can continue
to expect both similarities of thought and parallels of action to regularly occur between
those on all sides of almost every future conflict.
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Hoping to support Chomsky’s position, Glen Greenwald writes, in his article for
The Guardian, entitled, “Sam Harris, the New Atheists, and anti-Muslim animus”:
I find extremely suspect the behavior of westerners like Harris (and
Hitchens and Dawkins) who spend the bulk of their time condemning the
sins of other, distant peoples rather than the bulk of their time working
against the sins of their own country. That’s particularly true of
Americans, whose government has brought more violence, aggression,
suffering, misery, and degradation to the world over the last decade than
any other. Even if that weren't true – and it is – spending one’s time as an
American fixated on the sins of others is a morally dubious act, to put that
generously.… The reason this is particularly suspect and shoddy behavior
from American commentators is that there are enormous amounts of
violence and extremism and suffering which their government has
unleashed and continues to unleash on the world. Indeed, much of that US
violence is grounded in if not expressly justified by religion, including the
aggressive attack on Iraq and steadfast support for Israeli aggression (to
say nothing of the role Judaism plays in the decades-long oppression by
the Israelis of Palestinians and all sorts of attacks on neighboring Arab and
Muslim countries). Given the legion human rights violations from their
own government, I find that Americans and westerners who spend the
bulk of their energy on the crimes of others are usually cynically
exploiting human rights concerns in service of a much different agenda.680
Like Chomsky, Greenwald undoubtedly has a point that only he without sin should cast
the first stone. However, in making this point, Greenwald is forced to concede that “much
of that US violence is grounded in if not expressly justified by religion.” But even if this
is true, and there are ample reasons to believe it is, it simply serves to raise our own
moral awareness of the fact that faith continues to play a deceptively pernicious role
within our own society as well.

In an article for The Independent, Jerome Taylor adds fuel to the fire. Referencing
the work of Nathan Lean and Glen Greenwald, he argues that
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“conversations about the practical impossibility of God’s existence and the
science-based irrationality of an afterlife slid seamlessly into xenophobia
over Muslim immigration or the practice of veiling,” wrote Lean. “The
New Atheists became the new Islamophobes, their invectives against
Muslims resembling the rowdy, uneducated ramblings of backwoods
racists rather than appraisals based on intellect, rationality and reason.”…
“When criticism of religion morphs into an undue focus on Islam particularly at the same time the western world has been engaged in a
decade-long splurge of violence, aggression and human rights abuses
against Muslims, justified by a sustained demonization campaign - then I
find these objections to the New Atheists completely warranted,”
Greenwald concludes. “In sum, [New Atheism] sprinkles intellectual
atheism on top of the standard neocon, right-wing worldview of Muslims.”
681

But once again, even if such criticisms are merited, the result is hardly an endorsement
for any other stripe of organized religion. The oft-repeated claim that “they’re bad too!”
is insufficient to refute the heart of Harris’ position: that what is ultimately required is an
end to all faith, not just the faith of others, no matter how much more pressing the
repercussions of those other faiths may presently be. What Lean and Greenwald (and
Taylor) seem to have done is to mistake Harris’ most pressing current concern for the
entirety of his argument.

Perhaps an about-face admission of guilt from a former Muslim apologist will
serve to show how specious the charge of Islamophobe truly is when applied to critics
such as Harris. In his article, “The Critics of Islam Were Right,” Mike Dobbins writes:
I read the Quran, many Hadith, the biography of Muhammad, the history
of Jihad, and Islamic law. This is what I learned: The critics of Islam are
right. Islam is intrinsically, alarmingly violent, hateful and oppressive on a
scale greater than all other major religions combined. To say that radical
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Islamists are motivated to commit atrocities and embrace oppression based
on religious doctrine is the understatement of the century.
I, like most defenders of Islam, was ignorant, naïve, and in denial. I
wrongly assumed all holy books have enough good messages to offset the
bad. I wrongly assumed that, like Jesus, Muhammad promoted peace,
love, and non-violence. I wrongly assumed criticism of Islam equates to
criticism of all Muslims.
While I apologize to those wrongly labeled Islamophobes, my biggest
apology is owed to Muslims. Muslims have needlessly suffered under
oppressive Islamic religious and political doctrines as thousands of
uninformed smearests like myself rushed to judge and silence critics of
Islam. By not acknowledging the Islamic link to radical violence and hate,
smearests have unwittingly allowed it to spread. The smearests, denialists,
and the naïve have, unknowingly, turned their back on moderate Muslims
and a reformed, peaceful Islam.
We who have carelessly thrown around the Islamophobe label including
Glen Greenwald, Reza Aslan, and Karen Armstrong should lower our
heads in shame and guilt. Few things are as morally depraved as attacking
someone who criticizes Islam (Ayaan Hirsi Ali) rather than attacking the
Islamic apostasy and blasphemy laws teaching Muslims they should kill
her. We must now live with the knowledge that we’ve abandoned and
betrayed our principles. Though we claim the mantle of human rights, free
speech and equality, we lack the courage of our convictions when it
offends someone. We make the cowardly lion look like Churchill.
In reality, those who criticize Islam, especially reform minded Muslims,
are the bravest of the brave. They are literally putting their lives at risk by
the simple act of criticizing the Quran, Muhammad, and Sharia. It is the
critics of Islam who are working steadfastly for equality and human rights
for Muslims as apologists wallow in denial.
Criticizing the Quran and Muhammad is not criticizing or stereotyping the
Muslim minority just as criticizing The Book of Mormon and Joseph
Smith is not criticizing or stereotyping the Mormon minority. When
people criticize the Mormon holy book or prophet, rightfully, there is no
attempt to shield Mormonism from criticism or smear the critics as
Mormonophobes.
Now, we smearests must make up for lost time and lost chances. We must
double our efforts to criticize oppressive Islamic practices, doctrines, and
regimes and demand reform. We must embrace Muslims who truly are
moderate, acknowledge the faults in Islam, and are striving for
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coexistence, peace, equality, human rights, and freedom of expression and
worship. All non-Muslims can support Muslims best by doing the same.
It would be one thing if Islamic doctrines said Muslims should love nonMuslims and love their enemy. It would be one thing if the prophet
Muhammad preached non-violence. It would be one thing if Islamic Laws
supported equality for women, minorities, freedom of expression, and
valued human rights. It would be one thing if the Quran taught the golden
rule. It is because they do the complete opposite that I am now speaking
out. 682
Of course, even such a forthright and self-effacing apology is itself tainted by its
implicitly Christian biases, but at the very least, Dobbins’ piece demonstrates the false
equivalencies that are bound to result from this incessant appeal to cultural relativity.

This admission notwithstanding, Vox Day, in “An Atheist Critique Against Sam
Harris,” argues that
despite his atheism, Harris himself appears to be subject to a tribalism that
is older than either Christianity or Islam, the two religions he primarily
criticizes. And it is potentially significant to note how little he criticizes
either Judaism or Israel, despite the fact that there is considerable criticism
of the latter from secular Europeans who share his atheism. Now, I don't
dislike Sam. Unlike Dawkins and Myers, I don't think he's an intrinsically
dreadful individual. But his primary problem, aside from his apparent
tribalism, is that he is simply not sufficiently detail-oriented or logical
enough to be capable of successfully addressing the intellectual challenges
he sets himself.683
In other words, Harris’ opposition to Christianity and Islam is not the result a sustained
scientific and historical inquiry into the tenets and traditions of those two faiths. It is
instead primarily the result of his own Jewish heritage. What’s worse, this sense of
tribalistic loyalty is so ingrained in Harris that not only is he unable to refute it, but he
682
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cannot even consciously acknowledge it. Despite the obvious ridiculousness of such a
claim, let us presume that Mr. Day is, in fact, correct in his characterization. Would this
not serve as confirmation of Harris’ and Hitchens’ central theses that what is needed is
“the end of faith,” and that “religion poisons everything?”

In his article for The Nation, Jackson Lears’ critique of Harris represents, if
nothing else, a refreshing change in focus, even if the same cannot be said for tactics.
Lears argues that it is not so much that Harris misrepresents religion (though Lears will
presently make it clear that he believes Harris is guilty of this as well), but rather that he
distorts science. He writes:
To define science as the source of absolute truth, Harris must first ignore
the messy realities of power in the world of Big Science. In his books
there is no discussion of the involvement of scientists in the militaryindustrial complex or in the pharmacological pursuit of profit. Nor is any
attention paid to the ways that chance, careerism and intellectual fashion
can shape research: how they can skew data, promote the publication of
some results and consign others to obscurity, channel financial support or
choke it off. Rather than provide a thorough evaluation of evidence, Harris
is given to sweeping, unsupported generalizations. His idea of an
argument about religious fanaticism is to string together random citations
from the Koran or the Bible. His books display a stunning ignorance of
history, including the history of science. For a man supposedly committed
to the rational defense of science, Harris is remarkably casual about
putting a thumb on the scale in his arguments.684
Though this is certainly a valid criticism concerning the existence of second-rate
scientists, it hardly serves to devalue the overall scientific enterprise, which by their own
actions, these bad actors have either circumvented or betrayed outright.685
Nevertheless, Lears goes on to argue that
684
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[Harris’] critique of religion is a stew of sophomoric simplifications: he
reduces all belief to a fundamentalist interpretation of sacred texts,
projecting his literalism and simple-mindedness onto believers whose faith
may foster an epistemology far more subtle than his positivist convictions.
Belief in scriptural inerrancy is Harris’s only criterion for true religious
faith. This eliminates a wide range of religious experience, from pain and
guilt to the exaltation of communal worship, the ecstasy of mystical union
with the cosmos and the ambivalent coexistence of faith and doubt.686
And as proof of his more multicultural leanings, Lears even offers the
following example:
[Harris] is ignorant of the relevant anthropological literature on the
subjects that vex him the most, such as Hanna Papanek’s study of
Pakistani women, which described the burqa as “portable seclusion,” a
garment that allowed women to go out into the world while protecting
them from associating with unrelated men. As the anthropologist Lila
Abu-Lughod writes, the burqa is a “mobile home” in patriarchal societies
where women are otherwise confined to domestic space. Harris cannot
imagine that Islamic women might actually choose to wear one; but some
do. Nor is he aware of the pioneering work of Christine Walley on female
genital mutilation in Africa. Walley illuminates the complex significance
of the practice without ever expressing tolerance for it, and she uses crosscultural understanding as a means of connecting with local African women
seeking to put an end to it.687
Once again, I am at a loss to explain how this, in any way, shape, or form, represents a
critique of Harris’ argument. That some women should seek to find both solace and
solitude within the confines of a burqa in order to avoid the unwanted attentions of
unrelated men (in a dogmatically patriarchal society which might put them to death
should those unwanted attentions ultimately find them) is hardly a ringing endorsement
for the practice. It is merely justification for a physically and psychologically repressive
status quo. Lears’ comments on female genital mutilation are even more telling in this
regard. Were one to remove religious imperatives from the conversation, then absolutely
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no justification for the continuation of such a barbarous practice could ever, in good
conscience, be elucidated.688

But perhaps one of the most shocking allegations made against Harris is that his
particular brand of atheism is inherently sexist. In his article, “Sam Harris, The Criticism
of Bad Ideas, and Sexist Appeals to Biology,” Daniel Fincke identifies Harris’ crime in
an off-the-cuff remark Harris once made, trying to determine why more men appear to be
drawn to his argumentative tone.689
His impulse was to reach for a biologizing solution to what should clearly
be seen as a question of social injustice and proactive need for social
change. It was his ignorance (or indifference) to how statements about the
supposedly intrinsic masculinity of critical thinking have an ugly,
688
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millennia old, legacy in our culture. Those conscientious about
empowering women are educated about that history and loathe to repeat it
and eager to actively change it. It was his ignorance (or indifference) to
how stereotype threat serves to make false ideas about women’s inferiority
with respect to rational endeavors into self-fulfilling prophecies. Girls
have empirically been shown to perform equally to boys when not
exposed to prejudicial messaging about which are the “masculine” and
which are the “feminine” kinds of reasoning and horrifyingly worse when
exposed to such messaging.690
Fincke continues:
His language uncritically expresses a whole set of false and
disempowering ideas that humanists and educated people everywhere
should be fighting. He can’t set himself up as a humanist advocate for
women’s rights if he has contempt for all the philosophical and social
science scholarship behind feminist ideas. I’m not saying he has to agree
with it all. I’m saying he has to actually treat it seriously enough that he
realizes that it is a better testing ground for his ideas than the opinions of
whatever women happen to be in his inner circle. I’m also pointing out
that he’s incredibly out of touch with the numerous discussions in the
atheist movement that have brought these issues to the fore. Many women
have had powerfully valuable contributions to the discussion and there
have been many tangible steps towards improvement. Either he’s too
ignorant of the movement’s internal discussions to be a spokesperson for
this movement or he’s been too dismissive of the feminist arguments made
in the movement to even do them the justice of a nuanced reply or let them
make the slightest dent on his language use.
His lazy appeal to biology also evinced an implicit indifference to figuring
out how to get more women to make such criticisms of religion. Even if he
was non-culpably ignorant for some reason of all the women leaders in the
atheist movement, he didn’t seem vexed at all about that supposed
problem. He didn’t say “we need to do better”. He chalked it up to
biology. Which won’t motivate anyone to fix the problem but instead send
the message to countless low information readers of The Washington Post
that atheism’s not for women. Rather than starting with a baseline
assumption – not a mere “feminist desire” but a rational presumption –
women are as capable critical thinkers as men by nature, instead he looks
at women not engaging in one field of critical thought as visibly to the
media or to his own myopic vision as much as they should be and he says
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essentially that it is just biology and that it must be intrinsically male to
criticize bad ideas.
And regardless of his intent, that sounds way too indistinguishable from
“it’s intrinsically male for the man to run the household with his superior
reasoning skills given by God, or any of countless other reflexive
rationalizations for gender inequality.”691
Notice the rather transparent bait-and-switch Fincke is attempting to pull off. Because
Harris suggested that women might not be as biologically or historically accustomed to
public argumentation and outright aggressiveness, Fincke believes that he has proven
himself unfit to speak on any issues of concern to women. Where again, I would ask is
the criticism of any of Harris’ central ideas? Nevertheless, if one were to read a little
further, one could not help but notice the way that Fincke, by suggesting that female
philosophers most commonly pursue subjects specifically related to their gender,
arguably opens himself to the same sort of inadvertent sexism for which he would so
callously condemn Harris.
I currently think a lot of women do philosophy not only under the explicit
banner of Feminist Philosophy but also under the auspices of Women’s
Studies, Feminist Literary Studies, and Sociology. In those fields they’re
working with genuine philosophical distinctions and making genuine
advances, despite sometimes being outside the institutional reach of the
Gatekeepers Of Philosophy. Many professional philosophers readily prove
themselves embarrassingly more philosophically ignorant and outright
retrograde about gender than the average feminist on the blogosphere who
has no particular academic philosophical credentials. That’s not to say
more women doing feminism in philosophy wouldn’t be necessary also (or
that no explicit feminist philosophy is not being done that is crucially
aiding feminist work outside philosophy departments). And it’s not to say
women intrinsically have no interests in, or need for, philosophy beyond
feminism and that there shouldn’t be more women in all specializations
(ditto all these caveats for blacks). Rather, my point is that just as I, as an
ex-Christian, am more passionate about doing philosophy in the atheist
context that reflects my personal frustration with a particular set of
harmful bad ideas and mass deceptions, I think it would be perfectly
logical if academics who personally belong to marginalized groups are
691
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disproportionately interested in addressing issues related to their
oppression in their scholarship. There’s nothing wrong with that at all.692
I trust his rapid backpedaling and numerous qualifications in the preceding paragraph –
(i.e. “it’s not to say women intrinsically have no interests in, or need for, philosophy
beyond feminism and that there shouldn’t be more women in all specializations (ditto all
these caveats for blacks)” – are sufficient evidence of just how easily such a “mistake”
can be made and how it should in no way obscure or distract from the author’s overall
message: neither Fincke’s nor Harris’.

In his article, “Problematic Thoughts 06 - A Criticism of Sam Harris and the New
Atheist's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Lindsay Oden argues that
Sam Harris’s own views on religion are clearly the same kind of material
delusion that constricts the energies of many religious people. His blind
hatred for Muslims prevents him from recognizing the historical and
material circumstances that have produced terrorism and violence. US
military attacks against civilians are used as recruitment propaganda for
al-Qaeda and ISIS, so we shouldn’t be surprised when people become
terrorists. Moreover, Harris has more in common with the civilians in
Sudan and Afghanistan than he does with the military apparatus that is
dead-set on killing them. At the heart of the matter is survival in the face
of terrorism, whether it is state-sponsored or religious. This is not to say
that Harris is some kind of alienated proletarian yearning for connection to
his brethren; rather that the interests of civilians and Harris are
conspicuously aligned: end terrorism, end violence, end oppression. But
Harris is too focused on his fear of Muslims to realize that Muslims across
the globe also want to end those things.693
Although few of these criticisms are original, Oden’s concluding thoughts are particularly
interesting. He claims that, rather than recognizing that “the interests of civilians and
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Harris are conspicuously aligned,” Harris is “too focused on his fear of Muslims to
realize that Muslims across the globe also want to end those things.” As Oden points out,
“at the heart of the matter is survival in the face of terrorism.” On this, at least, I agree.
One wonders, however, which worldview represents a greater threat to that survival: the
scientific or the religious? In other words, do those women in burqas or without a clitoris,
of whom Jackson Lears spoke, have more to fear from the oppressive regimes under
which they live,694 or from those who are fighting to put an end to the inhumanity and
irrationalities of both?

In his article, “Detestable Crusade,” Omer Aziz argues that
Long before atheism went vogue in the West, the 9th-century atheist alMa’ari was irking the ruling classes in Syria with his vitriolic, anti-theist
poems. (When al Qaeda swept through northern Syria in 2012, they
beheaded statues of al-Ma’ari)… Muslims, Christians, Jews and other
minorities lived together in Muslim-governed territories for long stretches
of time. Relations between these communities were not always
harmonious — this is the past we are talking about — but co-existence
was woven into the fabric of Muslim society and polity. As the historian
Jason Goodwin writes, “Islam was generally not spread by the sword….In
both North Africa and Spain, ordinary people sometimes converted,
hoping for access to wealth and status. Often the conversions were sincere.
They were welcomed within limits, but they were very rarely forced.”
True, apostasy was still a crime, though let’s remember that translating the
Bible into the local language got one burned at the stake during the
contemporary period in Christendom. Even in Britain, Oxford and
Cambridge did not begin admitting non-Anglicans until the late 19th
century…. Muslim empires were bloody, seduced by power and
expansion, and their caliphs and sultans, like all imperialists from time
immemorial, wanted ever more control. But Harris is no multitasker;
holding a complicated picture and talking at the same time seems
impossible to him, so he reduces history to mottos and engages in
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sloganeering to mask his ignorance…. Why Sam Harris feels the need to
take sides in the fanatical squabbles of our barbaric ancestors eludes me.695
But with all due respect to Aziz, I would argue that it is not the “fanatical squabbles of
our barbaric ancestors,” with which Harris seeks to engage. That indeed would be
pointless. However, in order to confront the barbarisms of our own time, to which he
himself just alluded (the destruction of iconic art; the inherently tense situation of
minorities forced to live under the religious rule of others; the consistently harsh
punishment for apostasy; the various, often unsuccessful, challenges to the authority of
the religious elite, etc.), Harris must engage with the traditions of the faithful and the
histories they so painstakingly wrought. To do otherwise, would be to invite the
criticisms of willful ignorance that his opponents, however unjustly, already make.

But lest one believe reform must come from outside (as Harris maintains), Anwar
Omeish explains why this is not necessarily so:
As Suzanne Schneider details in her article “The Reformation Will Be
Televised: On ISIS, Religious Authority and the Allure of Textual
Simplicity,” Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, is incredibly complex. She
describes it as follows:
“Yet even more important than [other] factors is the
tradition of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principles it long
ago established for how to interpret the Qur’an’s sometimes
enigmatic passages. These include foundational principles
(usul al-fiqh) that govern the acts of Qur’anic exegesis,
without which no authoritative legal rulings can be
generated. For instance, one cannot issue a judgment on a
particular issue without consulting all of what has been said
about it within the Qur’an and the hadith (sayings attributed
to Muhammad). Because the Qur’an, like the Hebrew Bible
695
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and New Testament, contains passages that seem wildly
contradictory, this means that jurisprudence has
traditionally entailed acts of textual reconciliation that are
far more complex than a simple reading of any single verse
might suggest. The Islamic hermeneutic tradition also
requires familiarity with the “conditions for revelation”
(asbab al-nazul) for each verse, as some are considered
historically limited to Muhammad’s Arabia rather than
general commands for all times and places.”
Beyond these interpretive guidelines, there is a tradition of abrogation in
Qur’anic exegesis in which certain verses are understood to overrule
others. And we haven’t even mentioned the centuries of commentary that
established judicial precedents that impact how contemporary rulings are
decided. Oh, and by the way, these commentators don’t necessarily agree
with one another on any given matter. If this sounds awfully complicated,
that’s because it is. To suggest otherwise is not just foolish, it’s actually
quite dangerous.696
In other words, Omeish is arguing that outside assistance is not required for reform.
Islamic jurisprudence and the tradition of abrogation will suffice to correct the many
contradictions, miscommunications, and otherwise obscure passages within the holy texts
themselves. Though the centuries in which they have already engaged in this process
have yet to bear informative and reformative fruit, Omeish ostensibly remains confident
that they eventually will. I am considerably less so. I am instead reminded of Harris’
comments on how this process of scriptural analysis and revisionism actually unfolded in
the West. He writes that “the only reason anyone is ‘moderate’ in matters of faith these
days is that he has assimilated some of the fruits of the last two thousand years of human
thought (democratic politics, scientific advancement on every front, concern for human
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rights, an end to cultural and geographic isolation, etc). The doors leading out of
scriptural literalism do not open from the inside.”697

In an interview with Neil deGrasse Tyson, Harris once asked:
Do you feel that you need to walk a razor’s edge between political
passions and polls on questions of religion or hot button issues – culturewar science, evolution, etc. – because you’re trying to preserve a trust
from both sides insofar as that’s possible?698
Brian Gallagher records Harris’ response in his article, “Why Neil deGrasse Tyson Shuns
Sam Harris’ Swamp of Controversy”:
“Initially,” Tyson said, “I thought I was walking a razor’s edge, because
I’m not out here to offend anybody. I just want to enlighten people, as an
educator.” But then Tyson realized, he said, that this – enlightening people
– was a strong position in itself. “That position is: There are objective
truths out there that you ought to know about! And as an educator, I have a
duty to alert you of those objective truths,” Tyson said. “What you do
politically, in the face of those objective truths, is your business, not my
business. I have opinions on many things, but they’re not the kind of
opinions where I give a rat’s ass if you agree with my opinion. That’s why
it’s my opinion. That’s the difference, I think, between me and many
others who are scientifically astute, or are scientists themselves, and take
up a platform that involves trying to get people to see the world the way
they do – even politically. I have no such interest in doing that.”699
I would argue, however, that such a position, admirable though it may seem, is ultimately
untenable, or at the very least unsustainable, insofar as matters of empirical science are
concerned (evolution, global warming, etc.). For example, Tyson ultimately concludes
that
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I, as an educator, could go around hitting politicians in the head, but then
there’s the matter of all the people who wanted to vote for them. So, for
me, my target is not the politician. My target is the population following
statements that are objectively false. I see it as my duty to train the
electorate how to think about this information. Once they’re trained, they
can vote for who they want.700
But such open-minded objectivity implies that, once Tyson had finished educating the
electorate on the intricacies of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, or the abundant
evidence confirming not only the existence of global warming, but also humanity’s
undeniable role in exacerbating it, he must allow that it might still be logically and/or
scientifically reasonable to refute either position (as many politicians and a majority of
the voting public presently do). But of course, it wouldn’t and he couldn’t without
completely abandoning science (as currently understood and consistently confirmed) and
kowtowing to the populist whims of ignorance and superstition. If nothing else, science
has shown us that there are not always two (equally plausible and evidentially supported)
sides to every story.701
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But perhaps the last word on the matter should be Harris’. In an interview with
Claire Coffman of Los Angeles Magazine, Harris admits:
I don’t write warm and fuzzy books…. And I’m not especially warm and
fuzzy as a person. I’m deeply committed to unraveling these intellectual
problems that relate to our well-being and our failures to achieve it. As far
as tone is concerned, I think impatience and a kind of prickly-seeming
criticism is appropriate, given how far afield we are in this
bamboozlement of religion. It’s just that 83 percent of the population of
the United States thinks Jesus literally rose from the dead. And will be
coming back. And half of those people think that he’ll be coming back in
the next 50 years.702
Coffman and Harris conclude:
After three hours of conversation, I turn off my tape recorder, which is
around the time I can’t help myself: I push back. When I tell Harris I’m an
agnostic, he tells me I’m just confused about the term. (Which according
to the dictionary and/or my master’s degree in religious studies, I’m not –
but whatever.)
“It’s a safe thing to say,” he tells me, his voice gentle yet cold, “but it’s
usually ill considered. You aren’t agnostic about Zeus or Apollo or any of
the thousands of dead gods who are no longer worshiped. The atheist says,
‘Bullshit.’ The agnostic says, ‘I don’t know. How could we possibly know
about the validity of these claims?’ That is bullshit. If we’re talking
specifically about Jesus being resurrected from death, or born of a virgin,
or able to hear prayers, this entails a host of scientific claims – about
biology, about telepathy, about human flight without the aid of
technology. Are these claims that an agnostic wants to accept?
Agnosticism is just a way of being polite in the face of people’s
unjustified religious convictions. But if you maintained that attitude on
other topics, you’d be considered an imbecile.”
Did he just call me stupid?703
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CHAPTER FIVE: A PRELIMINARY POSTMORTEM ON POSTMODERNISM
Introduction/Disclosure

My fifth and final chapter, though structurally similar to the previous four, is
nevertheless quite different in terms of both content and perspective. The first half of the
chapter consists primarily of a critical analysis of the foundational texts and central
themes of deconstructive and poststructuralist postmodernism (as embodied in the works
of Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and others). At the
onset (and in the interest of academic integrity and ideological transparency), I wish to
openly and unequivocally acknowledge that my efforts in this chapter are of a
deliberately prosecutorial nature and that their intended consequence is nothing less than
an indictment of the postmodernist tradition itself, at least as it exists in its present form.
Once I have outlined my arguments and pleaded my cause, I will then conclude with
what I consider (or at least hope) to be two prescriptive essays, in which I will attempt to
reconcile the Modernists and those who came after them so that the initially honorable
intentions of each tradition might be upheld in a manner that is potentially palatable to
both and/or ultimately useful to all.
But before I begin, I believe it is incumbent upon me to briefly distinguish
between the original impetus for postmodernism, which I greatly admire (i.e. the
questioning of the various tenets and/or perceived failures of Enlightenment philosophy
as well as of the apparent epistemological limitations of natural science) and the proposed
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methodologies employed and ultimate conclusions drawn from doing so, with which I
very much wish to contend. After all, a healthy skepticism of accepted ideologies and
established approaches lies at the heart of the Modernist modus operandi as well. As is
the case with all such proposed paradigm shifts, nascent Modernism cut its metaphorical
teeth on the existing orthodoxies of its day (Aristotelian philosophy and metaphysics,
Catholic doctrine and ecumenical authority, etc.). It challenged the intellectual status quo
in order to determine whether the tenets and teachings of the age were worthy of the
adulation so unquestionably heaped upon them; it was undoubtedly right to do so. And
Modernism’s collective and respective conclusions – that science and reason were in
every way superior to the blind faith and ignorant superstition(s) that preceded them –
are, in principle, no more sacrosanct than the conventions which they themselves sought
to question and eventually overturn. Thus, it would be the very height of hypocrisy for
one to cry foul merely because one’s own methods of inquiry and analysis are now being
used against them.
Unfortunately, in questioning (and ultimately rejecting) Modernism’s ostensible
affinity for science and reason, Postmodernism performed what I consider to be an
overcorrection of sorts – the denunciation of classical logic and the denial of objective
reality, and in their place, the adoption of cultural and epistemological relativism – which
was both completely unnecessary and from which it has never recovered. First, it was
unnecessary because science and logic (unlike their Aristotelian and Catholic
counterparts) have built-in mechanisms within their methodologies that allow for
introspective analysis and, when necessary, self-correction. They are, by design, much
less vulnerable (if not outright immune) to the trappings of authority and tradition that so

353

plagued their ideological precursors (and descendants). Thus, an unsound scientific
theory or illogical argument need not result in the negation of science and/or logic (as
many Postmodernists would argue), but rather can be caught, critiqued, and corrected
from within their respective traditions, resulting not in a repudiation of their foundational
tenets but rather in a reaffirmation of the methods upon which they are ultimately
grounded and secured. This, in essence, is the case I wish to make.

So long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance
conservative tendencies in society. Firstly, because clear and logical
thinking leads to a cumulation of knowledge (of which the progress of the
natural sciences provides the best example) and the advance of knowledge
sooner or later undermines the traditional order. Confused thinking, on
the other hand, leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged
indefinitely without producing any impact upon the world.
- Stanislav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery (1972, p. 90)704
Everyone can see what’s going on
They laugh ‘cause they know they’re untouchable
Not because what I said was wrong
Whatever it may bring
I will live by my own policies
I will sleep with a clear conscience
I will sleep in peace
Maybe it sounds mean
But I really don’t think so
You asked for the truth and I told you
Through their own words
They will be exposed
They’ve got a severe case of
The emperor’s new clothes
- Sinéad O’Connor705
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Part I: An (Un)Timely Dissection

In 1994, American mathematician and physicist Alan Sokal submitted an article
for publication to the cultural-studies journal Social Text. This article, entitled
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum
Gravity,” was not only accepted for publication, it was also selected to appear in a 1996
special edition of the journal “devoted to rebutting the criticisms levelled against
postmodernism and social constructivism by several distinguished scientists.”706 Though
initially well-received, Sokal’s subsequent admission that the entire essay had been a
hoax – a deliberate attempt to expose the pedantry and pomp of postmodernism and its
adherents – was decidedly less so. The firestorm of denigration (and, to a lesser extent,
praise) that the so-called “Sokal Hoax” sparked within the academic community, coupled
with Sokal’s and Jean Bricmont’s ensuing exposé, Fashionable Nonsense, should more
than suffice to acquaint the reader with this, my final topic of study.
As Professor Steven Weinberg explains:
The targets of Sokal’s satire occupy a broad intellectual range. There are
those “postmoderns” in the humanities who like to surf through avantgarde fields like quantum mechanics or chaos theory to dress up their own
arguments about the fragmentary and random nature of experience. There
are those sociologists, historians, and philosophers who see the laws of
nature as social constructions. There are cultural critics who find the taint
of sexism, racism, colonialism, militarism, or capitalism not only in the
practice of scientific research but even in its conclusions.707
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Or, as Gary Kamiya unreservedly writes in his article, “Transgressing the Transgressors:
Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Total Bullshit”:
Anyone who has spent much time wading through the pious, obscurantist,
jargon-filled cant that now passes for “advanced” thought in the
humanities knew it was bound to happen sooner or later: some clever
academic, armed with the not-so-secret passwords (“hermeneutics,”
“transgressive,” “Lacanian,” “hegemony,” to name but a few) would write
a completely bogus paper, submit it to an au courant journal, and have it
accepted….
Sokal’s piece uses all the right terms. It cites all the best people. It whacks
sinners (white men, the “real world”), applauds the virtuous (women,
general metaphysical lunacy) and reaches the usual “progressive”
(whatever that word is supposed to mean) conclusion. And it is complete,
unadulterated bullshit -- a fact that somehow escaped the attention of the
high-powered editors of Social Text, who must now be experiencing that
queasy sensation that afflicted the Trojans the morning after they pulled
that nice big gift horse into their city.
Oops.708
Predictably, Jacques Derrida, a foundational figure and, by the late twentieth
century, “grand old man” of postmodernism, had a rather different take on the matter. His
response, while consciously skirting the actual issue(s) of coherence and
comprehensibility in academic writing, was itself surprisingly accessible. He writes:
This is all rather sad, don’t you think….
It would have been interesting to make a scrupulous study of the so-called
scientific “metaphors” – their role, their status, their effects in the
discourses that are under attack. Not only in the case of “the French”! and
not only in the case of these French writers! That would have required that
a certain number of difficult discourses be read seriously, in terms of their
theoretical effects and strategies. That was not done….
I am always sparing and prudent in the use of scientific references, and I
have written about this issue on more than one occasion. Explicitly.…
There is every reason to think that they have not read what they should
708
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have read to measure the extent of these difficulties. Presumably they
couldn’t. At any rate they haven’t done it….
As for the “relativism” they are supposed to be worried about – well, even
if this word has a rigorous philosophical meaning, there’s not a trace of it
in my writing. Nor of a critique of Reason and the Enlightenment. Quite
the contrary. But what I do take more seriously is the wider context – the
American context and the political context – that we can’t begin to
approach here, given the limits of space: and also the theoretical issues
that have been so badly dealt with.
These debates have a complex history: libraries full of epistemological
works! Before setting up a contrast between the savants, the experts, and
the others, they divide up the field of science itself. And the field of
philosophical thought. Sometimes, for fun, I also take seriously the
symptoms of a campaign, or even of a hunt, in which badly trained
horsemen sometimes have trouble identifying the prey. And initially the
field….
In whose interest was it to go for a quick practical joke rather than taking
part in the work which, sadly, it replaced? This work has been going on
for a long time and will continue elsewhere and differently, I hope, and
with dignity: at the level of the issues involved.709
Though an ostensibly reasonable plea, difficulties arise when one actually attempts to
take Derrida at his word and is then immediately confronted with his own penchant for
imprecise, often inscrutable language. For instance, when once asked simply to define
deconstructionism, an idea, incidentally, that he himself introduced, Derrida proved either
unable or unwilling to do so. Witness the following exchange from the 2002 documentary
film Derrida:
Interviewer/Narrator: You’re very well known in the States for
deconstruction. Can you talk a little bit about the origin of that idea?
Derrida (in his native French): Before responding to this question, I want
to make a preliminary remark on the completely artificial character of this
situation. I don’t know who’s going to be watching this, but I want to
underline rather than efface our surrounding technical conditions, and not
709
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feign a “naturality” which doesn’t exist. I’ve already in a way started to
respond to your question about deconstruction because one of the gestures
of deconstruction is not to naturalize what isn’t natural – to not assume
that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is natural.
Narrator (continuing the translation): The very condition of a
deconstruction may be at work in the work, within the system to be
deconstructed. It may already be located there, already at work, not at the
center but in an eccentric center, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the
solid concentration of the system, participating in the construction of what
it, at the same time, threatens to deconstruct. One might then be inclined
to reach this conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that supervenes
afterwards, from the outside, one fine day. It is always already at work in
the work. Since the disruptive force of deconstruction is always already
contained within the very architecture of the work, all one would finally
have to do to be able to deconstruct, given this “always already,” is to do
memory work. Yet since I want neither to accept or to reject a conclusion
formulated in precisely these terms, let us leave this question suspended
for the moment.710
But if you find Derrida’s (non)response to be as evasive and unsatisfying as I do,
don’t worry… NYU Professor of Social & Cultural Analysis Edward Hubbard can
explain:
For Derrida, truth is based on language, and language is not a fixed system
(the way structuralists conceive of it). Language is chaotic – words not
only have many different meanings and uses, but words (signifiers)
themselves do not simply correspond with their definitional meanings
(word-concepts or signifieds). These meanings are dependent on other
signifiers…. Words are constantly threatened by the encroachment of new
or unexpected meanings, words constantly evoke other words and
meanings (rather than merely reflecting their own, exclusive meanings) –
for example, the sign The Joshua Tree does not simply reflect one (or
three) stable signifier(s)…the signifier(s) can reflect the meaning affixed
to them in the dictionary: Yucca brevifolia, a monocotyledonous tree
confined mostly to the Mojave Desert…or those same words can make us
think of the Cahuilla Native Americans who used the tree for making
sandals, baskets and meals…or it can make us think of the Mormons who
crossed the Mojave Desert in the 19th century, saw the tree and gave it that
name…or those words can evoke for us the meaning it had for the
Mormons that gave it the name: the tree resembled the biblical Joshua
710
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raising his hands to the sky…this kind of tree is frequently used to
construct the expansive, arid and forlorn desert aesthetic of the American
southwest in films and visual art…yet still, those same words can evoke
the Grammy-award winning U2 album of the same name, the classic
album cover art no doubt referencing the desert aesthetic in which this tree
plays a signifying role – this monocotyledonous tree in the Mojave Desert,
that was prized by the Cahuilla, and named by the Mormons after a
physical act of Joshua in the Holy Bible…. Instead of having a simple,
stable signified (a clear, finite meaning) that corresponds to the words The
Joshua Tree, this original signified is merely another signifier reaching for
yet another meaning. This is the Derridean vision of language: this
slipping and sliding of signifiers over each other without ever reaching a
signified – a ground or an end-point for stable thought or for the
emergence of Truth.711
Regrettably for Derrida, this would seem to at least undermine, if not outright contradict,
many of his previously referenced statements to Sokal and Bricmont on relativism,
reason, and the principles of the Enlightenment. But even more unfortunate for us, it
would seem that any and all attempts to define postmodernism itself have proven
ultimately as frustrating and as fruitless. As Gary Aylesworth explains:
That postmodernism is indefinable is a truism. However, it can be
described as a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing
concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and
hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity,
historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning.712
Thus, given that no ironclad definition for the term has yet been agreed upon by
its advocates or opponents, perhaps the opening three paragraphs of Professor Sokal’s
original article should serve as our own introduction to the many ambiguities and
apparent logical contradictions of postmodern thought. In what follows, I would ask that
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the reader pay special attention to the italicized portions, as they comprise the heart of
Sokal’s satire, and thus facetiously capture the ideological thrust of the movement he in
fact ultimately intends to ridicule. He begins:
There are many natural scientists, and especially physicists, who continue
to reject the notion that the disciplines concerned with social and cultural
criticism can have anything to contribute, except perhaps peripherally, to
their research. Still less are they receptive to the idea that the very
foundations of their worldview must be revised or rebuilt in the light of
such criticism. Rather, they cling to the dogma imposed by the long postEnlightenment hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook, which can
be summarized briefly as follows: that there exists an external world,
whose properties are independent of any individual human being and
indeed of humanity as a whole; that these properties are encoded in
“eternal” physical laws; and that human beings can obtain reliable, albeit
imperfect and tentative, knowledge of these laws by hewing to the
“objective” procedures and epistemological strictures prescribed by the
(so-called) scientific method.
But deep conceptual shifts within twentieth-century science have
undermined this Cartesian-Newtonian metaphysics; revisionist studies in
the history and philosophy of science have cast further doubt on its
credibility; and, most recently, feminist and poststructuralist critiques have
demystified the substantive content of mainstream Western scientific
practice, revealing the ideology of domination concealed behind the
facade of “objectivity”. It has thus become increasingly apparent that
physical “reality”, no less than social “reality”, is at bottom a social and
linguistic construct; that scientific “knowledge”, far from being objective,
reflects and encodes the dominant ideologies and power relations of the
culture that produced it; that the truth claims of science are inherently
theory-laden and self-referential; and consequently, that the discourse of
the scientific community, for all its undeniable value, cannot assert a
privileged epistemological status with respect to counter-hegemonic
narratives emanating from dissident or marginalized communities. These
themes can be traced, despite some differences of emphasis, in
Aronowitz’s analysis of the cultural fabric that produced quantum
mechanics; in Ross’ discussion of oppositional discourses in post-quantum
science; in Irigaray’s and Hayles’ exegeses of gender encoding in fluid
mechanics; and in Harding’s comprehensive critique of the gender
ideology underlying the natural sciences in general and physics in
particular.
Here my aim is to carry these deep analyses one step farther, by taking
account of recent developments in quantum gravity: the emerging branch
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of physics in which Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics and Einstein’s
general relativity are at once synthesized and superseded. In quantum
gravity, as we shall see, the space-time manifold ceases to exist as an
objective physical reality; geometry becomes relational and contextual;
and the foundational conceptual categories of prior science – among them,
existence itself – become problematized and relativized. This conceptual
revolution, I will argue, has profound implications for the content of a
future postmodern and liberatory science.713
In the first passage, it appears that Sokal is not only casting aspersions on the “socalled” scientific method, but also expressing some serious doubts about the existence of
an external, observable universe, as well as of the presence of a set of universal physical
constants upon which such a universe would be foundationally dependent. As a
mathematician and scientist himself, Sokal’s claims should have immediately raised a
few eyebrows on the editorial board of Social Text, but because he was advocating a
perspective that had already gained widespread traction within the postmodern
community, his statements (outrageous as they are) were apparently taken at face value,
without serious deliberation or reservation. Even more incredibly, his subsequent
assertions that “physical ‘reality’, no less than social ‘reality’, is at bottom a social and
linguistic construct,” that scientific objectivity does not exist, and thus that scientific
discourse is no more deserving of “a privileged epistemological status with respect to
counter-hegemonic narratives emanating from dissident or marginalized communities,”
were likewise unquestionably accepted primarily as a result of their reflecting an already
established viewpoint (albeit a presumptive one) within the tradition.
So what precisely is Sokal (satirically) suggesting? Apart from his
pronouncements that even physical reality is inescapably subjective and that,
consequently, science’s attempts to objectify it are necessarily doomed to fail, Sokal goes
713
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on to suggest, as a solution to this epistemological uncertainty, a sort of egalitarian
relativism, in which any and all subjective views should be considered as equally valid
and worthy of mutual and sustained respect. These basic concepts, though not exhaustive,
nevertheless collectively serve to capture the heart of the postmodernist worldview, and
thus explain not only how Sokal’s article was able to clear all of the journal’s editorial
hurdles on its way to publication, but also why the author felt compelled to compose it in
the first place (and why I feel the same sense of urgency in relating it to you now). 714
Interestingly enough, even after confessing his pretention, Sokal still found a
number of individuals either unable or unwilling to accept his admission as genuine. As
Weinberg incredulously recounts:
After Sokal exposed his hoax, one of the editors of Social Text even
speculated that “Sokal’s parody was nothing of the sort, and that his
admission represented a change of heart, or a folding of his intellectual
resolve.” I am reminded of the case of the American spiritualist Margaret
Fox. When she confessed in 1888 that her career of séances and spirit
rappings had all been a hoax, other spiritualists claimed that it was her
confession that was dishonest.715
Or, as Andrew Ross, the editor quoted above, would later say of his colleagues:
Another, while willing to accept the story, was less sure that Sokal knew
very much about what or whom he thought he was kidding. A third was
pleasantly astonished to learn that the journal is taken seriously enough to
be considered a threat to anyone, let alone to natural scientists. At least
two others were furious at the dubious means by which he chose to make
his point. All were concerned that his actions might simply spark off a
new round of caricature and thereby perpetuate the climate in which
science studies has been subject recently to so much derision from
conservatives in science.716
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Admitting of this possibility and sincerely wishing to avoid it, Sokal subsequently
suggests:
Media hype notwithstanding, the mere fact the parody was published
proves little in itself; at most it reveals something about the intellectual
standards of one trendy journal. More interesting conclusions can be
derived, however, by examining the content of the parody. On close
inspection, one sees that the parody was constructed around quotations
from eminent French and American intellectuals about the alleged
philosophical and social implications of mathematics and the natural
sciences. The passages may be absurd or meaningless, but they are
nonetheless authentic. In fact, [my] only contribution was to provide a
“glue” (the “logic” of which is admittedly whimsical) to join these
quotations together and praise them.717
This, in essence, is the task that Sokal and Bricmont set for themselves in Fashionable
Nonsense. As scientists, they are careful to limit themselves to the various
misappropriations of science perpetrated by members of that “pantheon of contemporary
‘French theory’” referenced above. The following excerpts, though brief, should suffice
to outline the dangers of which Sokal and Bricmont speak as well as the spirit and
success of their efforts to combat them.
In a chapter dedicated to the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Sokal and
Bricmont unearth several pseudo-scientific gems. In the following passage, Lacan
attempts to relate mathematical concepts to the structural configuration of mental disease.
This diagram [the Mobius strip] can be considered the basis of a sort of
essential inscription at the origin, in the knot which constitutes the subject.
This goes much further than you may think at first, because you can search
for the sort of surface able to receive such inscriptions. You can perhaps
see that the sphere, that old symbol for totality, is unsuitable. A torus, a
Klein bottle, a cross-cut surface, are able to receive such a cut. And this
diversity is very important as it explains many things about the structure of
mental disease. If one can symbolize the subject by this fundamental cut,
in the same way one can show that a cut on a torus corresponds to the
neurotic subject, and on a cross-cut surface to another sort of mental
disease.
717
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(Lacan 1970, pp. 192-193)718
Sokal and Bricmont delightedly declare “perhaps the reader is wondering what these
different topological objects have to do with the structure of mental disease. Well, so are
we; and the rest of Lacan’s text does nothing to clarify the matter. Nevertheless, Lacan
insists that his topology ‘explains many things.’”719 They ultimately conclude:
Lacan’s defenders (as well as those of the other authors discussed here)
tend to respond to these criticisms by resorting to a strategy that we shall
call “neither/nor”: these writings should be evaluated neither as science,
nor as philosophy, nor as poetry, nor... One is then faced with what could
be called a “secular mysticism”: mysticism because the discourse aims at
producing mental effects that are not purely aesthetic, but without
addressing itself to reason; secular because the cultural references (Kant,
Hegel, Marx, Freud, mathematics, contemporary literature...) have nothing
to do with traditional religions and
are attractive to the modern reader. Furthermore, Lacan’s writings became,
over time, increasingly cryptic – a characteristic common to many sacred
texts – by combining plays on words with fractured syntax; and they
served as a basis for the reverent exegesis undertaken by his disciples. One
may then wonder whether we are not, after all, dealing with a new
religion.720
In his review of their book, Richard Dawkins offers the following praise/support:
The feminist ‘philosopher’ Luce Irigaray is another who gets wholechapter treatment from Sokal and Bricmont. In a passage reminiscent of a
notorious feminist description of Newton’s Principia (a “rape manual”),
Irigaray argues that E=mc2 is a “sexed equation”. Why? Because “it
privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to
us” (my emphasis of what I am rapidly coming to learn is an ‘in’ word).
Just as typical of this school of thought is Irigaray’s thesis on fluid
mechanics. Fluids, you see, have been unfairly neglected. “Masculine
physics” privileges rigid, solid things. Her American expositor Katherine
Hayles made the mistake of re-expressing Irigaray’s thoughts in
(comparatively) clear language. For once, we get a reasonably
unobstructed look at the emperor and, yes, he has no clothes:
The privileging of solid over fluid mechanics, and indeed
the inability of science to deal with turbulent flow at all,
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she attributes to the association of fluidity with femininity.
Whereas men have sex organs that protrude and become
rigid, women have openings that leak menstrual blood and
vaginal fluids... From this perspective it is no wonder that
science has not been able to arrive at a successful model for
turbulence. The problem of turbulent flow cannot be solved
because the conceptions of fluids (and of women) have
been formulated so as necessarily to leave unarticulated
remainders.
You do not have to be a physicist to smell out the daffy absurdity of this
kind of argument (the tone of it has become all too familiar).721
But lest one argue that Dawkins (or even Hayles) has misunderstood or misrepresented
Irigaray’s thought, witness the following passage, in which Irigaray “claims to unmask
also the sexist biases at the heart of ‘pure’ mathematics”:
the mathematical sciences, in the theory of wholes [theorie des
ensembles], concern themselves with closed and open spaces, with the
infinitely big and the infinitely small. They concern themselves very little
with the question of the partially open, with wholes that are not clearly
delineated [ensembles flous], with any analysis of the problem of borders
[bords], of the passage between, of fluctuations occurring between the
thresholds of specific wholes. Even if topology suggests these questions, it
emphasizes what closes rather than what resists all circularity.
(Irigaray 1985b, p. 315; Irigaray 1987a, pp. 76-77)722
Sokal and Bricmont’s criticism is at once piercing and incredulous. They write:
This theory is startling, to say the least: Does the author really believe that
menstruation makes it more difficult for young women to understand
elementary notions of geometry? This view is uncannily reminiscent of the
Victorian gentlemen who held that women, with their delicate
reproductive organs, are
unsuited to rational thought and to science. With friends like these, the
feminist cause hardly needs enemies.723
The writings of sociologist Jean Baudrillard are even more representative of the
sort of pseudo-intellectual drivel that passes for scholarship and profundity within the
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postmodern tradition. The following passages are taken from Baudrillard’s The Illusion of
the End and The Transparency of Evil. (Sokal and Bricmont’s comments immediately
ensue.)
Our complex, metastatic, viral systems, condemned to the
exponential dimension alone (be it that of exponential
stability or instability), to eccentricity and indefinite fractal
scissiparity, can no longer come to an end. Condemned to
an intense metabolism, to an intense internal metastasis,
they become exhausted within themselves and no longer
have any destination, any end, any otherness, any fatality.
They are condemned, precisely, to the epidemic, to the
endless excrescences of the fractal and not to the
reversibility and perfect resolution of the fateful [fatal]. We
know only the signs of catastrophe now; we no longer
know the signs of destiny. (And besides, has any concern
been shown in Chaos Theory for the equally extraordinary,
contrary phenomenon of hyposensitivity to initial
conditions, of the inverse exponentially of effects in
relation to causes— the potential hurricanes which end in
the beating of a butterfly’s wings?)
(Baudrillard 1994, pp. 111-114, italics in the original)
The last paragraph is Baudrillardian par excellence. One would be hard
pressed not to notice the high density of scientific and pseudo-scientific
terminology –inserted in sentences that are, as far as we can make out,
devoid of meaning.
These texts are, however, atypical of Baudrillard’s oeuvre, because they
allude (albeit in a confused fashion) to more-or-less well-defined scientific
ideas. More often one comes across sentences like these:
There is no better model of the way in which the computer
screen and the mental screen of our brain are interwoven
than Moebius’s topology, with its peculiar contiguity of
near and far, inside and outside, object and subject within
the same spiral. It is in accordance with this same model
that information and communication are constantly turning
round upon themselves in an incestuous circumvolution, a
superficial conflation of subject and object, within and
without, question and answer, event and image, and so on.
The form is inevitably that of a twisted ring reminiscent of
the mathematical symbol for infinity.
(Baudrillard 1993, p. 56)
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As Gross and Levitt remark, “this is as pompous as it is meaningless.”
In summary, one finds in Baudrillard’s works a profusion of scientific
terms, used with total disregard for their meaning and, above all, in a
context where they are manifestly irrelevant. Whether or not one interprets
them as metaphors, it is hard to see what role they could play, except to
give an appearance of profundity to trite observations about sociology or
history. Moreover, the scientific terminology is mixed up with a
nonscientific vocabulary that is employed with equal sloppiness. When all
is said and done, one wonders what would be left of
Baudrillard’s thought if the verbal veneer covering it were stripped
away.724
The work of philosopher and urbanist Paul Virilio receives similar treatment. The
following passages are taken from his 1984 L’Espace critique and from his 1991 The
Lost Dimension:
When depth of time replaces depths of sensible space;
when the commutation of interface supplants the
delimitation of surfaces; when transparence re-establishes
appearances; then we begin to wonder whether that which
we insist on calling space isn’t actually light, a
subliminary, para-optical light of which sunlight is only
one phase or reflection. This light occurs in a duration
measured in instantaneous time exposure rather than the
historical and chronological passage of time. The time of
this instant without duration is “exposure time”, be it over –
or underexposure. Its photographic and cinematographic
technologies already predicted the existence and the time of
a continuum stripped of all physical dimensions, in which
the quantum of energetic action and the punctum of
cinematic observation have suddenly become the last
vestiges of a vanished morphological reality. Transferred
into the eternal present of a relativity whose topological
and teleological
thickness and depth belong to this final measuring
instrument, this speed of light possesses one direction,
which is both its size and dimension and which propagates
itself at the same speed in all radial directions that measure
the universe.
(Virilio 1984, p. 77; Virilio 1991, pp. 63-64; italics in the
original)
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This paragraph – which in the French original is a single 193-word
sentence, whose “poetry” is unfortunately not fully captured by the
translation – is the most perfect example of diarrhea of the pen that we
have ever encountered. And as far as we can see, it means precisely
nothing.725
Although Sokal and Bricmont’s treatise contains dozens more examples of this
sort of pseudo-scientific posturing, I offer only one final instance of this intellectual
chicanery as a means of transitioning away from their general criticisms and toward my
own individual encounters with postmodernist literature/scholarship. In a chapter
dedicated entirely to the writings of philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Felix
Guattari, Sokal and Bricmont offer as evidence the following passage, taken from the
Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense:
In the first place, singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series
which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, but
rather “metastable,” endowed with a potential energy wherein the
differences between series are distributed. (Potential energy is the energy
of the pure event, whereas forms of actualization correspond to the
realization of the event.) In the second place, singularities possess a
process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that
a paradoxical element traverses the series and
makes them resonate, enveloping the corresponding singular points in a
single aleatory point and all the emissions, all dice throws, in a single cast.
In the third place, singularities or potentials haunt the surface. Everything
happens at the surface in a crystal which develops only on the edges.
Undoubtedly, an organism is not developed in the same manner. An
organism does not cease to contract in an interior space and to expand in
an exterior space – to assimilate and to externalize. But membranes are no
less important, for they carry potentials
and regenerate polarities. They place internal and external spaces into
contact, without regard to distance. The internal and the external, depth
and height, have biological value only through this topological surface of
contact. Thus,
even biologically, it is necessary to understand that “the deepest is the
skin.” The skin has at its disposal a vital and properly superficial potential
energy. And just as events do not occupy the surface but rather frequent it,
superficial energy is
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not localized on the surface, but is rather bound to its formation and
reformation.
(Deleuze 1990, pp. 103-104, italics in the original)726
As Sokal and Bricmont observe: “once again, this paragraph – which prefigures the style
of
Deleuze’s later work written in collaboration with Guattari – is stuffed with technical
terms; but, apart from the banal observation that a cell communicates with the outside
world through
its membrane, it is devoid of both logic and sense.”727 However, this “banal observation”
serves to distinguish this particular passage from those that came before it: at least it
contains a kernel of truth, and thus a hint of value. The problem is that this worth is
buried beneath a mountain of meaningless jargon and deliberate obfuscation in order to
make the obvious appear profound. This is the essence of my experience with (and thus
the source of my hostility toward) postmodernism, and it appears to be an objection I
share with Noam Chomsky, who once argued:
As for the “deconstruction” that is carried out… I can’t comment, because
most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another sign of my
incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just
restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show
why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing
long before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words,
incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely
meaningless, etc….
But instead of trying to provide an answer to this simple requests, the
response is cries of anger: to raise these questions shows “elitism,” “antiintellectualism,” and other crimes – though apparently it is not “elitist” to
stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who
talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don’t enter into the kind
of world in which I’d prefer to live….
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There has been a striking change in the behavior of the intellectual class in
recent years. The left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been
teaching in working class schools, writing books like “mathematics for the
millions” (which made mathematics intelligible to millions of people),
participating in and speaking for popular organizations, etc., are now
largely disengaged from such activities, and although quick to tell us that
they are far more radical than thou, are not to be found, it seems, when
there is such an obvious and growing need and even explicit request for
the work they could do out there in the world of people with live problems
and concerns…. There’s a huge gap that once was at least partially filled
by left intellectuals willing to engage with the general public and their
problems. It has ominous implications, in my opinion.728
Like Chomsky, I would ask that such so-called “brilliance” be shared with as
wide an audience as possible. Thus while the postmodernists’ failure to meaningfully
participate either in dialogue or in action with the public is the foundational source of my
antipathy towards them, it also serves to contrast and thus to ground my respect and
appreciation for the New Atheists’ accessible scholarship and deliberate engagement with
the general public. Theirs are the types of conversations, with just the sort of contributors,
that we as a society need to be having. Unfortunately, except for a handful of scholars
whose works attempt to shout across the interdisciplinary and interpersonal void –
academic-activists such as Professor Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Stephen Hawking, Neil
DeGrasse Tyson, Jared Diamond, Ayaan Hirsi Ali – most of our words and works fall
silent, often times even to each other. To illustrate this, in what follows, I will share
episodes from my own graduate experience in a humanities doctoral program. These will
include my own exposure to postmodernist, deconstructionist, and postcolonial writings,
many of which were quite similar (in spirit and style, if not always in content) to those
that Sokal and Bricmont so wittily dissected. Additionally, I will include excerpts of my
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own responsive and recursive writings toward these texts which, unintentionally but
unavoidably, ended up resembling many of those previously lambasted by the authors in
the passages above. These end results, however, were not criticized for their
obscurantism and meaninglessness; rather, they were well-received, even praised, for
their insightfulness and fidelity to the postmodernist tradition. This miscarriage of
intellectual justice simply cannot go unnoticed or unanswered.
We shall begin with Suzan-Lori Parks’ “The America Play,” a work that I was
assigned on not one but two occasions as being particularly representative of
postmodernism’s successes in challenging the existence and acceptance of meta (i.e.
master) narrative in all its myriad forms (historical, religious, sociological, etc.). Samuel
French, Inc. summarizes the play thusly:
Once upon a time there was a theme park called the Great Hole of History.
It was a popular spot for honeymooners who, in search of “post-nuptial
excitement,” would visit this hole and watch the daily historical parades.
One of these visitors was a man who has now come to call himself The
Foundling Father. He was a digger by trade – a grave digger – and he was
struck by the size of the Hole and the pageantry of the place. He returns
home with his wife, Lucy, a woman who keeps secrets for the dead, and
together they start a mourning business. Unfortunately, our hero can’t get
the Great Hole pageantry out of his head; the echoes of history speak to
him and call him to greatness. At rise we meet this Foundling Father. He
has left his wife and child and gone out west to dig a huge replica of the
Great Hole of History. In the hole sits our hero. He is dressed like
Abraham Lincoln, complete with beard, wart, frock coat and stove pipe
hat. He tells us the story of his own life (in the third person) and tells us
that he has become a very successful Abraham Lincoln impersonator!
He’s so successful that people actually pay a penny to re-enact Lincoln’s
assassination, using our impostor-hero and a phony gun. Eventually the
Father dies, and the second act sees his wife Lucy and thirty-five-year-old
son, Brazil, a professional weeper, visit the hole to dig for his Father’s
remains. Listening to the past through her deaf-horn, Lucy hears echoes of
gunshots and lurid stage-shows. When they dig up the Foundling Father’s
body (he’s alive) they decide they have to lay him to rest for good. In the
play’s last image, his son is trying to climb a ladder out of the Hole of
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History while the Foundling Father sits starkly on his own coffin, refusing
burial.729
If that synopsis left you feeling somewhat confused, don’t worry. That was precisely
Parks’ intention. As Haike Frank explains:
Suzan-Lori Parks’s The America Play (1990-1993) is a complex,
multilayered play about history. Both the history and the play itself refuse
to be pinned down; and appropriately, the play is devoid of clear linear
plot movement, and thus hard to follow. For both viewers and readers of
The America Play, just when a part begins to make sense, a slightly
altered version of the same story generates doubts about what is really
going on…. The play uniquely resists linear logic. Not only do the
spectators try to track down the meaning of the work, but the play also
chases its own meaning. Although this makes The America Play confusing
at first, one eventually realizes that this is exactly the point. Parks
consciously approaches the postmodern topic of “what is history” via the
instability complexity and layered-ness of meaning….
The fact that Parks focuses on the staging of new and alternative
interpretations of historical situations emphasizes her awareness of the
subjectivity and bias of traditionally white historiography. By reworking
events that have only received a thorough documentation from the white
perspective, she not only calls into question the validity of this traditional
historiography, but also destabilizes and deconstructs the content of this
documentation. By claiming that the staging of an historical event makes it
“actually happen,” she thus creates a way to challenge our perception of
reality and history. In accordance to postmodernism’s claim that history
equals our narrative of past events, she seems to suggest that reality is
based on subjective representation and that an objective version of reality,
including historical reality, can only be achieved by a multiplicity of
perspectives. Thus, by offering a re-reading of history, she automatically
redefines our, both black and white, ideas of the world, filling them with
new signification. In The America Play, Parks does this by staging a black
Abraham Lincoln look-alike who disturbs and challenges the whitedefined Lincoln myth that plays an essential part in American history and
modern American identity construction.730
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What, then, can we surmise about Parks’ intentions? Aside from the rather
obvious observation that “traditionally white historiography” is subjective and inherently
biased, I would suggest very little. What’s worse, by omitting or otherwise obscuring
such historical/literary norms as coherence, chronology, logic, narrative, and plot, one is
left not with the impression that additional historical narratives are needed to balance out
an admittedly prejudiced account, but rather that all such attempts at “doing history” are
themselves doomed to the same hopelessly subjective and irredeemable bias. In other
words, because Truth doesn’t exist in this one particular instance of historical narrative, it
cannot exist in any… or even in all. Here, I am reminded of Sokal and Bricmont’s
rebuttal to philosopher Paul Feyerabend’s relativistic charge that “all methodologies
have their limitations and the only ‘rule’ that survives is ‘anything goes.’”731 They
respond:
This is an erroneous inference that is typical of relativist reasoning.
Starting from a correct observation – “all methodologies have their
limitations” – Feyerabend jumps to a totally false conclusion: “anything
goes”. There are several ways to
swim, and all of them have their limitations, but it is not true that all
bodily movements are equally good (if one prefers not to sink). There is
no unique method of criminal investigation, but this does not mean that all
methods are equally reliable (think about trial by fire). The same is true of
scientific methods.732
I would suggest that the same holds true for historical investigations,
philosophical propositions, and indeed any and all intellectual undertakings. As a result,
Parks’ and the postmodernists’ crime is not their intention to criticize (that is perfectly
warranted), but rather their dubious conclusion to throw the baby out along with the
admittedly soiled bathwater. Or as Sokal and Bricmont argue:
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For us, the scientific method is not radically different from the rational
attitude in everyday life or in other domains of human knowledge.
Historians, detectives, and plumbers – indeed, all human beings – use the
same basic methods of induction, deduction, and assessment of evidence
as do physicists or biochemists. Modern science tries to carry out these
operations in a more careful and systematic way, by using controls and
statistical tests, insisting on replication, and so forth. Moreover, scientific
measurements are often much more precise than everyday observations;
they allow us to discover hitherto unknown phenomena; and they often
conflict with “common sense”. But the conflict is at the level of
conclusions, not the basic approach.
The main reason for believing scientific theories (at least the best-verified
ones) is that they explain the coherence of our experience. Let us be
precise: here “experience” refers to all our observations, including the
results of laboratory experiments whose goal is to test quantitatively
(sometimes to incredible precision) the predictions of scientific theories….
This agreement between theory and experiment, when combined with
thousands of other similar though less spectacular ones, would be a
miracle if science said nothing true – or at least approximately true –
about the world. The experimental confirmations of the best-established
scientific theories, taken together, are evidence that we really have
acquired an objective (albeit approximate and incomplete) knowledge of
the natural world.733
For another example, I would reference the capstone project in one of my
foundational doctoral level courses, in which I was asked to complete the following task:
Expand some aspect of your extant work – your Area of Interest
Presentation, a conference paper, a paper from another class, an article-inprogress, a short story, a performance text, etc. by way of one or more of
the critical readings in this class, or an equivalent one in your scholarly
field or artistic genre (please e-mail the professor in advance to clear any
equivalent readings). Rather than add on to the paper, etc., ‘bloom’ it
from inside, locating points at which it could use more elaboration,
investigation, depth, breadth, etc.734
The italicized portion of the assignment instructions should, if nothing else, reiterate and
confirm the superfluous role that critical theory (i.e. postmodernist literature) truly plays
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in the genesis and evolution of many our disciplines’ ideas and expositions. Far from
essential, they are simply inserted, piecemeal and often after the conceptual work has
been largely completed (much as they were in Sokal’s Hoax), in order to conform to and
appease the nebulous tradition in whose gravitational wake the humanities appear to have
been captured.
For my project, I chose to “bloom” an essay I had previously written on
theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer as part of my master’s thesis. In each of the succeeding
passages, I will produce a portion of the text as it originally appeared in my thesis,
followed by the modified version with works of critical theory inserted (and italicized for
easy identification). While humbly noting that my efforts earned not only an “A” for the
project, but indeed an “A” for the entire course, I would ask the reader what, if anything,
the supplementary material actually adds to my original essay.735
Example 1:
The Nazi Party desperately sought the approval and support of the
German Church in its quest to restore the nation to its former
greatness. Whether enticed by its rhetoric or simply afraid of
Bolshevik rule, many German clergymen pledged their support to
the Nazi Party. However, Bonhoeffer and several other prominent
churchmen viewed Hitler’s proposed reforms as a “definite
interference with the church and a molding of its theology.” As a
result, they refused to support the Nazi Party and forced a schism
in the German Church. Those who remained loyal to the Nazi
Party became known as the German Christians, while Bonhoeffer
and those who supported the church’s need for dogmatic and
theological independence from the political process became
members of what was to be known as the Confessing Church.
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Almost immediately, the Nazi Party desperately sought the
approval and support of the German Church in their quest to
restore the nation to its former greatness, for reasons best
described by Louis Althusser in his highly influential
examination/explication of contemporary political thought,
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. “The structure of
every society [is] constituted by ‘levels’ or ‘instances’ articulated
by a specific determination: the infrastructure, or economic base
(the ‘unity’ of the productive forces and the relations of
production) and the superstructure, which itself contains two
‘levels’ or ‘instances’: the politico-legal (law and the State) and
ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal,
political, etc.)...the upper floors could not ‘stay up’ (in the air)
alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base.”736 Though
primarily arguing for the structural necessity of an economic base
in achieving and maintaining societal stability, Althusser is also
implying a symbiotic relation or sorts between the two “levels” or
“instances” of the superstructure as well. In other words, in order
to implement the various political and economic reforms they had
previously promised, the National Socialist Party realized the
importance of securing either the sanction, or at the very least, the
silent obedient consent of the traditional German social/religious
authorities. And whether enticed or intimidated by their rhetoric,
or simply afraid of Bolshevik rule, many clergymen did indeed
pledge their support to the Nazi Party. However, Bonhoeffer and
several other prominent churchmen viewed Hitler’s proposed
reforms as a “definite interference with the church and a molding
of its theology.”737 As a result, they refused to support the Nazi
Party and forced a schism in the German Church. Those who
remained loyal to the Nazi Party became known as the German
Christians, while Bonhoeffer and those who supported the church’s
need for dogmatic and theological independence from the political
process became members of what was to be known as the
Confessing Church.738
Example 2:
After the close of the Finkenwalde seminary in 1937, life became
increasingly difficult for Bonhoeffer as more and more of his
personal liberties were slowly being pierced by the Gestapo’s everwatchful gaze. Persuaded by his friends’ fears that to remain in
Germany would cost him his life and rob the movement of one of
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its greatest voices, Bonhoeffer traveled to America briefly in 1939.
Although he had acquiesced to his friends’ wishes, upon arriving
in the New World, he knew immediately that his departure had
been a mistake, and sought to return to Germany straight away.
Despite knowing this decision could bring to bear terrible
consequences for Bonhoeffer, he argued that were he to abandon
his parishioners in their struggle against the Nazis, he would be
entitled no say in their path to redemption. Upon his return,
Bonhoeffer allied himself fully with the political resistance to
Hitler and the Nazi Party.739 No longer believing that his
theological battles could remain separate from the political war
now raging, Bonhoeffer adopted new tactics with which to fight.
Since he was no longer permitted to lecture or publish anywhere
within the growing German sphere of influence, he began an
underground relationship with a group of officers within the
German Military Intelligence Service who opposed Hitler and were
making preparations for an assassination attempt. Disregarding his
abhorrence for violence in all its forms, Bonhoeffer, no longer able
to see any alternative, cast his lot with the dissenters. He would
later justify his actions thusly: “It is not only my task to look after
the victims of madmen who drive a motor-car in a crowded street,
but to do all in my power to stop their driving at all.”740
After the close of the Finkenwalde seminary in 1937, life became
increasingly difficult for Bonhoeffer as more and more of his
personal liberties were slowly being pierced by the Gestapo’s everwatchful gaze. Persuaded by his friends’ fears that to remain in
Germany for would cost him his life and rob the movement of one
of its greatest voices, Bonhoeffer traveled to America briefly in
1939 (Robertson 8-9). Although he had acquiesced to his friends’
wishes, upon arriving in the New World, he knew immediately that
his departure had been a mistake, and sought to return to Germany
immediately. Despite knowing this decision could bring to bear
terrible consequences for Bonhoeffer, he argued that were he to
abandon his parishioners in their struggle against the Nazis, he
would be entitled no say in their path to redemption. In other
words, if “the task of the philosopher was to ‘represent the class
struggle in theory,’ taking the side of the oppressed in ongoing
ideological struggles with representatives of the ruling class,” then
it was the duty of the theologian to participate in those struggles
firsthand.741Upon his return, Bonhoeffer allied himself fully with
739

Ibid., 8-9.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller, rev. ed. (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1960), 22.
741
Louis Althusser, in Vincent B., Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Finke, et al.’s The Norton
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 1332.
740

377

the political resistance to Hitler and the Nazi Party.742 No longer
believing that his theological battles could remain separate from
the political war now raging, Bonhoeffer adopted new tactics with
which to fight. Since he was no longer permitted to lecture or
publish anywhere within the growing German sphere of influence,
he began an underground relationship with a group of officers
within the German Military Intelligence Service who opposed
Hitler and were making preparations for an assassination attempt.
Disregarding his abhorrence for violence in all its forms,
Bonhoeffer, no longer able to see any alternative, cast his lot with
the dissenters. He would later justify his actions thusly: “It is not
only my task to look after the victims of madmen who drive a
motor-car in a crowded street, but to do all in my power to stop
their driving at all.”743
Though few would have been able to justify or support such action
within the confines of traditional Christian ethics, scripture, or
theology, one is reminded of the words of Jean-Francois Lyotard.
“A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher:
the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle
governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged
according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar
categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories
are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the
writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the
rules of what will have been done. Hence the fact that work and
text have the characters of an event; hence also, they always come
too late for their author, or, what amounts to the same thing, their
being put into work, their realization (mise un oeuvre) always
begin too soon. Post modern would have to be understood
according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo).”744
Though like Althusser, speaking to a different audience and in a
different context, the truth of his words shines through. Bonhoeffer,
too, was operating “without rules in order to formulate the rules of
what will have been done.” (And like the post-modern writer
whose work is both too early and too late to be of any comfort
and/or salvation to him, Bonhoeffer’s words and actions ultimately
were to resonate with the age but fell regrettably silent upon the
man who had wrought and willed them into existence.)
Example 3:
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Although an unintended martyr, he was able to draw strength from
his beliefs and discern purpose from his hardships. “It is infinitely
easier to suffer in obedience to a human command than to accept
suffering as free, responsible men. It is infinitely easier to suffer
with others than to suffer alone. It is infinitely easier to suffer as
public heroes than to suffer apart and in ignominy. It is infinitely
easier to suffer physical death than to endure spiritual suffering.
Christ suffered as a free man alone, apart and in ignominy, in body
and in spirit, and since that day many Christians have suffered with
him.”745 Throughout his life, Bonhoeffer had advocated “costly
discipleship for Christ.” In the end, it was he who was to define
this concept in the most inimitable fashion. A true proponent and
follower of his own theology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer died as he had
lived, leaving behind an undeniable legacy and cementing his place
in history as one of the greatest theologians of the twentieth
century.
Although an unintended martyr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was able to
draw strength from his beliefs and discern purpose from his
hardships. “It is infinitely easier to suffer in obedience to a human
command than to accept suffering as free, responsible men. It is
infinitely easier to suffer with others than to suffer alone. It is
infinitely easier to suffer as public heroes than to suffer apart and
in ignominy. It is infinitely easier to suffer physical death than to
endure spiritual suffering. Christ suffered as a free man alone,
apart and in ignominy, in body and in spirit, and since that day
many Christians have suffered with him.”746 Once more, the words
of Althusser seem appropriate. While arguing against the
ideological apparatuses of both state and culture, he did recognize
those brave few who refuse to acquiesce to the demands of their
colleagues, contemporaries, and superiors. “I ask the pardon of
those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few
weapons they can find in the history and learning they ‘teach’
against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they
are trapped. They are a kind of hero. But they are rare.”747 Indeed
they are. Throughout his life, Bonhoeffer had advocated “costly
discipleship for Christ.” In the end, it was he who was to define
this concept in the most unmistakable fashion. A true proponent
and follower of his own theology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer died as he
had lived, leaving behind an undeniable legacy and cementing his
place in history as one of the most important theologians of the
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twentieth century. And if Christianity is to endure in our
postmodern (narrativeless) age, then it must rebrand or perhaps
even debrand itself to allow Bonhoeffer’s notion of Religionless
Christianity to blossom. Otherwise, the word (Christianity) and all
it represents may be forever lost. But as Lyotard once said in
defense of postmodernism, one could echo with equal conviction
here. “Under the general demand for slackening and for
appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a return
of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality. The
answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the
unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of
the name.”748
Should one actually manage to derive meaning from the italicized portions above, he or
she must do so with the knowledge that no such intention or design ever existed on the
part of the author (i.e. myself). They were merely inserted (years after the initial
composition, I might add) in order to add the unnecessary and superficial gravitas that
postmodernist writing seems to require. And rather than enhance or “bloom” my essay, I
would instead contend that they have caused it to wither away on the vine. Unfortunately,
the bitter taste of this fruitless experience was to linger throughout the remainder of my
studies.
For instance, about the same time that Sokal submitted his satirical essay to Social
Text, Stanford Professor Sylvia Wynter published an article entitled, “1492: A New
World View.” (I was required to engage with it on multiple occasions.) The article
begins:
The dispute over 1492 is in full spate. We are overwhelmed by an
avalanche of arguments between the celebrants and the dissidents. The
celebrants are intellectuals of Western European and Euroamerican
descent, and the dissidents are intellectuals mainly of indigenous or Native
American descent, joined by Euroamerican allies such as Hans Koning,
the writer, and Kirkpatrick Sale, the environmentalist.
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How, the argument runs, is the 1492 event to be perceived? Should it be
seen from the celebrant perspective – as a “glorious achievement,” a
“heroic and daring deed,” of discovery and exploration, a triumph for the
Christian West that was to liberate the indigenous peoples from their
Stone Age, deprived existence without the wheel (Hart 1991)? Or, is it to
be seen from the dissident perspective – as one of “history’s monumental
crimes,” a brutal invasion and conquest that led to a degree of genocidal
extinction and of still ongoing ecological disaster unprecedented in human
history…?
But can there be, besides these two, a third perspective? Is it possible to
go beyond what Gregory Bateson (1969) calls “the old conflicts in the old
premises, in which we just go round and round without resolution,” that is,
beyond the premises of both celebrants and dissidents? Can there emerge
a new and ecumenically human view that places the events of 1492 within
a new frame of meaning, not only of natural history, but also of a newly
conceived cultural history specific to and unique to our species, because
the history of those “forms of life” gives expression to a third level of
hybridly organic, and – in the terms of the Chilean biologists Maturana
and Varela (1987) – languaging existence?749
With the exception of that last sentence (which gets a bit wordy), Wynter has framed her
essay reasonably well: rather than embracing the false either/or dichotomy of
unreservedly celebrating or unilaterally condemning Columbus and his voyage, she will
examine whether it is possible to embrace a more harmonious both/and perspective in
which the pros and cons of each original viewpoint can be weighed against the backdrop
and historical brunt of the others. As a history professor myself, I can comfortably and
confidently state that the answer to such an obvious question is yes. By reexamining our
historical actions and attitudes from a broadened and more inclusive perspective, the
present consequences of past actions can be more fully understood and appreciated, and
the potential consequences of future decisions can be more thoughtfully considered, with
conclusions more universally and empathetically reached. Unfortunately, Wynter
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believes the answer to be far more nuanced and complex, and as a result the prose
quickly devolves into the same sort of pseudo-scientific babble found in Sokal and
Bricmont’s book.
For example, in the next two paragraphs, Wynter states:
Michel Foucault (1973) has argued that a history of the specifically human
needs to take its point of departure from the differing ways in which each
individual and the human group to which he or she belongs represent to
himself or herself, and to themselves, the life that they live. The linguist
Philip Lieberman (1991) has recently provided us with the outlines of how
such a new history could be conceptualized. Lieberman points out that the
biological evolution in early humans of the modern supralaryngeal vocal
tract, together with the brain mechanisms necessary to produce human
speech and syntax, generated a new type of evolution: we developed a
cognitive capacity related to our new ability to construct linguistically
encoded moral or ethico-behavioral systems. These developments enabled
us to induce the mode of altruism that bond us together as groups. In
consequence, as I propose here, in place of the genetic programs that
regulate the behaviors of all organic species, we developed our own
culture-specific programs by which our human behaviors – cognizing,
affective, and actional – came to be role-governed and lawfully regulated.
Lieberman (1971: 172) further argues that, although “the development of
human cultures of which moral sense is arguably the highest form, has
obviously progressed in the last 100,000 years, with slavery, for example,
although once universally common to all peoples, having now come to be
universally outlawed” (in spite of being practiced de facto in a few
remaining pockets), and although “we have populated and changed
continents, harnessed the forces of nature, and subjugated every other
form of life,” we ourselves have not yet attained those behavioral attitudes
of altruism, empathy, and moral sense in our dealings with each other that
he calls the “markers of fully modern human beings.” Can we place the
event of 1492 – both its undoubled “glorious achievement” aspect and its
equally documented atrocities aspects – within such a newly
conceptualized moral evolutionary history? As Théophile Obenga (1987)
and both molecular biologists and linguists (for example, Cavallo-Sforzi
1991; Vigilant et al. 1991) have pointed out, it is a history that began in
Africa, with the emergence of humans out of the animal kingdom. Yet, it
is also a history that can now be projected backward from the
contemporary imperative of our global interhuman and environmental
situation in which the attaining of Lieberman’s markers of what should
constitute fully modern human beings is now the necessary condition, at
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this conjunction, both of our species survival and, concomitantly, of our
interaltruistic co-identification as a species.750
What “profound” argument is Wynter making here? Simply that evolution originally
conditioned human altruism to extend only to those with whom we shared an immediate
geographical and/or social environment. However, as a result of modern human
communication, transportation, and other technological progress which one might
collectively call globalization, that altruism must now necessarily extend beyond culture,
kinship, or nationality in order to encompass the species as a whole if we are to survive
the self-inflicted consequences our advancement has wrought. As far as I can tell, the
numerous references to molecular biologists, Egyptologists, and linguists adds precisely
nothing to this rather simple, yet salient point.
What’s worse, just a few pages later, Wynter, while making another quite obvious
observation, seems to subscribe to the same epistemological relativism that characterizes
most postmodernist writing. She argues:
The central parallel here with 1492 is that Columbus was to be no less
governed in his actions by a mode of “subject of understanding” than were
the Aztecs. Consequently, the sequence, on the one hand, of admirable
behaviors that led him to persevere over many long years in putting
forward the intellectual rationale, in spite of the mockery and derision of
the learned scholars of his time, and that led him to carry out his
successful voyage “against,” as he later wrote, “the opinion of all the
world” and the sequence, on the other hand, of ruthless behaviors that
followed his landfall we’re both motivated by the same counter mode of
“subjective understanding” oriented about the then-emerging statalmercantile and this-worldly goal of rational redemption. The new ethicobehavioral system of “reasons-of-the-state” and its new mode of political
rationality led him, on arriving, not only to take immediate possession of
the new lands in the name of Spain, but also to deal with the peoples of
these lands as a population group that could be justly made to serve three
main purposes. One of these purposes was to expand the power of the
Spanish state that had backed his voyage. The second was to repay his
financial backers, as well as to enrich himself and his family with all the
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gold and tribune he could extort from the indigenous peoples, even from
making some into cabezas de indios y indias (heads of Indian men and
women), could be sold as slaves, in order to support the acquired noble
status that was part of the contract he had drawn up with the Crown before
the voyage (as a psychosocial status drive that was to also impel his
behaviors). His third purpose was to help accelerate the spread of
Christianity all over the world, in time for the Second Coming of Christ,
which he fervently believed to be imminent.
Consequently, Columbus’s behaviors were not unlike the ritual acts of
sacrifice of the Aztecs. Their behaviors, too, were impelled by an ethicobehavioral system based on securing what seemed to them to be the
imperative goal of “ensuring the good of the Commonwealth,” and to do
this by maintaining, as their founding supraordinate goal prescribed what
they should do, “the flow of life.” Columbus’s equally Janus-faced
behaviors were to be no less prescribed by the emergent religio-secular
political and mercantile goal of the state, which Columbus would come to
see as the vehicle both for the spread of the faith and for the advancement
of his own status. So the Aztecs’ “flow of life” imperative would become
for Columbus and the Spaniards (to the Aztecs’ horror and astonishment)
the imperative of maintaining a “flow of gold.” In an inextricably tangled
web of motives, for him this flow would serve not only to secure the good
of the state and his own personal enrichment, but also to finance the
reconquest of Jerusalem from its Islamic occupiers, in order to prepare the
world for the imminent Second Coming of Christ. It was a coming in
which many members of the new socially mobile merchant/artisan-cummapmaker category (in a world in which the nobility was still hegemonic)
fervently believed. This was the category to which Columbus belonged.751
Again, one might ask, what is Wynter’s point? To the best of my understanding, it is
simply that both Columbus’ and the Aztecs’ individual motivations for their actions,
while complex and even self-contradictory at times, were nevertheless rationally
grounded within their respective cultures. And understanding this can allow one to move
beyond the simple reactionary (and ultimately fruitless) assignments of blame and
victimhood in order to attain more empathy and understanding from and for both parties.
And I believe Wynter would agree with my summarization, for after sixteen
arduous, abstract pages filled with superfluous name-dropping, an irrelevantly inserted
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map detailing Columbus’ voyages, and a rather rambling discussion on poetics, even she
seems to finally admit as much. She writes:
This can occur even in those cases where these modes of “subjective
understanding” and the limits of the modes of altruism, or of the propter
nos that they impose, have become dangerous and dysfunctional for the
individual subjects of their orders.
This was to be true not only of Columbus and the Spaniards, but of the
peoples whom they confronted. And it is this historical fact, one
conceived in the terms of a new cultural history proposed earlier, that can
enable us to interpret the Janus-face paradox of 1492 from a transcultural
and therefore human point of view.752
Her argument thus made and her case effectively concluded, Wynter nevertheless ambles
along yet another eighteen pages before officially closing the door on Columbus and his
subjectively tendentious voyage. Those pages include such enigmatic and overelaborate
passages as the following:
As the biologists Riedl and Kaspar (1984) point out, the cognitive
mechanism specific to the human species, the mechanism to which we
give the term “mind,” is only “the most recent superstructure in a
continuum of cognitive processes as old as life on this planet.” Because
these processes are therefore the “least tested and refined against the real
world,” it is only with the natural sciences that any true “victory” has been
won in the ongoing “testing and refining” of the human cognitive capacity
against the real world. This point enables us not only to put forward an
ecumenically human interpretation of 1492 – one that can place it as an
event in the context of a “vaster notion of history” (Jameson 1991), one I
shall propose, that can be conceived of as the history of the evolution of
the human cognitive mechanism in the process of its “testing and refining
itself against the real world” – but also to grasp the contours of the new
path, as well as the dimensions of the challenge that now confronts us.
Therefore, in our new world view of 1492, both Columbus’s and
Copernicus’s “root of expansions of thought” would, within the wider
context of the political and cultural revolution of humanism, in time make
possible that mutation at the level of human cognition that led to the rise
of the natural sciences. This in turn led to the autonomy of such cognition
(that is, outside its earlier role as an imperative function of verifying each
order’s mode of “subjective understanding”) with respect to the earth and
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physical reality in general. However, if the winning of this autonomy
would gradually displace the notions of a nonhomogeneous earth and
universe, both of whose nec plus ultra lines (habitable/uninhabitable,
celestial/terrestrial) had served to encode the physico-spiritual notion of
order on whose totemic “categorical models” the feudal order had mapped
both the role allocating mechanisms of its order and the representations
that served to stably induce the mode of interaltruistic symbolic
conspecificity that integrated it, the new order of the secularizing modern
state would make its own role-allocating mechanisms and unifying code of
symbolic conspecificity onto a new notion of order. This new notion was
to be based on a by-nature difference between Europeans, on the one
hand, and peoples of indigenous and African descent, on the other. That
difference was represented as having ostensibly been ordained by God’s
intentions, as reflected in the Book of Nature, and specifically, in the
ordered differential design of the organic species, from which, however,
rational man was, as the effect of a separate divine creation, unbridgeably
divided….
This was the case until the general upheaval of the 1960s made possible a
new opening – that of the collective challenge made to the symbolic
representational systems and their “stereotyped images” by which we have
hitherto nonconsciously woven our innumerable modes of the Self and
their innumerable Others.753
As far as I can tell, the first paragraph simply indicates that human beings have the
intellectual ability to view historical events from a multiplicity of perspectives. The
second merely explains that, in the West, it was not until the scientific revolution of the
16th and 17th centuries that human beings finally came to realize our collective cognitive
potential (when the stifling oppression of religious orthodoxy finally began to subside
and was slowly replaced with a newfound and exponentially expanded form of
humanism). Unfortunately, this realization carried with it an implicit bias, based largely
upon racial, religious, and economic distinction, a regrettable reality that we have only
recently begun to address in earnest. (This seems to have been her point in paragraph
three.)
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And though this is but a taste of the veritable word salad that Wynter has created,
I would conclude by informing the reader that this essay was raised up time and again as
perhaps the finest example of postmodern prose in the last two decades; as a result, we
students were strongly encouraged to consider it an archetypal model upon which our
own future efforts should ideally be based. What follows is my one and only attempt at
doing so. In the assignment prompt, I was asked to compare/contrast (and if possible
reconcile) sociologist Avtar Brah’s notion of “transnational identity” with feminist
philosopher Nomi Braidotti’s concept of “nomadic embodied subjectivity,” and then to
situate my analysis within the fictional confines of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s
admittedly captivating novel Purple Hibiscus. Please allow me to apologize in advance
for what you’re about to read.
In “Diaspora, Border and Transnational Identities,” Avtar Brah states that
“the concepts of border and diaspora together reference the theme of
location. This point warrants emphasis because the very strong association
of notions of diaspora with displacement and dislocation means that the
experience of location can easily dissolve out of focus.” 754 In order to
avoid this – and thus to articulate precisely what she means by
“transnational identities” – Brah proposes a politics of location, which she
describes as “locationality in contradiction.”755 This notion is analogous
to, though not completely synonymous with, Frantz Fanon’s concept of
dual consciousness, in which a colonized subject is forced to attempt to
simultaneously integrate two very different (often opposed and/or
contradicting) cultural identities.756 However, whereas the colonized
subject’s task may indeed prove a logical impossibility, the diasporic
subject’s need not necessarily be so. As Brah subsequently explains, “the
identity of the diasporic imagined community is far from fixed or pregiven. It is constituted within the crucible of the materiality of everyday
life; in the everyday stories we tell ourselves individually and
collectively.”757 In other words, while the identities of the individual
diasporic subject and the diasporic community at large are founded and
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grounded upon such seemingly binary concepts as here/there, us/them, and
belonging/ostracism, these notions are themselves dynamic and thus
constantly in flux; therefore they need not be, indeed cannot be, mutually
exclusive. “The point is that there are multiple others embedded within
and across binaries, albeit one or more may be accorded priority within a
given discursive formation.”758
In “The Paradox of Nomadic Embodied Subjectivity,” Rosi Braidotti
echoes a similar sentiment. Though never addressing diaspora discourse
per se, her repeated emphasis on the importance of embodied materialism
in the de/reconstructed Post-Modernist, Post-Humanist subject speaks to
this fundamental truth. Describing Postmodernity as a “spasmodic and
slightly schizophrenic” age in which the repressed others of Modernity
(women, racialized and/or ethnic others, and nature) have “returned with a
vengeance,” Braidotti argues for a return to post-humanist philosophy in
order to accommodate the necessary shift in both perspective and
emphasis that must occur as a result.759 According to Braidotti, such a
philosophy would “break out of both anthropo- and andro-centrism, thus
leaving masculine biases behind. I think it also de-centers the Euro-centric
vision of this culture as the center of civilization and takes stock in a more
sober manner of the mixed legacy of European history. This should result
in a variety of cartographies or rather, in this case, ‘ethnoscapes’ for
contemporary subjectivity and thus break the mould of ethnocentric
subject positions.”760 In advocating for a “variety of cartographies,”
Braidotti is, in essence, making the same argument as Brah for the
reconsidered subjectivity of the individual in an increasingly global age.
Despite these similarities, there is at least one ideological and/or
methodological difference between Brah’s diasporic subject and
Braidotti’s nomadic subject which must be addressed. Ostensibly, it seems
as though both Brah and Braidotti are arguing for a type of grounded
globalism (or “simultaneous situatedness” as Brah describes it) in which
one’s subjective identity is firmly tethered to one’s physical embodiment
whilst enough rope yet remains for a somewhat itinerant, intersubjective
existence.761 However, in this context, Braidotti’s notion of nomadism
implies something decidedly different from Brah’s diaspora discourse.
Though both seem quite leery of falling victim to the inherent pitfalls and
presumptions of traditional either/or modes of thought, Braidotti’s
disavowal of dualism – and of dichotomous thinking in general – is so
complete as to destroy the line between self/other, here/there, us/them,
etc., thus inviting the sort of individual and cultural schizophrenia to
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which she alluded earlier. On the other hand, Brah’s broadening of binary
discourses is still sufficient to decenter and disassemble the
Modernist/Humanist subject, without at the same time severing the ties
that bind one to one’s bodily existence and intersubjective reality. In other
words, no matter how complicated or contextualized, the notion of
diaspora Brah insists upon still connotes a sense of attachment to one’s
former, current, and/or future surroundings as well as an implied intention
for the journey in-between; conversely, the continual wanderings and
ideological aimlessness of Braidotti’s nomadism do not. This distinction is
most readily apparent in the supporting examples each author provides.
Perhaps Brah’s best example is her problematization of the traditional
majority/minority binary. Calling instead for a “multi-axial understanding
of power,” Brah argues that “a group constituted as a ‘minority’ along one
dimension of differentiation may be constructed as a ‘majority’ along
another…. Moreover, individual subjects may occupy ‘minority’ and
‘majority’ positions simultaneously.”762 In support of this point, Brah
outlines the autobiographical accounts of two Feminist writers who grew
up in Alabama during the American Civil Rights Era: Minnie Bruce Pratt
and Angela Davis. As Brah notes, “Both women invoke the segregated
South of their childhood, but their memories construct an experiential
landscape charted from opposite sides of the racial divide.”763 For
instance, Pratt, a “white, middle-class, lesbian feminist,” is simultaneously
situated within both the racial and economic majorities of her community
and the gendered and sexual minorities of her culture.764 Davis’ account is
likewise situated within the gendered and/or sexual minorities of her
community, but it is also firmly rooted in the racial and economic
minorities of her culture as well. As Brah rightly suggests, “a juxtaposition
of these two narratives is helpful in offering related accounts of the
operations of racism and class in the constitution of gendered forms of
white and black subjectivity against the backdrop of a turbulent period in
recent American history.”765 In other words, in Brah’s formulation the
binary mode of thinking is undoubtedly problematized and expanded, but
not completely abandoned. Consequently, her diasporic subjects remain
firmly grounded to themselves and their surroundings, all the while
permitted a newly heightened sense of mobility and intersubjective
perspective.
Braidotti offers her own critique of the traditional binary structuration as
well. In describing the need for an impersonal or “post-personal” style of
thought, Braidotti outlines the way(s) in which she believes the traditional
writer/reader binary must be deconstructed and then recombined to allow
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for “a web of connections to be drawn, not only in terms of the author’s
‘intentions’ and the reader’s ‘reception’, but rather in a much wider more
complexified set of possible interconnections…. It is all a question of what
kind of rhizomatic connections we can draw among ourselves, here and
now, in the act of exchanging our cartographies and comparing notes on
our respective locations.”766 Unfortunately, such “rhizomatic connections”
are themselves completely opposed to, and thus incompatible with, any
and all binary formulations of thought. As a result, Braidotti’s attempt to
problematize binary discourse results not in its complification or
expansion, but rather in its dissolution altogether. As she herself admits, “I
would refigure such an embodied subject as a text by Gertrude Stein, set to
music by Phillip Glass, performed by Diamanda Galas.”767 No longer
firmly grounded to such notions as self/other or here/there, her nomadic
subject becomes not only decentered but destabilized as well. And though
still free to wander, he/she is no longer able to justify the reason for or
necessity of the journey.
For perhaps a more clear comparison of the notions of diasporic and
nomadic subjectivity, let us turn our attentions to Chimamanda Ngozi
Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus. Set in post-colonial Nigeria in the uncertain
aftermath of a two-year civil war, the novel follows the story of fifteenyear-old Kambili, torn between two worlds – that of her native Nigeria
and the remnants of Western would-be colonizers and cultural usurpers.
Arguably, the two most influential figures in Kambili’s life are those of
her father Eugene and her “Aunty” Ifeoma. Though brother and sister, and
thus in many ways sharers of the same geography and cultural heritage,
they represent near-perfect instantiations of Brah and Braidotti’s
ostensibly similar though substantively different theories. For her part,
Aunty Ifeoma represents the grounded, yet mobile perspective of Brah’s
diasporic subject, while Eugene embodies the sort of decentered,
destabilized schizophrenia that, I would argue, results from Braidotti’s
rhizomatic embrace of nomadism.
For instance, Aunty Ifeoma has managed to simultaneously integrate and
embrace many aspects of both her native Nigeria and the West. As an
independent, strong-minded, Catholic single mother of three, as well as
lecturer at the local college, Ifeoma has undoubtedly adopted many of the
characteristics and customs of the West, but her strong relationship with
her father (who remains unapologetically pagan), her own hybridized
understanding and practice of Catholicism, as well her communal ties to
the land and community demonstrate that her Nigerian roots continue both
to ground and to enrich her increasingly globalized existence. Conversely,
Eugene epitomizes the dangers of losing oneself to the irreversible
blurring of binary lines that must result from an embrace of nomadism.
His identity and subjective experience(s) are forever fractured by his
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inability to physically and psychologically situate himself within a
mongrelized world which he can no longer sufficiently define. For
example, while his embrace of the West can never be complete (as both
his geography and his embodiment serve to ground him elsewhere), his
disavowal of the traditions and communal ties to his native Nigeria
(including estrangement from his elderly father) at the same time ensures
that his ancestral domain can no longer provide the comforts of home and
hearth it once did. As a result, Eugene finds himself continually torn
between the competing ideologies and responsibilities of East/West,
work/family, and novelty/tradition. And with nothing and no one left to
ground him sufficiently to any one place or experience, his intentional
travels devolve into the aimless wanderings of the nomad. The end result
is not only a decentering and destabilization of self, but also of his wife
and children who seem forever caught in his wake.768
Although I was unable to organically incorporate it into the body of my essay, I was also
tasked with presenting my personal reactions to Braidotti’s piece during a subsequent
classroom discussion session; this quote, excerpted from an assigned reading in another
class in which I was concurrently enrolled, is how I chose to end that presentation. It is
from a 1997 article entitled “Psychotic Experience and Disordered Thinking: A
Reappraisal from New Perspectives,” by Michael Schwartz, Osborne Wiggins, and
Manfred Spitzer. While intended as an explanation/diagnosis of the schizophrenic
tendency, I think the description (not to mention the title) works equally well in capturing
the mainstream postmodernist mind. Make of it what you will.
The outcomes of expansion are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there is
an enlarged awareness of the interconnections that bind objects, events, and
people together as more and more aspects of things emerge out of one another: the
expansion. On the other hand, the individual’s struggle to handle and control this
overwhelming complexity leads him or her to focus on only a few of these
manifold meanings: the reduction of complexity. Focusing on only a few of the
meanings, however, disconnects these from the others. The individual thereby
disregards those meanings in the horizon that tie him or her to the shared reality
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of other people. The person is thus unburdened of overwhelming complexity but
only at the price of separation from the intersubjective world.769
Unfortunately, neither a catchy title nor a witty remark will go far towards
alleviating this intellectual crisis that currently plagues so many of our departments.
Substantive ideas and imitable approaches must be put forth in good faith by those who
would see a commonsense shift within the humanities, back to the sort of relevancy of
ideas, accessibility of prose, interdisciplinary dialogue, and public engagement that used
to comprise the majority of our scholarship.
And regardless of one’s perspective on their respective positions, I believe the
New Atheist treatises with which I began this book represent four such efforts. As a
means of concluding not only the chapter, but also the work itself, I humbly offer two
examples of my own creation. Along with this current project, they embody precisely
what I believe must occur in order to facilitate this paradigm shift. The first is addressed
principally to academics, specifically those within the philosophical tradition of
phenomenology who, for a variety of reasons, seem hesitant to embrace the sort of
interpersonal and cross-disciplinary communication that I think is required between the
natural and social sciences, as well as within the humanities more generally. The second
is the final project from my final course as a humanities doctoral student. It represents my
last, most complete, and most earnest attempt to reconcile postmodernist thought with the
more modernist, Enlightenment tradition to which I personally belong and steadfastly
adhere. But regardless of the ultimate success or failure of my efforts to bridge this gap, I
sincerely hope that, at the very least, they will serve to reestablish a dialogue, however
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tentatively, between not only the humanities and the natural sciences, but also between
the academy itself and the wider intellectual and cultural community to which it belongs.
May we never allow either conversation to fall silent or upon deaf ears again.

Part II: A Prescriptive Postmortem
In Defense of Dennett’s “Strawmen”: Heterophenomenology Reexamined770
In this section, I will examine the basic tenets of Daniel Dennett’s notion of
heterophenomenology. Following a brief outline of his proposed methodology, I will
survey, in some detail, his arguments concerning the so-called “Intentional Stance,”
which, I would argue, affords him a means not only of getting his arguments off the
ground, but also of balancing upon this philosophical tightrope that spans the conceptual
chasm between physicalism and phenomenology. I plan, subsequently, to defend
heterophenomenology against several of the most frequent critiques leveled against it by
contemporary philosophers, such as those recently raised by Daniel Zahavi, Shannon
Vallor, and Alva Noë. In doing so, I will argue that their criticisms – specifically those
concerning Dennett’s supposed misrepresentation(s) of Edmund Husserl, the issue of
observer neutrality within his methodology, as well as the inherent biases and
presumptions of the scientific method – actually support Dennett’s understanding of the
770
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authoritative and communicative limitations of classical phenomenology, and thus are not
the game-changers or show-stoppers that his detractors believe them to be.
In the Introduction to his Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty
writes:
Phenomena are never absolutely unknown to scientific consciousness
(which borrows all of its models from the structure of lived experience), it
is just that scientific consciousness does not ‘thematize’ them, it does not
make explicit the horizons of perceptual consciousness by which it is
surrounded and whose concrete relations it seeks to express objectively….
The experience of phenomena…is the making explicit or the bringing to
light of the pre-scientific life of consciousness that alone gives the
operations of science their full sense and to which these operations always
refer. This is not an irrational conversation, but rather an intentional
analysis.771
Though here intending to distinguish between the Husserlian notion of a complete
phenomenological epoché and his own understanding of the ontological necessity of
embodied consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s statement also effectively serves as the
philosophical foundation of and the conceptual springboard for Daniel Dennett’s notion
of heterophenomenology.
Essentially advocating for a third-person perspective on classical first-person or
“auto” phenomenology, Dennett describes heterophenomenology as “nothing other than
the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical
neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human
consciousness in a serious, scientific way.”772 This serious, scientific notion of which
Dennett speaks should not, however, be construed as a complete rejection of either
Husserlian or Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, nor of the contributive value(s) of a firstperson perspective in our overarching search for knowledge. As Dennett himself
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subsequently explains, “heterophenomenology is the beginning of a science of
consciousness, not the end. It is the organization of the data, a catalogue of what must be
explained, not itself an explanation or a theory.”773 In “Heterophenomenology
Reconsidered,” Dennett is even more explicit:
Let me begin, then, with something of a bird’s-eye view of what I take
heterophenomenology to be: a bridge – the bridge – between the
subjectivity of human consciousness and the natural sciences.... It is
precisely the point of heterophenomenology to honor that contrast, and
preserve and protect the point of view of the subject, and then to convey
the point of view of the subject, the cognitive system, to the scientific
enterprise.774
In Consciousness Explained, Dennett outlines his methodology for constructing
such a bridge. Initially dispensing with, or at the very least postponing, the question of
just which entities (if any) actually have consciousness, Dennett proposes what he
considers to be the most obvious and uncontroversial means of both accurately preserving
and effectively communicating one’s conscious experience(s) to an outside observer:
verbal interaction within a controlled setting. In this sort of investigative study, an
experimenter would attempt to induce a particular type of experience in her subject, while
the subject would, in turn, simply relate or describe (as best as she is able) what that
experience is like, or more specifically, what it is like for her.775
Throughout the process, both the experimenter and subject would be allowed to
ask for additional clarification from or to provide such elucidation for their counterpart,
whenever either considers it to be necessary or profitable to the exchange. To ensure
objectivity in so far as it is possible, these interactions would be recorded and then
independently transcribed by at least three stenographers. Any unclear or irreconcilable
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portions of the recordings that could not be comparatively rectified or collectively agreed
upon would be subsequently disregarded, so as to safeguard the study against charges of
ambiguity or observational bias.776 If accomplished, the end result would be an account
that is not only representative of the subject’s own perception(s) of his or her conscious
experience but also sufficiently vetted to be of scientific value for the outside observer
and larger community as well.
But Dennett asks “just what kinds of things does this methodology commit us to?
Beyond the unproblematic things all of science is committed to (neurons and electrons,
clocks and microscopes,...) just to beliefs – the beliefs expressed by subjects and deemed
constitutive of their subjectivity.”777 Of course as a result, a number of his critics have
claimed that Dennett’s methodology fails to account for the differences between
experience and one’s beliefs about experience, and in reality preserves only the latter.778
To this charge, Dennett has responded, “A catalogue of beliefs about experience is not
the same as a catalogue of experiences themselves, and it has been objected (Levine,
1994) that ‘conscious experiences themselves, not merely our verbal judgments about
them, are the primary data to which a theory must answer’. But how, in advance of
theory, could we catalogue the experiences themselves?”779 In other words, it is not that
his opponents are wrong to make the distinction between one’s beliefs about experience
and the experiences themselves, for a conceptual and communicative gap between them
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does indeed exist, but rather it is that they are wrong to doubt that heterophenomenology
is the most satisfying philosophical and scientific method for bridging them.
After all, this is a problem facing mainstream phenomenology as well, especially
when one considers the preference for and the primacy of the “first-person plural
presumption” contained within more traditional (i.e. Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian)
veins of the philosophy.780 Such a notion assumes not only a basic structural similarity of
conscious experience between subjects, but also an inherent ability to accurately perceive
and relate those experiences to others. Unfortunately, when combined with traditional
phenomenology’s relative lack of consistency concerning observational and accumulative
methodologies, it would seem that the gap between experience and one’s belief(s) about
experience is not only far wider under traditional phenomenology, but perhaps even to
the point where a bridge between them is no longer linguistically or scientifically
possible. That is to say that, without some mediating structure in place, the subject and
object of experience are necessarily one and cannot be distinguished, independently
verified, or communicated; thus the potential for ambiguity and observational bias within
the data set is increased exponentially.781
According to Dennett, this problem is further exacerbated by the fact that we (that
is, the individual subjects of our own conscious experience) are not the authoritative
voice(s) we so often believe ourselves to be. Or to return once more to the words of
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Merleau-Ponty, “Nothing is more difficult than in knowing precisely what we see.”782
Consequently, Dennett has proposed adopting an attitude of neutrality concerning
subjects’ beliefs about their conscious experience, not as a means of discounting them (as
has so often been claimed), but rather as a means of preserving them and treating them as
seriously as they can be taken. It is at this point that his arguments concerning the
“intentional stance” come rather forcefully into play. Given his admittedly physicalist and
ostensibly-eliminativist leanings, a majority of Dennett’s critics have argued that
employing the intentional stance with regard to a subject’s beliefs about his or her own
experiences is little more than a polite, unassuming way of brushing them aside entirely.
However, by elaborating on precisely what this notion both entails and permits, I intend
to demonstrate that such critics are themselves mistaken.
In “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works,” Dennett puts
forth his arguments concerning the existence, nature, and (most importantly) the
usefulness of belief.783 While Eliminativists argue that our understanding of mental states
(such as those commonly described by “folk psychology”)784 is itself false and therefore
likely to be replaced in the future by a more perfect physicalist understanding of the
brain, Behaviorists appear to wish to avoid the question altogether, by denying that the
internal mental states of individuals are of any consequence at all. As their name would
suggest, they concern themselves only with the observable actions (or behaviors) of
individuals in an attempt to understand, and therefore predict, how they will relate person
782
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and action one to another. At first glance, Dennett would seem to have little in common
with either tradition, but there are, in fact, elements of both notions contained within his
Intentional Strategy hypothesis. For instance, he too is primarily concerned with the
usefulness of a particular event (whether it be an external action or internal belief is, for
the moment, irrelevant) as a predictive agent in observable behavior. However, whereas
the Eliminativist would argue that the falseness of “folk psychology” rules out its
usefulness, Dennett would argue that it is actually its predictive success (or lack thereof)
that should make that determination. His arguments concerning the fickleness yet
pervasiveness of the astrological strategy in predicting behavior is perhaps the best
evidence of this conviction. Because it is predictively impotent, he argues, the
astrological strategy “is of interest only as a social curiosity.”785 Consequently, one would
be hard-pressed not to think of Dennett as at least metaphysically-committed to some
form of partial Eliminativism. However, the general usefulness of “folk psychology” in
describing, relating, and predicting one’s behavior rules it out as object for elimination (at
least for now).
That said, before proceeding any further, it would seem that a more thorough
examination of Dennett’s three interpretive “stances” is warranted. The first, often
referred to as the physical stance or strategy, is quite simple to understand though, as
Dennett himself later admits, not always as easy to employ. “Every physical thing,
whether designed or alive or not, is subject to the laws of physics and hence behaves in
ways that in principle can be explained and predicted from the physical stance.”786 In
essence, this stance is the basic platform of both physics and physicalism. But while the
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physicist is naturally comfortable working within these confines without further
explication, the physicalist philosopher will often feel the need to qualify such statements
so as to include more experiential concerns and observations. For instance, while it is true
that both a stone and an alarm clock can be understood solely from the physical stance,
the time and effort required for one to do so increases exponentially from the former to
the latter, and thus proves that while always possible, the physical strategy may not be
always preferable.
In such instances, the so-called design stance may prove more useful. At once
both riskier and richer than the physical strategy, this stance allows for a more timely
explanation of those objects that can be thought of in terms of their design function.
“Suppose I categorize a novel object as an alarm clock: I can quickly reason that if I
depress a few buttons just so, then some time later the alarm clock will make a loud
noise. I don’t need to work out the specific physical laws that explain this marvelous
regularity; I simply assume that it has a particular design – the design we call an alarm
clock – and that it will function properly, as designed.”787 This stance, it could be quite
logically argued, is what allows the average human to operate such devices as microwave
ovens and DVD players in relatively regular and predictable patterns. But while the
amount of useful, predictive information is unquestionably increased by the adoption of
this method, the design stance is not without its pitfalls and presumptions. As previously
stated, in order for one to successfully employ such a notion, one must first assume that
the object under observation has been designed in a purposeful, logical way and is
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functioning properly. Should either of these assumptions prove false, then the predictive
power of the design stance would be irreparably reduced.788
Of course, even in the most ideal of circumstances, this strategy will only take us
so far. Dennett’s example of the chess-playing computer is especially helpful to illustrate
this point. Obviously, to attempt a solely physical stance explanation for predicting the
behavior of such a device would be well beyond the intellectual purview of the average
human being (who is nonetheless still able to both understand and interact with the
computer). So perhaps this problem could be solved by employing the design stance?
Unfortunately, the knowledge that said computer is “designed” to play chess is, in and of
itself, hardly useful in predicting any real pattern(s) of play. Dennett then proceeds to list
the steps that would be necessary in order to successfully employ the design stance in a
predictive (and thus productive) manner. “First, list the legal moves available to the
computer when its turn to play comes up (usually there will be several-dozen candidates).
Now rank the legal moves from best (wisest, most rational) to worst (stupidest, most selfdefeating). Finally, make your prediction: the computer will make the best move.”789 And
while, predictively, this method is far superior to the physical stance, it is a far too
lengthy and arduous process to be of any practical use. This is where Dennett’s third and
final stance, the intentional stance, would seem to be of greatest use. Although admittedly
riskier than even the design stance, given that now both the proper design and physical
functioning of the chess-playing computer must be assumed in conjunction with its
“rational desire,” or intention, to win the game, it is also potentially a much more timely
and efficient means of predicting the behavior of said computer. Now, of course, this in
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no way implies that the computer is actually a rational agent, conscious of its supposed
intent or supervening behavior; only that conceiving of it in such a way is predictively
useful in a very real and verifiable way.
Although presumably intending to extend this methodology to human social
interaction and scientific inquiry (where it would arguably prove most useful), it appears
that a number of Dennett’s critics and supporters alike are either unable or unwilling to
see beyond his belief in inherent rationality as well as his anthropomorphic tendencies in
describing the behavior of obviously inanimate objects or processes.790 This seems to me
rather odd considering that Dennett has, on numerous occasions, argued against even the
possible existence of qualia (Consciousness Explained, Sweet Dreams, etc.). So to
presume liberalism on his part, at least in this regard, seems ill-advised if not deliberately
disingenuous.
This view is perhaps best expressed in his 1991 article, “Real Patterns,” in which
Dennett advocates for a type of “mild realism.” He considers it mild in the sense that it
cannot be equated with what he describes as the “industrial-strength realis[m]” of Jerry
Fodor in which “the pattern dimly discernible from the perspective of folk psychology
could also be discerned (more clearly, with less noise) as a pattern of structures in the
brain,” but real in the sense that it is “useful” in the predicting of behavior and the
recognition of patterns.791 In other words, the intentional stance, like the various concepts
of “folk psychology” which it helps us to interpret, are real in the sense that they are
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useful in (perhaps even essential to) the understanding, describing, and relating of human
experience and interaction from one person to another. So, simply stated, the intentional
stance is applicable only to those systems in which it “works,” and appropriate only for
those systems for which a physical stance would be uninformative and a design stance
either too limiting or too complex. We, therefore, have no need to apply it to stones,
alarm clocks, and the like, as the essence of these objects can be readily understood and
their “behaviors” reliably predicted using the more readily acceptable methodologies of
either the physical or design strategies.792
That said, grapplers with Dennett’s idea have argued (and rightly so) that no
human being is completely and consistently rational. We do occasionally hold either false
and/or self-contradictory beliefs both about ourselves and others. But I believe this fact in
no way undermines or obscures the usefulness of the intentional stance. This may itself
seem a false or contradictory belief until it is viewed through the lens (if not from the
perspective) of the design stance.
For instance, evidence of a mechanical failure in a particular automobile would
not suggest a total lack of design or a failure of the so-called design stance, but rather a
slight anomaly or imperfection within an otherwise working system. And understanding
how this particular example differs from the archetypal model (in this case, real in the
Fodorian sense) from which it is derived, would still have sufficient predictive power to
792
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warrant its consultation and continued use. Similarly, a physical or behavioral
abnormality within a single human being does not automatically reduce the predictive
powers of the design stance to nonviable levels. Instead, its comparison to the archetypal
model (which, in this instance, is real only in the Dennettian sense, as the “perfect”
human has never existed) can still provide great insight into its past and subsequent
“behavior.”
In other words, deviations from the so-called “norm” can still be useful in both
interpreting past behavior and predicting future behavior, whether that norm actually
exists (as in the example of the automobile prototype) or not (as in the case of the
idealized human body). Therefore, what matters most is its abstract usefulness, not its
concrete existence.793 In much the same way, perfect rationality need not be uniformly
practiced by all human beings at all times in order to justify employing the intentional
stance. Its general embrace and utilization within the population is itself sufficient to
warrant such a practice.
However, were we to conclude here, what argument could possibly be given for
insisting that Dennett is concerned with the nature of thought and the implication of
belief? In service of this end, we must now return to our previous discussions concerning
the predictive effectiveness (and therefore the mild realism) of “folk psychology,” a term,
incidentally, that Dennett himself coined back in 1981. The scientific idealism of
Eliminativists and Reductionists aside, the current state of physics does not permit a
purely materialist conception of mind nor yet provide the (necessary) alternative
physicalist vocabulary with which to discuss its development. For this reason, the
majority of us continue to conceive of and to communicate our experiences (either real or
793
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imagined) using the common colloquial jargon of “folk psychology.” Now, it could very
well be that, in time, a more accurate and complete physicalist understanding and
interpretation of experience will emerge, rendering “folk psychology” obsolete. But until
such time, we must rely on the best tools at our disposal for the understanding,
interpreting, and communicating of individual experience and behavior. And given the
reasonably reliable predictive success with which “folk psychology” is so often
employed, it is only logical to assume that a correlation (if not a direct mirroring)
between it and so-called “reality” does indeed exist. Perhaps only in a mildly realistic
sense, but real nonetheless. And so long as the methodology by which we refer to our
perceived internal mental states (beliefs, desires, goals, etc.) continues to prove the most
useful in identifying, relatable in describing, and essential in predicting our individual
and collective behavior, then one sees no reason to abandon or eliminate it.
Now that Dennett’s notion of heterophenomenology has been made clear, and the
intentional stance upon which it hinges has been sufficiently outlined, let us turn our
attentions to the recent rebuttals from Daniel Zahavi, Shannon Vallor, and Alva Noë to
determine what, if any, challenges their critiques represent to Dennett’s proposed
methodology. According to Zahavi:
Heterophenomenology doesn’t study conscious phenomena, since it is
neutral about whether they exist; rather it studies reports of conscious
phenomena. Thus, Dennett urges us to adopt a neutral stance and to
bracket the question concerning the validity of the subjects’ expressed
beliefs, and he argues that this maneuver amounts to a third-person version
of Husserl’s famous epoché.794
Zahavi counters that not only is Dennett’s proposed methodology
misguided (as it is not the reports of experiences with which phenomenology is
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concerned but the actual experiences themselves), but also that his initial reading
of Husserl is fundamentally flawed. He elaborates:
The purpose of the epoché and the reduction is not to doubt, neglect,
abandon, or exclude reality from consideration, rather their aim, as
Husserl repeatedly emphasizes, is to suspend or neutralize a certain
dogmatic attitude towards reality, thereby allowing us to focus more
narrowly and directly on reality just as it is given. In short, the epoché
entails a change of attitude towards reality, and not an exclusion of
reality.795
Thus, Zahavi takes Dennett’s argument to be something of a non-starter,
or “straw man” of sorts. And in a very limited sense, perhaps he is right. After all,
Dennett does appear to be maintaining a rather dogmatic attitude towards reality,
all the while questioning, or at the very least suspending judgment concerning the
possible existence of the very phenomena with which traditional phenomenology
is primarily concerned. In fact, in many ways, Dennett’s heterophenomenology
appears to constitute something of a mirrored philosophy to that of Husserl. But
rather than constituting a misreading of Husserl, as Zahavi maintains, I would
contend that this is precisely what Dennett is referring to when he describes his
own “Husserlian heritage.”796
For instance, in employing a type of epoché himself, Dennett, like Husserl
before him, is not suggesting a fundamental split between consciousness and
reality, only that we suspend our judgment(s) or unquestioned acceptance of the
one in order to better understand the other. Although they undoubtedly disagree as
to which we should accept and which we should withhold judgment, they both
seem to agree that the proposed methodology is sound. Zahavi’s own reading of
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both Dennett and Husserl, as evidenced in the above passages, would seem to
bear this out.
This fact notwithstanding, Zahavi then proceeds to “correct” another of
Dennett’s supposed misinterpretations: the introspective nature of traditional
phenomenology. Zahavi writes: “Phenomenology is certainly interested in the
phenomena and in their conditions of possibility, but phenomenologists would
typically argue that it would be a metaphysical fallacy to locate the phenomenal
realm within the mind, and to suggest that the way to access and describe it is by
turning the gaze inwards (introspicio).”797 While Zahavi subsequently provides
several categorical denials of phenomenological introspection previously put forth
by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and others, this critique seems to hinge
almost entirely on Dennett’s supposed misunderstanding of the aforementioned
epoché. If it were true, as Zahavi maintains, that Dennett believed both in the
totality of Husserlian epoché, and likewise in the totality of his own, then
introspection would indeed seem the only avenue left open to the
autophenomenologist to gain access to the experiences themselves. Similarly,
third-person observation would seem the only means by which the
heterophenomenologist could ever hope to study consciousness in any serious,
scientific way. Zahavi cites the notions of embodied consciousness in MerleauPonty and the Dasein of Heidegger in support of this point.798
However, as has already been demonstrated, neither Husserl nor Dennett
are themselves arguing for such an extreme understanding of the
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phenomenological reduction. Consequently, it would seem that introspection can
remain a tool in the heterophenomenologist’s handbag, and need not simply exist
as an albatross around the autophenomenologist’s neck, as Zahavi claims and
Dennett implies. This point can be made more plain by the following exchange:
Contrary to what Dennett is suggesting, a science of consciousness should
draw on both the first-,second- and the third-person point of view, just like
all of us do when we engage in the everyday practice of understanding
ourselves and others. If the only data the heterophenomenologists are
allowed to rely on are the data that are available from the outside, they
will not be permitted to draw implicitly on their own first-person
understanding of consciousness when they are to interpret and understand
the interviewed subject’s verbal reports. In fact, and needless to point out,
the heterophenomenologists have no direct first-personal access to their
own consciousness, according to Dennett.799
Dennett, however, maintains that
It has always been good practice for scientists to put themselves in their
own experimental apparatus as informal subjects, to confirm their hunches
about what it feels like, and to check for any overlooked or underestimated
features of the circumstances that could interfere with their interpretations
of their experiments. But scientists have always recognized the need to
confirm the insights they have gained from introspection by conducting
properly controlled experiments with naive subjects. As long as this
obligation is met, whatever insights one may garner from ‘first-person’
investigations fall happily into place in ‘third-person’
heterophenomenology.800
Thus, Zahavi’s issues with Dennett’s charge of phenomenological introspection
seem more semantic than substantial, as both he and Dennett appear to
acknowledge its value and use in their respective methodologies. As a result, I
would argue that it is not Dennett’s reading of Husserl that is mistaken, but
instead Zahavi’s reading of Dennett that is most in need of revision.
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Next, let us address the issues of observer neutrality and the supposed
biases of the scientific method. In “The Fantasy of Third-Person Science:
Phenomenology, Ontology and Evidence,” Shannon Vallor argues that “a
coherent scientific method cannot possibly elide first-person phenomenology but
must be rooted in it.”801 In effect, she claims that the proposed neutrality of the
observer within the heterophenomenological model is, at once, too broad
(encompassing the experiences themselves) and too narrow (by not automatically
accepting a subject’s own claims about her experiences as authoritative) to
warrant its supposed necessity or continued presence. In addition to repeatedly
accusing Dennett of having conflated a subject’s claims about “what is going on
in her” and “what it is like to be her,” 802 Vallor, like Zahavi, also charges him
with having fundamentally misunderstood Husserl, noting that
One of the most important of Husserl’s insights was his recognition of the
need to maintain a sharp distinction between…the real (in German, reell)
contents of the subject’s conscious experience considered from the
phenomenological standpoint (Husserl 1913, 213) vs. the real (in German,
reale) contents of her experience taken as the factual psychological state
of an empirical subject.803
This, Vallor seems to think, represents a fundamental flaw in Dennett’s logic. By
not recognizing the difference between the reell and the reale, she claims that
Dennett has missed the subtlety of Husserl’s arguments and thus failed to grasp
the utter impossibility of neutrality, observer or otherwise, and thus the inherent
biases contained within the scientific method.
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I find this a rather curious conclusion, especially when one is reminded of
the great pains undertaken by Dennett in the elaboration of his intentional stance
hypothesis to distinguish between “mild realism” and so-called “industrialstrength realism.” It seems not that Dennett has missed the subtlety of Husserl’s
argument, but rather that, in acceptance of his “Husserlian heritage,” he is one of
the few to truly understand its implications. It is precisely because pure neutrality
is impossible that the intentional stance must be adopted. Dennett maintains that it
is the abstract predictive power of a thing, and not its concrete physical existence
that is of utmost importance. The successful scientific employment of centers of
gravity, lines of latitude, the archetypal human body, and other only mildly real
notions and abstractions would seem to bear this out. In other words, it is only by
maintaining a neutral attitude regarding a subject’s actual experiences that
Dennett and other heterophenomenologists may successfully put aside the
question of their concrete existence and instead consider the implications of those
experiences as expressed in the subject’s articulated beliefs about them.
Here again, the objection to Dennett’s proposed methodology seems to be
more semantic than substantive. For instance, Vallor’s primary objection to
Dennett’s version of the epoché seems to center around his use of the word
“fictions” to describe the various phenomenological states of subjects, their
individual expressions and beliefs regarding those experiences notwithstanding.
“While Dennett is correct to resist the view that such states constitute a set of
‘further facts’ about consciousness, I claim that his conclusion that we should
therefore relegate them (at least provisionally) to the status of fictions is deeply
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misguided.”804 However, she then goes on to claim that, “phenomenological states
are neither ‘facts’ nor ‘fictions,’ but the sole evidential wellspring for both.”805
Perhaps “fictions” is indeed too strong or, at the very least too loaded, a word to
use in service of this argument, but in proclaiming that “phenomenological states
are neither facts nor fictions,” it would seem that Vallor is committing herself to
the same sort of observer neutrality and intentionalism for which she had
previously chastised Dennett.
A similar argument can be found in Alva Noë’s “Is the Visual World a
Grand Illusion?” In it, he states: “Dennett then points out, convincingly, that our
experience is not like a snapshot – there’s a blind spot, bad parafoveal vision, etc.
– and he concludes that we are victims of an illusion about the character of our
own consciousness.”806 Noë, however, disagrees with Dennett’s piecemeal
interpretation and instead offers his own more cumulative approach to
consciousness, somewhat analogous to the various pieces of a puzzle coming
together (via a potentially infinite number of individual perceptions) to form a
coherent and continuous consciousness. This is to say that Noë is challenging
Dennett’s assertion that “when we claim to be just using our powers of inner
observation, we are always actually engaging in a sort of impromptu theorizing –
and we are remarkably gullible theorizers, precisely because there is so little to
‘observe’ and so much to pontificate about without fear of contradiction.”807

804

Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
806
Alva Noë, “Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2002):
805

4.
807

Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 67-68.

411

However, it seems to me that Noë’s arguments hinge almost entirely upon
our individual ability to accurately perceive our inability to accurately perceive!
In other words, Noë’s account desires to preserve our own preferential position
and authority with respect to our own consciousness, but at the same time admits
that such a position can only be maintained by constant repositioning and
revision. “We don’t take ourselves to experience all environmental detail in
consciousness all at once. Rather, we take ourselves to be situated in an
environment to have access to environmental detail as needed by turns of the eyes
and head, and repositioning of the body.”808 Perhaps Noë is right that Dennett’s
view presumes too little about our own abilities, but it is almost certainly true that
Noë’s presumes too much. After all, Dennett’s point is that, for the most part, we
are completely unaware of the natural deficiencies within our own perceptual
fields and abilities. If this were not the case, then Noë’s arguments would
certainly seem a reasonable means of self-policing and correction. But as it
stands, even this solution implies the same sort of impromptu theorizing that Noë
is ostensibly arguing against in the first place.
Perhaps these arguments can be effectively summed up by the following
exchange. In “The Critique of Pure Phenomenology,” Noë writes:
The trouble with pure phenomenology, then, is not that it is reflective, or
introspective, or focused on experience and the subjective, or even that it
relies on first-person warrant (whatever exactly that is supposed to be).
The trouble, rather, is that pure phenomenology conceives of its subject
matter as autonomous. It is this epistemic isolation of phenomenology,
more than anything else, that threatens to undermine its claim to be a
serious kind of intellectual pursuit. At best, it seems, it is the fantasy of
such a pursuit.809
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On this point, I think Dennett would agree:
The problem with autophenomenology is not that it is (always, or
typically) victim to illusion and distortion but that it is (always) vulnerable
to illusion and distortion. That is why it must be quarantined behind
brackets. As Roy says, “the problem is not that autophenomenology takes
consciousness to be a purely passive form of observation, but that it fails
to appreciate its real limits.” But he also says: “Heterophenomenology is
phenomenology only inasmuch as it is a closet autophenomenology.”
Well, yes, and I am asking autophenomenologists to come out of the closet
and become an accredited part of the scientific enterprise. You don’t have
to abandon anything of value, since the widespread conviction that you
have to defend the citadel of the first-person is simply a mistake. And after
all, as autophenomenologists you have all along had the burden of making
your soliloquies comprehensible to an audience aside from yourself.810
In other words, Dennett is not suggesting that the heterophenomenological
bridge he hopes to build between phenomenology and the natural sciences consist
of one-way traffic only, nor be effectively burned once those on the philosophical
side have successfully journeyed across to the scientific. As we noted earlier,
“Heterophenomenology is the beginning of a science of consciousness, not the
end. It is the organization of the data, a catalogue of what must be explained, not
itself an explanation or a theory.”811 As such, the role of phenomenology has not
been diminished or dismissed by this new enterprise, as so many have claimed,
but has instead been communicated and connected to a much wider scientific
community from which both may ultimately benefit.
Perhaps an example would prove useful as both a conclusion and as a
means of recognizing Dennett’s importance as the interdisciplinary arbiter that he
is. Merleau-Ponty once said, “Everything that I know about the world, even
through science, I know from a perspective that is my own or from an experience
810
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of the world without which such scientific symbols would be meaningless. The
entire universe of science is constructed upon the living world, and if we wish to
think science rigorously, to appreciate its sense and its scope, we must first
awaken that experience of the world of which science is the second-order
expression.”812 Thus, the task of the phenomenologist.
Although a number in the scientific community might understandably take
umbrage at Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of their discipline as somehow
derivative, Albert Einstein’s words remind us that there is a certain amount of
truth to them. “It would not be difficult to come to an agreement as to what we
understand by science. Science is the century-old endeavor to bring together by
means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena of this world into as
thoroughgoing an association as possible. To put it boldly, it is the attempt at the
posterior reconstruction of existence by the process of conceptualization.”813 This,
the work of the scientist. And thanks to Dennett, the two need no longer view one
another as either alien or antagonist. Instead, a resuscitated heterophenomenology
makes possible the sharing of that experience, and the collaboration of that
endeavor, in a way that is palatable and profitable to both enterprises, as well as
to the larger world of which they are mutually and inseparably a part.
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Alternatives to Fanon: The Search for a Less Violent, More Cosmopolitan Approach to
Decolonization814
Introduction
Frantz Fanon’s 1961 The Wretched of the Earth is undoubtedly one of the most
prominent and potent examples of anti-colonial scholarship to emerge from the
tumultuous aftermath of World War II. In it, he describes the ways in which imperialism
inevitably dehumanizes its victims, destabilizes their society, and devalues/destroys their
culture, all the while managing to offer a two-pronged solution to the problem which
jointly serves to bookend his treatise. In the opening chapter, Fanon makes the case for
the necessity of retributive violence in the process of decolonization, while in the
concluding chapter, he calls for a new form of humanism in which the culture and
traditions of imperialist Europe are to be excluded in favor of more “universal” values.
Although I applaud much of what rests between these two sections, I cannot help but be
troubled by what is contained within them. In what follows, I will endeavor to elaborate
my misgivings about these two proposals, as well as to introduce the reader to two
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individuals who I believe offer viable alternatives to Fanon’s ideology and/or approach:
C.L.R. James and Kwame Anthony Appiah. Although I title the first section “The
Problems,” I am hesitant to call its successor “The Solution(s).” That would be unfair to
Fanon (for much of what he has to say is true and of unquestionable value) as well as to
the theorists I offer in his stead (for, as we shall see, their ideas and suggestions are not
without challenges and complications of their own). My aim, then, is not to solve the
“problem” of Fanon, but simply to contribute to the conversation that already surrounds
him and the post-colonial world(s) of which he was a part.
The Problems:
Concerning Violence

In the opening chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon makes the
following assertion: “whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced,
decolonization is always a violent phenomenon.”815 Historically speaking, it is difficult to
disagree with his assessment: from our own revolution against the British all those
centuries ago to the many recent and current independence struggles of the African and
Asian continents, decolonization has always been a violent phenomenon. However, in
acknowledging this fact, we must not allow ourselves to make the ideological leap from
past truth (or even present circumstance) to future inevitability. Unfortunately, this is
precisely what Fanon seems to do: “colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body
endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield
when confronted with greater violence.”816 In his preface to the work, Jean-Paul Sartre
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echoes the same sentiment: “this irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the
resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man recreating
himself. I think we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it – that no
gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them.”817 In
both instances, I believe it is possible to agree with the historicity of Fanon and Sartre’s
statements, all the while challenging the abject fatalism of their collective conclusion(s).
In this section of the essay, I shall attempt to do so.
Sartre and Fanon’s discussion of the three phases of colonial violence is
especially useful towards achieving this end. The first phase consists of violence done
against the native at the hands of the settler. The second phase of this process consists of
this violence being absorbed and appropriated by the native, who then often redirects it
against himself as well as his own people. The final stage is the self-corrective phase
when native violence is then finally, perhaps righteously, revisited upon the settler. Sartre
describes this final phase as a time when “the same violence is thrown back upon us as
when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go toward a mirror.”818 Not only
is this statement visually effusive; it is also psychologically informative as well.
According to Sartre, blaming the native for his violent reaction to the violence visited
upon him would be akin to blaming the mirror for showing us the unpleasantness of our
own appearance. In both instances, Sartre would argue, the fault lies with us and
responsibility must be accepted as such. However, this admission/realization in no way
implies either the efficacy or the necessity of violence to which both Sartre and Fanon
seemed committed.
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In realizing that violence against the settler may indeed be justified, neither he nor
the native poised to inflict it would be well served in allowing this reckoning to proceed
unchallenged or unconsidered. For, rather than a three-phased process nearing its
conclusion, what we, in fact, find is a perpetual cycle of violence and self-destruction
from which none can ever hope to escape. Our own American Revolution provides
perhaps the best example of this unfortunate reality.
Fanon argues that “the immobility to which the native is condemned can only be
called in question if the native decides to put an end to the history of colonization – the
history of pillage – and to bring into existence the history of the nation – the history of
decolonization.”819 This would certainly seem to have been the impetus for our own
revolution against the might of British colonials. Our Founding Fathers may be
considered somewhat akin both to Fanon’s notion of native nationalists and the “knowall, smart, wily intellectuals” of colonial Africa.820 However, whether acting as true
patriots or mere opportunists, it was they who initially championed compromise… so
long as they believed it possible and profitable. Once disillusioned with its potential for
success, it was they who most vociferously incited the masses to violence, all in the name
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their goal thus achieved, they did not then
(as promised) seek either justice for the fallen or happiness for the masses, but rather only
retributions and reparations for themselves. For many Americans to this day, the
promises of the Declaration and Constitution remain little more than a dream deferred,
left to wither on the malnourished vine of democracy.
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Even worse, the United States has not become the enemy of colonialism we
intended, but rather an imperialist power itself. Our fraternal bonds, once forged in the
fires of revolution, have since cooled at home, and now rage only in the vast expanses
beyond our borders. It is only when confronted with the notion of “other” that we manage
to resurrect our repressed nationalism and redirect our individual hostilities toward
mutual enemies and/or collective opportunities abroad. Once the victims of abuse, we
have since become the abusers, a cycle all too familiar to those who have experienced it
on a personal (i.e. domestic) level. Perhaps, as a nation, we will now share in the fate of
our once oppressors, and perhaps that violent destiny is, in a way, justified and
appropriate. However, I would seek to spare not only myself and my kinsmen from such
horrid fortune, but also those who would visit it upon us. Perhaps Sartre and Fanon were
right; perhaps violence is simply man recreating himself. But so long as he does so with
the tools and in the image of his oppressor, he should not be surprised to find he does not
like the reflection staring so sadly and so contemptuously back at him.
A New Humanism?
A similar problem with Fanon’s approach can be found in the final sentiments of
his conclusion to The Wretched of the Earth, in which he argues that “if we wish to reply
to the expectations of the people of Europe, it is no good sending them back a reflection,
even an ideal reflection, of their society and their thought with which from time to time
they feel immeasurably sickened. For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades,
we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new
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man.”821 Leaving aside, for the moment, that this statement directly contradicts both
Sartre’s and Fanon’s earlier rationale for the use of retributive violence, one could also
argue that this turning over of a new leaf is, in fact, merely a gilding or repurposing of the
old.
Although perhaps difficult to discern in the current context, the reasons for this
can be found just two pages earlier in the text, in which Fanon admits “all the elements of
a solution to the great problems of humanity have, at different times, existed in European
thought. But the action of European men has not carried out the mission which fell to
them, and which consisted of bringing their whole weight violently to bear upon these
elements, of modifying their arrangement and their nature, of changing them and finally
of bringing the problem of mankind to an infinitely higher plane.”822 Thus, it appears
that, while Fanon does find at least occasional merit in the history of European thought,
he is less convinced of its past and present application on the world stage. And once
again, it is hard to argue with his assessment: after all, “Enlightened” Europe has
certainly failed to make good on most of its promises and proclamations regarding the
self-evident equality and universal brotherhood of all men. Unfortunately, Fanon allows
his disappointment with past action to overshadow his (admittedly begrudging)
appreciation of abiding ideal.
To illustrate this point, let us turn our attention again to the history of the postcolonial United States. In the previous section, I argued that the United States’ own
subsequent imperialism has been a direct result of its willingness to appropriate Sartre
and Fanon’s notion of retributive violence. If you’ll recall, in his introduction to The
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Wretched of the Earth, Sartre likened this process of anti-colonial violence to that of a
reflection being cast in a mirror, and thus implied that we (the colonizers) mustn’t blame
the mirror for showing us the distastefulness of our own reflection but should instead
recognize that the responsibility for that image actually lies with us. If this is, in fact, the
case, it seems strange that Fanon would categorically reject the opportunity to
demonstrate something quite similar with regards to the failed application of European
philosophical and cultural ideals. Unfortunately, this is precisely what he does.
In recounting his own understanding of American history, Fanon claims that “two
centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded
so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the
sickness, and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions.”823
Paradoxically, Fanon attributes this not to the former colonies’ willingness to appropriate
and reflect the violence of their oppressors, but rather upon their desire to “catch up” and
presumably emulate the ideals and institutions of Europe. I would argue that this is where
Sartre’s and Fanon’s mirror metaphor shatters and their arguments become, consequently,
unsustainable.
For if Europe’s great crime has been, as Fanon claims, that it has failed to carry
out the mission which fell to it (i.e. to disseminate Enlightenment ideals throughout the
world), then how could the United States, or any former colony for that matter, be guilty
of unwisely appropriating its tenets? In other words, if Europeans failed to understand,
appreciate, and export the “sometimes prodigious theses” that they created, and instead
carried with them to their colonies only the desire for power, an appetite for material
gain, and a fanatical will to sweep aside or oppress any who would stand in their way,
823
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then these would have been the only European notions that would have been readily
available for the colonists to imitate or adopt.824 That the majority have historically been
so obtusely oppressive is made all the more tragic by Fanon’s inability to realize this
irony and thus to perpetuate and endorse its continued existence.
In adopting violence as the primary, if not exclusive, means of overthrowing
colonial power, Sartre and Fanon have committed themselves and those who would
follow them to the cycle of abuse that continues to play itself out in the United States and
elsewhere in the post-colonial world. Furthermore, in summarily rejecting the tenets of
European (i.e. Western) culture, Fanon is not, as he believes, advocating for a new leaf of
humanism, but is instead committing himself to the same tired foliage (and unfortunate
fate) of the colonizers from which he most fervently wishes to escape. When he says
“comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies
which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something from us other
than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature,” I fear that Fanon
misses the point entirely.825 After all, it is not the ideas and ideals of Europe that have
failed, but rather its actions.826 And to mirror the latter, whilst denying the former, is to
invite this vicious cycle to continue all but unabated. It is, to employ an old expression,
not that Fanon has thrown the baby out with the bathwater; it is, in fact, that he has done
just the opposite.
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The Alternatives:

C.L.R. James and the Argument for Cross -Cultural Communication

1938 was a pivotal year in the life and career of C.L.R. James. Not only did it
include an extended lecture tour of the segregated United States, but it also resulted in the
publication of two of his most influential discourses on the history of global black
resistance. The first, A History of Negro Revolt (later retitled A History of Pan-African
Revolt), was intended not only as a “stinging indictment of colonialism,” but also as an
examination of “all sorts of problems – like the struggles of women, market women in
Africa and so on,” in addition to “historical things like the Haitian Revolution and the
blacks in the American Civil War.”827 The second, The Black Jacobins, is a closer look at
one of those aforementioned events, the San Domingo Slave Revolt (1791-1803), which,
according to James, is the only successful slave revolt in history. While it focuses largely
on the exploits of a single man, Toussaint L’Ouverture, former slave and subsequent
leader of the Haitian Revolution, James is quick to remind us that “great men make
history, but only such history as it is possible for them to make. Their freedom of
achievement is limited by the necessities of their environment. To portray the limits of
those necessities and the realisation, complete or partial, of all possibilities, that is the
true business of the historian.”828 And, as we shall see, that is precisely what James
provides us. But like L’Ouverture, James, too, was a product of his environment, and so
to understand his role in history, one must first endeavor to situate him within it.
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Cyril Lionel Robert James was born in Trinidad in 1901, “one year after the
epochal Pan-African Conference held in London had bequeathed the term ‘panAfricanism’ to the worldwide struggle of black peoples.”829 That his life would become
so closely intertwined with Pan-African movement thus seems almost preordained. He
was raised “solidly middle class – at least in terms of cultural capital if not actual money.
He read Thackeray and Shakespeare with enthusiasm, and due to his mother’s influence
he became an inveterate reader of history, literature, and to a lesser degree politics.”830
Following the completion of an instructional certificate program at Queen’s Royal
College in 1918, James accepted a teaching position at his alma mater and began what
could have been a very comfortable and comparatively normal life.
But despite his intellectual leanings (or perhaps because of them), James remained
wary of becoming disconnected from the rhythms of everyday life and the various pulses
of Trinidadian popular culture. In addition to his interests in history, literature and
politics, James was also fascinated by jazz and calypso, and particularly with the game of
cricket. It was, in fact, the latter, that ultimately led him from his Caribbean home to the
stony shores of England in 1932. Hired to assist in the writing of a book on cricket and
English society, James relocated to Lancashire, where he moonlighted as a cricket
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian. This work served to connect him with the
English masses, and as a result of his discussions with local workers in both Lancashire
and London, James became quite interested in Marxism (particularly Trotskyism) and the
struggles of the Depression-era proletariat. “Thus it was as a budding Trotskyist and
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supporter of the Independent Labour Party that James entered London’s hotbed of black
anti-colonial and Pan-Africanist politics.”831
Not coincidentally, this was also the time during which James met, and in some
cases mentored, many of the men who were to eventually lead independence movements
of their own. “First among these was George Padmore, the Trinidadian who, in 1928,
became head of the Negro Bureau of the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern),
whose headquarters were in Moscow.”832 Other people of note within James’ newly
minted circle of friends include Kwame Nkrumah, who would later play a pivotal role in
the fight for Ghanaian independence, and Jomo Kenyatta, who would later serve as both
the first Prime Minister and first President of Kenya. It is, therefore, also no coincidence
that these men (Nkrumah and Kenyatta in particular) and the varying success of their
respective movements were to occupy a significant portion of the new epilogue to James’
1969 reissuing of A History of Negro (now Pan-African) Revolt. But before we examine
James’ analysis of these two men and their methodologically opposed paths to
independence, some attention must first be paid to James’ own understanding of PanAfricanism and the way(s) in which it might realistically be achieved.
According to Kenan Malik, “The problem, for James, lay not in the ideals of the
Enlightenment but in their distortion, in the way in which they had been turned by
Europeans into tribal values, for their benefit and for the enslavement of the rest of the
world. James thought of himself not as crafting an alternative to Enlightenment values
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but as reclaiming them for all of humanity.”833 This stands in stark contrast to the more
separatist ideology of Fanon, who argued that the miscarriage of justice perpetrated by
the exponents of Enlightenment culture had rendered that society and its values
inappropriate for adoption by the “Other” peoples of the world. But rather than viewing
them as the tools and trappings of the oppressor, James read in the works of Thackeray
and Shakespeare the same critique of European hypocrisy and the same cries for freedom,
equality, and constancy that Fanon (and others) would later echo. Perhaps an example or
two would prove useful in illustrating this point.
When discussing Shakespeare’s King Lear, James once remarked “for me, the
play is the thing, wherein you will catch the conscience, not of the King, but of the play,
particularly of the playwright.”834 Whereas the majority of academic criticism has
focused on the play’s dramatization of such topics as the spiritual value of human
suffering, the bonds and burdens of kinship, and even the essence of human nature itself,
James argues that King Lear is, first and foremost, “a critique of Elizabethan society, of
the society that was and of the society that was coming into being. But Shakespeare
didn’t merely criticize. He put somebody there. He put Edgar, today one of the most
important of Shakespeare’s characters, and he gave him the training and the discipline,
and Edgar himself tells us how fitted he was to take charge of a country that was in ruins
and would be in difficulties for some time to come.”835 What, one might ask, makes
Edgar so uniquely qualified to assume the mantle of leadership following Lear’s and
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Cordelia’s demise? After all, as son and heir to the Earl of Gloucester, he is, by all rights,
just another aristocrat, and thus ostensibly no different from the many other highborn
claimants to Lear’s throne. But that is only part of Edgar’s story.
The blameless victim of his illegitimate half-brother Edmund’s slanderous
schemes to usurp his birthright, Edgar is, in due course, disinherited, banished from his
father’s home, declared an outlaw, and made to wander the countryside as an agricultural
vagrant. In order to disguise his true identity and thus evade capture, Edgar is forced to
adopt the persona of “Poor Tom,” a crazed beggar whose rages against society in many
ways mirror those of the King. But whereas the King (and the rest of the aristocracy) only
have cause to mourn for the noble ills of high society, Edgar now understands the
situation from the point of view of the masses as well. When he encounters Lear and his
father upon the heath, he is asked to identify himself. Witness his reply:
Poor Tom; that eats the swimming frog, the toad,
the tadpole, the wall-newt and the water; that in
the fury of his heart, when the foul fiend rages,
eats cow-dung for sallets; swallows the old rat and
the ditch-dog; drinks the green mantle of the
standing pool; who is whipped from tithing to
tithing, and stock-punished, and imprisoned; who
hath had three suits to his back, six shirts to his
body, horse to ride, and weapon to wear;
But mice and rats, and such small deer,
Have been Tom’s food for seven long year.
Beware my follower. Peace, Smulkin; peace, thou fiend!
(Shakespeare’s King Lear 3.4. 120-131)836

Thus, in a single passage, Shakespeare has identified precisely why it is this man
who is most qualified to lead his people into a new era of peace and prosperity for all. For
though afforded the education and charmed life of the upper echelons of society for most
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of his young life, Edgar has also been made to experience the hardships of the common
man and so to understand both the hypocrisies and shortcomings of that high-minded
ideology. The result is a man uniquely positioned to understand his world from the
perspective of both its rulers and its people. And according to James, it is only such a
man who can break the cycle of corruption and abuse that occurs when the will of the
masses is not tempered by the wisdom of its culture. “That is the play, as I want you to
think of it, as I have seen it. The rest is now up to you.”837 Of course, a literary example
alone would hardly seem sufficient to confirm James’ belief in the universal value and
real-world applicability of Enlightenment ideals. For that, we must turn our attention to
another society in transition, and the “Poor Tom” that emerged from its chaos to usher in
a new era for all mankind.
Toussaint L’Ouverture was born a slave on the island of San Domingo (modern
day Haiti) sometime in the mid-1740s. It was to this lowly existence that he was relegated
for the first four and a half decades of his life. But by the summer of 1791 (when he
joined the budding rebellion), “he was forty-six, first his master’s coachman and
afterward, owing to his intelligence, placed in charge of the livestock on the estate, a post
usually held by a white man. He had a smattering of education, but he could not write
correct French, and usually spoke Creole i.e. the local French patois.”838 That smattering,
however, seems to have been rather broad, and appears to have encompassed such
historical figures as Epictetus (the Stoic philosopher who, like L’Ouverture, had once
been a slave), Machiavelli, and Guillaume Thomas Raynal (a French belletrist and
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contemporary of L’Ouverture, whose writings often championed the abolition of
slavery).839
Even more importantly, L’Ouverture’s own correspondence demonstrates more
than a passing familiarity with the events of the French Revolution (1789-1799). In fact,
it was this uprising that provided L’Ouverture and his insurgent band of brothers with not
only the political opportunity but also the justifying ideology for their freedom. As James
recounts “during the revolutionary period the blacks fought under the slogans of liberty
and equality. They embraced the revolutionary doctrine, they thought in republican terms.
The result was that these slaves, lacking education, half-savage, and degraded in their
slavery as only centuries of slavery can degrade, achieved a liberality in social aspiration
and an elevation of political thought equivalent to anything similar that took place in
France.”840
When L’Ouverture and his army demonstrated similar physical prowess in the
field (winning numerous battles against not only the French, but the British and Spanish
as well, whose subsequent participation in the struggle was intended primarily to
substitute their authority in place of the French), the nations of Europe eventually had no
choice but to acknowledge the power of their presence and to comply with the principles
of freedom and self-determination that they themselves had first dictated. That they did
so only reluctantly and with ulterior motives in tow is revealed by L’Ouverture’s own
letters. After forming a tenuous alliance with the French republican government in 1794,
it soon became apparent to L’Ouverture and his advisors that what the French intended
839
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was not a newly collaborative effort between equals but instead a coercive attempt to
subvert their rebellion and restore its members to their former condition as slaves. But
what is most interesting about this unfortunate turn of events is not the betrayal of the
French (of both their people and their principles), but the way in which L’Ouverture’s
reply forces them to confront the limitations of their ideology and the consequent
hypocrisy of their actions. Witness his reply:
Do they think that men who have been able to enjoy the blessing of liberty
will calmly see it snatched away? They supported their chains only so long
as they did not know any condition of life more happy than that of slavery.
But today when they have left it, if they had a thousand lives they would
sacrifice them all rather than be forced into slavery again. But no, the
same hand which has broken our chains will not enslave us anew. France
will not revoke her principles, she will not withdraw from us the greatest
of her benefits. She will protect us from all our enemies; she will not
permit her sublime morality to be perverted, those principles which do her
most honor to be destroyed, her Decree of the 16th Pluviose which so
honors humanity to be revoked. But if, to re-establish slavery in San
Domingo, this was done, then I declare to you it would be to attempt the
impossible; we have known how to face dangers to obtain our liberty, we
shall know how to brave death to maintain it.841
By being familiar with both the wisdom of his culture and the suffering of its
masses, L’Ouverture was able to recognize their ideological incompatibility and thus to
appropriate the power of the two in order to improve the quality of the whole. That their
movement and its precepts were destined to spread beyond their shores seems evidence
of this truth. (Within a matter of years following Haitian independence, the Atlantic slave
trade was abolished; within decades, the peculiar institution itself was destroyed.) As
James later recounted, “They had at their disposal the French language in which to
express themselves, and still more important, they had the ideas of the French Revolution
by which to develop themselves. In other words, that was a perfect situation and they
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developed it perfectly.”842 This is certainly a far cry from Fanon’s assessment of French
language and culture and its effects on the psyche of the oppressed. “Every colonized
people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been
created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – finds itself face to face
with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country.
The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the
mother country’s cultural standards.”843 In other words, where Fanon sees only obstacle
and obfuscation, James sees occasion and opportunity.
When writing the new epilogue to his 1969 reissuing of A History of Negro
Revolt, James sought to determine whether or not the lessons of the San Domingo Slave
Revolt were being utilized in the various independence struggles then taking place on the
African continent. Although he discusses several, we shall examine only two, Ghana and
Kenya, because, as James notes, “in the Gold Coast and in Kenya we have the two
extremes of the African struggles for independence.”844 Their respective paths to freedom
and divergent post-colonial histories demonstrate both the viability of James’ hypothesis
as well as the ways in which it has largely failed to be implemented.
The Gold Coast had been a British colony since the 1870s. Although calls for
self-determination, at least in limited form, were occasionally made, it was not until the
end of World War II that the independence movement truly garnered widespread
attention and unified support. Using the tools of civil disobedience and non-violent
resistence (when and where possible), the citizenry of the Gold Coast instituted boycotts,
led protest marches, and even called for a national strike. Although the repression of
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these activities by the British government did result in intermittent acts of violence (on
both sides), the path to independence was primarily paved with the best of intentions and
the values by which colonial Britain had largely failed to abide. That someone such as
Nkrumah would emerge in 1948 to become the leader of the resistance seemed, at least to
James, a most reasonable course of events.
They had been waiting for somebody to lead them and they welcomed
Nkrumah as a person to do so. Lawless mob indeed. Within eighteen
months Nkrumah was going to call a Ghana Constituent Assembly in
Accra, which would be attended by 90,000 people. Within two years these
people would carry out a policy of Positive Action in which the life of the
whole country would be brought to a standstill with the utmost discipline
and order. Within three years they would give Nkrumah a vote of 22,780
out of a possible 23,122. Nkrumah was taken out of jail to be made Leader
of Government Business. Then after years of in-fighting he finally
achieved the independence of the Gold Coast in 1957.845
Kenya’s path to independence was quite different. As James laments “nowhere in
Africa was there such a struggle as began before 1914 and lasted decade after decade
until it culminated in the independence of Kenya nearly fifty years later.”846 Perhaps the
height of that struggle came with the Mau Mau Rebellion (1952-56). Initially ignored or
dismissed as inconsequential by the British colonial government, it was not until the later
part of 1953 that the rebellion was recognized as a true threat to the stability and
prosperity of the colony.847 Convicted of being one of its leaders, Jomo Kenyatta was
imprisoned by the British in 1952, where he would remain for almost a decade. The
rebellion was effectively suppressed in 1956, with many thousands killed and at least
50,000 revolutionaries rounded up and “detained in special camps to cure them of the
mental disease which the British authorities discovered as the cause of their refusal to
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submit.”848 Unfortunately, their “disease” proved incurable, and, as in Ghana, the will of
the people led to the formation of pro-independence political parties, and the ultimate
release and elevation of Kenyatta from prisoner to Prime Minister in 1963.
Superficially, these both appear to be success stories in the rather bleak history of
anti-colonial struggle. However, the post-independence history of these two nations
reveals the less-than-pleasant realities with which they were both still confronted. With
the British effectively ousted, the nationalist ties that had once bound these disparate
people and cultures together soon began to unravel. Interethnic violence became rampant,
and in response, the leaders became increasingly despotic and their governments more
intolerant and suppressive of difference and dissent. As James recalls:
The states which the African nationalist leaders inherited were not in any
sense African. With the disintegration of the political power of the
imperialist states in Africa, and the rise of militancy of the African masses,
a certain political pattern took shape. Nationalist political leaders built a
following, they or their opponents gained support among the African civil
servants who had administered the imperialist state, and the newly
independent African state was little more than the old imperialist state
only now administered and controlled by black nationalists.849
Thus, what happened is exactly what one would expect given the imitation of
European actions and not of Enlightenment ideals. Nevertheless, that Ghana was able to
achieve its independence largely without the employment of widespread organized
violence – armed only with the (quite literally) transcendental tools of civil disobedience
and non-violent protest – stands as a testament to the value and viability of James’ notion
of cross-cultural communication as well as to the inherent pitfalls and presumptions of
Fanon’s more radical methodology. And while Ghana has since managed to recapture its
more pluralistic spirit in recent decades, Kenya continues to embrace a more forceful
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ideology, still tethered to the notions of strength and separatism. That the former has
emerged a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful nation, while the latter continues to
descend further into chaos and an unfortunate state of neo-colonialism, should therefore
come as no surprise.
Kwame Anthony Appiah and the Case for Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is a rather ancient idea. The term itself has been with us for the
better part of two and a half thousand years, but the notion is undoubtedly even older than
that, perhaps even as old as civilization itself. When the Greek philosopher Diogenes first
claimed to be a kosmopolitês, or citizen of the world, “the formulation was meant to be
paradoxical, and reflected the general Cynic skepticism toward custom and tradition….
Talk of cosmopolitanism originally signaled, then, a rejection of the conventional view
that every civilized person belonged to a community among communities.”850
A revolutionary notion, perhaps, but on a more personal level, Diogenes was
simply speaking truth. Though of Greek heritage, both biological and cultural, Diogenes
was born in the colony of Sinope in what is today northern Turkey. Following the
exposure of a financial scandal in which he was personally involved, Diogenes was
stripped of his home, his possessions, and most significantly, his citizenship within the
polis. Thus, when the exiled Diogenes entered Athens and uttered those fateful words, he
was not merely positing a new philosophical theorem; he was also attempting to redefine
himself in a new, and now necessary, way. Later infused into (Greek and then Roman)
Stoic philosophy, cosmopolitanism managed to survive into the modern age, even

850

Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2006), xiv.

434

underwriting “some of the great moral achievements of the Enlightenment, including the
1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man,” and Immanuel Kant’s work proposing a
“league of nations.”851
Consequently, when Anthony Appiah first attempted to revive and repurpose the
term in 2006, he did so with the understanding that while his task was indeed possible it
would be somewhat problematic as well. Like Diogenes’, Appiah’s cosmopolitanism
rejects the notion of a “community among communities,” and instead replaces it with a
“communities within communities” approach. As he states in his introduction, “people
are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences.
Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor
desire that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life.”852 As
we have seen, this notion stands in stark contrast to both the European imperialist
approach and the more stringently exclusivist notions of Fanon. But unlike Diogenes’,
Appiah’s form of cosmopolitanism isn’t as inherently skeptical of communities’ differing
notions of custom and tradition. He is merely advocating for more active dialogue
amongst those communities as a means of achieving a more peaceful coexistence
between them. This is, of course, no easy task, and as Appiah himself admits, “there’s a
sense in which cosmopolitanism is the name not of the solution but of the challenge.”853
Standing in cosmopolitanism’s way are two diametrically opposed ideological
camps: the universalists and the cultural relativists. The dangers of the universalist
approach should be obvious. When describing the self-assuredness and intolerance that
most often accompanies universalist (i.e. fundamentalist) movements, Appiah makes two
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statements that are in many ways reminiscent of the mirror metaphor that both Sartre and
Fanon attempted to employ. “You will find some parts of the truth (along with much
error) everywhere and the whole truth nowhere. The deepest mistake… is to think that
your little shard of mirror can reflect the whole.”854 The particular problem with
universalists, Appiah argues, is that “their mirror is not shattered, it is whole: and we
have no shard of it. All of these men want everyone on their side, so we can share with
them the vision in their mirror… there is no curiosity about the ways of the ‘disbeliever.’
All we are is embodiments of error.”855 Conversely, the relativist’s intentions are
probably more honorable and his desires for toleration sincere, but his efforts are almost
as unlikely as the universalist’s to lead to the sort of dialogue that Appiah prescribes.
“From our different perspectives, we would be living effectively in different worlds. And
without a shared world, what is there to discuss? People often recommend relativism
because they think it will lead to tolerance. But if we cannot learn from one another what
it is right to think and feel and do, then conversation between us will be pointless.
Relativism of that sort isn’t a way to encourage conversation; it’s just a reason to fall
silent.”856
And therein, skeptics will say, lies the problem. “You are asking us to care about
all human beings. But we care only about people with whom we share an identity –
national, familial, religious, or the like. And those identities get their psychological
energy from the fact that to every in-group there’s an out-group.”857 There is undoubtedly
some truth to this critique, especially in the colonial context which has framed the
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majority of our discourse thus far. Appiah’s response is nuanced, and he uses humanity’s
seemingly universal appreciation for art to frame it.
We can respond to art that is not ours; indeed, we can fully respond to
“our” art only if we move beyond thinking of it as ours and start to
respond to it as art. But equally important is the human connection. My
people – human beings – made the Great Wall of China, the Chrysler
Building, the Sistine Chapel: these things were made by creatures like me,
through the exercise of skill and imagination. I do not have those skills,
and my imagination spins different dreams. Nevertheless, the potential is
also in me. The connection through a local identity is as imaginary as the
connection through humanity. The Nigerian’s link to the Benin bronze,
like mine, is a connection made through the imagination; but to say this
isn’t to pronounce either of them unreal. They are among the realest
connections that we have.858
If that argument still seems a bit too idealistic to be of any practical use, one
should remember that, like Diogenes, Appiah is a living embodiment of his philosophy.
Though born (in 1954) and later educated in London, he came of age in Ghana. His father
was a Ghanaian lawyer and statesmen who actively participated in the independence
struggle as well as in the post-war period of political and economic instability that was to
follow. His mother was a British children’s author and philanthropist, who spent the last
fifty years of her life in Ghana. Thus his philosophy, like his life, has been rooted in the
understanding that cosmopolitanism is already a reality in many parts of the world, and
that one need only embrace it as an ideology to reap its many social and psychological
benefits. Observe how he describes the city of his childhood:
The capital of Asante is accessible to you, whoever you are – emotionally,
intellectually, and, of course, physically. It is integrated into the global
markets. None of this makes it Western, or American, or British. It is still
Kumasi. What it isn’t, just because it’s a city, is homogenous. English,
German, Chinese, Syrian, Lebanese, Burkinabe, Ivorian, Nigerian, Indian:
I can find you families of each description. I can find you Asante people,
whose ancestors have lived in this town for centuries, but also Hausa
households that have been around for centuries, too. There are people
858
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there from all the regions, speaking all the scores of languages of Ghana as
well. And while people in Kumasi come from a wider variety of places
than they did a hundred or two hundred years ago, even then there were
already people from all over the place coming and going. I don’t know
who was the first Asante to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, but his trip
would have followed trade routes that are far older than the kingdom.
Gold, salt, kola nuts, and alas, slaves have connected my hometown to the
world for a very long time. And trade means travelers. If by globalization
you have in mind something new and recent, the ethnic eclecticism of
Kumasi is not the result of it.859
Cosmopolitanism, then, is not the naïve, abstract philosophical principle that the
so-called realists would have us believe. It is, in Kumasi and most other cities around the
world, already a fact of life. Thus, the problem with trying to impose an imperialist
ideology is, in many ways, the same as the problem with trying to exclude the culture
behind it. As Appiah states, “Trying to find some primordially authentic culture can be
like peeling an onion,” and in every society, if one delves deeply enough, one discovers
that all “tradition was once an innovation. Should we reject it for that reason as
untraditional? How far back must one go?”860 This holds just as true for European culture
as it does for African. Therefore, the solution lies not in trying to determine which set of
cultural norms and values to adopt and which to reject. It is instead to be found in the
recognition that each culture has already helped to shape the other, for better or for
worse, and will undoubtedly continue to do so. That realization carries a power and a
responsibility all its own, complete with the knowledge that, in this global age of ours,
isolationism isn’t possible, and violence isn’t necessary.
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EPILOGUE: SOPHISTIC(ATED) INDEED: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE THEISTIC
ARGUMENTS OF CRAIG, LENNOX, MCGRATH, AND PLANTINGA

Thirteenth Rule: To be right in everything, we ought always to hold that the white which I
see, is black, if the Hierarchical Church so decides it, believing that between Christ our
Lord, the Bridegroom, and the Church, His Bride, there is the same Spirit which governs
and directs us for the salvation of our souls. Because by the same Spirit and our Lord
Who gave the Ten Commandments, our holy Mother the Church is directed and
governed.861
The nondenominational parachurch organization Got Questions Ministries defines
presuppositionalism as “an approach to apologetics which aims to present a rational basis
for the Christian faith and defend it against objections by exposing the logical flaws of
other worldviews and hence demonstrating that biblical theism is the only worldview
which can make consistent sense of reality.”862 Such are the oft-stated intentions and
generally-recognized results of Christian apologists William Lane Craig, John Lennox,
Alistair McGrath, and Alvin Plantinga. However, if you’ll recall from my introductory
remarks, I denounced (while promising to subsequently demonstrate) the speciousness of
such circular reasoning and to expose it for the (at best) wishful or (at worst) duplicitous
thinking that it is. For the most part, I have yet to accomplish my goal.
While it is true that Drs. Craig and Plantinga did receive some (rather derogatory,
albeit terse) attention in the body of the preceding work, neither the names nor works of
Professors Lennox or McGrath appeared at all. But rest assured, this was neither an
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inadvertent omission nor a silent retraction of my earlier claims, only a simple stylistic
choice on my part. At the start of the previous chapter, I included an excerpted lyric from
the Irish singer-songwriter Sinead O’Connor, in which she claims that “through their own
words, they will be exposed.” Thus the song (also entitled “The Emperor’s New
Clothes”) was not only a titular reference to the name of my own work, but also a concise
explanation of the tack I intended to take in the chapter: to allow the proponents of
postmodernism to paint themselves into their own ideological corners… the insinuation,
of course, being that they did not require any assistance from me in exposing the
bankruptcy of their banality, the pretenses of their posturings, and indeed the “bad faith”
of their entire pseudo-academic enterprise.
My intention here is quite similar. In what follows, I will present excerpts of four
televised, live-streamed, and/or published debates featuring each of the aforementioned
scholars and one of the so-called Four Horsemen. In the interest of full transparency, I
will provide corresponding links to the complete transcripts and/or texts of each of these
encounters (which I highly recommend both for their respective contents and as evidence
that the passages I will shortly provide are in keeping with the overall positions and
perspectives being elucidated and advanced). Believing it wholly unnecessary and thus
not wishing to insert myself into these discourses, I will allow the self-proclaimed
presuppositionalism of each individual to speak for itself. Whether, in fact, they
collectively represent more sophisticated arguments in support of (Christian) theism as
both they and their supporters claim, or whether they are simply more elaboratelystitched, extensively-embroidered invisible garments for an emperor who shall remain
nameless (and naked)… well, I leave such judgments entirely up to you.

440

“Does God Exist?”
Christopher Hitchens vs. William Lane Craig
Biola University, 4 April 2009

CRAIG: Why does the universe exist, instead of just nothing, where did it
come from? There must have been a cause which brought the universe into
being. Now as the cause of space and time, this being must be an
uncaused, timeless, spaceless, immaterial being of unfathomable power.
Moreover, it must be personal as well. Why? Because the cause must be
beyond space and time, therefore it cannot be physical or material. Now
there are only two kinds of things that fit that description: either an
abstract object, like numbers, or else a personal mind. But abstract objects
can’t cause anything. Therefore it follows that the cause of the universe is
a transcendent, intelligent mind. Thus the cosmological argument gives us
a personal creator of the universe.
CRAIG: If God does not exist then objective moral values do not exist. By
objective moral values I mean moral values which are valid and binding
whether we believe in them or not…. here Mr. Hitchens seems to agree
with me. He says moral values are just innate predispositions, ingrained
into us by evolution. Such predispositions, he says, are inevitable for any
animal endowed with social instincts. On the atheistic view then an action
like rape is not socially advantageous and so in the course of human
development has become taboo, but that does absolutely nothing to prove
that rape is really morally wrong. On the atheistic view there’s nothing
really wrong with raping someone. But the problem is that objective
values do exist and deep down we all know it. In moral experience we
apprehend a realm of objective moral goods and evils. Actions like rape,
cruelty, and child abuse aren’t just socially unacceptable behavior, they’re
moral abominations. Some things, at least, are really wrong. Similarly
love, equality, and self-sacrifice are really good. But then it follows
logically and necessarily that God exists.
CRAIG: The historical person Jesus of Nazareth was a remarkable
individual. Historians have reached something of a consensus that the
historical Jesus came on the scene with an unprecedented sense of divine
authority, the authority to stand and speak in God’s place. He claimed that
in Himself the Kingdom of God had come and as visible demonstrations
of this fact He carried out a ministry of miracle working and exorcisms.
But the supreme confirmation of His claim was His resurrection from the
dead. If Jesus did rise from the dead than it would seem that we have a
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divine miracle on our hands and thus evidence for the existence of God.
Now most people probably think that the resurrection of Jesus is
something you just believe in, by faith or not. But there are actually three
established facts recognized by the majority of New Testament historians
today which I believe are best explained by the resurrection of Jesus. Fact
number one: On the Sunday after His crucifixion, Jesus’ tomb was
discovered empty by a group of His women followers. According to Jakob
Kremer, an Austrian specialist, by far most scholars hold firmly to the
reliability of the biblical statements about the empty tomb. Fact number
two: On separate occasions different individuals in groups experienced
appearances of Jesus alive after his death. According to the prominent
New Testament critic Gerd Lüdemann, it may be taken as historically
certain that the disciples had experiences after Jesus’ death in which Jesus
appeared to them as the risen Christ. These appearances were witnessed
not only by believers but also by unbelievers, skeptics, and even enemies.
Fact number three: The original disciples suddenly came to believe in the
resurrection of Jesus despite having every predisposition to the contrary.
Jews had no belief in a dying, much less rising Messiah. And Jewish
beliefs about the afterlife prohibited anyone’s rising from the dead before
the resurrection at the end of the world. Nevertheless the original disciples
came to believe so strongly that God had raised Jesus from the dead that
they were willing to die for the truth of that belief. N. T. Wright, an
eminent New Testament scholar concludes, “That is why as a historian I
cannot explain the rise of early Christianity unless Jesus rose again leaving
an empty tomb behind him.” Attempts to explain away these three great
facts like the disciples stole the body or Jesus wasn’t really dead have
been universally rejected by contemporary scholarship. The simple fact is
that there just is no plausible, naturalistic explanation of these facts. And
therefore it seems to me the Christian is amply justified in believing that
Jesus rose from the dead and was who he claimed to be. But that entails
that God exists.
CRAIG: The immediate experience of God: This isn’t really an argument
for God’s existence, rather it’s the claim that you can know that God exists
wholly apart from argument, simply by immediately experiencing him.…
belief in God is, for those who know him, a properly basic belief grounded
in our experience of God.… We mustn’t so concentrate on the external
arguments that we fail to hear the inner voice of God speaking to our own
hearts. For those who listen, God becomes an immediate reality in their
lives.
CRAIG: Genesis 1 admits all manner of different interpretations and one
is by no means committed to six-day creationism.… if evolution did occur
on this planet it was literally a miracle, and therefore evidence for the
existence of God. So I don’t think this is an argument for atheism, quite
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the contrary, it really provides good grounds for thinking that God
superintended the process of biological development.
CRAIG: Now Mr. Hitchens says, “But why did God wait so long before
he sent Christ? Human beings have existed for thousands of years on this
planet before Christ’s coming.” Well, what’s really crucial here is not the
time involved rather it’s the population of the world. The population
reference bureau estimates that the number of people who have ever lived
on this planet is about 105 billion people. Only 2% of them were born
prior to the advent of Christ. Erik Kreps of the Survey Research Center of
the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research says, “God’s
timing couldn’t have been more perfect. Christ showed up just before the
exponential explosion in the world’s population.”
CRAIG: Now what about my arguments for theism? Mr. Hitchens had
some general remarks here: He says it’s difficult to get from deism to
theism. Now I want to point out that’s a false use of these terms, this is
simply confused. Deism is a type of theism. Theism is the broad world
view that God exists. Deism is a specific kind of theism that says God has
not revealed himself directly in the world. Now my arguments are a
cumulative case for Christian theism. They add up to the belief in the God
that has been revealed by Jesus of Nazareth. Now Mr. Hitchens says, “But
you must prove this with certainty.” Not at all, I am not claiming these
argument demonstrate Christian theism with certainty. I’m saying this is
the best explanation of the data when you compare it with other competing
hypotheses. I think it’s more probable than not.
CRAIG: Now, Mr. Hitchens responds, “But we’re headed towards
nothingness, we’re ultimately going to be doomed and therefore the
universe is not designed.” Well now, this is not a very powerful objection.
The temporal duration of something is irrelevant to whether it’s been
designed. The products of human intelligence and engineering like
computers and automobiles will eventually decay and cease to exist but
that doesn’t mean they weren’t designed. I think the real objection that
he’s getting at here is why would God create mankind only to have it go
extinct? But of course, you see, on the Christian view that’s false, that is
an atheistic assumption. On the Christian view life does not end at the
grave and God has given assurance of this by raising Jesus from the dead.
So the objection simply has no purchase against Christian theism. So it
seems to me that the fine tuning argument is also unrefuted.
CRAIG: Let me simply quote N. T. Wright in his recent study of the
resurrection. He says that, “The empty tomb and the appearances of Jesus
have a historical probability so high as to be virtually certain, like the
death of Augustus in AD 14 or the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70.” So we are
on very solid ground in affirming these three facts that I mentioned in my
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opening speech and I can’t think of any better explanation than the ones
that the eye witnesses gave, namely that God raised Jesus from the dead.
CRAIG: Mr. Hitchens seems to fail to recognize that atheism is itself a
world view and it claims alone to be true and all the other religions of the
world false. It is no more tolerant than Christianity, with respect to these
other views. He asserts that he alone has the true world view: atheism. The
only problem is he doesn’t have any arguments for this world view, he just
asserts it. So it seems to me that if you’re going to have a world view and
champion it tonight you’ve got to come to a debate prepared to give some
arguments and we haven’t heard any.
CRAIG: You need to ask yourself is the atheist claiming, as Epicurus did,
that the existence of God is logically incompatible with the evil and
suffering in the world? If that’s what the atheist is claiming then he’s got
to be presupposing some kind of hidden assumptions that would bring out
that contradiction and make it explicit because these statements are not
explicitly contradictory. The problem is no philosopher in the history of
the world has ever been able to identify what those hidden assumptions
would be that would bring out the contradiction and make it explicit. On
the contrary, you can actually prove that these are logically compatible
with each other by adding a third proposition, namely, that God has
morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world. As long as
that statement is even possibly true, it’s proves that there’s no logical
incompatibility between God and the suffering in the world. So the atheist
would have to show that it is logically impossible for God to have morally
sufficient reasons for permitting the evil and suffering in the world and no
atheist has ever been able to do that. So, that the logical version of this
problem, I think, is widely recognized to have failed.
CRAIG: It seems to me that on the basis of the resurrection of Jesus that
we have grounds for the hope of immortality. This is the foundation upon
which the Christian hope is predicated. So, again, it gets back to whether
or not one has good grounds for thinking that Jesus was who he claimed to
be, and that God raised him from the dead. Because if he did, then there is
hope of immortality.863
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The God Delusion Debate
Richard Dawkins vs. John Lennox
The University of Alabama at Birmingham, 3 October 2007
LENNOX: I can’t speak authoritatively for other religions but faith in the
Christian sense is not blind, and indeed I do not know a serious Christian
who thinks it is. Indeed, as I read it, blind faith in idols and figments of the
human imagination, in other words delusional gods, is roundly condemned
in the Bible. My faith in God and Christ as the Son of God is no delusion;
it is rational and evidenced based. Part of the evidence is objective and
some of it comes from science, some comes from history, and some is
subjective coming from experience.
LENNOX: If in the end my beliefs, my theories, my scientific theories are
the results ultimately of the motions of atoms in my brain produced by an
unguided, random, mindless process, why should I believe them? In other
words it’s like someone sitting on the branch of a tree cutting off the
branch on which they’re sitting. And it seems to me that therefore atheism
actually undercuts the scientific endeavour very seriously. That for my
mind is a fatal flaw.… An argument that purports to derive rationality
from irrationality doesn’t even rise in my opinion to the dignity of being
an intelligible delusion. It is logically incoherent. But theism tells us that
the reason science is possible, the reason that I can access the universe at
least in part through my human intelligence, is because the same God who
created the universe is ultimately responsible for the human mind in here.
LENNOX: The Bible is frequently dismissed as being anti-scientific
because it makes no predictions. Oh no, that’s incorrect! It makes a
brilliant prediction! For centuries it’s been saying there was a beginning,
and if scientists had taken that a bit more seriously they might have
discovered evidence for the beginning a lot earlier than they did.
LENNOX: Created gods are by definition a delusion…. The God who
created the universe, ladies and gentlemen, was not created. He is eternal.
This is the fundamental distinction between God and the universe. It came
to exist, He did not. And this is precisely the point that Christian apostle
John makes at the beginning of his gospel: “In the beginning was the
word.” The word already was. All things came to be by him. God is
uncreated. The universe was created by Him.
LENNOX: If a rock falls off of a mountain onto your head and kills you, it
makes no sense calling the rock evil. It just exists. If Pol Pot chooses to
eliminate a million intellectuals or the 9/11 terrorists choose to fly
hundreds of people to their deaths into the twin towers, how can you call
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them evil if they were simply dancing to their DNA? Now that strikes me
as a hideous world you’re delivering us into. That is no morality at all…
this kind of philosophy, that has no base for morals in a transcendent God,
has got to find morality either in raw nature or a combination of nature and
society, and often leads to a kind of utilitarianism. And we are in serious
ethical confusion I think in our contemporary world, in the legal sphere, in
the ethical and the medical sphere, and in the business sphere, because the
foundations are crumbling.
LENNOX: I do not think that miracles are violations of the laws of nature.
Because the laws of nature describe what normally happens. God, who is
the God of this universe, and created it with its regularities, is perfectly at
liberty to feed a new event into the universe.
LENNOX: The resurrection of Jesus Christ, a miracle, something
supernatural, for me constitutes the central evidence upon which I base my
faith not only that atheism is a delusion, but that justice is real and our
sense of morality does not mock us, because if there is no resurrection, if
there is nothing after death, in the end the terrorists and the fanatics have
got away with it.864
Poison or Cure – Religious Belief in the Modern World:
Christopher Hitchens vs. Alister McGrath
Georgetown University, 11 October 2007

MCGRATH: The real problem I think is extremism, the kinds of
ideologies that force violence upon us and those it seems to me do need to
be challenged and on that, I’m at one with Mr. Hitchens. But is it God
that’s doing this? Let’s move on and talk about this. Clearly a very
important question here is how we know what God is like. Can you
imagine God saying, go and do violence to someone. Well I think some
could, quite easily. But I speak from a specific perspective, namely, that of
a Christian theologian and for Christianity. The identity, the nature of God
is disclosed in Jesus of Nazareth. He is the image of the invisible God, he
is the fulfillment of the law and the prophets. And when we look at Jesus
of Nazareth, we see something that I think is very, very challenging. We
have one who refuses to do violence, even in Gethsemane, when some
want to raise swords to defend him as he’s about to be betrayed, he bids
864
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them to put their swords down. Jesus does not do violence, but he has
violence done to him. And the point I want to make is that your vision of
what God is like has a profound impact on what you think God is urging
you to do. And it seems to me that if one is a good Christian, then one is
going to take the vision of what God is like and what God wants us to do
from what we find disclosed in Jesus with the utmost seriousness.
MCGRATH: We can read nature in an atheist way, we can read nature in
an agnostic way, and we can read nature in a Christian way. But nature in
itself and of itself does not force us to any of those positions. I will simply
say that I find my Christian faith gave me new intellectual energy both to
engage the natural order, and I found to engage nature is to learn more
about God and also to energize my understanding of what I was
observing.… In other words, it gives you an intellectual lens or framework
through which you can look at the world, ourselves and our culture and
see it in a new light. So for me science and religion, there may be tensions,
but is also a very powerful synergy which I believe to be both welcomed
and also something that can be developed further.
MCGRATH: I find it puzzling because for me as an intellectual historian,
the Enlightenment really had been left behind us as being in the view of
many postmodern critics a world view that led to intolerance and a world
view that actually generated the potential of a conflict in violence. You all
know why postmodernity moved away from modernity on that point. And,
people like Alistair McIntyre, and other critics of modernity make the
point that its foundational judgments about the nature of reason, the nature
of what is right actually cannot be sustained on the basis of an appeal to
history and reason itself. For McIntyre and for many others, the
enlightenment offers us a vision of a rationality and morality which
actually are unattainable in practice.
MCGRATH: What do I think about the resurrection? Do I think about this
being metaphorical? I think the resurrection is a historical event,
something that happened in history, was seen as intriguing but not
obviously interpreted as something of dramatic significance. The key
question was not simply the history, but also its meaning. And so in the
New Testament, for example, we see debates taking place around the time
of the resurrection which are primarily concerned with “what does this
mean?” In other words, something seems to have happened, but it’s a
historical event, what is the overall meaning of this event? And so for me
that, that second question begins to emerge as being of major importance.
And in the New Testament we see a number of ideas beginning to emerge,
the most important of these is that in some way Jesus had been
demonstrated to have some sort of relationship with God that validated his
teaching; in other words, that authorized him to speak with authority on
what God was like. It’s a bit like, you know, interpreting something like
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Caesar crossing the Rubicon…. And of course the Christian hope of
eternal life, the very strong New Testament declaration that we are people
who have hope is very much grounded on that particular idea.
MCGRATH: The key idea in the New Testament is that in some way the
death of Christ, again violence done to Christ, not violence done by Christ,
is seen as having as transformative potential for human beings and this
transformative potential is articulated using a range of models, some of
which are drawn from the Old Testament. For example, there’s an analogy
drawn with animal sacrifice and that is seen as in some way establishing a
link between Christ’s death and the bringing of possibility of purity to
someone…. For me, the death of Christ on the cross means that something
that I could never gain for myself has been done for me and offered to me.
In other words, it is something that by myself as a human being I could
never hope to achieve, is achieved on my behalf and offered to me and I
am asked: will you accept what has been done for you? In other words, it’s
about the possibility of transformation being offered to me but not being
imposed upon me. And for me, that is about a God who offers but does not
demand that I respond to him in this way. I find that to be a very good
summary of what the Christian faith is trying to say about a God who
offers but does not impose.
MCGRATH: I’m a Christian, and, obviously I read the Old Testament and
one of the questions is how on earth do I make sense of those passages
which seem to, at least on the face of it, authorize acts of killing and so on
which I personally find very disagreeable. And for me as a Christian, as I
was saying, a fundamental theme here is that Christ is the fulfillment of
the law and the prophets. In other words, not simply that he brings to
fulfillment their intentions, but that in some way he is authorized to show
us what these are really meant to be like. In other words, that there are
other interpretations, but these are relativized or placed to one side
because of who Jesus is and what he did. And, therefore, I would want to
look at the Old Testament through this lens and say that I believe it allows
us to look at these passages and challenge the most natural
interpretations…. we gain a further understanding of what God is like, a
firmer understanding of what God is like as time goes on and above all,
for example, through the revelation of Christ and, again, whether you’re a
Protestant or a Catholic, you might talk about the continued guidance of
the Holy Spirit or indeed continued reflection on the part of the church,
but the engagement of the scripture is dynamic and ongoing. It’s not really
something that’s been ended in the past.
MCGRATH: I don’t think it’s all solipsistic to say let’s reflect on why we
are here, let’s reflect on why there is something rather than nothing, it’s to
ask a very important question about how the universe came into being,
why is there something rather than nothing. I mean for Wittgenstein that
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was a hugely important question and it seems to me to be entirely right to
answer that question or at least to try and answer it.… I made it very, very
clear I was not making any claims to special knowledge, I was looking at
what I saw, what others say. I interpreted it in this way. I claim no
privilege. I say it is my judgment that this is the best explanation and it
means this, and I’m open to challenge on this, as you have challenged me,
but I am not claiming anything special. I’m saying there are public events
there, they are open to interpretation, as they were at the time, and the
issue really is what is the best explanation of those. And I think that is a
legitimate debate. I’ve made it very clear what my conclusion is. I made it
clear it is a matter of faith and I cannot prove this, but I’m also suggesting
that whatever judgments we make on this is actually a matter of faith and
therefore while I’m very happy to be challenged on this, I think I’m still
entitled to say that this seems to me to be the best way of making sense of
it and live my life out on its basis.865

Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?
Daniel Dennett vs. Alvin Plantinga.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011 .
PLANTINGA: It’s clear, I think, that there is no conflict between theistic
religion and the ancient earth thesis, or the descent with modification
thesis, or the common ancestry thesis. According to theistic belief, God
has created the living world; but of course he could have done so in many
different ways, and in particular in ways compatible with those theses.…
But is it also consistent with Darwinism? It looks as if it is. God could
have caused the right mutations to arise at the right time, he could have
preserved populations from perils of various sorts, and so on; in this way,
by orchestrating the course of evolution, he could have ensured that there
come to be creatures of the kind he intends.… But Gould’s suggestion
presupposes that God has not guided and orchestrated the course of
evolution, and hence can’t be appealed to as a reason for supposing that he
has not done so. Given the biological evidence and the proposition that
God has indeed created human beings in his image, Gould’s suggestion is
wholly implausible; for if the tape were rewound and let go forward again,
no doubt God would still have intended that there be creatures created in
his image, and would still have seen to it that there be such creatures….
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But clearly a mutation could be both random in that sense and also
intended and indeed caused by God.866
PLANTINGA: Belief in God is seldom accepted on the basis of the
teleological argument, or indeed any argument or propositional evidence
at all. Both
untutored observation and current research in the scientific study of
religion suggest that a tendency to believe in God or something like God,
apart from any propositional evidence is part of our native cognitive
endowment. Furthermore, if theistic belief is true, it probably doesn't
require propositional evidence for its rational acceptance. As I argued in
Warranted Christian Belief, if theistic belief is true, then very likely it has
both rationality and warrant in the basic way: that is, not on the basis of
propositional evidence.… In this way belief in God, like belief in other
minds, has its own source of rationality and warrant, and doesn't depend
on arguments from other sources for those estimable qualities. The demise
of the teleological argument, if indeed evolution has compromised it, is
little more of a threat to rational belief in God than the demise of the
argument from analogy for other minds is to rational belief in other
minds.867
PLANTINGA: Going all the way back to St. George Mivart, critics have
expressed serious doubts as to whether the eye, for example, could have
come to be by way of unguided natural selection operating on random
genetic mutation – could have, that is, apart from absolutely stunning
improbability. The eye, the mammalian brain, and other organs remain
difficult problems for unguided evolution. But the really hard problem
here for unguided Darwinists isn’t the development of macroscopic organs
such as eyes and hearts. The hard problem is rather at the microscopic
(molecular) level: the stupefying complexity of the living cell… with its
enormous complication, together with what we know about mutation rates,
the age of the earth, population sizes, and the like, it seems reasonable to
estimate that [the probability of unguided evolution] is exceedingly low,
orders of magnitude lower than [the probability of guided evolution]. If
this is right, then even if we think [unguided], as an explanation, is
Ockhamistically superior to [guided], it is inferior to [guided] in that the
relevant likelihood is lower….
As an analogy, suppose we land a spaceship on a planet we know is
inhabited by intelligent creatures. We find something that looks exactly
like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations apparently
made in the process of shaping and sharpening it. Two possibilities
suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of
866
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erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and
fashioned by the inhabitants. Someone with a couple of courses in
philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred
because it posits because it posits fewer entities than the latter. He’d be
wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains
intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking
those structures designed. The same would go for evolution; theists
already accept divine design, and do not incur additional Ockhamistic cost
by way of thinking of evolution as guided….
Even if, contrary to fact, there were scientific evidence for unguided
evolution and hence for atheism, that would by no means settle the issue.
Suppose there is scientific evidence against theism: it doesn’t follow that
theism is false, or that theists have a defeater for their beliefs, or that
theistic belief is irrational, or in some way problematic. Perhaps there is
also evidence, scientific or otherwise, for theism. But second, and more
important… if theism is true, it is likely that it has its own intrinsic and
basic source of warrant…. Indeed what Christians and other theists should
think of current science can quite properly depend, in part, on theology.868
PLANTINGA: [Dennett] and others like to try to discredit theism by
comparing it with ideas everyone takes to be silly – Supermanism, or
Flying Spaghetti Monsterism, or Tooth Fairyism, or Bertrand Russell’s
fantasy of an undetectable china teapot orbiting the sun, and so on. They
typically don’t give us their reasons (if they have any) for thinking theism
is like these ideas. But is theism like these ideas? Well, any two views
resemble each other in some respects. Takin atheism and solipsism, for
example. You’re a solipsist if you think you’re the only thing that exists,
everything else being a figment of your imagination. Atheism obviously
resembles solipsism in many ways: Both involve the denial of the
existence of personal beings (atheism denies God; solipsism denies other
persons); both go contrary to beliefs most people have and that
furthermore we seem to be hard-wired to have; both are exceedingly hard
to support by way of decent argument; etc.
As a matter of fact, atheism is a lot more like solipsism than theism is like
Supermanism. Superman is certainly an impressive young fellow, but
clearly not much greater than Captain Marvel, or even the Green Lantern.
God, on the other hand, is all-knowing, all-powerful, and wholly good;
furthermore, God has these properties essentially; he could not have been
ignorant or impotent, or evil. He has also created the world.
Still further, according to classical theism, God is a necessary being; he
exists in all possible worlds; it’s not even possible that he should fail to
exist. And since he as the property of being omniscient essentially, his
868
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believing a proposition is logically equivalent to that proposition’s being
true. Further yet, many theists hold that God’s will, what he approves and
disapproves, is the standard for right and wrong, good and bad. Superman
may be faster than a speeding bullet and more powerful than a locomotive,
but he is pretty small potatoes when compared with God.869
PLANTINGA: The scientific evidence for unguided evolution (as opposed
to evolution simpliciter) seems to be scant to nonexistent. Given this
alleged connection between evolution and naturalism, furthermore, many
Americans are understandably reluctant to have evolution taught to their
children in the public schools, the schools they themselves pay taxes to
support. Protestants don’t want Catholic doctrine taught in the schools
and Christians don’t want Islam taught; but the distance between
naturalism and theistic belief, whether Catholic or Protestant, or Muslim
or Jewish, is vastly greater than the distance between Catholics and
protestants or, for that matter, between Christians and Muslims.
Christians, Jews, and Muslims concur on belief in God; naturalism stands
in absolute opposition to these theistic religions; and evolution is widely
seen as a pillar in the temple of naturalism. This association of evolution
with naturalism is the obvious root of the widespread antipathy, in the
United States, to the theory of evolution. Insofar as Dennett and others
proclaim conflict between evolutionary theory and theistic belief, they
exacerbate this distrust of evolution – a distrust that spills over to science
itself, with the consequent cost in public support of science.870
PLANTINGA: One of the ways in which Christian theism is hospitable to
science, one of the reasons modern empirical science came to be and
flourished in the Christian West, is this assumption that God is in control
of nature and does not act arbitrarily. According to Christian, Jewish, and
some varieties of Islamic theism, God has created us human beings in his
image. For present purposes, we can take this to mean that he has created
us as rational creatures, creatures who resemble him in having the capacity
to know important things about ourselves, our environment, and God
himself. The divine image includes more: It includes a moral sense, the
grasp of right and wrong, and the ability to know and love God. But a
central and crucial part of the divine image in us human beings is our
ability to have worthwhile and important knowledge about ourselves and
our world. Obviously our ability to do science is an extremely important
part of the divine image, so taken. God has created both us in our world,
and created them in such a way that the former can know much about the
latter. But this implies that God would not arbitrarily stand in the way of
our coming to such knowledge – by, for example, capriciously spoiling
our experiments. And this shows, as against Dennett and Haldane, how

869
870

Ibid., 58-59.
Ibid., 62-63.

452

far off the mark is the suggestion that science presupposes atheism or
naturalism….
Of course God’s faithfulness and reliability along these lines doesn’t mean
that he never acts in ways outside of the normal course of things: It
doesn’t mean, for example, that miracles never occur. Some people seem
to think that the occurrence of miracles, supposing they occurred, would
somehow go against science – presumably because miracles would violate
the laws promulgated by science…. This too is in error…. The laws or
principles of science are typically stated for closed systems, systems that
are closed to outside causal influence…. But now suppose God
miraculously created a full-grown horse inside the headquarters of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science: Any system
containing that headquarters, obviously, would not be causally closed;
hence the preceding principles would not apply to them.871
I’ll leave you with two terms to consider. Wishful thinking is defined as “the
attribution of reality to what one wishes to be true or the tenuous justification of what one
wants to believe.”872 Conversely, sophistry is defined as “subtly deceptive reasoning or
argumentation.”873 Whether or not one ultimately chooses to affix either of these terms to
the aforementioned statements (or to the modus operandi of the authors who proffered
them), I would nevertheless submit that the above excerpts demonstrate that such
unflattering adjectives must be acerbically ascribed to any future pronouncements
concerning their supposed sophistication or the unambiguous approbation with which
they have been heretofore received.
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